Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CV-11-442307, CV-13-488119, CV-13-488659, CV-13-488748 DATE: 20180921 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

PATRICK WHITTY, RPR ENVIRONMENTAL INC., 1049585 ONTARIO INC., and 876947 ONTARIO LIMITED Plaintiffs – and – EDWARD N. WELLS, EDWARD G. WELLS, BRADLEY MAY, RENZO BENOCCI, MARK VANDERLAAN, MANON BOMBARDIER, GORDON OWEN and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Defendants

Counsel: Vilko Zbogar, counsel for the Plaintiffs J. Dais-Visca and Wendy Wright, counsel for the Defendants

HEARD: September 18, 2018

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

F.L. MYERS, j.

The Motions

[1] The defendants move to dismiss these four proceedings due to the failure of the plaintiffs to pay into court the sum of $130,000 as security for costs by July 1, 2018 as required by an order dated April 4, 2016. [1] The defendants also rely on other alleged breaches of orders to argue for the dismissal of these proceedings as discussed below.

[2] The plaintiffs’ cross-move to vary the security for costs order to delete the requirement for them to post further security and to pay out of court to them the funds already posted. Alternatively, they seek an extension of time to post the further security required.

[3] For the reasons that follow, the actions by Patrick Whitty personally are dismissed. The remaining corporate plaintiffs are granted until October 31, 2018 to post the outstanding installment of security for costs. If, by the close of business on October 31, 2018, the corporate plaintiffs have not provided counsel to the defendants with a copy of a receipt under Rule 72 of the Rules of Civil Procedure confirming that they have paid into court the remaining $130,000, the defendants may move before me in writing and without notice to the remaining plaintiffs to dismiss all of the their actions.

Facts

[4] The following are terms of the court’s order dated April 4, 2016:

3. THIS COURT ORDERS that the plaintiffs jointly and severally shall post $100,000 in cash or by unconditional letter of credit issued by a schedule 1 bank as security for costs of the defendants other than Ms. Antoniani on or before May 1, 2016.

4. THIS COURT ORDERS that the plaintiffs jointly and severally shall post a further $130,000 as security for costs for steps leading up to the commencement of trial preparation within 30 days of the earlier of: (a) the unsuccessful end of a future mediation; or (b) the date of a Case Conference at which the hearing of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment is booked.

[5] Without repeating the lengthy procedural history of this matter, the rationale for the security for costs order was summarized in my endorsement dated April 4, 2016, reported at 2016 ONSC 2266, as follows:

[6] …I am confronted with plaintiffs who do not feel compelled to obey what they perceive to be minor procedural orders, who five years into the case have resisted focusing on the “one big question” of their damages, and who have not seen fit to respond to my expression of concern that the litigation may be being carried in bad faith.

[33] In these circumstances, it seems to me that an order for security for costs is very much a fitting term of a further extension of time. If the plaintiffs persist in disobeying court orders or if they fail to deliver a proper expert report on a timely basis, which I fear is a real likelihood, then a dismissal of the actions and a substantial award of costs of the action against the plaintiffs is indeed quite likely. I am very dubious that the plaintiffs will produce a credible, complete expert report by mid-June if at all. I have heard no evidence indicating that the plaintiffs have approached the task of proving their damages with anything approaching the investment of time and resources required to do a credible job in a substantial case. The evidence is more consistent with the plaintiffs doing the minimum necessary to keep the litigation alive. Their reluctance is palpable and continues despite my making clear in October that the time for them to tip their hands was nigh.

[34] The action involves serious claims of intentional wrongdoing. A punitive costs award is quite possible if those claims are not proven. Ordering the plaintiffs to post security to protect against a costs award if they do not proceed appropriately with their claims will provide an economic incentive to focus the plaintiffs on the need to invest in the proceeding appropriately to fulfill their obligations on a timely, credible, and ongoing basis. It will also test their engagement. If the plaintiffs do not wish to proceed on that basis they can decline to post the security and have the actions dismissed now. If the plaintiffs think that their provable damages do not justify the investment required to proceed, they are always free to open settlement discussions. If posted, security will protect the defendants against the risk of collecting on a subsequent costs order that could well be made if the plaintiffs subsist in dilatory or improper conduct. [Emphasis added.]

[7] The parties engaged in mediation which failed. By case conference endorsement dated June 21, 2018, I directed:

Mediation ended May 31, 2018. Security for costs due and [plaintiffs] stayed under Rule 56.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as of July 1, 2018 if $130,000 is not posted by then. [Plaintiffs are] granted leave to move to vary my order for security for costs. Crown will bring motion to dismiss under Rules 56.06 and 57.03/60.12 of the Rules of Civil Procedure if all costs and security for costs are not fully paid.

The Plaintiffs’ Evidence and Position

[8] The plaintiffs have filed evidence of a consultant whom they have retained to assist with these proceedings. He says that the plaintiffs have always wished to proceed as quickly as possible. They blame their counsel’s health and other commitments that have “sometimes affected the time it has taken to complete some tasks.” The consultant then advises that the plaintiffs’ collective revenue for the past two fiscal years was $5.4 million and $6.2 million respectively. They have incurred expenses for operations and business re-investment of nearly $5.5 million in each of these years. The consultant notes that the plaintiffs also have significant assets that can be drawn upon to pay any costs award that may be incurred. But the plaintiffs are challenged in their working capital. As of December 31, 2017, for example, they are operating with a working capital deficit (an excess of current liabilities over current assets) of just over $100,000.

[9] The consultant advises that the plaintiffs need to maintain their working capital and manage their cash flow for operations. As a result of their working capital and cash flow issues, the corporate plaintiffs were only able to post $50,000 of the $100,000 initial installment of security for costs. The remaining $50,000 was posted by Mr. Whitty personally.

[10] Mr. Whitty is a plaintiff in two of the four related actions. He owns the corporate plaintiffs. The plaintiffs’ consultant testifies that Mr. Whitty will not pay personally any further security for costs. Any further funds will have to be “found in the business.” He says further that taking further funds out of the business “will significantly harm the business.”

[11] At para. 46 of his affidavit, the consultant confirms that the plaintiffs “are not impecunious.”

[12] In a further affidavit the consultant details unsuccessful efforts by the plaintiffs to have a broker obtain a bond for the second security instalment. He says that the plaintiffs’ bank requires cash collateral to secure a letter of credit. Nevertheless, the consultant advises that if the plaintiffs remain required to post the second installment of $130,000, they would post $65,000 within 60 days of the court’s decision and a further $65,000 on completion of examinations for discovery and any discovery-related motions.

[13] The bulk of the consultant’s evidence concerns the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs allege that the government conducted illegal searches of their premises, planted evidence, coerced the plaintiffs to plead guilty to a charge that the government knew was not true, and then defamed them. While serious and difficult to prove, the claims are not devoid of merit. While there are innocent spins on the evidence advanced by the plaintiffs, there are also possible interpretations that are anything but innocent. I am not in a position at this point to assess the strength of the plaintiffs’ cases apart from noting that I have said throughout that there is potential merit in some of the plaintiffs’ claims. I am therefore cognizant of the desirability of having the claims heard on the merits if that can be done justly.

[14] The plaintiffs argue that circumstances have changed since the order for security for costs was made. In particular, counsel notes that most of the individual defendants against whom they levied unparticularized allegations have been let out of the actions. While the court had concerns about the plaintiffs’ prior failure to comply with procedural orders, they understand the importance of complying and are complying now. The plaintiffs produced their expert’s report on damages within the time ordered by the court in the security for costs order. Security for costs is not an incentive for them to proceed with the actions but a hindrance on their financial ability to do so.

[15] The plaintiffs argue that just because they have the ability to pay security for costs does not mean it is just to require them to do so. They remind the court in the first sentence of their factum that, “The court will always strive to see justice done.”

The Government’s Evidence and Position

[16] The government argues that the plaintiffs have not met the test to vary an order for security for costs. This is their second effort to set aside the security for costs order. They failed in a prior attempt and were penalized in costs at the time. Here, they admit that they are not impecunious. They do not point to any gap between the amount of security for costs ordered and the likely costs of proceeding to trial. Rather, the government says that the plaintiffs are repackaging the merits to re-argue the security for costs motion for a third time.

[17] The government refutes the plaintiffs’ professed bases to say that security for costs is no longer required. While the plaintiffs finally agreed to let individuals out of the claims, they never actually delivered their notices of discontinuance to end the litigation. It was only at the hearing of these motions that the court dismissed the claims on consent. The plaintiffs declined to deliver the necessary notices on the basis that their claims were stayed while their security for costs remained outstanding.

[18] The government denies that the plaintiffs have now started to comply with orders and the rules. Rather, since the motion for security for costs was made, the plaintiffs have incurred almost $100,000 in further costs orders, including punitive awards on a substantial indemnity basis, due to their continued prosecution of unmeritorious motions. The government notes that after I required the plaintiffs to return privileged documents that had been mistakenly disclosed and Spies J. denied leave to appeal from my order, the plaintiffs then sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the denial of leave to appeal. There is no such thing. The plaintiffs allowed that proceeding to be dismissed for delay. Then the plaintiffs delivered a motion to have a panel of the Divisional Court review the denial of leave to appeal under s. 21 (5) of the Courts of Justice Act. Despite the defendants taking steps to have that proposed proceeding dismissed as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the court making an endorsement that accommodated the motion proceeding at the Divisional Court, it was only many months later that the plaintiffs disclosed that they never filed their motion with the Divisional Court.

[19] In support of the government’s motion to dismiss but also in response to the plaintiffs’ motion to vary the security for costs, the government also points to other alleged breaches of orders. For example, despite the plaintiffs’ costs orders being due months ago, the plaintiffs only delivered cheques to pay the outstanding costs very recently while these motions have been outstanding.

[20] The government also argues that Mr. Whitty is in breach of the orders requiring production of documents and an expert report on damages. He has produced no documents concerning his own financial losses and no expert report on damages. Mr. Zbogar argues that Mr. Whitty’s loss is as owner of the corporate plaintiffs. In other words, he has no independent loss once the plaintiffs are made whole. Otherwise, he claims damages for defamation that are at large. While I agree that Mr. Whitty is not in breach of the two orders in respect of damages that are at large, these submissions do factor into the discretion to dismiss Mr. Whitty’s personal claims that I discuss below.

[21] Finally, the government has adduced evidence from a paralegal that the plaintiffs have not returned or destroyed the privileged information that I ordered both the plaintiffs and Mr. Zbogar to return and destroy. If true, this could be a serious breach of an order. While the plaintiffs cross-examined the paralegal witness, they did not ask her any questions on this issue. Neither did they seek leave to file responding evidence. They have left the government’s evidence unanswered. While the paralegal has personal knowledge that no documents have been returned, she cannot know if the defendants have destroyed them. Mr. Zbogar argues that they have done so. His submission is not admissible evidence. However, I am not prepared to act on the allegation without a better inquiry being made. I should note that if the plaintiffs have chosen to proceed by destroying all copies of the privileged materials that they received, they will have the burden to prove that they have done so effectively so that there are no copies of the documents accessible to them through their computers and Mr. Zbogar’s computers whether through the cloud or on other portable storage devices or at all. I would expect evidence of a carefully conducted search and a carefully conducted process for destruction with appropriate expertise brought to bear. But, overall, that is for another day.

Analysis

[22] The security for costs orders impose joint and several liability on Mr. Whitty and the corporate plaintiffs. I have emphasized above the invitation in my endorsement for the plaintiffs to decline to post security if they do not wish to invest the funds and effort required to bring this significant matter to trial. In my view, Mr. Whitty has indicated that he is no longer interested in being a personal plaintiff by expressly declining to post further security despite his joint and several liability. This is consistent with the fact that Mr. Whitty has no damages independent of the companies except, possibly, general damages for defamation. Those damages would be trifling compared to the costs of proceeding. Mr. Whitty has made his personal position clear and I respect his choice. The two actions commenced by him are therefore dismissed. [2]

[23] As to the corporate plaintiffs, there are two competing principles. In Bottan v Vroom, [2001] O.J. No. 2737 (S.C.J.), aff’d [2002] O.J. No. 1383 (Ont. C.A.) Nordheimer J. (as he then was) discussed motions to dismiss a claim for breach of procedural orders under Rules 60.12 and 57.03(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure:

If it was the case that the merits of the matter always had to be determined before such remedies could be imposed, there would be little room for the effective application of either of these rules.

[24] I agree with Firestone J. in Apollo Real Estate Limited v Streambank Funding Inc., 2018 ONSC 392 at para. 42 and Dunphy J. in Rana v Unifund Assurance Company, 2016 ONSC 2502, that the failure to ensure compliance with procedural orders made throughout a lawsuit is “corrosive of the entire justice system.” The failure to enforce the rules invites continuing abuse. The failure to enforce the rules is perhaps the most common complaint heard at civil litigation conferences and education seminars. Enforcing the rules of procedure is an important goal in itself.

[25] On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that the overall goal of the civil justice system, including the applicable rules of procedure, is the fair and just resolution of civil disputes. Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, at para. 23. There is a special need to be wary of the risk of unjustly depriving a plaintiff of a fair and just resolution of a claim due to the effect of security for costs. As the Court of Appeal recently discussed in Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2017 ONCA 827:

[22] In deciding motions for security for costs judges are obliged to first consider the specific provisions of the Rules governing those motions and then effectively to take a step back and consider the justness of the order sought in all the circumstances of the case, with the interests of justice at the forefront. While the motion judge concluded that an order for security for costs would be just, with respect, she failed to undertake the second part of that analysis. The failure to consider all the circumstances of the case and conduct a holistic analysis of the critical overarching principle on the motion before her constitutes an error in principle. It therefore falls to this panel to conduct the necessary analysis of the justness of the order sought.

(ii) Justness of the Order

[23] The Rules explicitly provide that an order for security for costs should only be made where the justness of the case demands it. Courts must be vigilant to ensure an order that is designed to be protective in nature is not used as a litigation tactic to prevent a case from being heard on its merits, even in circumstances where the other provisions of rr. 56 or 61 of the Rules of Civil Procedure have been met.

[24] Courts in Ontario have attempted to articulate the factors to be considered in determining the justness of security for costs orders. They have identified such factors as the merits of the claim, delay in bringing the motion, the impact of actionable conduct by the defendants on the available assets of the plaintiffs, access to justice concerns, and the public importance of the litigation. See: Hallum v. Canadian Memorial Chiropractic College (1989), , 70 O.R. (2d) 119 (H.C.); Morton v. Canada (Attorney General) (2005), , 75 O.R. (3d) 63 (S.C.); Cigar500.com Inc. v. Ashton Distributors Inc. (2009), , 99 O.R. (3d) 55 (S.C.); Wang v. Li, 2011 ONSC 4477, 2011 ONSC 4477 (S.C.); and Brown v. Hudson’s Bay Co., 2014 ONSC 1065, 318 O.A.C. 12 (Div. Ct.).

[25] While this case law is of some assistance, each case must be considered on its own facts. It is neither helpful nor just to compose a static list of factors to be used in all cases in determining the justness of a security for costs order. There is no utility in imposing rigid criteria on top of the criteria already provided for in the Rules. The correct approach is for the court to consider the justness of the order holistically, examining all the circumstances of the case and guided by the overriding interests of justice to determine whether it is just that the order be made.

[26] The motion currently before me is not a motion for security for costs. Rather, the plaintiffs seek to vary an order previously made. I am prepared to accept, for the purposes of this motion, that on a motion to vary, there is a continuing need to take the step back to consider holistically the justness of continuing to require security for costs in all of the circumstances as discussed by the Court of Appeal in Chevron. However, I am not reconsidering or hearing the initial motion afresh. Rather, the issue arises in the context of the current circumstances.

[27] In Bexley Trading Inc. v Ottawa Health Research Institute and Philip Wells, at paras. 11 and 12, Ray J. held that to vary an order for security for costs, a moving plaintiff needs to show that there has been a change in circumstances that has yielded a significant gap between the security ordered and the actual legal expenses of the defendant which were not foreseeable at the time of the order was made.

[28] It is apparent that the plaintiff has not made out or tried to make out this test at all. Rather, it is taking a run at the initial security for costs order on the basis that the facts on which the order was based no longer appertain. That is not a basis to vary a security for costs order generally. In any event, I do not agree with the plaintiffs on the facts.

[29] Throughout these proceedings the plaintiffs have taken a dilatory approach and they have repeatedly brought proceedings so lacking in merit so as to lead me to have questioned their good faith desire to have this matter heard despite its potential merit. I do not know if this is because they have nowhere near the $50 million in damages alleged or perhaps they hold some abstruse notion about using the civil lawsuit process to punish those whom they perceive to have wronged them. But they have not abated their misuse of the process.

[30] I do not accept the appropriateness of the plaintiffs’ refusal to discontinue against the personal defendants against whom they never asserted a proper claim. They created a stay against themselves by failing to post security as required by a court order and then purported to use that stay as a basis to fail to perform the final step in their settlement agreement to release government employees from the lingering lawsuit against them personally. Had the plaintiffs truly believed themselves stayed from delivering the promised notices of discontinuance, leave was just a telephone call away as it has been throughout this proceeding.

[31] After being ordered to post security, the plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside that order based on allegations of fraud that they made against the government’s lawyers personally. I found the allegations to be wholly without merit. Then, in their costs submission, the plaintiffs denied having made the allegations that were the very basis for their motion. After being denied leave to appeal to the Divisional Court they then brought a frivolous proceeding to the Court of Appeal and they misrepresented having brought yet another proceeding to a panel of the Divisional Court. Mr. Zbogar denies making any misrepresentation. Yet the government and the court acted on the proceeding without Mr. Zbogar ever mentioning that he had not actually ever filed it. In all, after being ordered to past security for costs, the plaintiffs ran up another $100,000 in costs awards against themselves which they only paid on the eve of these motions.

[32] Finally, the financial evidence adduced by the plaintiffs is specious. They concede they can pay the security for costs ordered while saying that doing so will be a hardship. But they have produced no backup financial information to allow any effective testing of that bald conclusion. No financial statements; no tax returns; no working capital calculations or particulars; no cash flow statements or projected cash flows. While they did submit a chain of emails with their insurance broker, the failed to include copies of the financial documents that they provided to her. Moreover, on their own evidence, they made a profit last year of at least $700,000 after capital investments are deducted. Their negative working capital, without supporting details, provides no meaningful information as to their ability to fund security of costs from other sources (fixed assets or long term debt). Being tight on cash flow also says nothing meaningful, especially if Mr. Whitty pays himself a salary from cash flow. Reviewing entertainment expenses and personal expenses of a sole owner run through the business can often be enlightening as well.

[33] In light of the dearth of meaningful disclosure, the plaintiffs’ confirmation that they are not impecunious, and the plaintiffs’ proposal to pay over time, I am not satisfied that the plaintiffs lack the ability to pay. To be sure they may not want to do so. But I continue to be of the view that there is a significant possibility that this action will be resolved by default by the plaintiffs before trial. Whether they suffered significant damages is very much in issue. While they have indeed delivered a form of expert’s report on their damages as ordered, I had questioned whether they would deliver a “credible, complete” report. That remains to be determined.

[34] Based on the foregoing, there is much reason to dismiss these cases. This is the second time that the plaintiffs have sought avoid the security for costs order without a basis in law or fact. The motion to vary may itself be just another interlocutory process deflecting the parties from advancing the cases to discovery and trial

[35] Stepping back however, considering all of the circumstances, including the clear and express statement of the plaintiffs’ intent to now move these cases quickly to oral discovery and the fact that there are enough questions in the evidence on the merits to at least require some answers from the government, in my view, to be just, the plaintiffs need one last clear opportunity to determine their own fate. If, for some inexplicable reason, the plaintiffs thought that they were entitled to re-visit the security for costs motion despite have tried once already and paying a heavy costs penalty for doing so; and if for some inexplicable reason the plaintiffs thought that adducing conclusory evidence of their desire to invest their profits elsewhere than in this litigation would convince the court to alter the existing orders, they now know that they were mistaken. In my view, it is just to give the corporate plaintiffs one last chance to show their intention to proceed on the merits by obeying the security for costs order.

Order and Costs

[36] The corporate plaintiffs are granted an extension of time until October 31, 2018 to post the outstanding installment of security for costs of $130,000. If, by 4:00 p.m. EST on October 31, 2018, counsel to plaintiffs has not provided counsel to the defendants with a copy of a receipt under Rule 72 of the Rules of Civil Procedure confirming that the remaining corporate plaintiffs have paid into court the outstanding $130,000 for security for costs to the credit of these four actions, the defendants may move before me in writing and without notice to the plaintiffs to dismiss all of the actions with costs.

[37] The actions by Patrick Whitty are dismissed with costs (other than the costs of these motions) reserved to the judge who determines the merits of the remaining claims in those cases.

[38] In the event that the corporate plaintiffs post the required security for costs, counsel are to arrange a case conference with me by telephone to schedule the next steps in the actions.

[39] The defendants may deliver no more than five pages of costs submissions and any offers to settle on which they rely by September 28, 2018. The plaintiffs may deliver up to five pages of costs submissions plus any offers to settle on which they rely by October 5, 2018. Both sides shall include a costs outline with their submissions. All materials shall be sent to me as searchable PDF attachments to an email to my Assistant. No case law or statutory materials are to be sent to me. Any references to case law or statutory materials shall be by hyperlinks embedded in the submissions.

F.L. Myers, J.

Released: September 21, 2018

COURT FILE NO.: CV-11-442307, CV-13-488119, CV-13-488659, CV-13-488748 DATE: 20180921 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

PATRICK WHITTY, RPR ENVIRONMENTAL INC., 1049585 ONTARIO INC., and 876947 ONTARIO LIMITED Plaintiffs – and – EDWARD N. WELLS, EDWARD G. WELLS, BRADLEY MAY, RENZO BENOCCI, MARK VANDERLAAN, MANON BOMBARDIER, GORDON OWEN and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Defendants

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT F. L. Myers, J.

Released: September 21, 2018

[1] At the time that the order was granted, the proceedings were consolidated. They have since been deconsolidated on consent. The order ought to have been placed in each of the four court files to which it applies. This judgment applies in each of the four proceedings. The formal order is to bear all four titles or four separate orders may be prepared as counsel may agree.

[2] I make no finding concerning any ongoing obligation that Mr. Whitty may have to fund the corporate plaintiffs in the event that they do later claim impecuniosity. That issue is not before me.

cited_cases: legislation: - title: "Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/90c43" - title: "Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/900194" case_law: - title: "Whitty v. Wells, 2016 ONSC 2266" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2016/2016onsc2266/2016onsc2266.html" - title: "Bottan v Vroom, [2001] O.J. No. 2737 (S.C.J.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2001/2001canlii28000/2001canlii28000.html" - title: "Bottan v Vroom, [2002] O.J. No. 1383 (Ont. C.A.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2002/2002canlii41800/2002canlii41800.html" - title: "Apollo Real Estate Limited v Streambank Funding Inc., 2018 ONSC 392" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2018/2018onsc392/2018onsc392.html" - title: "Rana v Unifund Assurance Company, 2016 ONSC 2502" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2016/2016onsc2502/2016onsc2502.html" - title: "Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2014/2014scc7/2014scc7.html" - title: "Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2017 ONCA 827" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2017/2017onca827/2017onca827.html" - title: "Hallum v. Canadian Memorial Chiropractic College (1989), 70 O.R. (2d) 119 (H.C.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/1989/1989canlii4354/1989canlii4354.html" - title: "Morton v. Canada (Attorney General) (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 63 (S.C.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2005/2005canlii6052/2005canlii6052.html" - title: "Cigar500.com Inc. v. Ashton Distributors Inc. (2009), 99 O.R. (3d) 55 (S.C.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2009/2009canlii46451/2009canlii46451.html" - title: "Wang v. Li, 2011 ONSC 4477" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2011/2011onsc4477/2011onsc4477.html" - title: "Brown v. Hudson’s Bay Co., 2014 ONSC 1065, 318 O.A.C. 12 (Div. Ct.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2014/2014onsc1065/2014onsc1065.html" - title: "Bexley Trading Inc. v Ottawa Health Research Institute and Philip Wells" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2007/2007canlii57811/2007canlii57811.html"