COURT FILE NO.: 15-M7872 DATE: 2018/10/23

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – GINO LANGEVIN

Counsel: Meaghan Cunningham, for the Crown Michael A. Smith, for the Accused

HEARD: December 14, 2017, March 20 and September 27, 2018

SENTENCING DECISION

RATUSHNY J.

[1] Mr. Langevin has pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

1. Background Facts

[2] On July 21, 2015 Mr. Langevin killed his partner of nine years, Gail Fawcett, while experiencing a cocaine-induced psychotic episode. It is agreed that as a result, he did not have the required intent for murder. He had repeatedly stabbed her with a knife while she was running away from him on the street outside their residence.

[3] Mr. Langevin was 45 years of age at the time of the offence. He had been using hashish and cocaine since the age of 16 and over time, his use of cocaine increased to daily consumption, particularly after work each evening, he said, as a reward. He regarded himself as a functioning drug addict who was able to maintain his home, yard and relationships with loved ones and perform well at work, all while high on cocaine. He began, however, to resent the twelve to fifteen hundred dollars per month he was spending on his daily one-gram habit over the previous 15 years. On the Friday before the Tuesday of the stabbing, he decided to stop using it on his own. He did not seek any medical advice or attend a detox program. He went from daily use of cocaine to total abstinence from it.

[4] On the day before the stabbing, Monday, Ms. Fawcett called 911 because she felt Mr. Langevin needed medical help with his drug addiction issues. Mr. Langevin agreed to be transported to the hospital for assessment. He was seen by a doctor and released later that evening.

[5] On the day of the stabbing Ms. Fawcett again called 911, around 1 p.m. She was fearful of Mr. Langevin’s erratic behaviour. She kept whispering, “please hurry” over the phone. The paramedic who arrived was the same individual, Derek Marriner, who had responded to her call the day before and so he was slightly familiar with both Mr. Langevin and Ms. Fawcett. He met and spoke to Ms. Fawcett on the street outside her residence. Mr. Langevin then exited his home in possession of a knife and moved to where Ms. Fawcett and Mr. Marriner were standing. It appeared Mr. Langevin was focussed on Mr. Marriner and so Mr. Marriner told Ms. Fawcett to run. She started to run from the scene and Mr. Marriner got in his vehicle and into the only available seat not covered in equipment, and locked its doors. As Mr. Langevin was trying to gain access to Mr. Marriner’s vehicle and “bouncing” his knife off its window, Ms. Fawcett returned and yelled at Mr. Langevin to stop.

[6] Mr. Langevin then turned his focus to her. She started to run away again but he ran after and grabbed her and repeatedly stabbed her with the knife. As she lay unresponsive on the street, he removed her shorts, took off all his clothing and stood over her body and kissed her. Mr. Marriner activated his sirens to try to get Mr. Langevin to stop. Mr. Langevin did not respond to the sirens. Mr. Marriner then drove his vehicle toward Mr. Langevin, striking him slightly with the mirror of his paramedic vehicle. At that point, Mr. Langevin stood up and Mr. Marriner told him to sit down and kicked the knife out of his possession. Mr. Langevin complied and remained sitting on the curb until police arrived and placed him under arrest. By that point in time, Ms. Fawcett was unconscious and bleeding heavily. She was pronounced dead at 2:04 p.m., one hour after she had placed the 911 call.

[7] Mr. Langevin has no recollection of these events but he has no doubt he stabbed Ms. Fawcett and killed her.

[8] Dr. Brad Booth, a psychiatrist at the Royal Ottawa Health Care Group, assessed Mr. Langevin in February 2016. His Report is dated August 2, 2017, with the delay due to obtaining additional funding for it. His diagnoses of Mr. Langevin at page 20 of his Report is that at the time of the stabbing Mr. Langevin was suffering from a cocaine-induced psychotic disorder, a severe cocaine use disorder, a mild cannabis use disorder and unlikely delirium due to substance withdrawal.

[9] Dr. Booth described psychosis as, “an altered brain state in which individuals have very impaired reality testing and lose touch with what is real and what is not. Often they develop delusions, which are false ideas that seem entirely real to the individual. This might include persecutory ideas, such as fears that others are trying to harm them.” He said that while the psychosis can occur as part of being intoxicated with the substance, it can persist for hours, days or weeks after stopping the substance.

[10] He noted from the evidence before him that Mr. Langevin had been stressed about his finances and had been exploring declaring bankruptcy, that Mr. Langevin had told the emergency room physician the day before the stabbing that for about two weeks he had been having paranoid thoughts about a conspiracy at work, and that three weeks before the stabbing Ms. Fawcett had told her son, Donald, that Mr. Langevin had “started to act different - that he was off”.

[11] Dr. Booth said he considered a possible diagnosis of a delirium, being a confusional state with a fluctuating mental state that can result from medical disorders in addition to withdrawal from substances. At page 21 of his Report, he said, “However, given his psychosis present 2 weeks earlier and absence of significant medical issues, Mr. Langevin was less likely to be in a delirium than a psychotic state.”

[12] I accept Dr. Booth’s psychiatric opinion. I agree it serves to reduce the homicide to manslaughter.

2. The Accused

[13] Mr. Langevin is 48 years of age at the present time.

[14] As a Presentence Report and Dr. Booth’s Report indicate, he is fortunate to have had a happy childhood, good health, a loving relationship with his parents, a good relationship with his child and his former partner’s child, a loving relationship with Ms. Fawcett, good friends, and a good employment record in sales, where a co-worker described him as always kind towards customers and mild-mannered.

[15] Mr. Langevin has no history of occurrences with the Ottawa Police, no prior criminal record and no outstanding criminal charges.

[16] A Gladue Report dated September 7, 2018 was prepared. Mr. Langevin’s aboriginal ancestry comes from his father’s side of the family through his paternal grandmother. His paternal great grandmother is thought to have been from an Algonquin community near Maniwaki, Quebec. Mr. Langevin’s father was able to obtain his Métis citizenship card and Mr. Langevin said he also had a Métis card a long time ago but his wallet was stolen and he never replaced it. The Gladue Report indicates Mr. Langevin’s parents faced “no hardships” and had a happy marriage. It indicates that Mr. Langevin had a normal upbringing with no alcohol, abuse or violence.

[17] Mr. Langevin is interested in learning more about his aboriginal ancestry and its culture.

[18] Mr. Langevin’s long-term use and addiction to cocaine has been detailed above. As Dr. Booth has stated, his cocaine use induced his psychotic episode at the time of the stabbing, altering his perception of reality.

[19] Mr. Langevin has told the author of the Presentence Report, Dr. Booth and the author of the Gladue Report that he does not know why he stabbed Ms. Fawcett, but he thinks it was due to “withdrawals”.

[20] Mr. Langevin also spoke emotionally at his sentencing hearing, apologizing to Ms. Fawcett’s family and his own. He expressed great remorse for taking the life of the woman he loved and cherished with all his heart. He said he is still confused and lost at how this tragic accident could have happened and also that he is very sorry his addiction caused all this unbelievable heartache. He said he has been clean for over three years and relapse is not an option for him.

3. The Victims

[21] I wish to acknowledge the numerous victim impact statements and various readings of them at the court attendance back in March of this year. I thank everyone for their participation, as difficult as I know it was and continues to be. All the statements express continuing shock, sorrow and heartsickness, and for some, understandable anger. They all describe Gail Fawcett as a beautiful, loving and compassionate person with unique laughter, such a kind heart and a wonderful soul. She was trying to help Mr. Langevin go straight and clean. She loved and trusted him. Mr. Langevin loved her. As her nephew, Jason, said in his statement, she stood by him through the thickest of times. She died as she continued to try.

[22] I also thank Sheila, her sister, for her memories and the incredible story of Gail’s lost child. May you all, and I make particular mention of Gail’s father, Wallace, find some peace in your good memories of her.

4. Analysis

Counsel Positions on Sentence

[23] Defence counsel seeks a sentence of incarceration in the 4 to 6 years range less a credit for presentence custody, allowing for a probationary term after incarceration so as to require and monitor drug addiction treatment and abstinence for Mr. Langevin.

[24] Crown counsel recommends a sentence in the range of 11 to 12 years incarceration less the presentence custody credit, citing cases establishing a sentencing range for manslaughter with aggravating circumstances of 7 to 12 years.

[25] Both counsel have submitted cases providing some guidance although, as is ever the situation, not because of identical facts. I return to those cases below.

Presentence Custody Credit

[26] Mr. Langevin has served a total of 1191 days in presentence custody to today’s date. That translates into 1787 days or roughly 5 years of presentence custody credit at the customary rate of 1.5 to 1, so that Mr. Langevin is to be regarded as having already served the equivalent of almost 5 years of his sentence of incarceration that is to be imposed today.

Sentencing Principles and Objectives

[27] A starting point for the analysis of an appropriate sentence to be imposed is to identify, based on the particular circumstances of the offence and of the offender, the sentencing principles and objectives that need to be reflected in the sentence, the factors serving to mitigate and aggravate sentence and the balance to be struck between all of these considerations.

[28] One of the sentencing principles, the fundamental sentencing principle under section 718 of the Criminal Code, forms the underpinning of an appropriate sentence, that “[a] sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.”

[29] In a serious case such as this dealing with the loss of a life by a stabbing caused by the intentional consumption of cocaine, there can be no question that the primary objectives to be reflected in the sentence are the need for denunciation of Mr. Langevin’s choice to consume cocaine, denunciation of what happened, and deterrence of others and Mr. Langevin in the future.

[30] I do have some concern, as stated above, regarding the risk to public safety that Mr. Langevin could present should he relapse and use illegal drugs. As the Crown has emphasized, relapse by drug addicts is an unfortunate reality. Protection of the public, therefore, is a component objective of this sentencing.

[31] The sentencing objective of rehabilitation also has a role, albeit with a secondary status due to the seriousness of the offence. It is crystal clear that the focus of Mr. Langevin’s rehabilitative efforts must be drug addiction counselling.

Mitigating Factors

[32] The factors serving to mitigate sentence are the following.

[33] Except for his choice to consume cocaine on a daily basis, Mr. Langevin has led a pro-social life. He has enjoyed the benefits of a happy childhood, supportive family and friends, the devotion of Gail Fawcett and has a good work record. He has had no prior contacts with the criminal justice system. He was not a violent person before the tragedy. He has expressed remorse. I accept his remorse as sincere and genuine. He has pleaded guilty to manslaughter, saving everyone the hardship of a trial.

[34] I accept that the crime was out of character for Mr. Langevin.

Gladue Factors

[35] Mr. Langevin’s aboriginal ancestry, although relevant, serves to exert little weight on his sentencing in terms of lessening his moral culpability for the offence. I agree with the Crown’s submissions that the disadvantageous systemic and background factors, most often generational, as described by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Gladue, 1999 SCC 19, appear not to have affected Mr. Langevin.

[36] Neither is there any evidence that Mr. Langevin’s cocaine use was driven by his upbringing. As he told the author of the Presentence Report, he used it because he liked how it made him feel.

[37] Of course while his cultural identity is important, there is no evidence, as the Crown submits, that he ever felt lost or adrift or lacked attachment. Instead, all the evidence points to the opposite - that he was happily and fully engaged with his friends, family and community. Defence counsel has put forward a number of cases involving disadvantaged aboriginal offenders, and this lack of weight to be given to Gladue factors affects, therefore, their applicability.

[38] The result, and reflecting Gladue at paragraph 79, is that the sentence for this most violent offence committed by a person not impacted if at all by his aboriginal heritage and certainly not negatively impacted, is to be dealt with as if it had been committed by a non-aboriginal person.

Cocaine-Induced Psychotic Episode as a Mitigating Factor

[39] The Crown submits that the fact of Mr. Langevin’s cocaine-induced psychotic episode, and self-induced, as the cause for his actions does not amount to a significant mitigating factor serving to reduce his moral culpability for his actions because it has already played its role in reducing the charge from murder to manslaughter. As the Agreed Statement of Facts has stated, it resulted in Mr. Langevin not having the required intent for murder.

[40] I have difficulty with this submission on the facts of this case and according to the Crown’s authorities.

[41] The Crown relies on R. v. Sullivan, [2017] O.J. No. 7102 (ONSCJ), R. v. Devaney, [2004] O.J. No. 6160 (ONSCJ), R. v. Devaney, 2006 ONCA 761, R. v. Tahir, 2016 ONCA 136 and R. v. Kimpe, 2010 ONCA 812.

[42] In Sullivan at para. 6, the court explained that while the accused’s stabbing attack on his mother, who survived, had occurred while he was in a substance-induced psychotic state and as such, was “involuntary”, by virtue of section 33.1 of the Criminal Code, this was not a defence. He had taken a Wellbutrin overdose voluntarily in a suicide attempt and the resultant intoxication and psychotic state were self-induced. A trial had been held and the accused found guilty of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon. The accused had a long criminal record and a significant history of mental health issues.

[43] In considering sentence, Salmers J. did not treat the accused’s self-induced intoxication and psychotic state as a mitigating factor but rather as a neutral factor because, as he stated at paragraphs 40-45, the accused had had a drug abuse problem for years, had sought no treatment for it and when he took the overdose, “he would not have been surprised to have become intoxicated or high (at para. 43)” but that “Mr. Sullivan took the Wellbutrin overdose as part of a suicide attempt that he regretted almost immediately taking the pills (at para. 44).” He commented at para. 53, that “Mr. Sullivan is a deeply disturbed person.” The total sentence imposed was 5 years incarceration for aggravated assault and the other offences.

[44] I do not understand Sullivan to stand for the proposition that a self-induced psychotic state at the time of the commission of the offence cannot be considered as a mitigating factor. Additionally, Mr. Langevin’s personal history is much different from that of Mr. Sullivan’s.

[45] In Devaney, a jury had found the accused not guilty of second degree murder but guilty of manslaughter as a result of his self-induced intoxication by alcohol when he administered 107 stab wounds that killed his landlady.

[46] In his sentencing decision, Gans J. stated, at para. 33, “I am of the opinion that self-induced intoxication cannot be viewed as a factor on sentencing since the offender has already benefitted from his intoxication by the reduction of the offence from murder to manslaughter.” A sentence of 11 years incarceration was imposed.

[47] In saying this, Gans J. appeared to disagree with the judgment of Bastarache J. in R. v. Stone, 1999 SCC 42, regarding whether the trial judge had erred in considering provocation as a mitigating factor in sentencing after s. 232 of the Criminal Code had reduced a verdict of murder to one of manslaughter.

[48] In Stone, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed with Finch J.A. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal that the trial judge had been correct to consider provocation as a mitigating factor when sentencing because it was probative as to the appellant’s state of mind at the time of the killing and as such was relevant to the issue of moral blameworthiness. At para. 153, the issue before the Supreme Court of Canada was stated as follows: “Did the Court of Appeal err in principle in deciding that the sentencing judge was entitled to consider provocation as a mitigating factor for manslaughter where the same provocation, through the operation of s. 232 of the Criminal Code had already reduced the stigma and penalty of an intentional killing from murder to manslaughter?”

[49] In Stone, Bastarache J. found, at paras. 232-237, that an accused does not gain a “double benefit” if provocation is considered in sentencing after a verdict of manslaughter has been rendered by operation of s. 232 so that the sentencing judge had been correct in considering provocation as a mitigating factor in that case.

[50] However, when Devaney reached the Ontario Court of Appeal, the trial judge’s rejection of allowing a “double benefit” for self-induced intoxication was upheld without analysis, at paras. 29 and 37, and the sentence of 11 years upheld as being entitled to deference and within the range of 8 to 12 years for an offence of manslaughter with significant aggravating circumstances (at para. 38).

[51] I understand the Court of Appeal in Devaney to have passed over the issue of the self-induced intoxication as a mitigating factor as characterized by the sentencing judge and instead, to have primarily focused on the issue of the appropriate range of sentence for the offence of manslaughter with significant aggravating circumstances, rejecting the label of “aggravated manslaughter” as “not useful” and “potentially diverting” (at para. 33).

[52] I do not understand, therefore, that Devaney conflicts with Stone in respect of the availability of a “double benefit” for self-induced intoxication.

[53] In Tahir in an endorsement lean on facts, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of 12½ years for a conviction of manslaughter where the appellant had received, by virtue of that included offence, the “benefit” of his self-induced intoxication and the trial judge had found the impairment not to be mitigating to any “significant extent” (at para. 1). The Court re-affirmed a suggested range of 8 to 12 years for manslaughter with aggravating circumstances (at para. 2).

[54] I do not understand that Tahir prohibits the availability of a “double benefit” for self-induced intoxication.

[55] In Kimpe, after a trial, provocation operated to reduce second degree murder to manslaughter in the strangling death of the accused’s spouse. The accused, described as a “gentle giant”, a devoted partner, who had expressed remorse, who was a valued employee and who had a dated and irrelevant criminal record, was sentenced to 10 years incarceration. He had also panicked after the strangulation and set their house on fire.

[56] The appellant in Kimpe relied on Stone at para. 237 to submit that the victim’s provocation should operate as a significant mitigating factor in assessing his moral blameworthiness and in determining an appropriate sentence (at para. 15). The appellant argued for a lower sentence in the range of 8 or 9 years. The Court of Appeal did not reject the reliance on Stone but upheld the 10 year sentence as being justified in particular by the aggravating circumstances of a domestic homicide, an act of extreme violence over approximately 5 minutes, the vulnerability of the victim due to her small stature and the disregard of her lifeless body as he set fire to the house.

[57] Neither do I understand that Kimpe prohibits the availability of a “double benefit” for provocation.

[58] Returning to Mr. Langevin’s circumstances, I consider his self-induced psychotic state to operate as a mitigating factor, not because it serves as an excuse for his violence, as the victims’ family and friends have correctly pointed out, but because I accept that for him, it was an unexpected consequence of his cocaine use. Even during his many years of cocaine consumption, he was otherwise a kind and devoted partner and friend of many. He had no forewarning, contrary to the situation in Sullivan and quite apart from whether he should have understood its possible consequences, that he would become violently paranoid and unconnected with reality as a result of his continued consumption. However, because Mr. Langevin’s decision to consume cocaine operates as an aggravating factor on sentencing, as explained below, and because the stabbing resulted from that consumption, his unexpected self-induced psychotic state remains bound up in his heightened moral culpability for his consumption of cocaine and serves, therefore, to mitigate his moral blameworthiness only to a limited extent.

Aggravating Factors

[59] The factors serving to aggravate sentence are the following.

[60] Mr. Langevin chose to consume cocaine for many years. He knew cocaine was an illegal drug and so too his possession of it but he carried on as a daily user. He enjoyed its effects and deliberately used it as a reward at the end of each day. Directly related to his choice to consume this illegal drug, he suffered a psychotic episode and committed the most violent of acts against his partner, ending her life in a matter of seconds or minutes. He was not a person compensating through his use of cocaine for past hardships or trying to create an alternate world free of suffering and unhappiness. He had enjoyed the opposite: a happy life, a healthy body, a good job and a devoted partner. He chose to layer onto this happy life the “reward” as he phrased it, of cocaine at the end of each day. It was his choice and his decision to consume cocaine, regardless of its possible consequences whether he correctly understood those consequences or not, that serves to heighten his moral culpability for the offence.

[61] Mr. Langevin’s sentence must reflect, therefore, the strong need for denunciation of his decision to consume a highly addictive and illegal drug because it made him feel good, without any regard whatsoever for its possible dangerous consequences.

[62] Mr. Langevin appears to lack some insight into his actions and that cocaine was the clear cause. In his written apology filed at his sentencing hearing and as stated in the Presentence Report, he called his actions an “accident”. The supportive letters filed at the sentencing hearing from his friends refer to this event as being completely out of character. One friend said he was “baffled” as to how it could have occurred.

[63] In the face of Dr. Booth’s clear diagnoses and explanations, Mr. Langevin still professes not to understand how his psychotic episode could have happened. Some of his friends also do not understand. However, as the Crown has stated, there is no mystery.

[64] If Mr. Langevin’s characterization of the event as an accident is indicative of a lack of understanding that it was his cocaine use that triggered his psychotic episode and the stabbing, this would increase the risk he would present should he suffer a relapse in the future and a psychotic episode re-occur. Such an apparent lack of insight operates, therefore, although not as strongly as the others, as an aggravating factor in terms of increasing his risk to the public for the reoccurrence of a cocaine-induced violent episode.

[65] I recognize, however, that Mr. Langevin may simply be baffled as to why, after all his years of cocaine use, he suffered his first psychotic episode. This may be the “accident” he refers to, in terms of being an event that had not previously been a consequence of his cocaine use. He may well understand, even when he calls this an accident, that he can never use cocaine again, as he has stated.

[66] The result is that because I have doubts as to the degree of his insight into why the stabbing occurred, I do not accord this issue a great deal of weight as an aggravating factor.

[67] Mr. Langevin’s victim was his partner who loved and trusted him. Defence counsel submits that in Mr. Langevin's psychotic state at the time of the stabbing, the victim could have been anyone who happened to be nearby so that the stabbing should not be regarded as having occurred in a domestic situation. While it may be that anyone nearby could have been the stabbing victim, this remains speculative and, in any event, I agree that the rationale for an offence against a spouse or common law partner being a statutorily aggravating circumstance under section 718.2(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code is related to the vulnerability of persons in a domestic relationship. Their vulnerability due to their relationship based on trust and love increases their risk of bodily safety. It was Gail Fawcett’s relationship with Mr. Langevin that put her in harm’s way when she stopped running away and thought she could help Mr. Langevin stop his violent interactions against Mr. Marriner. The result is that this domestic context strongly serves to aggravate sentence.

[68] It is additionally aggravating that Mr. Langevin went to get a knife and used it against two people. He first directed his violence against Mr. Marriner. Mr. Marriner, an experienced paramedic who has been confronted with many tragedies, was a second victim of Mr. Langevin’s actions. I acknowledge Mr. Marriner remains significantly affected to this day by the serious trauma he suffered, knowing that his life was in immediate peril.

Length of Incarceration

[69] The Crown submits that in the wide range of circumstances able to amount to manslaughter, the circumstances in this case are closer to a “near murder” than a “near accident” and therefore warrant a longer period of incarceration.

[70] I have difficulty with this characterization, however, because of the psychotic episode that altered Mr. Langevin’s perception of reality, as Dr. Booth has indicated. Mr. Langevin was clearly in a confused and paranoid state when he stabbed Gail Fawcett. That mental state has allowed him to plead guilty to manslaughter as opposed to murder. Of course he is responsible for choosing to use cocaine. He intended to use an illegal drug. His offence of manslaughter is not due to provocation from the victim, as in Stone and Kimpe. He is also responsible for his cocaine-induced psychotic episode stemming from his decision to use this illegal drug and for the stabbing that resulted from the psychotic episode. In these circumstances where the self-induced psychotic episode has already served to negate the element of intent for murder but it remains seriously aggravating that Mr. Langevin chose to consume cocaine, the assessment of his moral culpability as being a “near murder” or a “near accident” becomes difficult.

[71] To characterize the stabbing as a near murder because of Mr. Langevin’s intentional consumption of cocaine, when he was unaware or perhaps chose to be blind to a possible consequence of a psychotic state, appears to me overly harsh and inappropriate. On the other hand, to label his stabbing caused by his use of cocaine as closer to an accident risks minimizing his moral blameworthiness for his deliberate and long-term consumption of this illegal and dangerous drug.

[72] I think it preferable to avoid trying to label where his actions might fall on the spectrum of possible manslaughter scenarios between the low end of near accident and the high end of near murder. It is a characterization in the circumstances of this case that does not assist, in my view, in an assessment of an appropriate sentence.

[73] Instead, the task remains one of adequately reflecting the primary need for denunciation and deterrence for the manslaughter and arriving at a sentence that is proportionate to its gravity and Mr. Langevin’s degree of responsibility or, his moral blameworthiness for it.

[74] I accept the Crown’s cases referred to above establishing a range of 7 or 8 to 12 years for circumstances somewhat similar to the present case. Of those cases involving the offence of manslaughter, I regard Devaney (11 years) and Kimpe (10 years) as most applicable.

[75] The case of R. v. Dupuis, 2014 ONSC 3573 relied upon by defence counsel is also relevant to Mr. Langevin’s circumstances. After a trial on second degree murder, the accused was found guilty of manslaughter in the stabbing death of the victim with whom she had been in a relationship. She had stabbed him during the course of an angry argument. She was 21 years of age at the time, a single mother of a young son, remorseful, had made significant rehabilitative efforts and was without a criminal record. She had suffered a dysfunctional childhood. There was no provocation or intoxication, only anger that had caused the stabbing. The trial judge considered the range to be 7 to 12 years imprisonment, relying on Kimpe. A sentence of 8 years was imposed.

[76] For Mr. Langevin, in recognition of the generally accepted sentencing range and the particular mitigating and aggravating factors reviewed before, I impose a sentence of 8 years incarceration less his presentence custody credit. I say to Mr. Langevin and especially to Gail Fawcett’s family and friends that I regard this sentence as being completely inadequate to ever compensate for her life that was so violently taken. No sentence can achieve this. As stated in the Devaney case, attributed to Justice Watt of the Ontario Court of Appeal, “no sentence, regrettably, has such restorative powers”.

Mr. Langevin, please stand at this time.

[77] I sentence you for the manslaughter of Gail Fawcett to 8 years incarceration. You have already served the equivalent of 1787 days as your credit for presentence custody, leaving the balance of the total sentence left to serve of just over 3 years. I ask the Registrar to indicate on your warrant of committal that the sentence left to serve is 1133 days, after those 1787 days of credit are deducted.

[78] I additionally impose the mandatory DNA Order, requiring you to submit to the taking of a bodily sample for the purposes of DNA analysis and data bank storage, as well as an Order under s. 109 of the Criminal Code, prohibiting you for your lifetime from possessing any firearm or ammunition or other item as referred to in that section.

The Honourable Madam Justice Lynn Ratushny

Released: October 23, 2018