COURT FILE NO.: 1417/19 DATE: 2020-05-14
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: G.J, Applicant AND: B.-L. S., Respondent
BEFORE: The Honourable Madam Justice L. Bale
COUNSEL: Ms. K Junger, Counsel, for the Applicant Mr. F. Roy, Counsel, for the Respondent
HEARD: May 14, 2020
E N D O R S E M E N T -- COVID 19 PROTOCOL
[1] AS A RESULT OF COVID-19 which has caused the suspension of regular Superior Court of Justice operations at this time, as set out in the Notice to the Profession dated March 15, 2020, this urgent matter was heard by teleconference. See the Notice to the Profession dated March 15, 2020 available at https://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/covid-19-suspension-fam/ , and as updated.
[2] Electronic materials were filed through the Courthouse email address: Hamilton.Family.Superior.Court@ontario.ca .
[3] The following documents have been considered in the determination of this matter:
a) Request for Urgent Motion (correspondence) dated May 4, 2020, of F. Roy (Counsel for the Respondent mother); b) Notice of Motion of Respondent mother dated May 3, 2020; c) Affidavit of the Respondent mother dated May 4, 2020; d) Affidavit of the Applicant father dated May 8, 2020; e) Affidavit of T. J. (Paternal Aunt) dated May 8, 2020; f) Affidavit of the Respondent mother dated May 12, 2020; g) Correspondence of K. Mikalski of the Hamilton Children’s Aid Society dated May 5, 2020.
[4] Upon the resumption of court operations all materials will be duly filed in the physical record at the courthouse.
OVERVIEW
[5] The Respondent mother seeks a Temporary Without Prejudice Order for unsupervised access to the child, K.L.J., born […], 2015, on alternative weekends, and for police enforcement of any court-ordered right of access. Her materials leave open-ended to the court the request to provide more time with the child or even to reverse the child’s status quo primary residence with the father.
[6] The Applicant father is opposed to this motion. He asserts that this matter is not urgent: the mother has been offered access to the child and has either misrepresented, lied or failed to respond to offers for access. Further, the father asserts that the matter has been delayed in progressing efficiently through the court system as a result of the mother’s failure to comply with court orders, specifically with respect to sharing information with the Children’s Aid Society.
BACKGROUND
[7] The parties were involved in an ‘on again/off again’ relationship that ended in May 2019. Together, they have two children. The first child was apprehended at birth and made a crown ward with no access. The second child, K.L.J., is the subject-child of this motion. He was also apprehended at birth and has been in the care of each party at different times. It is common ground that the child has been in the care of the Applicant father since October 2019, however the basis of this change in residence is disputed.
[8] K.L.J. is 3 years of age and is a special needs child.
[9] The Respondent mother has another child, age 12 for whom she appears to have joint custodial rights and significant unsupervised time, including overnights.
[10] In 2012 the father was convicted of serious charges of domestic violence against the Respondent mother. The materials suggest that the domestic discord between the parties was one of the main concerns of the Society which resulted in the apprehension of the parties’ children.
[11] The information provided with respect to the litigation history in this proceeding is somewhat limited. Two Without Prejudice Temporary Orders dated November 15, 2019 and November 28, 2019 provided for supervised time between the Respondent mother and the child, with conditions, and as arranged through the paternal aunt, T.J. Both Orders were made on the consent of the parties on a without prejudice basis pending a Case Conference. A Case Conference was held on January 9, 2020.
[12] There is currently no order in place with respect to the custody of or access to the child. The mother was delayed in the submission of her motion materials to the Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton, as directed by the case conference judge.
[13] The initial triage endorsement of Justice Pazaratz on this motion, dated May 5, 2020, provides additional information:
a) Both of these parents have had their share of personal problems. They have an intermittent, turbulent relationship. b) K.L.J. was apprehended from the parties’ care at birth by the Hamilton Children’s Aid Society. He was then placed in the mother’s care. As noted above, how the child came to be in the primary care of the Applicant father in October 2019 is disputed. c) As of February 25, 2020 the mother was apparently having one supervised visit with the child per week, supervised by the Applicant father’s sister (the paternal aunt). The endorsement of the court at this “to be spoken to” court attendance suggests that the parties were making arrangements to expand this access to include supervised visits two times per week: Jordan v. Steele, 2020 ONSC 2834 at para. 7.
[14] The parties agree that the mother’s access was being supervised by the paternal aunt. They disagree as to when that access stopped. The mother asserts that she has not been permitted to spend time with K.L.J. since March 2, 2020. The father asserts that the mother continued to exercise access with K.L.J. until April 1, 2020. They do agree that, at present, the mother is not spending any time with the child.
[15] There is no ‘official’ explanation of how the status quo arrangement of K.L.J. residing primarily with his father, and spending supervised time only with his mother, came to be. This arrangement does not appear to be at the direction of the Children’s Aid Society, or pursuant to any court-ordered term. The mother asserts that the father refused to return the child into her care after a Thanksgiving access visit. The father asserts that the child came into his care in October 2019 because the mother was being evicted from her home. He does not go so far as to advise that this was a consensual arrangement. For whatever reason, this living arrangement was allowed to continue such that the current status quo wherein the child resides primarily in the care of the Applicant father in the home of the paternal aunt has now been in place for more than six months.
[16] The materials suggest that there are three general themes to the difficulties in effecting the mother’s time with K.L.J.:
- Scheduling of visits/Availability of the supervisor;
- Altercation between the Applicant and Respondent;
- Concerns pertaining to COVID-19.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Urgency
[17] By Notice to the Profession dated March 15, 2020, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (SCJ) advised the profession, the media and the public that, while the SCJ was suspending court operations, it would continue to hear, amongst other things, urgent family matters. Under that Notice, urgency in non-child protection family law matter specifically included requests for urgent relief relating to the safety of a child and issues that must be determined relating to the well-being of a child.
[18] On May 5, 2020, Justice Pazaratz, in his capacity as triage judge, ruled that this matter was potentially urgent. He noted that “arrangements for this young, vulnerable child need to be re-addressed immediately” but left the ultimate determination of urgency to the motions judge.
[19] The following factors are necessary for a finding of urgency:
a) The concern must be immediate; that is one that cannot await resolution at a later date; b) The concern must be serious in the sense that it significantly affects the health or safety or economic well-being of parties and/or their children; c) The concern must be a definite and material rather than a speculative one. It must relate to something tangible (a spouse or child’s health, welfare, or dire financial circumstances) rather than theoretical; d) The concern must be one that has been clearly particularized in evidence and examples that describes the manner in which the concern reaches the level of urgency: Thomas v. Wohleber, 2020 ONSC 1965 at para. 38.
[20] I am satisfied that this motion meets the threshold requirements particularized in Thomas v Wohleber. The matter is urgent. This view is consistent with a developing body of caselaw arising from the COVID-19 health crisis which supports the position that the purposeful obstruction of access and a failure to support the ongoing relationship between a child and parent meets the urgency requirements as set out in the Notice to the Profession. See for example Di Vetta v. Di Vetta, 2020 ONSC 2347. I am particularly guided by the helpful comments of McGee J. in Matus v. Gruszczynska:
Decisions of this court since the March 15 Notice to the Profession affirm the importance of children maintaining contact with both parents during the current crisis. In my view, young children in the attachment phase of development are particularly vulnerable to the harmful effects of removing a care giving parent. Young children who have already experienced disruptions in their parenting are even more vulnerable”: 2020 ONSC 2353 at para. 21.
[21] In this case, K.L.J. is a young and vulnerable child. He was in the primary care of the Respondent mother until October 2019. K.L.J. has special needs. The change in his primary caregiver at a young age is somewhat concerning. The complete cessation of contact with his (former) primary caregiver warrants immediate and urgent consideration.
Best Interests of the Child
[22] Under the Children’s Law Reform Act a child’s parents are equally entitled to custody of the child and the merits of a claim for custody or access are determined solely on the basis of the best interests of the child: R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 12, s. 20.
[23] On application for custody or access to a child, the only test for consideration is the best interests of the child, such that the court shall consider all the child’s needs and circumstances, including:
(a) the love, affection and emotional ties between the child and, (i) each person, including a parent or grandparent, entitled to or claiming custody of or access to the child, (ii) other members of the child’s family who reside with the child, and (iii) persons involved in the child’s care and upbringing; (b) the child’s views and preferences, if they can reasonably be ascertained; (c) the length of time the child has lived in a stable home environment; (d) the ability and willingness of each person applying for custody of the child to provide the child with guidance and education, the necessaries of life and any special needs of the child; (e) the plan proposed by each person applying for custody of or access to the child for the child’s care and upbringing; (f) the permanence and stability of the family unit with which it is proposed that the child will live; (g) the ability of each person applying for custody of or access to the child to act as a parent; and (h) any familial relationship between the child and each person who is a party to the application: CLRA, s. 24(2).
[24] Further, in assessing a person’s ability to act as a parent, the court shall consider whether the person has at any time committed violence or abuse against his or her spouse, a parent of the child to whom the application relates, a member of the person’s household, or any child: CLRA, s. 24(4). Anything done in self-defence or to protect another person shall not be considered violence or abuse: CLRA, s. 24(5).
[25] On Application by a party for custody or access, the court:
(a) by order may grant the custody of or access to the child to one or more persons; (b) by order may determine any aspect of the incidents of the right to custody or access; and (c) may make such additional order as the court considers necessary and proper in the circumstances, including an order, (i) limiting the duration, frequency, manner or location of contact or communication between any of the parties, or between a party and the child, (ii) prohibiting a party or other person from engaging in specified conduct in the presence of the child or at any time when the person is responsible for the care of the child, (iii) prohibiting a party from changing the child’s residence, school or day care facility without the consent of another party or an order of the court, (iv) prohibiting a party from removing the child from Ontario without the consent of another party or an order of the court, (v) requiring the delivery, to the court or to a person or body specified by the court, of the child’s passport, the child’s health card within the meaning of the Health Insurance Act or any other document relating to the child that the court may specify, (vi) requiring a party to give information or to consent to the release of information respecting the health, education and welfare of the child to another party or other person specified by the court, or (vii) requiring a party to facilitate communication by the child with another party or other person specified by the court in a manner that is appropriate for the child: CLRA, s. 28.
[26] K.L.J. has now spent significant time in the care of each of his parents. It is safe to assume that he has developed a love, affection and emotional tie with each of his parents. On review of the materials provided, I have also formed the opinion that K.L.J. has benefitted from an opportunity to bond with his paternal aunt in her home.
[27] K.L.J.’s age and developmental delays make it unreasonable to ascertain and/or consider his views and preferences, however there is no suggestion in the materials filed that he has an aversion to either parent.
[28] K.L.J.’s caregiving situation has not been perfectly stable to date. He was previously in the care of the Hamilton Children’s Aid Society. He was later placed in the care of his mother (I note that there is no elaboration within the materials as to what role the father played in K.L.J.’s care and upbringing prior to October 2019). Most recently, K.L.J. has been in the care of the father for approximately six months. Although not fully explored, I find that there has been either some acquiescence by the mother as to this most recent placement, or some delay in moving this matter forward if she did not agree.
[29] The Affidavit materials filed by the father, and supported by the paternal aunt suggest that K.L.J. is developing well in his current environment. I believe that the support provided by the paternal aunt in this home has been valuable to the father and the child. Given the number of transitions in care that this special-needs child has already been subject to, this court would be loathe to disrupt his primary residence, yet again, on Affidavit materials alone.
[30] Both parents clearly want to care for K.L.J. Both parents also seem to have some challenges. What is most concerning for the court at this time is:
a) The complete cessation of access between the mother and child; and b) The ongoing allegations of conflict and violence between the parties, especially in the presence of the child.
Scheduling of Visits/Availability of Supervisor
[31] The mother advises the court that even prior to the complete cessation of access, her time with K.L.J. was not consistent. For example, the notice she received with respect to scheduling access might include a date but no time – effectively putting her ‘on call’ for visits. The visits were irregular and without defined time parameters. The mother advises that short notice and last-minute changes were commonplace, and that scheduling was sometimes complicated by the obligations and availability of the paternal aunt, T.J.
[32] T.J. filed an Affidavit for purposes of this motion. By contrast, T.J. advises the court that:
a. She has been supervising the mother’s time with K.L.J. since November 2019; b. She frequently reaches out to the mother to offer time with K.L.J. The mother rarely reaches out requesting time with the child; c. The mother often arrives late and leaves early from visits arranged with K.L.J. Visits have never been time limited; d. The mother has not asked for time with the child since April 1, 2020 (except by way of filing this motion); e. The mother spent time with the child on March 2, 2020, March 9, 2020, March 15, 2020 and March 22, 2020; and f. Offers by T.J. to effect facetime access have been unanswered by the mother.
[33] In my view, ad hoc and flexible time-share arrangements are only successful in cases where parents demonstrate a capacity for effective communication, co-parenting, and mutual respect. This is not the case before me. There is no need to cast blame for the scheduling difficulties which arose, it is sufficed to conclude that even before the suspension of access, a lack of certainty as to the access schedule complicated the parties’ parenting situation. Scheduling was further complicated by the need to involve a third-party in the arrangements and to respect her own life commitments. In my view, the lack of a specified time-sharing arrangement with K.L.J. has only served to heighten the conflict and distrust between the parties. It is clear that, moving forward, a defined schedule is necessary in the best interests of K.L.J.
March 2, 2020 Altercation
[34] The father has prior convictions of serious domestic assault against the mother. The father also asserts that he has been the victim of emotional, physical and verbal abuse. He advises that he has had no criminal charges since the parties separated.
[35] On March 2, 2020, an altercation took place between the parties. The Respondent mother describes a sexual assault. The Applicant father describes a consensual act. Both parties agree that the altercation escalated to the point where the front door of the home (i.e. the screen) was damaged. The child was present in the home during this event.
[36] The mother’s allegations are very serious. However, it is difficult to make findings of credibility on Affidavit evidence alone. It is even more difficult outside of the typical courtroom setting – devoid of any opportunity to observe the parties’ demeanour, body language and behaviour in court. In the context of this motion, I cannot make any findings of fact as to what transpired between the parties on March 2, 2020. However, I do note that, if the mother’s allegations are true, it would be unjust to require her to negotiate the terms of access with her abuser. Further, if the allegations are untrue, it would be unfair to the father to require him to negotiate terms of access with an individual who made false allegations against him. Either way, in this court’s view, it is important to impose a schedule upon both parties, with little room for negotiation and little need for contact between them.
COVID-19
[37] On April 1, 2020 the paternal aunt advised the mother that access would be suspended due to COVID-19. The father asserts that this was not challenged by the mother until the commencement of this motion. T.J. advises the court that she suspended the mother’s access to K.L.J. on April 1, 2020 due to COVID-19 concerns. Although no elaboration was provided to the mother at the time, the father justifies this position on the basis that the mother’s access previously occurred in a public setting (e.g. Kiwanis club, the library, Tim Hortons, etc.) and all public settings are now closed or limited in nature.
[38] It is important to recall that, at this time, there is no court Order in place which requires that the mother’s time with K.L.J. must be supervised, and there is no court order in place which requires the mother’s time with K.L.J. to occur in a public setting. Further, there are no directive from the Hamilton Children’s Aid Society suggesting the need for these protective measures.
[39] The mother’s materials specify that she practices social distancing: she leaves home only for essential items, and on those occasions, she wears a mask and gloves. Further, the mother advises the court that she washes her hands regularly and disinfects her home with sanitizing spray and wipes. She is not sick. She lives alone but spends regular time with her 12 year-old son, which includes lengthy periods of overnight visits.
[40] In Ribeiro v. Wright Justice Pazaratz providing the following guidance as to how parents and courts might deal with COVID-19 parenting cases:
a) The parent initiating an urgent motion on this topic will be required to provide specific evidence or examples of behavior or plans by the other parent which are inconsistent with COVID-19 protocols. b) The parent responding to such an urgent motion will be required to provide specific and absolute reassurance that COVID-19 safety measures will be meticulously adhered to – including social distancing; use of disinfectants; compliance with public safety directives; etc. c) Both parents will be required to provide very specific and realistic time-sharing proposals which fully address all COVID-19 considerations, in a child-focused manner. d) Judges will likely take judicial notice of the fact that social distancing is now becoming both commonplace and accepted, given the number of public facilities which have now been closed. This is a very good time for both custodial and access parents to spend time with their child at home : 2020 ONSC 1829 at para. 21.
[41] In this case, the father has led insufficient evidence for this court to conclude that the mother is not following proper COVID-19 protocols. I accept the mother’s reassurances that she is. The father has not provided any specific and realistic time-sharing alternatives for K.L.J. to enjoy time with his mother. The closure of public facilities should have prompted the father to reconsider his position as to the necessity of supervision of the mother’s time with K.L.J. – to expand the timeshare arrangement to permit the Respondent mother and K.L.J. to spend time together in her home. In my view, the father did not give due consideration to realistic alternatives. I do not accept that telephone or facetime (video) contact are reasonable alternatives on the facts of this case. K.L.J.’s young age and developmental (verbal) delays limit the meaningful impact of this type of contact.
[42] I am not satisfied that the COVID-19 crisis justified the complete cessation of the mother’s access. I share the concern noted within the triage endorsement - “A significant concern is arising about whether the father is simply trying to take advantage of a favourable status quo, to banish the mother from the child’s life in the hope of extinguishing any possibility of a transfer of custody”. The father is now K.L.J.’s de facto primary parent. In this important role it is incumbent upon him to ensure that he fosters and promotes a positive relationship between K.L.J. and his mother. At this time, he has not done enough, and a court order is necessary to remedy the situation.
Access
[43] An Order for supervised access requires evidence of exceptional circumstances as it is just one small step away from a complete termination of the parent-child relationship: V.S.J. v. L.J.G., 2004 ONSC 17126, at para. 1. The onus is on the person seeking to limit access by way of supervision order to prove that the requested access restrictions are in the best interests of the child.
[44] In essence, the father argues that the mother’s time with K.L.J. must be supervised for the following reasons:
a) The father alleges in his Affidavit that: (i) the mother was prostituting herself and having johns attend at her home while the child was present, (ii) the mother was associating with an individual who was charged with weapons offences after waving a firearm around in the mother’s home in the child’s presence, and (iii) the mother’s housing situation was unstable (i.e. she was being evicted); b) The father asserts that the mother should provide further evidence as to why her oldest child does not reside with her at present; c) The father asserts that K.L.J.’s development has improved dramatically since being in his primary care. Specifically, he is now potty trained and has been able to start saying a few words. He questions the level of care given by the mother by comparison to the milestone he sees the child as having met while in his care; and d) The damage caused to the screen door of the paternal aunt’s home by the Respondent mother on May 2, 2020 is indicative of anger-management issues.
[45] Further, the paternal aunt opines in her Affidavit that the mother’s access should be supervised due to the mother’s “lifestyle choices”. She is “concerned that she would not be able to provide a safe environment for K.L.J., especially given her recent actions”. She does not provide elaboration on this issue. T.J. advises the court that she is willing to continue to supervise access visits but will not permit access visits to take place at her home (or in the backyard) due to the property damage caused (i.e. ripped screen door) on March 2, 2020. She did not describe her general availability to assist.
[46] I do not accept that the father’s concerns rise to the level necessitating a court order for the supervision of the mother’s access. I draw this conclusion for the following reasons:
- The mother categorically denies the father’s allegations with respect to prostitution and association with persons with weapons. The father provides no evidence in support of his very serious allegations, nor does he identify the source of this information. Further, the father’s allegations were made known to the Hamilton Children’s Society during their investigation, and this child protection agency has not seen fit to act upon them.
- The father’s allegation as to the mother’s eviction in October 2019, as contained within his Affidavit, appears to be false. I accept that the Respondent mother continues to reside at the same residence that she always has since 2013, prior to K.L.J.’s birth. The mother has parented the child on an unsupervised and overnight basis in this home in past.
- I accept the mother’s explanation as to her oldest child’s living arrangements. I do not share the father’s concern that further information should have been forthcoming on this issue. Again, I note that the Society interviewed both the child and the child’s father in the conduct of their investigation and raised no red flags.
- With respect to K.L.J.’s development, the mother notes that he has been diagnosed with Autism. She asserts that he was almost fully potty-trained in August 2019 and commenced speaking while in the care of the mother. She argues that the child’s diagnosis and challenges are not to be blamed on either parent. She has taken courses as recommended by the Society with respect to K.L.J.’s care, and she did well in these programs. Without more objective and fulsome evidence this court is not in a position to find that either parent has provided superior care to K.L.J. by comparison to the other. Medical evidence as to the child’s development by K.L.J.’s physicians or other qualified professionals would likely assist if this line of argument is pursued at trial.
- With respect to the damage caused to the paternal aunt’s screen door, if the damage occurred in the mother’s attempt to fight off a sexual assault as she alleges, her actions would constitute self-defence and would not be indicative of anger-management issues in any way.
- Until October 2019 the child was in the primary care of the mother, unsupervised, including overnights. There is no reliable evidence before this court that the child was not safe in her care. As stated previously, the historical concerns of the Children’s Aid Society appear to relate primarily to conflict and abuse between the parties.
- There is no evidence that the mother’s parenting of the child during supervised access visits was in any way neglectful or unsafe, safe and except that the child was exposed to conflict between the Applicant and Respondent on March 2, 2020.
- Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton has filed an update with the court for purposes of this motion. This information specifies that:
a. The Society has reviewed the Affidavit materials filed in this matter; b. The Society has conducted interviews with the parties and numerous collateral sources; c. The Society has conducted a virtual tour of the Respondent mother’s home and no concerns were noted; d. The Society anticipates concluding its investigation shortly; and e. The Society takes no position with respect to custody and access issues, and directs only that the parties should have no contact with one another and access exchanges should be facilitated by a third party.
[47] In my view, on a balance of probabilities, the Applicant father has not established that the mother’s time with K.L.J. requires supervision. I am not satisfied that safety concerns have been established which would warrant a restriction on the mother being left alone with the child. It is in the best interests of this child that unsupervised access time with the Respondent mother commence immediately. For clarity, the Respondent mother’s first weekend with K.L.J. will commence May 15, 2020 (tomorrow).
[48] It is imperative that frequent and meaningful contact commence immediately in order to ensure the continued bond between K.L.J. and his mother. At minimum, this access must include alternate weekends and one overnight per week, as specified below. Given the young age of this child, it is not appropriate that he go lengthy periods of time between visits with either parent. As such, I am including a mid-week overnight visit between K.L.J. and the Respondent mother on Wednesdays. If it is the case that a mid-week visit on a different day of the week would better accommodate the schedules of the parties (and any access exchange facilitators), the parties may consent to same through counsel. The ultimate timesharing arrangement and primary residence of the child may be explored more fulsomely at trial, however, the parties are urged to continue to negotiate a schedule that best reflects the needs of the child and the availability of the parties - with the assistance of their counsel.
Make-Up Time
[49] The mother requests additional make-up time for the period during which she was deprived access to K.L.J.. I do not believe this is necessary given the mid-week visit that I am ordering. Further, I note that the mother was slow to comply with the Case management endorsement of Justice Pazaratz, requiring her to share her pleadings with the Society. The position of the Hamilton Children’s Aid Society has influenced the decision of this court to the benefit of the mother. Had the mother complied with the endorsement in a more timely manner, she may have attained a court-ordered access schedule months ago.
Police Intervention
[50] While the court does not condone the actions of the father, in withholding access between K.L.J. and his mother, he has not breached any term of a court order. He will be expected to comply with the terms of this Order. Serious ramifications follow non-compliance with court orders. Further, a parent’s compliance or non-compliance with court-ordered terms of access can impact the ultimate decision at trial regarding parenting. I trust that this father will strictly adhere to the access terms imposed below and that an unnecessary strain on first responders during this health crises will not be needed in this case. I decline to order enforcement of the access terms at this time.
Graduated Access
[51] Counsel for the father submits that, if unsupervised access is granted, it should be graduated in nature as the mother has not had the child in her care since October 2019. I reject this argument.
[52] Prior to October 2019 the mother was the primary caregiver to the child. The child is familiar with her and the child is familiar with her home. I am not completely satisfied that the change in the child’s primary residence was done fairly; it certainly was not done on a graduated basis. Graduated access would be appropriate if the child required an opportunity to get to know his mother, or if the mother had proven incapable of meeting K.L.J.’s needs for extended periods of time. This is not the case before me and as such regular and consistent access shall commence forthwith, without need for a phased-in approach.
ORDER
[53] On the basis of the above, there shall be a Temporary Order to go as follows:
Commencing May 15, 2020 the Respondent mother shall spend time with the child K.L.J., born […], 2015, as follows: a. Alternate weekends from Friday at 5:00 p.m. until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and b. Wednesdays from 12:00 p.m. until Thursdays at 12:00 p.m.
The child will reside with the Applicant father in the home of the paternal aunt at all other times.
To the extent possible, access exchanges shall be facilitated through an agreed-upon third party.
In the event that a third party is unable to assist with access exchanges, the exchanges shall take place in the Hamilton Police Service parking lot closest to the Applicant father’s home.
Communications between the parties shall be limited to communications in writing, which may include text or e-mail messaging.
The Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton shall forthwith be provided with a copy of this endorsement.
If costs are in issue, the parties may make submissions as follows: a. The party seeking costs shall serve and file written submissions not exceeding two pages in length plus bill of costs on or before May 29, 2020; b. The party responding to the request for costs shall serve and file responding submissions not exceeding two pages in length plus bill of costs on or before June 12, 2020; c. Reply submissions, if any, shall be limited to one page in length and shall be served and filed on or before June 19, 2020; and d. If no cost submissions are filed on or before May 29, 2020, the issue of costs shall be deemed to have been settled.