Court File and Parties
Court File No.: FS-14-80843 Date: 2020-02-21 Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Between:
VISHAL MAHTANI Applicant
Michael J Stangarone and Stephen P. Kirby for the applicant
- and -
VIDESHI MISTRY Respondent
Robert Fernandes for the respondent
Heard: January 10, 2020 at Brampton
Corrigendum
TO THE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2019
Emery J.
[1] The Reasons for Judgment from the trial of this case were released on September 11, 2019 under 2019 ONSC 5260. At the end of those reasons, I invited the parties to make written submissions on costs. In paragraph 149 of the reasons, I also gave each party permission to file submissions requesting any mathematical correction to, or clarification of, the reasons they wished to call to my attention. This invitation expressly provided that any request for correction or clarification must be consistent with my findings of fact. Those submissions were due at the same time the submissions on costs were due.
[2] I have received the submissions on costs filed by Mr. Fernandes on behalf of the respondent Ms. Mistry. At the same time, I received a letter from Mr. Fernandes requesting corrections to the mathematical calculations made in the judgment. Mr. Fernandes also called my attention to the fact that child support had not been agreed upon by the parties as the reasons suggested and that orders relating to child support are still required.
[3] The misconception of the court that the parties had reached an agreement on child support was reflected in paragraph 5 of the reasons. That paragraph reflects the understanding of the court from a representation found in closing arguments that because of the parenting regime the parties had agreed upon, child support is offset to the extent that no party shall be ordered to pay child support to the other parent.
[4] The applicant, Mr. Mahtani, had by this time retained Mr. Stangarone as counsel. Mr. Stangarone and his firm did not represent Mr. Mahtani at trial. After it was made known that child support remains an outstanding issue, I invited Mr. Fernandes and Mr. Stangarone to arrange for a reattendance before the court to make submissions on that issue.
[5] Mr. Fernandes and Mr. Stangarone agreed between them that Mr. Stangarone would not be required to file responding submissions on costs until after that reattendance and the release of any resulting decision.
[6] The parties and counsel reattended before me on January 10, 2020, at which time they addressed not only the child support issues but also the corrections to the mathematical components of the judgment that Mr. Fernandes has brought to my attention. Counsel also resolved the amount of retroactive spousal support Mr. Mahtani is to pay Ms. Mistry net of income tax under the judgment. All submissions made that day were based on the findings made in the Reasons for Judgment, without prejudice to the right of either party to seek appellate review of any assessment of the evidence.
Date of marriage property values
[7] Mr. Fernandes submits that Mr. Mahtani should have a credit for assets he owned on the date of marriage totaling $21,916.50. The credit that Ms. Mistry should have received for the value of her RRSP on the date of marriage should have been $7,845.38 instead of the $13,887.68 shown.
[8] These corrections are unopposed by Mr. Mahtani. Therefore, paragraph 124 is revised to read as follows:
[124] The property owned by each Mr. Mahtani and Ms. Mistry as of the date of marriage therefore had a value of $21,916.50 and $7,845.38 respectively.
[9] As a result, the property owned on the date of marriage by Mr. Mahtani had a net negative value of $20,083.50 and the property owned by Ms. Mistry on the date of marriage had a net value of $3,566.18. These corrections in turn yield the result that Mr. Mahtani’s net family property for the purposes of equalization is adjusted to $232,760.96, and the adjusted net family property of Ms. Mistry becomes $11,230.89. The difference between the value of each net family property calculation is $221,530.07. Mr. Mahtani is therefore ordered to pay one half the difference in the amount of $110,765.04 to Ms. Mistry for equalization, less the $5,000 that Ms. Mistry was ordered by Skarica J. to pay to Mr. Mahtani for costs on July 25, 2014.
[10] Paragraphs 129, 130, and 142 are amended accordingly, resulting in an order that Mr. Mahtani pay $105,765.04 as an equalization payment to Ms. Mistry.
Spousal support
[11] Counsel for the parties have computed the amount for retroactive spousal support that Mr. Mahtani has been ordered to pay Ms. Mistry, net of income tax. This computation provides the parties with the tax relief for retroactive spousal support Mr. Mhatani has been ordered to pay, without requiring the parties to file corrected tax returns.
[12] On consent, the amounts payable under paragraph 136(b) of the Reasons for Judgment are as follows:
i. $34,325 for 32 months from May 1, 2014 to January 1, 2017 at $1,500 each month based on Ms. Mistry’s annual income of $22,230 and an imputed annual income of $121,430 to Mr. Mahtani for those amounts, less $5,000 for a net total of $29,325; and
ii. $13,388 for 32 months since January 1, 2017 to August 1, 2019 at $726 each month based on Ms. Mistry’s income of $45,202 a year and an annual income of $123,000 imputed to Mr. Mahtani.
[13] Paragraph 136 of the Reasons for Judgment is amended accordingly.
Child support
[14] Mr. Stangarone acknowledges that there was no agreement between the parties for child support going forward. The misapprehension of the court that there was such an agreement was not a finding that precludes the determination of child support as an issue on both an ongoing and on a retroactive basis. These are issues for the court to decide and paragraph 5 of the Reasons for Judgment is amdended accordingly.
Ongoing child support
[15] The children of the marriage resided with Ms. Mistry upon the parties separating on April 25, 2014. Since Skarica J. made a temporary order providing for a shared parenting regime on an equal basis in July 2014, the children have lived with each parent equally. The parties accept that the set-off provisions of the (Federal) Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 (“CSG’s”), apply, subject to Mr. Mahtani’s position that no retroactive child support is payable.
[16] Mr. Fernandes concedes that he represented during his opening statement at trial that he would not be calling evidence on the budgetary evidence contained in Ms. Mistry’s financial statements to establish the claim for child support. Instead, he proposed to base that claim for child support on the actual or the imputed incomes of the parties to determine the table amounts payable.
[17] Counsel agree, based on my findings at trial, that the annual income of Ms. Mistry is $45,202 and the annual income imputed to Mr. Mahtani is $123,000 for the purpose of calculating ongoing child support payable after set-off. The table amounts for child support payable on these incomes are $677 per month by Ms. Mistry and $1,753 per month by Mr. Mahtani. After setting off the mutual obligations of each party under section 9 of the CSG’s, Mr. Mahtani is hereby ordered to pay child support in the amount of $1,076 each month to Ms. Mistry, commencing September 1, 2019.
[18] Ms. Mistry has been receiving the federal child benefit for the two children since the date of separation. Effective October 1, 2019, the parties shall share that child benefit equally. I am therefore making an order that the parties take whatever steps are necessary for Mr. Mahtani to receive the Canada Child Benefit for both children for each month in 2020 and in even numbered years thereafter, and for Ms. Mistry to receive that Canada Child Benefit for each month commencing on January 1, 2021 and in odd numbered years thereafter. I further order that Ms. Mistry shall be entitled to claim the eligible dependant credit for both children against her income on the tax return she files in those years commencing with tax year 2019. Mr. Mahtani is entitled to claim that tax credit for those years ending with an even number, commencing with tax year 2020.
Retroactive child support
[19] Mr. Fernandes seeks retroactive child support on a setoff basis in the amount of $1,341 each month between the date of separation and January 1, 2017, and $1,076 per month after that date to September 1, 2019. In all, Mr. Fernandes seeks retroactive child support payable by Mr. Mahtani to Ms. Mistry in the amount of $77,344.
[20] Mr. Stangarone and Mr. Kirby argue that Ms. Mistry’s entitlement to claim retroactive child support is curtailed because of the principles set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37, [2006] 2 SCR 231. They argue on behalf of Mr. Mahtani that Ms. Mistry did not lead evidence at trial to support a claim for retroactive child support. The Supreme Court explained in D.B.S. that courts should attempt to craft a retroactive award in a way that minimizes hardship, while recognizing the obligations of a parent who has not paid to support children of the marriage.
[21] The majority in D.B.S. confirmed bedrock principles relating to the obligation of separated parents to pay child support. The amount of support payable under this obligation depends on their ability or their income according to the governing support regime that applies to them.
[22] Bastarache J. observed that the mere fact of parenting places a great responsibility upon parents. They are immediately responsible as guardians and providers upon the birth of a child. Bastarache J. further observed that the parent and child relationship is one that engages not only moral obligations, but also legal obligations; support is an obligation that arises automatically upon the birth of a child.
[23] The parental obligation to support a child is therefore the corollary of a child’s right to have support provided and exists independent of any statute or court order. It is an obligation rooted in the parent and child relationship. This means that a parent’s obligation to support a child predates the separation of the child’s parents and remains a continuing obligation of those parents in the post-separation environment.
[24] The Supreme Court looked at three scenarios where retroactive child support might be ordered: where there has already been a court order for child support to be paid, where there has been a previous agreement between the parents, or where there has not already been a court order for the payment of child support. The suite of four appeals in the DBS decision included the appeal in the case of Hiemstra v. Hiemstra from the Court of Appeal for Alberta at 2005 ABCA 16. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in Hiemstra, thereby upholding an award of retroactive child support made in the first instance.
[25] Bastarache J. found that s. 15.1 of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), does not expressly provide for retroactive support orders. In the context of a claim for support where no previous order has been made or agreement reached between the parties for the payment of one parent to another for child support, this court has jurisdiction to award retroactive child support under s. 15.1 of the Divorce Act on a contextual reading of the statute. The court found that there is no restriction in the Divorce Act as to the date from which a court may order that an order of child support may take effect. In this respect, retroactive support for a child is actually compensation for what is legally owed.
[26] The court also found that a parent who is to pay support under the federal guidelines has an obligation to increase child support payments he or she is to pay when he or she earns greater income year over year.
Discussion
[27] The finding of entitlement to retroactive child support is fact driven. I have considered the factors in D.B.S. to make that determination.
[28] In D.B.S., the court set out the two steps to decide the issue of retroactive child support. The court must first determine whether a retroactive award should be made on the facts of the case. This determination, in my view, is a question about entitlement. The second step is to decide the amount of support that would adequately quantify the obligation of the payor to pay support during the intervening time. This step requires the court to determine the date from which retroactive child support should be payable, as the amount payable each month is fixed by the table amount according the CSG’s for the payor’s income in each year of the retroactive period.
[29] There are several factors to consider in the entitlement analysis. First, there is the question about whether Ms. Mistry provided a reasonable excuse for why support was not sought earlier. As I have stated before, Ms. Mistry asked for child support in the answer she filed in July 2014. Her priority on the motion brought in July 2014 heard by Skarica J. was the immediate parenting of the children. It would have been difficult for Ms. Mistry to formulate a position on temporary child support at that time, as she had few resources to bring a subsequent motion. I find this particularly persuasive in view of Mr. Mahtani’s lack of disclosure. The secrecy that surrounded the financial integration of his income and resources with those of his family and their companies was discussed in the main reasons after trial.
[30] The argument that Mr. Stangarone and Mr. Kirby make on behalf of Mr. Mahtani against finding he owes retroactive child support focuses on the issue of notice in para. 118 of the D.B.S. decision. That paragraph reads as follows:
118 Having established that a retroactive award is due, a court will have four choices for the date to which the award should be retroactive: the date when an application was made to a court; the date when formal notice was given to the payor parent; the date when effective notice was given to the payor parent; and the date when the amount of child support should have increased. For the reasons that follow, I would adopt the date of effective notice as a general rule.
[31] Mr. Mahtani argues that Ms. Mistry did not give notice of her intention to claim child support, or that she did not intend to seek child support until the case went to trial. Mr. Mahtani relies on this lack of notice, notwithstanding the fact that he offered to pay Ms. Mistry amounts for child support that were admittedly less than table amounts after the date of separation.
[32] Mr. Fernandes referred the court to MacKinnon v. MacKinnon (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 175 (C.A.), and Vanos v. Vanos, 2010 ONCA 876 for guiding principels to find when retroactive support may be ordered. In Vanos, the Court of Appeal for Ontario applied a rule from its earlier decision in MacKinnon that a party who claims support is presumptively entitled to prospective support from the date notice is given that a support claim is being pursued. In Vanos, the respondent had filed an answer in which she claimed spousal support, and prospective support was an issue from that point forward. From the date that answer was served, the applicant in Vanos knew that the spousal support claim was an issue between the parties and would be determined at trial. The court found there was no principled reason to relieve the payor from his responsibility to pay the appropriate amount of spousal support in those circumstances. Mr. Fernandes made submissions that this court should make the same finding.
[33] I called the attention of counsel to the more recent decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Wharry v. Wharry, 2016 ONCA 930, 408 D.L.R. (4th) 548. In Wharry, Pardue J.A. addressed the giving of effective notice in D.B.S. as follows:
[54] The Supreme Court in D.B.S. at para. 118 provided that, having determined that a retroactive award is appropriate, the court must choose a date of retroactivity. Among the four main options are (i) the date of effective notice and (ii) the date of formal notice.
[55] D.B.S. at paras. 121-122 established that the date of effective notice will generally serve as a default option when choosing a date of retroactivity; this serves as a fair balance between certainty and flexibility. The date of effective notice refers to any indication by the recipient that child support should be paid or renegotiated. It does not require the recipient to take any legal action; all that is required is that the topic be broached.
[56] Despite this general default to effective notice, the Supreme Court in D.B.S. added at para. 123 that it will usually be inappropriate to make a support award retroactive to a date more than three years before formal notice was given: see also Gray v. Rizzi, 2016 ONCA 152, 129 O.R. (3d) 201, at paras. 45 and 61. One of the reasons for this general rule was to ensure that recipients move discussions forward after providing effective notice. The Supreme Court stated at para. 123:
Once the recipient parent raises the issue of child support, his/her responsibility is not automatically fulfilled. Discussions should move forward. If they do not, legal action should be contemplated. While the date of effective notice will usually signal an effort on the part of the recipient parent to alter the child support situation, a prolonged period of inactivity after effective notice may indicate that the payor parent’s reasonable interest in certainty has returned. Thus, even if effective notice has already been given, it will usually be inappropriate to delve too far into the past. The federal regime appears to have contemplated this issue by limiting a recipient parent’s request for historical income information to a three-year period: see s. 25(1)(a) of the Guidelines. In general, I believe the same rough guideline can be followed for retroactive awards: it will usually be inappropriate to make a support award retroactive to a date more than three years before formal notice was given to the payor parent. [Emphasis added.]
[57] On March 13, 2007, the appellant filed her Answer, claiming child support for the children. This appears to be the date of both effective and formal notice. Therefore, the three-year rule in D.B.S. is not at issue in this case, as the appellant gave effective and formal notice at the same time, and less than four months after separation.
[34] I consider the facts before me to be similar to those facts addressed by the Court of Appeal in Wharry. The Wharry decision compels me to find that Ms. Mistry gave both effective notice and formal notice when she served her answer that contained a claim for prospective child support.
[35] Ms. Mistry made a claim for child support in her answer filed in July 2014. The answer was served upon Mr. Mahtani shortly thereafter. Prospective child support therefore became an issue between them because she had given Mr. Mahtani effective notice as of the date.
[36] Second, I am to consider the circumstances of the children.
[37] The children resided primarily with Ms. Mistry at the home of her parents after the date of separation. Although the parties shared parenting of the children on an equal basis since the date of the order made by Skarica J. in July 2014, the children still required support from their father. This child support was payable according to his ability to pay table support based on his actual or imputed income since the parties separated.
[38] I consider the circumstances of the children to merit a lump sum payment for retroactive child support.
[39] Third, I consider the conduct of Mr. Mahtani as the payor.
[40] Mr. Mahtani misrepresented his income from the family business to the court, and perhaps to his own income valuator, by concealing the incorporation and operation of VAKA Trading Inc. to essentially divert business from VAMS Canada Inc. This maneuver effectively reduced his income from VAMS Canada by up to one half.
[41] Mr. Mahtani continued living in the home he owns with his mother after separation and has enjoyed the lifestyle funded by the family companies. In my view, Mr. Mahtani has benefitted from the surplus of funds he would otherwise have paid in child support after the date of separation. This surplus has benefited Mr. Mahtani at the expense of Ms. Mistry.
[42] In contrast, Ms. Mistry registered to receive assisted income to support herself and the children. She also deregistered RRSP savings accounts for which she had to pay income tax. She has forfeited any potential accumulation of capital from those investments by redeeming those accounts to support herself and the children.
[43] Mr. Mahtani left Ms. Mistry to suffer a financial deprevation for which he received an ongoing benefit by not paying child support after they separated. I am left to reach no other conclusion than Mr. Mahtani’s conduct justifies a retroactive support order against him.
[44] Fourth, I am to consider the hardship a retroactive award may cause to Mr. Mahtani.
[45] Mr. Mahtani has submitted that he would suffer a hardship to pay retroactive child support because he has provided equal parenting time and resources to the children since July 2014. He also relies on evidence from the trial that he paid several thousand dollars in orthodontic fees for the children. Further, he states that he offered Ms. Mistry the opportunity to take the full child tax benefit prior to trial, even though they were parenting the children on an equal basis. He points to his financial statement to argue that his own expenses exceed his income, and that he has an inability to pay retroactive support as a lump sum.
[46] The argument that Mr. Mahtani has paid several thousand dollars in orthodontic fees for the children is not a reason not to pay retroactive child support. Those orthodontic fees would properly be considered Section 7 expenses, which are outside retroactive or ongoing child support payable on a monthly basis.
[47] Mr. Mahtani’s argument that he devoted parenting and resources to the children on an equal basis since July 2014 representing a hardship is not accepted. His family provided support during his parenting time with the children. The resources committed to that parenting were absorbed by the greater family. Mr. Mahtani has been imputed a greater income than the amount claimed in his financial statement, and he has the means to pay retroactive child support as a lump sum.
[48] Finally, Mr. Mahtani’s argument that he would suffer a hardship if he was to pay retroactive child support because he allowed Ms. Mistry to receive the full amount of the universal child benefit is not a hardship. It is an agreement to allow the spouse earning less income to have the benefit of a government contribution to household income. The evidence is unclear whether Ms. Mistry accepted this offer or allowance in exchange for not seeking a temporary order for child support at an earlier time.
[49] Despite the submissions that Mr. Mahtani would face hardship if he was required to pay a lump sum for retroactive child support, the court heard little if any evidence of that hardship at trial. I make no finding that Mr. Mahtani would encounter hardship if ordered to pay what he ought to have paid for child support all along.
[50] After applying these factors, I conclude that Mr. Mahtani must pay retroactive child support. I must now decide the amount of the award for retroactive child support. In doing so, I am to apply two elements to make this determination.
[51] The first element is to determine the date from which retroactive child support was payable.
[52] Under all the circumstances, I award retroactive child support to Ms. Mistry, payable by Mr. Mahtani effective on July 1, 2014. This date aligns with the order made by Skarica J. for the parents to have equal parenting time with the children but leaving primary residence of the children with Ms. Mistry. This was the date that Ms. Mistry would have been in a position to seek child support on a temporary basis if she had all the facts and the resources to bring a motion. Mr. Mahtani could have reasonably expected that a court would order him to pay child support, effective on that date.
[53] The second element involves quantifying the amount for Mr. Mahtani to pay for that retroactive child support. This calculation consists of finding child support payable on a set-off basis having regard to the respective incomes of the parties before and after January 1, 2017.
[54] For the 30 months from July 1, 2014 to January 1, 2017, based on Ms. Mistry’s annual income of $22,230 and an imputed annual income of $121,430 to Mr. Mahtani, the set-off amount Mr. Mahtani should pay to Ms. Mistry would be $1,341 per month. From that amount I subtract $633 per month as the amount Mr. Mahtani would have received for one half the child tax benefit ancillary to the shared parenting arrangements during those months. Allowing that deduction makes this entitlement consistent with the ongoing support now ordered by the court. The amount of this deduction represents one half of the $1,274 Ms. Mistry has disclosed she received each month for child tax benefits on her financial statement dated January 12, 2018.
[55] Mr. Mahtani is therefore ordered to pay the net amount of $708 per month for 30 months, totalling $21,240 for retroactive child support up to January 1, 2017. The net amount is calculated on the assumption that Ms. Mistry actually received all of the Canada Child Benefit for both children throughout this period.
[56] For the 32 months between January 1, 2017 and August 1, 2019, Mr. Mahtani would have paid $1,076 per month in child support after set-off based on Ms. Mistry’s income of $45,202 a year and an annual income of $123,000 imputed to Mr. Mahtani. For the same reasons set out above, Mr. Mahtani is entitled to a credit of $637 for each of those months to compensate him for one half the child tax benefit he would have received in those months, for a net payment of $439 per month. Ms. Mistry is therefore awarded $14,048 on a net basis for retroactive child support since January 1, 2017.
Orders made pursuant to this Corrigendum
[57] Paragraph 142 of the Reasons for Judgment released on September 11, 2019 at 2019 ONSC 5260 (hereinafter, the “Reasons for Judgment”) is further amended as follows:
“Mr. Mahtani is ordered to pay $110,765.04 as an equalization payment to Ms. Mistry, less $5,000, for a net total of $105,765.04”.
[58] Paragraph of the [141A] is added to the Reasons for Judgment as follows:
“Vishal Mahtani is hereby ordered to pay retroactive child support to Videshi Mistry from May 1, 2014 through to August 1, 2019, in the total amount of $35,288, broken down as follows:
(1) $21,240 for the period from July 1, 2014 through to December 31, 2016, which amount has been calculated with reference to the following material facts: (1) Vishal Mahtani’s imputed annual income of $121,430.00; (2) Videshi Mistry’s imputed annual income of $22,230.00; (3) $633 per month for the child tax benefit in each of those month and (4) the shared timesharing arrangements in place during this period for the parties’ children, Krish Mahtani, born May 13, 2008 (hereinafter, “Krish”), and Ayanna Mahtani, born February 23, 2011 (hereinafter, “Ayanna”); and
(2) $14,048 for the period from January 1, 2017 through to August 1, 2019, which amount has been calculated with reference to the following material facts: (1) Vishal Mahtani’s imputed annual income of $123,000.00; (2) Videshi Mistry’s imputed annual income of $45,202.00; (3) $637 per month for the child tax benefit in each of those month and (4) the shared timesharing arrangements in place during this period for Krish and Ayanna.”
[59] Commencing on September 1, 2019, and on the first day of each and every month thereafter, Vishal shall pay to Videshi the sum of $1,076.00 per month in set-off child support for Krish and Ayanna, which figure has been calculated with reference to the following material facts: (1) Vishal’s imputed annual income of $123,000.00; (2) Videshi’s imputed annual income of $45,202.00; and (3) the shared timesharing arrangements in place for Krish and Ayanna.
[60] Subparagraph 136(b) of the Reasons for Judgment is hereby amended as follows:
“Vishal Mahtani is hereby ordered to pay to Videshi Mistry retroactive spousal support from July 1, 2014 through to August 1, 2019 for a net total of $42,713, broken down as follows:
(1) $34,325.00 for the period from May 1, 2014 through to December 31, 2016, which amount has been calculated with reference to the following material facts: (1) Vishal Mahtani’s imputed annual income of $121,430.00; and (2) Videshi Mistry’s imputed annual income of $22,230.00;
(2) $13,388.00 for the period from January 1, 2017 through to August 1, 2019, which amount has been calculated with reference to the following material facts: (1) Vishal Mahtani’s imputed annual income of $123,000.00; (2) Videshi Mistry’s imputed annual income of $45,202.00”; and
(3) Less $5,000.
[61] Starting in 2019, and in every consecutive year thereafter, the parties shall equally share the Child Tax Benefit and dependant tax credit for the children, Krish and Ayanna, with these benefits/credits to be rotated between them on a year-to-year basis. Videshi Mistry shall be allowed to claim these benefits/credits in all odd-numbered years, starting in 2019, and Vishal Mahtani shall be allowed to claim these benefits/credits in all even-numbered years, starting in 2020.
[62] Costs of the appearance before me on January 10, 2020 shall be reserved to the determination on costs for the trial of this matter.
[63] A Support Deduction Order shall issue.
[64] Unless the Support Order and Support Deduction Order are withdrawn from the office of the Director of the Family Responsibility Office, they shall be enforced by the Director, and the amounts owing under the Support Order shall be paid to the Director, who shall pay them to the party to whom they are owed.
[65] If the parties agree to opt out of the Family Responsibility Office at any time, they are both required to file with the Office of the Director of the Family Responsibility Office a separate written request consenting to the withdrawal of the Support Order and the Support Deduction Order.
[66] For as long as child support is to be paid, the payor (and recipient, if applicable) must provide updated income disclosure to the other party each year, within 30 days of the anniversary of this Order, in accordance with Section 24.1 of the Child Support Guidelines.
[67] This Order bears post-judgement interest at the rate of 3.0% per annum effective from the date of this Order. Where there is a default in payment, the payment in default shall bear interest only from the date of default.
Costs
[68] I now call upon Mr. Stangarone and Mr. Kirby to provide the responding submissions on behalf of Mr. Mahtani on costs by March 15, 2020.
Emery J.
Released: February 21, 2020



