Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CV-10-400035/ 08-CV-352871/08-CV-364585/ 04-CV-279726/CV-14-515899/CV-18-594948/CV-16-544153/ CV-16-564078/CV-14-515899 various

DATE: 20180928

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Peoples Trust Company, David Brooker, Taras Kulish, Moses Muyal, Michael Harold Kimberly, Stancer Gossin Rose, Blair Coleman Rose, Raymond Stancer, Mitchell Hart Rose, Rose and Rose, Blair Coleman Rose, Scott Kelly, Ron Hatcher, Steinberg Morton Frymer LLP, Rahul Shastri, Ira T. Kagan, David Winer, David Sloan, Baker Schneider Ruggiero, Patrice Côté, Michael John Mitchell, Nicholas Carlos Canizares, David Hart, Bresver Scheininger & Chapman LLP, Rui Ruivo, Frank Pa, Atlantic (HS) Financial Corporation, Tom Pires, Megacorp, Krishnan Chahal and Nutan Chahal, Plaintiffs

AND:

Nadire Atas and 626381 Ontario Limited, Defendants

AND RE: Dale & Lessman LLP, Robert E. Dale, David E. Mende, Christina J. Wallis, Kagan Shastri LLP, Rahul Shastri, David Winer, Stancer Gossin Rose LLP, Raymond Stancer, Eric Gossin, Mitchell Rose, Garth Dingwall, Ralph Steinberg, J. David Sloan, Peoples Trust Company, Derek Peddelesden, Frank Renou, Martin Mallich and Sharon Small, Plaintiffs

AND:

Nadire Atas and 626381 Ontario Limited, Defendants

BEFORE: Corbett J.

COUNSEL: Christina J. Wallis, for Peoples Trust and the Chahals Gary M. Caplan, for Applicants other than Peoples Trust and the Chahals Yoginder Gulia, for Krishnan and Nutal Chahal D. Yiokaris for David Sloan and Baker Schneider A. Pantel, for various LawPro defendants Nadire Atas, self-represented and for 626381 Ontario Limited

HEARD: September 14, 2018 RELEASED: September 28, 2018

CASE MANAGEMENT ENDORSEMENT

Request to Adjourn This Case Management Conference

[1] Ms Atas contacted my office late on September 13, 2018 to request adjournment of the case management conference scheduled for September 14, 2018. She advised that she was “deathly ill”.

[2] Opposing parties opposed the adjournment on the basis that the last-minute request was a continuation of ongoing vexatious behaviour and should not be tolerated.

[3] The Court directed that Ms Atas advise of the nature of her illness, why it would prevent her from attending the conference, and to be in a position to provide medical documentation about her situation.

[4] Ms Atas sent further emails on the evening of September 13, 2018 in response to the Court’s direction, but after business hours, and these were not received until shortly before the conference was scheduled to begin.

[5] On September 14, 2018, Ms Atas attended the case management conference, on time, for a scheduled 9:00 a.m. start. She advised that she had attended at hospital emergency the night before. She had papers attesting to this visit, on which was written that she should re-attend at the hospital “as soon as possible” for an ultrasound. Ms Atas told me that this was the attending doctor’s direction and that S/he had written it down and initialed it at her request, so that she could show it to me. I asked Ms Atas why the ultrasound had not been done when she was at the hospital, if it was urgent. She did not know and suggested that perhaps the equipment was not available immediately.

[6] On September 14th, Ms Atas appeared to me to be ill – not “deathly ill” but definitely under the weather. She was alert and did not appear flushed or fevered, but she did seem pallid and not her “usual self”. I suggested to her that the doctor’s advice was that she deal with her situation promptly, but that a further short delay while we conducted our conference would not preclude her from obtaining an ultrasound once we were done, that the doctor had not written that she was too ill to attend to her court business, and that I intended to proceed with the conference.

[7] Ms Atas remained in the conference and participated fully for the next three hours.

[8] I am satisfied that Ms Atas was ill. Thus, I am satisfied that her concerns were not merely vexatious behaviour. On the other hand, I am satisfied that Ms Atas was well enough to attend and participate in the conference.

[9] I have pointed out, repeatedly, that Ms Atas must provide the Court with sufficient information to enable the Court to make an informed decision about scheduling when she seeks an adjournment. Ms Atas resisted this very conference on the basis that she was “not available”, without particulars. The Court directed her to explain her unavailability. When she did so, her explanation was insufficient, and the Court directed that the conference proceed. In this context, a last-minute adjournment request, without a doctor’s note or other explanation, or truly exigent circumstances, is inappropriate. At the risk of repetition, it is the Court, not the litigant, who decides whether to adjourn a conference, and a failure to explain and, where appropriate, document An adjournment request, may be fatal to that request.

HRTO decision

[10] By decision dated July 11, 2018, the HRTO found Ms Atas to be a vexatious litigant (Atas v. Dale and Lessman LLP, 2018 HRTO 894). The Tribunal’s decision raises two concerns for this court.

(i) Breach of this Court’s Judgment

[11] At paragraph 26 of its decision, the HRTO wrote as follows:

I note that the applicant never filed a copy of Justice Corbett’s decision with this Tribunal. She filed this Application on May 2, 2017. The application was incomplete and the Tribunal provided the applicant with several extensions to complete it. On December 13, 2017, she requested an extension of time to complete her application until January 8, 2018. On December 8, 2017, the Court had informed the applicant that Justice Corbett would render his decision. Justice Corbett rendered his decision on January 3, 2018. On January 15, 2018, the applicant emailed the Tribunal attaching the Court’s December 8, 2017 letter and asked for directions on how to proceed pending her appeal of Justice Corbett’s decision. In her email, she stated “[a]lthough Justice Corbett does not have the authority over the Tribunals (sic), the requirement that the Order be provided to the Tribunal can obviously taint or influence the matter before the Tribunal.” She did not attach a copy of the decision to her correspondence with the Tribunal. The failure to attach the Court’s decision appears to be a failure to comply with Justice Corbett’s order to this effect in his decision. (2018 HRTO 894, para. 26)

[12] This is obviously of concern to this Court – a finding by the HRTO that Ms Atas has apparently breached this Court’s judgment. Ms Atas explained to me that there was no ongoing process at the HRTO when this Court’s judgment was rendered on January 3, 2018. She advised that she did provide the HRTO with the judgment – she thinks around the end of January, 2018.

[13] Ms Atas was, of course, aware of the HRTO’s decision of July 11, 2018 before this case management conference. She was not aware with this Court’s concern about the HRTO’s decision. My inquiries were for the purpose of deciding whether further steps should be taken on this issue. In this spirit:

(a) Ms Atas may (but is not required to) provide this Court with information and documentation to establish

(i) whether, when and how she advised the HRTO about this Court’s judgment of January 3, 2018;

(ii) the status of Ms Atas’ HRTO proceedings at the material times; and

(iii) any other information that would shed further light on the quoted portion of the HRTO’s decision.

If Ms Atas decides to provide this information, she should do so by October 15, 2018.

(b) Other parties may provide information about this issue, and/or respond to information provided by Ms Atas, by October 29, 2018.

[14] A deliberate breach of this Court’s judgment could lead to a finding of contempt. Not all non-compliance, however, rises to the level of contempt. At this point the Court is aware of the HRTO decision, is concerned about it, and is soliciting information to assist the Court in deciding whether to pursue the issue further. Ms Atas has the right to remain silent, since her liberty interest may be engaged here.

[15] Finally, I note the HRTO’s statement of the history of the matter before it in the first five paragraphs of its decision which, when read in concert with paragraph 26 of the decision, seems to say that there were ongoing processes before the HRTO, and that Ms Atas never provided the HRTO with a copy of this court’s judgment. The HRTO finds that Ms Atas explained this failure on the basis that she had appealed this court’s judgment and did not wish to provide it to the HRTO for fear the decision would taint the HRTO’s view of matters. Any information that can be provided by any of the parties on these points would assist the court in determining whether to pursue this issue further.

(ii) Request for Reconsideration of HRTO Decision

[16] Ms Atas has not made a request for reconsideration of the HRTO’s decision declaring her vexatious. The deadline for such a request is 30 days. The HRTO decision was rendered on July 11, 2018. Thus the deadline has passed.

[17] Ms Atas advised me that, in her opinion, the HRTO simply applied this Court’s judgment rather than carrying out its own analysis of Ms Atas’ record as a litigant before the Tribunal. Thus, she told me, she saw no point in seeking reconsideration until after the Court of Appeal has disposed of her appeal from my judgment of January 3, 2018.

[18] Ms Atas’ appeal from my judgment of January 3, 2018 had not been perfected by the time of this case conference (September 14, 2018). She expected and hoped to perfect on September 14th. Assuming that she did so, or that she does perfect her appeal soon, the responding parties will have to complete their appeal materials, then the appeal must be scheduled, argued, and a decision rendered. It will be many months, at minimum, one would expect, before all of that is accomplished.

[19] Ms Atas told me that in “exceptional” circumstances, the deadline to seek reconsideration of an HRTO decision can be extended. In her view, this principle should extend her time to seek reconsideration until after her appeal from my judgment of January 3, 2018.

[20] Ms Atas has a history of this sort of thing– taking a position on fair process, acting on it, and then revealing it after-the-fact to affected parties. When her view of process does not find favour, she then argues that, as a self-represented litigant, she should not be disadvantaged by her procedural error.

[21] It is not for this Court to involve itself in the HRTO process, of course. However, I have told Ms Atas that, on ordinary principles that apply to extensions, she should bring her request to extend the deadline for reconsideration now, so that the HRTO can rule prospectively on the issue. It will be for the HRTO to decide what to do if and when Ms Atas ever does make a request for reconsideration.

(iii) Co-ordinated Control of Vexatious Litigants

[22] As I found in my judgment of January 3, 2018, this Court does not have jurisdiction to restrict Ms Atas’ recourse to administrative tribunals like the HRTO. But neither should this Court ignore the opportunity presented to Ms Atas by administrative proceedings for further vexatious conduct. When faced with a vexatious litigant like Ms Atas, this Court must take a wide view to its case management role, to reduce the risk of Ms Atas playing the courts and the HRTO off against each other, to delay matters and drive up costs.

[23] There are recent examples within Ms Atas’ court proceedings. To forestall just such tactics in these proceedings, this Court noted in its judgment of January 3, 2018, that case management would not be stayed pending any appeal that was taken from the judgment. Ms Atas did not accept this statement and then advised that she would move for a stay in the Court of Appeal. After her stay motion failed, and Ms Atas still did not follow the case management directions in the judgment, Ms Atas began a campaign to have me removed as the case management judge for bias, culminating, at this point, in the Chavali request addressed below. She has failed to comply with case management directions and at this case management conference sought extensions of all pending deadlines in the matters under case management on the basis of deadlines she faces in the Court of Appeal and before Pollak J. in the contempt proceedings. The goal – manifestly clear at this point – is to delay case management as long as possible, to obtain in this fashion, to the extent possible, the effect of the stay that was denied to her by the Court of Appeal.

[24] It is for this Court to deal with delays in its own process. It is for Pollak J. to deal with the contempt proceedings before her and for the Court of Appeal to deal with the proceedings before it. Likewise it is for the HRTO to deal with its own process. This Court can and should note what appears to be an effort to play these processes off against each other.

[25] For present purposes, in regard to the HRTO process, Ms Atas has been told by this Court that she should not presume that an appeal decision on the s.140 application will constitute “exceptional circumstances” justifying an extension of time to seek reconsideration before the HRTO. If she does not address this issue prospectively, it will be for the HRTO to weigh that in the context of any request for reconsideration she may make later.

Interlocutory Injunction Motion

[26] On April 9, 2018, I granted an interim interim injunction against Ms Atas in connection with an online defamation campaign of abuse and harassment targeting children, siblings and associates of persons adverse in interest to Ms Atas, including their counsel. On May 1, 2018, I continued that order until return of the motion for an interlocutory motion.

[27] The moving parties delivered their injunction motion materials on April 24, 2018. To date, Ms Atas has not delivered responding materials. I canvassed this issue with the parties in writing in late June. The moving parties confirmed that their materials were then complete and that they are ready to proceed. Despite being asked to do so repeatedly, Ms Atas did not respond to this Court’s request for a proposed schedule. At this case management conference she explained that she had had a lot on her plate, with the contempt and appeal proceedings, and therefore she had neglected to respond. When it was pointed out to her that all that was required from her was a short note setting out the steps she wished to take and a schedule, she apologized and acknowledged that she did not have a good reason for failing to answer.

[28] Ms Atas is currently subject to the interim order granted May 1, 2018. That order will be in place until the interlocutory injunction is decided. If Ms Atas had filed responding materials in the spring, that motion could have been argued in June or September. If she had filed materials in the summer, the motion could have been heard in September or October. She now says that she needs until November, 2018, given her other court obligations. I have acceded to her scheduling proposal, since the delay hurts only her: if the continuation of the interim order is highly prejudicial to her, as she claims that it is, then she need only expedite delivery of her responding materials – this Court will do what it can to expedite a return date if the materials are delivered early.

[29] Order to go that Ms Atas deliver any responding materials for the motion for an interlocutory injunction in the 2018 Defamation Action by November 16, 2018. The plaintiffs may deliver any reply or supplementary materials by November 30, 2018. There shall be a further case management conference before me on December 7, 2018, 9:00 am, at which time this court will schedule any further steps in this motion and may fix a return date for argument of the injunction.

[30] The plaintiffs have not served their affidavits of documents in the Defamation Proceedings or scheduled a trial scheduling conference before Firestone J., pursuant to paragraphs 11f and 11g of my endorsement of June 27, 2018, on the basis that they seek a consolidation order, and wish to deliver their affidavits of documents on the basis of any consolidation that may be ordered. The timetable for delivery of affidavits of documents will be revisited once the consolidation issue has been resolved.

[31] After discussion of the consolidation issue at the case management conference, both sides agreed that the court order the Defamation Proceedings be tried before the same trier of fact, together or one after the other, as the trial judge may direct. This, in my view, is preferable to a consolidation order – there may be similar fact issues in this trial that will be simpler to manage if the proceedings are kept separate, and there are different plaintiffs among the Defamation Proceedings. It was left that Mr Caplan would provide a draft order and Ms Atas would advise if she agreed to its form. The parties did not agree on the form, but the basic principle that the cases be tried by the same trial judge, as that judge directs, is agreed.

[32] The parties shall appear before me on October 19, 2018, at 9:00 am, for one hour, to settle the form of the order and establish a timetable for affidavits of documents and examinations for discovery and any other steps that need to be taken to see the case through to the end of discoveries. Both sides should bring their proposed schedule for these steps with them to the case management conference. Persons who are not parties or counsel in the Defamation Proceedings need not attend this case management conference.

The Substance of Ms Atas’ Responding Materials

[33] Ms Atas has made a Chavali request to be permitted to move for an order that I recuse myself from her proceedings. The Chavali request is inadequate for reasons I set out below. However, having been made aware that Ms Atas wishes to move on these issues, I told her that she could raise all of her bias issues in her response to the motion for an interlocutory injunction. A number of the allegations of bias relate to the interim injunction that is currently in place, and so it appears to me that Ms Atas should be able to raise these concerns as a basis upon which she defends the interlocutory injunction. She can fully air any concerns and defenses she has in her responding materials – I have placed no restrictions on the substance of her responding materials. This is not to say, of course, that Ms Atas may litigate the interlocutory injunction motion vexatiously. If there are any concerns about Ms Atas’ responding materials, those concerns may be raised at the December 7th case conference.

Chavali Request for Recusal

[34] Ms Atas asks to be permitted to bring a motion that this Court recuse itself of any further involvement in her litigation. Ms Atas’ most recent prior request that this Court recuse itself was dismissed in February, 2017 for reasons set out in my judgment of January 3, 2018.

[35] Ms Atas has made multiple requests that judges and other adjudicators recuse themselves for bias. An allegation of bias is a serious thing and, of course, must be taken seriously by any judge. In the context of a closely-controlled case management process, in a situation where the Court controls a litigant’s access to the courts, the situation is delicate – Ms Atas must bring her recusal motion before me, she cannot bring it without this Court’s direction, and then she cannot appeal it unless this Court grants her permission to do so. When the actual focus of the motion is the Court’s own conduct, there is an inherent appearance of unfairness unless Ms Atas is given a full and fair opportunity to raise her issues.

[36] This is a convenient time and process during which to address this issue – as a response to the motion for interlocutory relief. The record respecting these issues should not be complex or difficult for opposing parties to address and it should not involve them in significant additional cost. I see little prejudice to opposing parties, and Ms Atas will have a full opportunity to air her issues before this Court without otherwise disrupting the case management process. And finally, the arguments, do relate, at least in part, to this Court’s handling of the injunction to date and thus may be relevant to the interlocutory injunction motion.

[37] Ms Atas asks that I decide her Chavali request, even though I am permitting her to raise the issues in her response to the motion for an interlocutory injunction.

[38] Ms Atas’ request to move under s.140 of the Act is denied because there is another, more convenient, more cost- and time-effective means for these issues to be put before the Court for a decision on the merits. In my view this issue should be litigated once, in the interlocutory injunction motion.

[39] On the merits of the Chavali request, I note the following, to provide Ms Atas with guidance for future requests:

(1) Ms Atas has addressed the merits of the litigation she wishes to undertake in her request. That is appropriate. I have no comment on the merits of her proposed motion, which will be addressed by the court once there is a record before the court.

(2) Ms Atas has not addressed the issue of her vexatiousness, and how her proposed litigation would affect those who have been prejudiced by her past conduct, including:

(a) The basis on which she says the proposed litigation is not a continuation of her vexatious conduct;

(b) The prejudice – or lack of prejudice – to the past targets of her vexatious conduct;

(c) Any outstanding costs orders against her, the steps she has taken or will take to pay those costs orders;

(d) What assurances she can give the Court about her ability to pay an adverse costs order if she is unsuccessful in the litigation;

(e) The basis on which she says the court should believe that she will not litigate the proposed litigation vexatiously.

This list is not exhaustive. It illustrates the purpose of a Chavali review. It is not simply to assess whether there may be some arguable basis for the proposed litigation (although that is part of it), but to consider whether it is proportional, reasonable, whether the costs to be borne by opposing parties are reasonable in light of unpaid costs orders, and the extent to which the proposed litigation would serve to extend and further vex persons who have already been disadvantaged by Ms Atas’ vexatious conduct.

[40] Following the case management conference, Ms Atas wrote to the court, on September 18, 2018, advising that she “did not want to” assert her allegations of bias in defence of the interlocutory injunction, but rather wished to proceed with a stand-alone motion for recusal. I make four points about this correspondence:

(a) I decided that the recusal issues would be litigated in the interlocutory injunction during the case management conference. It is not open to Ms Atas to write to the court, without the court’s permission, taking issue with that decision. The decision had been made and is not subject to further submissions.

(b) Taking the position that a further and separate process should be undertaken, rather than litigating the issue within the injunction motion, is, itself, vexatious. It argues for the most cumbersome method to address an issue, at additional expense and potential delay for opposing parties. For the reasons I have given already, it is not the proportional and reasonable way in which to proceed, and obviously so.

(c) Ms Atas may fully air the issues she has raised in her Chavali request within the motion for an interlocutory injunction, and will suffer no disadvantage by proceeding in that fashion.

(d) The letter sent by Ms Atas on this topic was a direct violation of this court’s directions about communications with the court – directions that have been repeated several times since the judgment was issued in January 2018. As such it is a further example of vexatious conduct.

Ms Atas’ request that she be permitted to move for leave to bring a motion that this court recuse itself from all her matters is denied, since there is another, more convenient, less expensive and more proportional way in which Ms Atas may fully raise these issues with the court.

Fee Waivers

[41] In my judgment of January 3, 2018 (Peoples Trust Company v. Atas, 2018 ONSC 58), I set aside Ms Atas’ fee waivers and directed that she could seek fee waivers from the case management judge. This issue has now arisen three times since the judgment and it is clear that the Court needs to provide some directions on this issue.

[42] Paragraphs 324-325 of the Reasons for the Judgment state:

Ms Atas has conducted herself in such a way that she should not be permitted the benefit of fee waivers any more. She has put the court system, and thus the public purse, to considerable expense. Further, if there were some financial cost to her of bringing a proceeding or a step in a proceeding, she might exercise greater discretion in deciding which steps to take – just as is the case for other litigants. She is, apparently, impervious to adverse costs orders, and at the time being she is self-represented. Court fees and her own out-of-pocket expenses in duplicating materials and the like are the only financial disincentives for her to engage in frivolous litigation.

I would add one qualification to this decision. Ms Atas should be permitted to ask the case management judge to relieve her from paying particular court fees for particular steps in proceedings if she can establish, on proper evidence, that she meets the financial criteria for a fee waiver and that the interests of justice would be advanced by waiving those fees for her.

[43] Ms Atas has thus far been granted two fee waivers in the Superior Court. The circumstances of those waivers have apparently led to some misapprehension on the part of Ms Atas as to what is required of her if she seeks a fee waiver, in light of the judgment in the s.140 application.

[44] The first fee waiver was granted by me, without reasons, at the case conference of June 26, 2018. The issue arose without notice in the following context. There are three defamation proceedings against Ms Atas – the 2010 Defamation Proceedings, the 2016 Defamation Proceeding and the 2018 Defamation Proceedings. As of the time of the case management conferences, Ms Atas had not delivered statements of defence in two of these proceedings. She indicated that she also wishes to assert a counterclaim in one or both of these proceedings. I provided her with a deadline to serve and file the pleadings and she then asked for a fee waiver to file these pleadings. The conference ran long – it lasted an entire court day and we did not have time to address all outstanding matters. The Defamation Proceedings should proceed to disclosure, discovery and trial promptly, since the plaintiffs have interlocutory injunctions in two of the actions and an interim injunction in the third. There was no time for a further case management conference before the summer. Rather than delay filing of the Statements of Defence and Counterclaim by Ms Atas in order to consider a request for a fee waiver on proper materials, I exercised my discretion to grant the fee waiver summarily.

[45] In paragraph 11(a) of my endorsement of June 27, 2018, I directed Ms Atas to serve her outstanding statements of defence in the Defamation Proceedings by July 13, 2018, and to file those documents by July 20, 2018. These documents have been served but not filed. Ms Atas explained that, although I had waived the filing fee to file these documents, that waiver did not include the cost of commissioning an affidavit of service at the court office in order to file the pleadings. I asked Ms Atas what the charge was for commissioning an affidavit of service. She did not know because she did not ask. On the court web site the fee posted is $20.

[46] Ms Atas shall forthwith file her statements of defence; if she needs to pay a fee to commission affidavits of service then she shall pay that fee, without prejudice to her applying to this court, on proper materials, after a case management conference, for an order that she be repaid these fees on the basis that they should be waived. I address the proper process for seeking fee waivers below.

[47] Over the course of the summer, Ms Atas wrote to my office requesting a fee waiver for the cost to obtain a file stored off-site. She did not advise of the quantum of the fee or why it was that she could not pay it. She asserted that she “required” the waiver in order to perfect her appeal at the Court of Appeal. At the June case management conference I had advised the parties that I would be away over July and August and that there would not be an opportunity for another case management conference before September. Ms Atas considered the issue of the fee waiver to obtain a file from storage to be sufficiently urgent that she wrote, repeatedly, to the Regional Senior Justice, asking him to intervene in my absence (the judgment does provide that the powers of the case management judge may be exercised by the Regional Senior Justice or his/her designate if the case management judge is unavailable). The Regional Senior Justice was persuaded to grant the fee waiver to obtain the off-site file this one time. The Regional Senior Justice did not give reasons for this decision.

[48] The fee to obtain an off-site file is $75, as reported on the court’s web site.

[49] Ms Atas has requested that the court grant her a general fee waiver in the Defamation Proceedings, because she is a defendant. Ms Atas’ status in the litigation is a relevant consideration, but is not, by itself, a sufficient basis to grant a fee waiver. Ms Atas has filed no evidence to establish a proper basis for a fee waiver, as described in paragraphs 324-325 of the Judgment. Her request for a general fee waiver for the Defamation Proceedings is denied, without prejudice to Ms Atas making a further request for this relief, on proper materials.

[50] For any future requests for a fee waiver, Ms Atas shall observe the requirements set out in paragraphs 324-325 of the judgment. She may apply for fee waivers for “particular court fees for particular steps in proceedings”. She will have “to establish, on proper evidence, that she meets the financial criteria for a fee waiver” and she will have to establish that “it is in the interests of justice that the fee waiver be granted to her”. In the absence of such evidence she should not expect that a fee waiver will be granted.

Chavali Request In Respect to Defamation Counterclaims

[51] Ms Atas requested an extension of the deadline in which to make a Chavali request in respect to any counterclaims she has asserted in the Defamation Proceedings. I see no basis for an extension. This deadline was imposed on June 27th, and it pertains to claims she has apparently already asserted in documents she was to have filed by July 20th. The fate of those counterclaims will affect disclosure and discovery in the Defamation Proceedings and thus must be addressed promptly. The request to extend this deadline is rejected.

No Chavali Requests To Vary, Set Aside or Appeal Existing Injunctions

[52] In paragraph 11(e) and 11(g) of my endorsement of June 27, 2018, I advised that Ms Atas would need to make Chavali requests before she would be permitted to move to set aside, vary or appeal any of the existing injunction orders. No such requests have been made thus far and so no directions are required in respect to them.

Assessment of Mortgage Enforcement Costs

[53] Peoples Trust was directed to provide legal argument on an issue respecting mortgage enforcement costs by September 21, 2018. At the case management conference, Peoples Trust advised that these submissions would be filed on time; subsequently they were.

[54] At the conference Ms Atas asked for an extension of all her current deadlines on the basis of the work she had to do in respect to her appeal, and commitments she has in the contempt proceedings ongoing before Pollak J. I originally set the deadlines with a view to the fact that Ms Atas has "a lot on her plate", and the deadlines were already generous in that regard. The anticipated contempt trial scheduled before Pollak J. in late August 2018 did not proceed as scheduled. Further steps were scheduled in those proceedings. Ms Atas did not ask Pollak J. to accommodate scheduling in the contempt proceedings in light of Ms Atas' deadlines in case management before this court. She explained to me that she had not considered it appropriate to raise that issue before Pollak J. This is not acceptable. Any court tries to set scheduling with an eye to respecting processes ongoing before other courts, so as not to disrupt them. Further, I do not accept that the deadline for motion materials on Ms Atas' pending motion to dismiss the contempt proceedings should take precedence over case management orders made already. Nor am I satisfied that Ms Atas will be unable to complete all of her outstanding commitments - to this court and in the contempt proceedings. I decline to extend any deadlines on this basis.

[55] In particular, Ms Atas asked that the deadline for her detailed response to Peoples Trust mortgage expense accounting be extended beyond the current deadline of October 19, 2018. This request is denied. Ms Atas was ordered to do this in the judgment of January 3, 2018. She has failed to comply with this term of that judgment for over eight months, has no excuse for this failure, and has been on notice since June 27, 2018 that this would be required of her by October 19th. Peoples Trust is entitled to have the issue of its recoverable enforcement costs decided and there is no reason for further delay at this point.

Claims Involving the Chahals

[56] Ms Atas and the Chahals did not manage to transfer the storage locker to Ms Atas over the summer. On the basis of what I was told during the case management conference, Mr Chahal apparently insisted on being present for the transfer and the parties were unable to find a mutually convenient time to do this. I see no reason for the parties to attend at the site with each other and many good reasons to suppose that this would be a rather bad idea. At the case management conference, the Chahals were directed to provide their consent to the transfer of the rental locker by September 17, 2018. Counsel subsequently corresponded with the court to advise that the consent had been delivered, to provide a copy of the consent, and to request that it be added to the court file. This is not a proper way to add something to a court file - the Chahals may ask that these matters be confirmed at a subsequent case management conference, if they wish. Otherwise, they should preserve their evidence of compliance with the court's directive and be in a position to provide it to the court if it becomes an issue.

[57] I understand from Ms Atas that her car had been at the property purchased by the Chahals and subsequently was towed away by the City of Toronto at the request of the Chahals. This all happened many years ago. Ms Atas also says that she has or may have claims against the Chahals in respect to other personalty. These issues may be canvassed at a subsequent case management conference when the court considers what should next be done respecting the litigation involving the Chahals. In this regard I note that the court directed Ms Atas to make any Chavali request she intends to make respecting her claims against the Chahals by July 31, 2018, failing which "these claims may be dismissed at the next case management conference". That "next" conference was the one that took place on September 14, 2018, and no Chavali request had been made by Ms Atas about her claims against the Chahals. The Chahals may pursue directions to obtain dismissal of these proceedings at the next case management conference; it is still open to Ms Atas to serve a Chavali request in respect to these claims, but she should understand that her continuing delay is something the court may take into account in deciding what to do with these claims.

Claims Involving Sutton Group

[58] Sutton Group and its agents did not appear at the case management conference and I was advised that they had decided not to participate in the knowledge of my endorsement of June 27, 2018. So be it. There are related proceedings in the Small Claims Court. There was some uncertainty over the question of whether any or all of the claims involving Sutton Group have been dismissed administratively. All the claims are connected, and there should not be multiple proceedings in separate courts over these issues. If Ms Atas wishes to pursue her claims in the Sutton Group litigation, she shall (a) determine from a review of the relevant court files the current status of the proceedings and obtain copies of any administrative dismissal orders; (b) provide for the court a copy of the pleadings in all of the Sutton Group litigation, in this court and in the small claims court; (c) make a Chavali request of this court to continue any claims she wishes to continue in any of the Sutton Group litigation, so that this court can decide which claims should continue and on what terms. I am not imposing a deadline for these steps at this time. It is open to any other party to complete steps (a) and (b) for a subsequent case management conference, in which event I will provide a deadline for a Chavali request.

Costs of the s.140 Application

[59] The court advised that it is ready to complete its costs endorsement from the s.140 application, but that in its review of all the materials filed, it had been unable to locate any responding costs submissions from Ms Atas. To be clear, Ms Atas did file submissions claiming costs for herself for some past steps in the underlying litigation - that is a separate issue. But apparently she did not provide any responding submissions to the detailed costs submissions provided by the successful applicants on the s.140 application. I advised that I wanted to confirm that this was, in fact, the case - a great deal of material has been provided to the court since the judgment of January 3, 2018, and I wanted to be sure that I had not missed costs submissions that had been filed by Ms Atas. Counsel for the s.140 applicants advised that they had not received any responding costs submissions. Ms Atas thought that she had filed submissions. I directed that Ms Atas locate and transmit to the court a copy of any responding submissions that she has provided already. I directed that she could not, now, file fresh costs submissions: if she neglected to do so in accordance with the court's directions then it was too late to do so now.

[60] By letter dated September 18, 2018, Ms Atas sent the court costs submissions dated that day, expressly what I told Ms Atas she could not do.

[61] In these submissions dated September 18, 2018, Ms Atas claims that she has previously filed costs submissions. In paragraph 2 of her submissions, she writes:

I had already filed… responses dated January 31, 2018, March 30, 2018, April 30, 2018, Affidavit sworn May 17, 2018 and Affidavit sworn June 1, 2018.

Ms Atas failed to include a copy of these submissions, which she said she filed previously. Thus she failed to do the very thing I directed her to. I will address the substance of the improper costs submissions in my costs decision. I will give Ms Atas one final opportunity to provide me with a copy of any costs submissions that she filed in response to the costs submissions of the applicants in the s.140 application: she shall do so by October 12, 2018, failing which the court shall release its costs decision without hearing further from Ms Atas.

Claims for Legal Fees By Former Solicitors of Ms Atas

[62] Only one former solicitor for Ms Atas took the position that he was still pursuing a claim for unpaid legal fees: David Sloan and his law firm Baker Schneider. The amount claimed is $8,035.37. I discussed this matter with counsel for Mr Sloan and with Ms Atas. There appears to be a disagreement about whether this claim was settled during the assessment process. I was shown several documents related to this issue, and they appear to be a settlement of terminated assessment proceedings, but not of the legal account itself. But I cannot decide an issue like that without proper evidence. I directed counsel to prepare a motion for summary judgment on this issue. I did not impose a deadline for this to be done - Ms Atas shall have 45 days from receipt of the motion for summary judgment to serve responding materials. Either side may raise the status of this issue with me at any subsequent case management conference. In respect to claims by other lawyers to unpaid fees and disbursements, counsel for the following lawyers expressly indicated that their clients were not pursuing any such claims: Messrs. Cote, Shastri, Steinberg, Mitchell, Canazares, Grossman, Brooker, and their respective law firms.

Outstanding Costs Orders In Favour of Peoples Trust

[63] At para. 344 of the Judgment, I directed Peoples Trust to provide me with a list of all outstanding costs awards in its favour as at January 2018. Those costs awards total $66,900, plus interest that has accrued on the costs. Peoples Trust requests that these costs orders, plus accrued interest, be paid to it out of the proceeds held in trust by counsel for Peoples Trust as security for mortgage enforcement costs.

[64] Ms Atas has not responded to this list of costs awards or to the request that the costs be paid from the trust funds. She shall do so by October 19, 2018 if she opposes Peoples Trust’s request for payment of these costs from the trust funds.

No Chavali Requests To Reopen Past Litigation

[65] Ms Atas has taken the position consistently that she will seek to re-open the Gomes/Kelly Mortgage Action, the Peoples Trust Wycliffe Mortgage Proceeding and the Peoples Trust St George Mortgage Proceeding (all terms as defined in the Judgment). Each of these proceedings has terminated in final judgments from the Superior Court, and dismissal of appeals brought by Ms Atas in the Court of Appeal.

[66] Much of the subsisting litigation appears to be based upon collateral attacks on the judgments in these prior proceedings.

[67] Ms Atas has not made a Chavali request to re-open any of this decided underlying litigation. If she has not made such requests by November 30, 2018, the court will proceed to address the status of the outstanding litigation on the basis that the decided cases are authoritative. Ms Atas should understand that if she has failed to take the steps she has said, for years, she wishes to take, to re-open the litigation, her continuing delay will count against her in any future request to re-open the cases.

Multiple Deadlines

[68] I appreciate that this decision stipulates multiple deadlines, most of them for Ms Atas. I also appreciate that Ms Atas has limited resources and does have contempt proceedings in which she is involved.

[69] The issues being addressed in case management now have been outstanding since January 2018 and shortly thereafter, when other parties began providing materials in accordance with this court’s directions. Ms Atas has had plenty of time to deal with these matters and she is now being given further time. In my view the deadlines are reasonable.

Communications With the Court

[70] Ms Atas is reminded, again, that she is not to communicate with the court except in accordance with the directions stipulated in the Judgment at para. 358 of the Judgment. This direction does not preclude Ms Atas from making Chavali requests, which she may make of this court at any time without prior permission.

D.L. Corbett J. Date: September 28, 2018