COURT FILE NO.: 31-2597721 DATE: 2020-04-27 SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PROPOSAL OF STEPHEN FRANCIS PODGURSKI (of the Town of Courtice, in the Region of Durham, in the Province of Ontario)

THE SUPERINTENDANT OF BANKRUPTCY, Moving Party

AND:

STEPHEN FRANCIS PODGURSKI, Debtor

AND:

BDO CANADA LIMITED, Licensed Insolvency Trustee

BEFORE: Chief Justice G.B. Morawetz.

COUNSEL: Stéphanie Lauriault, for the for the Attorney General of Canada Pamela Huff, for The Insolvency Institute of Canada Stephen Francis Podgurski, self represented

HEARD: April 24, 2020 (Via Video Conference) RELEASED: April 27, 2020

ENDORSEMENT

Overview

1The Superintendent of Bankruptcy (“Superintendent”) brings this motion with a view to providing flexibility to the administration of all Ontario insolvency estates that are affected by the economic impacts of COVID-19, seeking an Order (a) increasing the number of payment defaults or time required to cause a deemed annulment of a consumer proposal; and (b) extending the timelines set out in specific sections of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, (R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3) (“BIA”) and Bankruptcy and Insolvency General Rules, (C.R.C., c. 368) (“BIGR”) (The specific sections of the BIA and the BIGR are set out in Schedule “A”). The Superintendent intends to seek a similar order from each province and territory in Canada.

2The relief sought provides a temporary answer, within the jurisdiction of the Court, to a portion of the issues arising out of COVID-19 and its impact on the insolvency system. It is subject to any action that Parliament or the Governor-in-Council may decide to take, or where applicable, the legislature may decide to take, to address issues affecting the insolvency system caused by COVID-19.

3The Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals support the position of the Superintendent.

PART I - Facts

4In Ontario, an emergency was declared pursuant to Order in Council 518/2020 (Ontario Regulation 50/20) on March 17, 2020, pursuant to section 7.0.1 of the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.9. It was extended on April 14, 2020 until May 12, 2020.

5Provincial limitation periods and provisions relating to periods of time within which any step must be taken in any proceeding in Ontario provided in any statute, regulation, rule, by-law or order of the Government of Ontario were suspended for the duration of the emergency, retroactive to March 16, 2020.

6Every Canadian jurisdiction has taken various other measures to help slow the spread of COVID-19. These measures have impacts on society generally and have created significant delays. The insolvency process has not been spared.

7The emergency created by COVID-19 and its containment measures are impeding the ability of insolvency professionals, debtors, creditors and stakeholders to meet the timelines of the BIA.

PART II - Points in Issue

8The significant point raised in this motion is can and should this court exercise its discretion to provide the relief sought by the Superintendent, namely:

a. Increase the amount of payment defaults and increase the time required to cause a deemed annulment of a consumer proposal, as per ss. 66.31(1) of the BIA;

b. Extend the time for holding the meeting of creditors provided by ss. 51, 66.15, and 102 of the BIA;

c. Extend the time for holding mediation as required by paragraphs 105(4) and (10) of the BIGR;

d. Extend the time for referring a matter to court, as required by ss. 170.1(3) of the BIA;

e. Declare that the Order applies to all active bankruptcies, active Division I proposals, active Division II proposals, as well as all bankruptcies and proposals to be filed with the Superintendent up to June 30, 2020; and

f. Dispense with notice of the motion, as permitted by ss. 187(12) of the BIA

9The Superintendent contends that this court has jurisdiction to grant these remedies and that it should exercise its discretion to grant them given the current situation created by the COVID-19 pandemic.

10For the following reasons, the requested relief is granted.

PART III - Submissions

11The intent of the extension of a time for doing any act or thing by the time of the Suspension Period is for a party to be able to pick up from where things stood before the Suspension Period, as if the intervening period never existed.

12In requesting these remedies, the Superintendent referenced key definitions.

• The “Period of the Emergency” shall be defined as the period of March 13, 2020 to June 30, 2020. For greater certainty, the start date and the end date are included in the Period of the Emergency.
• The “Suspension Period” shall be defined as the period from the date of the Court’s Order to June 30, 2020. For greater certainty, the start date and the end date are included in the Suspension Period.
• The “Active Consumer Proposals” (Division II proposals) targeted by the requested relief shall be defined as including the proposals filed with the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy up to the end of the Period of the Emergency, but excluding the proposals that were deemed annulled, annulled or that were fully performed on or before the date of this Order.
• The “Active Bankruptcy Files” targeted by the requested relief shall be the ones filed with the Office of the Superintendent in Bankruptcy (“OSB”)
• The “Active Commercial Proposals” (Division I proposals) targeted by the requested relief shall be the ones filed with the OSB up to the end of the Period of the Emergency.

Impact of COVID-19 in Insolvency

On Consumer Debtors

13The Superintendent submits that COVID-19 related disruptions have both increased financial pressures on consumer debtors and made complying with statutory requirements for creditor protection more difficult. When consumer debtors fail to make payments in accordance with their proposal, it can be deemed annulled by operation of law. The consumer debtor loses the protection of the stay of proceedings, and the rights of creditors are revived for the amount of their claim less any dividend they had received. Further, the debtor is prohibited from filing another proposal without court approval, and in the instance of when a consumer proposal made by a bankrupt is annulled, the consumer debtor is deemed to have made an assignment in bankruptcy.

14The Superintendent further submits that many consumer debtors were already in arrears for their proposal payments prior to COVID-19 and it is expected that the defaults in payments for consumer proposals are set to rise significantly.

15The evidence of the Superintendent establishes that there are 288,939 Canadians who have active consumer proposals, in which they have contractually agreed to make regular payments to their estate for the benefit of their creditors.

On Insolvency Administration

16The Superintendent deposes that concerns about difficulties meeting timelines and requirements of the BIA under the current conditions resulting from COVID-19 have been expressed to the OSB by debtors, creditors and Licensed Insolvency Trustees (“LIT”).

17The Superintendent contends that from a practical standpoint, holding meetings of creditors, and mediations via teleconference where videoconferencing is unavailable, presents challenges with respect to verification of identification and timely exchange of documents and reports. Quorum may not be met if creditors who are working remotely do not receive notice of the meeting

18The courts in Ontario are operating, but at reduced and variable capacities. The running of limitations and of procedural timelines have been suspended in Ontario and certain other provinces for the duration of their declared states of emergency/public health emergency, retroactive to dates in March.

19As it stands, no emergency amendments or orders have been made that impact the statutory timelines and deadlines set by the BIA.

20The Superintendent points out that the BIA itself does not offer direct mechanisms to deal with the problems raised in this motion without a court order. Consequently, the Superintendent is asking this Court to grant remedies to address them.

Power of Superintendent to Intervene

21Subsection 5(4)(a) of the BIA gives the Superintendent the power to intervene in any matter or proceeding in court. The duties and powers of the Superintendent are very broad. They include the supervision of all estates and matters to which the BIA applies. It is under this power that that the Superintendent intervenes in the 451,536 open insolvency files comprised of all active consumer proposals, active commercial proposals and active bankruptcies.

Forms of Relief Requested

(a) Relief of Deemed Annulment Thresholds for Consumer Debtors

Legal Basis for Court’s Jurisdiction: ss. 66.31(1) BIA

22In these exceptional times, due to the uncertainty caused by COVID-19, the Superintendent seeks an order to provide more flexibility to consumer debtors, many of whom are facing income interruptions.

23The Superintendent seeks an order to provide flexibility to consumer debtors by allowing the equivalent of up to three additional payment defaults or three months time during the period of March 13, 2020, to December 31, 2020, from the requirements of ss. 66.31(1) of the BIA before a deemed annulment of the consumer proposal is triggered.

24Subsections 66.31(1)(a) and (b) of the BIA provide a consumer proposal that is in default with respect to certain missed payments is deemed to be annulled. The relevant provisions of the BIA read as follows:

25The Superintendent points out that these defaults will lead to an annulment under the statute “unless the court has previously ordered otherwise”. As such, the Superintendent submits that the court has the express jurisdiction under ss. 66.31(1) of the BIA to alter ss. 66.31(1)(a) and (b)’s default criteria that will lead to an annulment.

26The Superintendent contends that the other options provided to consumer debtors in the BIA are both insufficient or impractical to respond to the current COVID-19 crisis.

27The option of an amendment to an active consumer proposal, as provided by ss. 66.37 of the BIA, needs not only to take place before the deemed annulment occurs, but also needs to be viable. To recommend an amendment, the administrator must be of the opinion that the consumer debtor will be able to perform the proposal as amended.

28However, the Superintendent contends that due to COVID-19, it is close to impossible for debtors who have recently lost their source of income to determine when or if they will return to work and earn income to pay for their proposal. In essence, consumer debtors’ ability to make their payments is dependent on an uncertain event, the happening of which is entirely out of their hands.

29Another option under the BIA is to file a notice of revival within 30 days of the deemed annulment of a consumer proposal, as provided by ss. 66.31(6) of the BIA. This notice, sent to the official receiver and all the creditors, automatically revives a consumer proposal 60 days after the deemed annulment unless a creditor objects. As opposed to the voting requirements when approving a proposal, in this case, it only takes one creditor to object for this revival to fail.

30The revival does not cure the defaults of payments, nor does it change the terms of the consumer proposal.

(b) Court may Extend Timelines

Legal Basis for Court’s Jurisdiction: ss. 187(11) BIA

31Subsection 187(11) of the BIA provides as follows:

32The Superintendent submits that ss. 187(11) confers the discretionary power to the bankruptcy court to extend the time for doing any act or thing either before or after the expiration thereof, unless explicitly provided otherwise.

33The Superintendent seeks to extend the timeline in which LITs must hold a meeting of creditors in active consumer proposals, active commercial proposals, and in active bankruptcies by the Suspension Period.

34The Superintendent submits that the BIA does provide some flexibility with respect to extensions and adjournments of creditor meetings by the official receiver or the chair of a meeting, however this flexibility may not be sufficient to address the needs in the current COVID-19 context.

35The Superintendent also seeks to extend the 45-day period under the BIGR in which mediations are to take place either as a result of issues arising out of the establishment of surplus income, or when the discharge of bankrupt is opposed for certain reasons.

36Though the BIA provides a certain flexibility for the mediation to be rescheduled or adjourned, this flexibility is rather limited as a new date must be set a maximum of 10 days after the rescheduling.

37Importantly, the Superintendent points out that the objective sought through the blanket order extension of time for the Period of the Emergency is not to adjourn all the creditors meetings or mediations until after the Period of the Emergency. The objective is to provide stakeholders with more time for the holding of these important meetings.

38The Superintendent submits that a blanket extension in all active insolvency files for holding creditor meetings and mediations by the Period of the Emergency would allow for the flexibility needed in certain situations due to COVID-19 containment measures, and avoid any unintended harm or prejudice.

Referrals to Court Should be Made After the Period of the Emergency

39Subsection 170.1(3) the BIA requires the LIT to apply without delay to the court for a hearing following a bankrupt’s failure to comply with a mediated surplus agreement, or in the event that mediation fails to resolve issues.

40The Superintendent contends that extending the time in which LITs are required to apply to court will likely reduce the burden on the courts, as with the passage of time, many of these issues could resolve themselves, thereby reducing the need for applications. If LITs apply only after the Period of the Emergency, courts may be more operational and unresolved matters can then be scheduled in the normal course of business.

(c) Order to be Applied to All Active Insolvency Filings, as Well as to Filings with the OSB up to June 30, 2020

Legal Basis for Court’s Jurisdiction: Inherent Jurisdiction

41The Superintendent seeks to have the procedural relief sought not only apply to existing active insolvency files as of the date of the order, but also to have the relief apply to filings with the OSB up to the end of the Period of the Emergency. The purpose would be to treat all insolvency stakeholders affected by the COVID-19 containment measures in an equitable fashion.

42The BIA does not specifically address the possibility for a bankruptcy court to issue an order binding on matters not before it. The Superintendent submits that this can be completed through the Ontario Superior Court of Justice exercising its inherent jurisdiction.

43The jurisdiction of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, as well as the other Canadian bankruptcy courts is conferred by ss. 183(1) of the BIA, and reads as follows:

44The Superintendent submits that the effect of ss. 183(1) of the BIA is to expressly preserve the bankruptcy court’s equitable and ancillary powers of a superior court. It also confirms that the sparingly used tool that is the inherent jurisdiction of the superior court which is entrenched in s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and confirmed in ss. 11(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, may be relied upon in the context of administering the BIA.

PART IV – Law and Analysis

45It is clear and obvious that COVID 19 has had a seismic economic impact on Canada. Thousands insolvent debtors and their creditors are impacted by COVID-19 and have raised a number of concerns with the Superintendent. Professional organizations such as the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals have also raised issues with the Superintendent and the Superintendent in seeking this relief is responding to their concerns.

46In determining this motion it is necessary to consider the impact of the requested relief on both insolvent debtors and on their creditors, and to ensure that the substantive rights of both are not unduly altered during the Suspension Period.

47It must also be recognized that the legal issues raised on this motion are unusual. I am mindful that Parliament, in enacting numerous time limits in the BIA, specifically addressed the administration of Division I and Division II proposals and bankruptcy estates in general.

48However, it must also be recognized that in enacting the BIA, and in making amendments over the years, Parliament could never have envisioned the impact of a pandemic such as COVID-19.

49This motion raises many practical questions and it is up to this court to provide practical answers and direction. There is precedent for taking this practical approach. In many respects, the BIA is a commercial statute, the administration of which is largely in the hands of businesspeople. Technical objections should, therefore, not be given effect to beyond what is necessary for the proper interpretation of the BIA: Re McCoubrey (1924), 5 C.B.R. 248 (Alta. S.C.); Camirand Ltée v. Gagnon (1924) 4 C.B.R. 344 (Qué S.C.)).

(a) Relief of Deemed Annulment Threshold for Consumer Debtors

50With respect to the requested relief of deemed annulment thresholds for consumer debtors, I accept the submissions of the Superintendent to the effect that the alternatives are insufficient or impractical in the exceptional circumstances created by the containment measures of COVID-19. I am satisfied that ss. 66.31 establishes the legal basis to make the requested order. The automatic impact of payment defaults can be alleviated by court order provided such order is made prior to the deemed annulment.

51The impact of such a court order is exceptional. But, as the Superintendent points out, these are exceptional times and the relief requested by the Superintendent is, in my view, reasonable in the circumstances and it is granted.

52In arriving at this conclusion, I have also taken into account that the relief requested by the Superintendent does not apply to proposals that were deemed annulled, annulled or that were fully performed on or before today’s date.

(b) Extension of Timelines

53With respect to the request to extend the aforementioned timelines, the issue is whether ss. 187 (11) confers the necessary discretionary power to the court to grant the requested relief.

54The Superintendent takes the position that the court can grant such relief as the statutory provisions in question do not explicitly provide that the court cannot extend the time for doing the acts in question.

55Most cases which have addressed the scope of ss. 187(11) deal with the question of extension of time in relation to appeals from a disallowance of claim. A number of cases have held that if the provisions of ss. 187(11) conflict with a special provision of the BIA, e.g. ss. 135(4), which requires that a creditor appeal from a disallowance of a claim within 30 days after the service or mailing of the disallowance, then the special provision governs and the court cannot extend the time under ss. 187(11): Re Truax Carsley & Co. (1930) 12 C.B.R. 28 (Que. S.C.); Re Glen Woollen Mills Limited (1939), 20 C.B.R. 162 (Ont. S.C.); Re St. Pierre (1963), 5 C.B.R. (N.S.) 61 (Qué S.C.); Re King (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 169 (B.C.S.C.) and Re Fredrickson (1994), 29 C.B.R. (3d) 135 (Man. Q. B.).

56These cases are distinguishable on the basis that the provisions from which the Superintendent requests relief do not provide that an application for extension of time must be made within a certain period. This distinction has been referenced in appeals from a notice of dispute by a trustee under ss. 81.2. Examples are Re St. Pierre Automotive Products Co. v. Sylvain et Lafaive, supra and Re Weinberg (1969), 14 C.B.R. (N.S.) 182 (Ont. S.C.). Other examples are Re Rizzo Shoes (1989) Limited (1995), 29 C.B.R. (3rd) 270 and Keystone Forest Products Limited v. Garibaldi Building Supplies Ltd. (Receiver of) (1995), 32 C.B.R. (3d) 139. It should be noted that in Rizzo and Keystone, the court expressed a reluctance to extend the time periods, but noted that in appropriate circumstances, the time could be extended.

57One decision requires further comment. In Re IDG Environmental Solutions Inc. (1993), 16 C.B.R. (3d) 317 (Ont. Reg.) (“IDG”), the court held that it could not extend the time, pursuant to s. 187(11) to file a cash flow statement after the expiration of the time limited to do so.

58In IDG, a notice of intention to file a proposal by IDG was filed on December 31, 1992. The cash flow statement was not filed until January 15, 1993.

59Subsection 50.4(2) of the BIA provides that “within 10 days after filing a notice of intention…, the insolvent person shall file with the official receiver…” a cash flow statement and the other documents mentioned in the subsection.

60Registrar Ferron commented that unlike ss. 50.4(9), ss. 50.4(2) makes no provision for an extension of time for filing, so that if the time is to be extended, one must look elsewhere in the BIA for authority. He then referenced ss. 187 (11):

7In my opinion, that section is not applicable. Section 187 (11) is applicable only in those cases where there is no intervening statutory event consequent upon default. Here, as a consequence of the default, a very significant event occurs; bankruptcy intervenes. (emphasis added)

9The bankruptcy of the insolvent person in the circumstances is automatic and by operation of the statute, immediate, on the expiration of the 10 days following the filing of the notice of intention in cases where the cash flow statement is not filed. No motion nor action by anyone is required to deem the insolvent person a bankrupt.

12At this point, that is, the date of the motion, the insolvent person is bankrupt, rights have accrued and the devolution of asset accomplished. A court which, in effect, attempts to cure the default following the cash flow statement by a nunc pro tunc extension of time order would be, in fact, setting aside an assignment, and abrogating the rights of creditors and others, acquired or occurring on the bankruptcy which, as I pointed out, becomes the fact on the expiration of the 10 days referred to in subs. 2.

61In contrast, in the provisions from which the Superintendent is requesting extension of time, there is no intervening statutory event which results in a bankruptcy. The consequential events referenced by Registrar Ferron in relation to ss. 50.4(8) do not exist in the circumstances referenced by the Superintendent.

62It is significant that the obligation contained in ss. 50.4(2) falls upon the person making the proposal, whereas the obligation under ss. 66.15 is an obligation upon LITs. It would seem perverse for automatic bankruptcy, the intervening event that arises upon default for a breach of ss. 50.4(2), to result for a consumer if an administrator fails to act under ss. 66.15.

63Further, in Re Casa Verde Health Centre Inc. (1993), 22 C.B.R. (3rd) 24, Ground J. of the Ontario Court (General Division), without giving reasons, extended the time for filing the cash flow statement nunc pro tunc; presumably relying on ss. 187(11) as authority for making the order.

64In my view, given the circumstances outlined by the Superintendent giving rise to this motion, it is appropriate to grant the requested relief concerning the extension of time limits.

65There is also scope to grant the requested relief using the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The inherent jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts is a broad and diverse power. It has been said that inherent jurisdiction is a power that is exercisable “in any situation where the requirements of justice demands it” (Gillespie v. Manitoba (Atty. Gen.), 2000 MBCA 1, at para. 92), and that “nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, but that which is specifically appears to be so” (Board v. Board, [1919] A. C. 956 at pp. 17-18, per Viscount Haldane).

66Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the inherent jurisdiction of superior courts in Endean v. British Columbia, 2016 SCC 42, and described it as follows:

23The inherent powers of superior courts are central to the role of those courts, which form the backbone of our judicial system. Inherent jurisdiction derives from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law and may be defined as a “reserve or fund of powers” or a “residual source of powers”, which a superior court “may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them”: I. H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970), 23 Curr. Legal Probs. 23, at p. 51, cited with approval in, e.g., Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 20; R. v. Caron, 2011 SCC 5, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 78, at para. 24; and MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725, at paras. 29-31. The Supreme Court acknowledges that the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction is amorphous in nature: Ontario v. Ontario Criminal Lawyers Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, at para. 22. As a result, the parameters of what a Superior Court judge may do or not do under the power of inherent jurisdiction are unknown.

67The ambiguity inherent in the doctrine is compounded by the fact that COVID-19 is a novel public health crisis imposes an ever-evolving challenge to the administration of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

68In the oft-cited 80 Wellesley St. E., Ltd. v. Fundy Bay Builders Ltd., [1972] 2 O.R. 280 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that except where provided specifically to the contrary, the court’s inherent jurisdiction is “unlimited and unrestricted in substantial law and civil matters.” The Court of Appeal set out the jurisprudential basis for this holding:

In Re-Michie Estate and City of Toronto et al., [1968] 1 O.R. 266 at pp. 268 – 9, Stark J, after considering the relevant provisions of the Judicature Act and the authorities, said:

It appears clear that the Supreme Court of Ontario has broad universal jurisdiction over all matters of substantial law unless the Legislature divests from this universal jurisdiction by legislation in unequivocal terms. The rule of law relating to the jurisdiction of superior Courts was laid down at least as early as 1667 in the case of Peacock v. Bell and Kendall [1667], 1 Wms. Sound. 73 at p. 74, 85 E.R.84:

… And the rule for jurisdiction is, that nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a Superior Court, but that which specifically appears to be so; and, on the contrary, nothing shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction of an Inferior Court but that which is so expressly alleged.

69However, the doctrine is not unlimited: it is subject to both statutory and purposive limitations. The doctrine cannot be exercised so as to contradict a statute or rule. Inherent jurisdiction is also limited to exercises that fulfil the underlying purpose of the doctrine, being to regularize and protect the administration of justice. Inherent jurisdiction should be exercised “sparingly and with caution:” R c. Caron, 2011 SCC 5, at para. 28.

70In Endean, the Supreme Court set out that before exercising the court’s inherent jurisdiction, a justice should first determine the scope of express grants of statutory powers before dipping into this “important but murky pool of residual authority” (Endean, at para. 24). Having done so, in my view, it is both necessary and appropriate to exercise inherent jurisdiction in responding to this motion.

71In these most unusual circumstances, there is little guidance to be found in the jurisprudence. We are dealing with the unknown and a just and practical response must be found.

(c) Order to be Applied to All Active Insolvency Files

72In requesting the relief to extend the various timelines as well as to request that the order be applied to all active insolvency filings as well as to filings with the Superintendent up to June 30, 2020, I have not identified any statutory provision that specifically prohibits a superior court from granting the requested relief. Unlike IDG, it is not the case that automatic bankruptcy results from a failure of administrators to meet their duties. There is a legislative gap around the events, if any, that flow from such a failure to act.

73Having determined that there is no statutory provision preventing the granting of the requested relief, in my view this is one of the occasions, keeping in mind that inherent jurisdiction is to be used sparingly, where it is appropriate and necessary to grant the relief requested by the Superintendent.

Order Dispensing with Notice

Legal Basis for Court’s Jurisdiction: ss. 187(12) BIA

74Finally, the Superintendent seeks an order to dispense with the requirement to serve the Motion Record on each interested party and dispensing with the requirement to file it in each individual court file.

75Requiring the Superintendent to provide notice of this motion to the 451,536 open insolvency files comprised of all active consumer proposals, active commercial proposals and active bankruptcies, each one containing a separate list of creditors is unreasonable in the circumstances and is justification for this Court to dispense with the notice requirements required by the BIA.

76I am satisfied that, in accordance with the provisions of ss. 187(12) of the BIA, that it is appropriate to dispense with the foregoing notice provisions.

PART V - Order Sought

77The Superintendent of Bankruptcy respectfully requests the relief set out below:

78For the purposes of this Order:

a. The “Period of the Emergency” shall be defined as the period of March 13, 2020, to June 30, 2020. For greater certainty, the start date and the end date are included in the Period of the Emergency.

b. The “Suspension Period” shall be defined as the period from the date of the Court’s Order to June 30, 2020. For greater certainty, the start date and the end date are included in the Suspension Period.

c. All “Active Commercial Proposals” (Division I proposals), which shall be defined as all the Division I proposals filed with the OSB up to the end of the Period of the Emergency;

d. All “Active Consumer Proposals” (Division II proposals), which shall be defined as all the Division II proposals filed with the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (“OSB”) up to the end of the Period of the Emergency, but excluding the Division II proposals that were deemed annulled, annulled or that were fully performed on or before the date of this Order; and

e. All “Active Bankruptcy Files”, which shall be defined as all bankruptcies filed with the OSB, up to the end of the Period of the Emergency, but excluding the bankruptcies wherein the bankrupt had received his or her discharge on or before the date of this Order.

Matters applicable to Active Commercial Proposals

• The time for holding the meeting of creditors that is to take place during the Period of the Emergency, as provided by s. 51 of the BIA, is to be extended by the time of the Suspension Period.

Matters applicable to Active Consumer Proposals

• The time for holding the meeting of creditors that is to take place during the Period of the Emergency, as provided by ss. 66.15 of the BIA, is to be extended by the time of the Suspension Period.
• An Active Consumer Proposal shall not be deemed annulled pursuant to ss. 66.31 of the BIA unless the consumer debtor is in default of: a. In the case when payments under the Active Consumer Proposal are to be made monthly or more frequently, the day on which the consumer debtor is in default for an amount that is equal to more than the amount of three payments plus an additional amount equivalent to up to three payments for defaults that occurred during the period of March 13, 2020, to December 31, 2020; or b. In the case when payments under the Active Consumer Proposal are to be made less frequently than monthly, the day that is three months after the day on which the consumer debtor is in default in respect of any payment except that for those payments due between March 13, 2020 to December 31, 2020 it shall be the day that is six months after the day on which the consumer debtor is in default.

Matters applicable to Active Bankruptcy Files:

• The trustee’s obligation to apply to court for a hearing during the Period of the Emergency, as provided by ss. 170.1(3) of the BIA, is to be extended by the time of the Suspension Period.
• The time for the holding of the meeting of creditors that is to take place during the Period of the Emergency, as provided by s. 102 of the BIA, is to be extended by the time of the Suspension Period.
• The time for scheduling a mediation that is to take place during the Period of the Emergency, as provided by rule 105(4) and (10) of the BIGR, is to be extended by the time of the Suspension Period.
• Any interested person may apply to the Court to terminate the relief provided herein in respect of any proceeding, on providing notice of the application to do so on five days notice to the trustee, the OSB, and any other person likely to be affected by the order sought.

PART VI – Disposition

79In the result, the relief requested by the Superintendent is granted. An order reflecting the foregoing has been signed.

80With the exception of notice to Stephen Podgurski, these Orders were made without notice to affected creditors or debtors in the context of LIT substitution motions.

81The publication of the Order on the OSB’s website is sufficient in the circumstance to notify interested parties of their rights flowing from the Order of this Court.

82I thank counsel for their helpful submissions.

83In view of the relief granted, I direct that this endorsement be brought to the attention of the affected government ministries, for information purposes in the event that relief is required beyond June 30, 2020.

Chief Justice G.B. Morawetz

Date: April 27, 2020

Schedule “A” Text of Statutes

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 170.1 187

Bankruptcy and Insolvency General Rules 105