COURT FILE NO.: FC-14-1125-1 DATE: 2018/10/11

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: S.M., Applicant -and- N.T., Respondent

BEFORE: Justice P. MacEachern

COUNSEL: S. Arlitt, for the Applicant N.T., Self-Represented (Appeared via teleconference)

HEARD: August 15, 2018

Note: Pursuant to s. 137 (2) of the Courts of Justice Act, no person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying the child in relation to this proceeding.

Endorsement

Overview

[1] This is a motion for summary judgement under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules [1], brought by the Applicant within her Motion to Change proceeding. The Applicant seeks a final order granting her sole custody of the parties’ 5 year old child, K., no access to the Respondent, child support based on imputed income, and a restraining order.

[2] For the reasons that follow, I have granted the motion for summary judgement, making a final order with respect to custody, access and child support, and a restraining order.

Initials

[3] The Court has discretion to grant an order restricting public access to a court file where it is in the child’s best interests. In this matter, the Respondent has been criminally convicted of sexually assaulting the Applicant’s older child, L.; K. is L.’s half-sibling. In order to protect L.’s identity, I make the following orders under s.137(2) of the Court of Justice Act [2]:

a. The parties and children K. and L. shall be identified by their initials in these proceedings. The title of proceedings is hereby amended accordingly; and b. Except as needed for enforcement purposes of this Order with the required authorities, no person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying the child, L., in relation to this proceeding.

[4] Any orders made within the criminal proceedings protecting the identity of L. continue to apply.

Background

[5] The parties were in a common law relationship from 2009 to February 1, 2014. They have one child, K., born […], 2012.

[6] The Applicant has one other child from a previous relationship, L., born […], 2006, who is now 12 years of age.

[7] The Respondent has four other children from prior relationships.

[8] On October 29, 2014, Justice Parfett granted a final order providing for the parties to have joint custody of K., with equal timesharing (“the 2014 Order”). The 2014 Order provides for the Respondent to pay the Applicant child support in the amount of $50 per month, which is described as a set off amount taking into account that the Respondent already has four other children and that the Applicant receives all of the child tax credit. The parties’ incomes are not specified in the order.

[9] On March 7, 2015, the Applicant filed a Motion to Change the 2014 Order. She sought sole custody, with access to the Respondent every second weekend, and to change child support to $100 per month.

[10] The Respondent filed a Response to the Motion to Change, opposing the change in custody and access, but seeking a reduction in child support based on his position that his income had decreased from what it was at the time of the 2014 Order, which he said was close to $40,000 per year, to under $28,000 per year.

[11] In December of 2016, the Respondent’s access to K. was suspended due to an investigation by the Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa (“CAS”) related to his conduct towards L. In January of 2017, the Respondent was charged with sexually assaulting L. On June 26, 2017, he plead guilty to those charges.

[12] On August 10, 2017, Justice Engelking, at a motion brought by the Applicant on an urgent basis, formally suspended the Respondent’s access to K. on a temporary without prejudice basis, pending the return of the motion on August 29, 2017 to allow the Respondent to file responding material.

[13] On August 29, 2017, the motion was argued before Justice Summers. On September 11, 2017, Justice Summers granted the Respondent temporary supervised access with K. for 3 hours per week.

[14] On October 25, 2017, the Respondent was sentenced for his criminal conviction. He was sentenced to a period of 18 months in custody, followed by a term of probation for three years with conditions that include:

a) Not to communicate directly or indirectly with L. or the Applicant except with the Applicant’s consent to facilitate access to K.; b) Not to be within 500 metres of any place he knows L. or the Applicant to live, work, go to school, frequent or to be, except as required for court appearances or for the purpose of facilitating access to K.; c) Not to be in the company or communicate with persons under the age of 16 except for the purpose of employment, except for K. in the presence of a designated access supervisor and the CAS, if actively involved, and except with [Respondent’s other children] with the consent of their mother and the CAS, if actively involved; and d) The Respondent to attend and actively participate in all assessments, counselling, and rehabilitative programs as directed by the probation officer and to complete them to the satisfaction of the probation officer, including attending and actively participating in all assessments, counselling, and rehabilitation as recommend by Dr. Federoff or his designate, and to continue to see Dr. Federoff or his designate and comply with all treatment and recommendations, including medications prescribed.

[15] The Respondent’s sentence also includes an Order pursuant to section 161 of the Criminal Code that prohibits the Respondent, for a period of eight years, from:

a) attending at a public park or public swimming area if persons under the age of 16 are present or can reasonably expect to be present, or a daycare centre, school ground, playground, or community centre; b) being within 500 metres from the dwelling house where L. normally resides or from where she attends school; and c) seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment or becoming a volunteer in any capacity that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards a person under the age of 16 years.

[16] A settlement conference was scheduled for March 19, 2018. That conference did not take place because the Respondent did not participate.

[17] The Respondent was served with the Applicant’s motion material for this motion on June 18, 2018.

[18] The Respondent has not had any access to K. since two supervised visits took place in September/October 2017.

Evidence

[19] The Applicant has filed two affidavits in these proceedings, one sworn August 24, 2017 and a second affidavit sworn June 7, 2018.

[20] The Respondent has filed three affidavits, one being his Response to Motion to Change, sworn April 11, 2016, a second brief affidavit sworn April 11, 2016, and a third affidavit sworn August 13, 2017. He has filed a financial statement, sworn April 11, 2016. The Respondent has not filed an affidavit specifically on this motion for summary judgment, nor an updated financial statement. The Respondent did participate at the motion by phone.

Analysis and Disposition

[21] The first issue on this motion is whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial to determine the issues in dispute fairly and justly. Rule 16(6) of the Family Law Rules [3] requires the Court to grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. The moving party has the onus to provide evidence that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.

[22] As set out in Hryniak v. Mauldin:

“There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result [4].”

[23] Based on the evidence before, including that this is a motion to change that normally proceeds based on affidavit evidence, and that both parties have had the opportunity to file affidavits, I am satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial in this matter and that I am able to reach a fair and just determination on the issues in these proceedings, being the Applicant’s Motion to Change the 2014 Order and the Respondent’s Response to that Motion to Change.

Custody and Access

[24] The test for determining custody and access is the best interests of the child [5]. These are to be determined based on a consideration of all of the child’s needs and circumstances.

[25] Based on the evidence before me, primarily being the Respondent’s current incarceration and the circumstances that lead to that incarceration, I find that it is in K.’s best interests to be in the sole custody of the Applicant, with no access by the Respondent unless agreed to in writing by the Applicant and the CAS, if the Society is actively involved, or further Order of the Court.

[26] The Respondent is required to participate in assessments, counselling, and rehabilitative programs as part of his probation. At the hearing of the motion, the Respondent advised the Court that he was participating in such programming now, and would continue to do so. It may be that some access between the Respondent and K. will be in K.’s best interests at some point in the future. I am not making any determination of what access may or may not be in K.’s best interests at a later date, when the Respondent has completed further counselling and/or treatment or is no longer incarcerated. That may be the subject of a future motion to change.

[27] I also find that it is in the child’s best interest for the Applicant to be permitted to apply for a passport for the child, K., without the need for the consent of the Respondent, and to be permitted to travel with the child, K., including travel outside of Canada, also without the need for the Respondent’s consent.

Restraining Order

[28] The Applicant seeks a permanent restraining order prohibiting the Respondent from having any direct or indirect contact with her or either child, and from attending within 500 metres of her home, place of employment, the children’s school, or any other place the Applicant or the children are known to frequent.

[29] In her material, the Applicant states that she is seeking this restraining order so that, when the criminal restraining order expires, there will be a family court restraining order in place. The Applicant does not provide any further evidence in support of her request for a restraining order, other than the conduct that harmed L. and her fears for K.’s safety given those events. The Applicant does not allege that the Respondent has otherwise threatened the Applicant’s safety.

[30] Under s.35(1) of the CLRA [6], the Court can order a temporary or final restraining order against any person if the Applicant has reasonable grounds to fear for her safety or for the safety of a child in her custody.

[31] Under s. 46(1) of the Family Law Act [7], the Court may make a temporary or final restraining order against the Applicant’s spouse or former spouse, or against a person with whom the Applicant is cohabiting or has cohabited for any length of time, if the Applicant has reasonable grounds to fear for her safety or for the safety of a child in her custody.

[32] The test under both statutes is to determine whether the moving party “has reasonable grounds to fear for his or her safety or for the safety of any child in his or her custody” [8]. The Courts must exercise caution when granting a restraining order due to the nature of restraining orders: limiting the freedom of movement and communication of a party and the risks of criminal sanctions if breached [9]. The onus is upon the person requesting the restraining order, on a balance of probabilities, to persuade the court that it is required [10].

[33] The restraining order sought by the Applicant is too broad. Based on the evidence before me, I do not find that there is a basis to restrain the Respondent with respect to communications or contact with the Applicant. The Applicant has not provided any evidence upon which she alleges that she fears for her safety. Portions of the restraining order imposed by the criminal court do restrain the Respondent from contact with the Applicant, although an express exception has been made for the purpose of facilitating access to K. The Applicant’s proposed restraining order does not provide for any means to discuss access with K.

[34] The restraining order sought by the Applicant also does not provide any mechanism for agreed upon access to K., even though the Applicant, in her affidavit, expressly contemplates that the Respondent may bring a request to change access after he completes various programing.

[35] I am satisfied there should be a permanent restraining order in place for L. For K., the restraining order should mirror the criminal terms, which allows for communications with respect to access, and, while K. is under 18 years of age, for access to take place when agreed upon by the Applicant and the CAS, if the Society is involved. As this restraining order will be a final order, once K. is over 18 years of age, it is her consent that will be required.

Child Support

[36] The 2014 Order for child support was premised upon the child, K., being in a shared timesharing arrangement and was based on a set-off amount. K. is now residing solely with the Applicant. I find this change, as well as the Respondent incarceration since October 25, 2017, to constitute a change in the circumstances sufficient to warrant a variation of the child support.

[37] The Applicant seeks an order requiring the Respondent to pay child support commencing May 1, 2018 in the amount of $227 per month, being the table child support payable for a payor earning $27,300 per year. Effective January 1, 2019, she seeks an order increasing this to $249 per month, being the table payable for a payor earning $29,250 per year.

[38] These income levels are based on the annual income for a payor earning minimum wage, based on a 37.5 hour week for 52 weeks of the year. The increase on January 1, 2019 is premised upon an increase in the minimum wage that previously was to come into effect on that date – this increase has now been repealed by the Ontario government.

[39] The Applicant did not provided me with any caselaw in support of her position that income should be imputed to the Respondent.

[40] The Respondent’s position is that he does not have a current ability to pay child support due to his incarceration but is agreeable to paying child support in the future based on his income, once he is able to earn income.

[41] Section 19 of the Child Support Guidelines [11] grants the court broad discretion to impute income as it consider appropriate in the circumstances. These circumstances include where a spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed.

[42] I have considered the decisions of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Drygala v. Pauli [12] and Lawson v. Lawson [13]. I have also reviewed a number of decision which considered a payor’s obligation to pay child support during a period of incarceration (Zapreff v. Zegarac, 2015 ONCJ 243, Rogers v. Rogers, 2013 ONSC 1997, Khara v. McManus, 2007 ONCJ 223, and Costello v. Costello, 2012 ONCJ 399; Alazari v. Al Rubaie, 2018 ONSC 3433; Cote v. Taylor 2013 ONSC 5428; and, R.(P.D.) v. R.(J.E.), 2005 NBBR 16, Billingsley v. Billingsley, 2010 ONSC 3381, Cote v. Taylor, 2013 ONSC 5428, 38 R.F.L. (7th) 448]).

[43] In this matter, the Respondent has no ability to earn any income while incarcerated. His ability to earn income once he is no longer incarcerated will also be limited, given the conditions that continue to apply to him on release. There is also no evidence before me the Respondent has any assets from which he can draw from to pay child support. The Respondent’s financial statement sworn August 1, 2014 shows that his only assets were a ten year old car valued at $1,000 and $100 in savings. It also shows debt of over $20,000. The Respondent’s financial statement sworn April 11, 2016 does not show any assets, nor any debts. The Applicant has not provided evidence that the Respondent has means greater than what he discloses in his financial statement. The 2014 Order, although made on a set off basis, reflects the Respondent’s limited means in that it only provided for the Respondent to pay child support of $50 per month. The Respondent’s limited means is also reflected in the Applicant’s original Change Information Form, in which she only sought child support in the amount of $100 per month.

[44] This matter is not a situation, in contrast to some of the other decisions, where the Respondent’s present incarceration is related to conduct that was motivated by an intention to evade his child support obligation. Although the law in Ontario, under the Drygala v. Pauli decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, is that there is no need to find a specific intention to evade child support obligations before income can be imputed, the lack of such an intention may still form part of the circumstances the court may consider in determining whether it is appropriate to impute income [14].

[45] Based on all of the circumstances before me, I find that it is not appropriate to impute income to the Respondent for the purpose of paying child support. The Respondent has no ability to pay child support at this time. The consequences of making a child support order that the Respondent has no means of paying exposes the Respondent to further enforcement measures due to non-payment, which ultimately exposes him to the risk of further incarceration. Such a result does not serve the interests of justice, does not provide a fair and just result, and does not assist the best interests of K.

Orders

[46] Therefore, I make the following final orders, which do not restrict or modify the orders made in the criminal proceedings as part of the Respondent’s sentencing, which continue to apply:

1. The parties and children K. and L. shall be identified by their initials in these proceedings. The title of proceedings is hereby amended accordingly.
2. Except as needed for enforcement purposes of this Order with the required authorities, no person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying the child, L., in relation to this proceeding.
3. If requested by the Applicant, a separate Order shall issue confirming the names and birthdates of K. and/or L. if needed to identify them as the individuals to which the order issued using initials relates, to be used for enforcement purposes only and only to be provided to the required authorities.
4. The Applicant shall have sole custody of K., pursuant to s.28 of the Children’s Law Reform Act [15].
5. The Respondent shall not have any access to K. unless agreed to in writing by the Applicant, and subject to any required approval by the Children’s Aid Society, if involved, or pursuant to further Court Order.
6. The Applicant shall be permitted to apply for a passport for the child, K., without the need for the consent of the Respondent, and permitted to travel with the child, K., including travel outside of Canada, also without the need for the Respondent’s consent.
7. The Respondent shall be restrained from communicating with the child L., either directly or indirectly, and from attending within 100 metres of L.’s residence, place of employment, school, or any other place that L. is known to frequent, pursuant to s.35(1) of the Children’s Law Reform Act [16].
8. The Respondent shall be restrained from communicating with the child K., either directly or indirectly, and from attending within 100 metres of K.’s residence, place of employment, school, or any other place that K. is known to frequent, pursuant to s.35(1) of the Children’s Law Reform Act [17]; except, while K. is under 18 years of age, for any access agreed upon by the Applicant and the Children’s Aid Society, if the Society is involved; or when K. is older than 18 years of age, for any contact to the Respondent to which K. may consent in writing; or pursuant to further Court Order.
9. Effective November 1, 2017, the Respondent’s obligation to pay child support to the Applicant for the support of K. shall be reduced to $0 per month, pursuant to section 33 of the Family Law Act [18].
10. Forthwith upon the Respondent obtaining employment or other income, he shall provide the Applicant with proof of such income, including supporting documents, so that his child support obligation may be calculated. The date that child support shall be payable by the Respondent to the Applicant shall be the date that the Respondent commences earning income at a rate of greater than $12,000 per year (being the income amount for which child support begins to be payable for one child under the Child Support Guidelines Tables [19] amended November 22, 2017). The amount of child support that shall be payable by the Respondent to the Applicant shall be determined by a court on a motion to change if the parties are not able to otherwise agree on the amount.
11. The Respondent shall continue to have an obligation to provide the Applicant with his annual income information pursuant to sections 24.1 and 25 of the Child Support Guidelines [20] [i].
12. As the Orders made at 10. and 11. above require the Respondent to communicate with the Applicant, these Orders are suspended for so long as the Respondent is prohibited from communicating with the Applicant directly or indirectly pursuant to the terms of the orders made in the criminal proceedings on his sentencing, or until such time as the Applicant consents in writing for the Respondent to communicate with her, or her counsel or designated agent, for the purpose of the Respondent providing the required income information and/or for determining the Respondent’s child support obligation.

Costs

[47] If the parties are unable to agree on the issue of costs, the Applicant may serve and file submissions with respect to costs on or before November 12, 2018. The Respondent may serve and file submissions with respect to costs on or before January 10, 2019 (he may file these earlier if possible, but extended time is provided given the anticipated difficulties to the Respondent preparing his response while incarcerated). Cost submissions of both parties shall be no more than three pages in length, plus any offers to settle and bills of costs, and shall comply with Rule 4.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure [21].

Date: October 11, 2018 Justice P. MacEachern

Footnotes

[1] Family Law Rules, O.Reg. 114/99 as am., Rule 16 [2] Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.43, as am., s.137(2) [3] Family Law Rules, O.Reg. 114/99, as am., Rule 16(6) [4] Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87 at para. 49 [5] Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.12, s. 24 [6] Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.12, as am., s.35(1) [7] Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.F.3, as am [8] Wright v. Holmstrom, 2015 ONSC 1906, Fuda v. Fuda, 2011 ONSC 154, Khara v. McManus, 2007 ONCJ 223, D.F. v. D.C., 2018 ONSC 4481 [9] C. (D.) v. C. (M.T.), 2015 ONCJ 242, at para. 64 [10] C. (D.) v. C. (M.T.), ibid, at para. 64 [11] Child Support Guidelines, O.Reg. 391/97 as am. [12] Drygala v. Pauli , [2002] O.J. No. 3731 (Ont.C.A.) [13] Lawson v. Lawson , [2006] O.J. No. 3179 (Ont.C.A.) [14] See for example, Cote v. Taylor, 2013 ONSC 5428 at para. 23 [15] Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.12, as am, s.28 [16] Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.12, as am, s.35(1) [17] Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.12, as am, s.35(1) [18] Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.F.3, as am, s.33 [19] Child Support Guidelines, O.Reg. 391/97 as am, Schedule I [20] Child Support Guidelines, O.Reg. 391/97 as am, ss. 24.1 and 25 [21] Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194

Appendix: Child Support Guidelines Sections 24.1 and 25

[i] Sections 24.1 and 25 of the Child Support Guidelines O.Reg. 391/97 as am, provide as follows:

Annual obligation to provide income information

24.1 (1) Every person whose income or other financial information is used to determine the amount of an order for the support of a child shall, no later than 30 days after the anniversary of the date on which the order was made in every year in which the child is a child within the meaning of this Regulation, provide every party to the order with the following, unless the parties have agreed otherwise:

1. For the most recent taxation year, a copy of the person’s, i. personal income tax return, including any materials that were filed with the return, and ii. notice of assessment and, if any, notice of reassessment.
2. As applicable, any current information in writing about, i. the status and amount of any expenses included in the order pursuant to subsection 7 (1), and ii. any loan, scholarship or bursaries the child has received or will receive in the coming year that affect or will affect the expenses referred to in subparagraph i. O. Reg. 25/10, s. 6.

Notices of assessment

(2) If the person has not received his or her notice of assessment or notice of reassessment for the most recent taxation year by the date referred to in subsection (1), the person shall provide every party to the order with a copy of the notice as soon as possible after the person receives the notice. O. Reg. 25/10, s. 6.

Change in address

(3) If the address at which a party receives documents changes, the party shall, at least 30 days before the next anniversary of the date on which the order was made, give written notice of his or her updated address information to every person required to provide documents and information under subsection (1). O. Reg. 25/10, s. 6.

Failure to comply

(4) If a person required to provide a document or information under this section fails to do so, a court may, on application by the party who did not receive the document or information, make one or more of the following orders:

1. An order finding the person to be in contempt of court.
2. An order awarding costs in favour of the applicant up to an amount that fully compensates the applicant for all costs incurred in the proceedings.
3. An order requiring the person to provide the document or information to, i. the court, ii. the applicant, and iii. any other party to whom the person did not provide the document or information when required to do so. O. Reg. 25/10, s. 6.

Exception

(5) Subsection (4) does not apply if the person who fails to provide the document or information is a child who is not a party to the order for support. O. Reg. 25/10, s. 6.

Transition

(6) In the case of an order to which subsection (1) applies that is in existence on the day section 5 of Ontario Regulation 25/10 comes into force, if the first date by which a person must provide documents and information under that subsection occurs less than six months after the day on which the person provided documents and information under section 25, the person is not required to provide documents and information under subsection (1) in the first year in which he or she would otherwise have been required to provide them. O. Reg. 25/10, s. 6.

Continuing obligation to provide income information

25. (1) Every parent or spouse against whom an order for the support of a child has been made must, on the written request of the other spouse or the person or agency entitled to payment under the order not more than once a year after the making of the order and as long as the child is a child within the meaning of this Regulation, provide that other spouse, or the person or agency entitled to payment under the order, with,

(a) the documents referred to in subsection 21 (1) for any of the three most recent taxation years for which the parent or spouse has not previously provided the documents; (b) as applicable, any current information in writing about, (i) the status and amount of any expenses included in the order pursuant to subsection 7 (1), and (ii) any loan, scholarship or bursaries the child has received that affect the expenses referred to in subclause (i); and (c) as applicable, any current information, in writing, about the circumstances relied on by the court in a determination of undue hardship. O. Reg. 391/97, s. 25 (1) ; O. Reg. 25/10, s. 7 (1, 2).

Below minimum income

(2) Where a court has determined that the parent or spouse against whom an order for the support of a child is sought does not have to pay child support because his or her income level is below the minimum amount required for application of the tables, that parent or spouse must, on the written request of the other spouse or the applicant under section 33 of the Act, not more than once a year after the determination and as long as the child is a child within the meaning of this Regulation, provide the other spouse or the applicant with the documents referred to in subsection 21 (1) for any of the three most recent taxation years for which the parent or spouse has not previously provided the documents. O. Reg. 391/97, s. 25 (2) ; O. Reg. 25/10, s. 7 (3).

Obligation of receiving parent or spouse

(3) Where the income information of the parent or spouse in favour of whom an order for the support of a child is made is used to determine the amount of the order, the parent or spouse must, not more than once a year after the making of the order and as long as the child is a child within the meaning of this Regulation, on the written request of the other parent or spouse, provide the other parent or spouse with the documents and information referred to in subsection (1). O. Reg. 391/97, s. 25 (3) ; O. Reg. 25/10, s. 7 (4).

Information requests

(4) Where a parent or spouse requests information from the other parent or spouse under any of subsections (1) to (3) and the income information of the requesting parent or spouse is used to determine the amount of the order for the support of a child, the requesting parent or spouse must include the documents and information referred to in subsection (1) with the request. O. Reg. 391/97, s. 25 (4) .

Time limit

(5) A parent or spouse who receives a request made under any of subsections (1) to (3) must provide the required documents within 30 days after the request’s receipt if the parent or spouse resides in Canada or the United States and within 60 days after the request’s receipt if the parent or spouse resides elsewhere. O. Reg. 391/97, s. 25 (5) .

Deemed receipt

(6) A request made under any of subsections (1) to (3) is deemed to have been received 10 days after it is sent. O. Reg. 391/97, s. 25 (6) .

Failure to comply

(7) A court may, on application by either spouse, an applicant under section 33 of the Act or an order assignee, where the parent or spouse has failed to comply with any of subsections (1) to (3),

(a) consider the parent or spouse to be in contempt of court and award costs in favour of the applicant up to an amount that fully compensates the applicant for all costs incurred in the proceedings; or (b) make an order requiring the parent or spouse to provide the required documents to the court, as well as to the spouse, order assignee or applicant under section 33 of the Act, as the case may be. O. Reg. 391/97, s. 25 (7) .

Unenforceable provision

(8) A provision in a judgment, order or agreement purporting to limit a parent’s or spouse’s obligation to provide documents under this section is unenforceable. O. Reg. 391/97, s. 25 (8) .

COURT FILE NO.: FC-14-1125-1 DATE: 2018/10/11 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE RE: S.M., Applicant -and- N.T., Respondent BEFORE: Justice P. MacEachern COUNSEL: S. Arlitt, for the Applicant N.T., Self-Represented (Appeared via teleconference) HEARD: August 15, 2018 ENDORSEMENT Justice P. MacEachern

Released: October 11, 2018