WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
( a ) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
( b ) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a) .
(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)( a ) or ( b ), the presiding judge or justice shall
( a ) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
( b ) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
DATE: 2024 10 08 COURT FILE No.: Windsor 20-2004
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
D.N.
Before Justice S. G. Pratt
Sentencing submissions heard on 19 July 2024 Reasons for Judgment released on 8 October 2024
Counsel: Siobhan Dundon.................................................................................. Counsel for the Crown Jessica Grbevski......................................................................... Counsel for the Defendant
Pratt J.:
1 On 18 January 2024, I found the Offender D.N. guilty of two counts of sexual assault on the Victim L.G.M. On 19 July 2024 I heard sentencing submissions from both counsel. These are my reasons for sentence.
Facts
2 The facts underlying the convictions were set out in my trial decision. Briefly, the Offender’s guilt was based on his inculpatory statement to police. He admitted to touching the Victim’s vaginal area without her consent while they were sitting in a park, and to non-consensual sexual intercourse in her apartment.
Positions of the Parties
3 Counsel for the Offender seeks a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by 2-3 years of probation. Crown counsel argues for a penitentiary sentence of 6-8 years. The Crown also seeks a 20-year SOIRA registration order and an order under s. 743.21 disallowing contact with the Victim while the Offender is in custody.
4 A weapons prohibition under s. 109 and an order that the Offender provide a DNA sample are both mandatory. No submissions were made by either side regarding the victim surcharge, but $200 is payable on each count unless it is waived by the Court.
Pre-sentence Report and Supporting Documents
5 I received a Pre-sentence report (PSR) prepared by probation officer Lucas Agnew. It is largely positive. The Offender was born in England but has lived in Canada since childhood. He is 56 years old. He had an unremarkable upbringing and described his family life in positive terms. His father passed away in 1991. The Offender currently lives with his mother and his own adult son.
6 The Offender was married for 30 years. He and his former spouse have two sons. The younger son lives with him while the older son lives in Leamington. His marriage ended, he said, because of his spouse’s issues with alcohol.
7 When he was a child, the Offender was diagnosed with an intellectual disability. He was placed in special education classes as a result. Nonetheless, he graduated from school at age 16 and earned a Certificate of Achievement.
8 He has worked in maintenance but is currently supported by a disability pension.
9 As a result of his intellectual disability, he enjoys community supports from a private support worker and from Family Services Adult Protective Services. With this assistance, he participates in community activities like bowling and bocce. He has also participated in one session of general counselling. According to Carly Baz-Ficociello, a case worker from Regional Support Associates, he is open to further counselling.
10 Regarding the offences before the Court, the Offender acknowledged poor judgment in committing the offences, but also told the PSR author he felt the Victim had provided consent. Certainly, there is nothing wrong with an offender maintaining his innocence after a contested trial. I do note, however, that his stated belief in the Victim’s consent contradicts his admissions made to police. He expressed a desire to apologize to the Victim.
11 The PSR author referred to a psychological assessment carried out on 23 February 2021. A copy of that assessment was provided by the Offender’s counsel. It notes several significant limitations in the Offender’s intellectual functioning. On the General Adaptive Composite, a measure described as “likely to be the most reliable and accurate estimate of how successfully an individual can access and apply their abilities when needed to remain independently safe and successful”, the Offender scored in the 1st percentile. That is, he scored lower than 99% of all individuals of comparable age. His communication, social functioning, and self-care abilities, as just three examples, were all no higher than the 5th percentile. The report also characterizes the Offender’s challenges as permanent. The fact that the report is three years old is therefore of less importance than it might otherwise be.
12 I have also received several letters of support. The first is from K.D., the Offender’s sister. She confirmed the history set out in the PSR and spoke of his level of supervision should he be sentenced to house arrest.
13 Val Tessier runs the special needs bocce program the Offender attends. She has known him for over 10 years and has never had any problems with him. She described him as helpful and never inappropriate. It does seem, as the Crown pointed out, that Ms. Tessier is perhaps not entirely informed on the Offender’s current situation as she stated only that he “has been suspected of an issue”. He is beyond being suspected of anything at this point. Still, her perspective on his behaviour is useful to me.
14 Ms. Baz-Ficociello, of Reginal Support Associates, also provided a letter where she set out the level of support the Offender receives in the community. She said he has engaged with her in a positive way and is open to receiving support. She expressed concern that the Offender has a hard time admitting to others when he does not understand something. Further, as his disabilities are not readily apparent, he has what she described as a “cloak of competency” where he seems more able than he really is. Like Ms. Tessier, Ms. Baz-Ficociello expressed concern for the Offender’s well-being if he were to be sentenced to custody.
15 Finally, I have an email from Kim Garon-Purdy, the Offender’s Adult Protective Services worker. She outlined the assistance she provides and described the Offender’s mental state as a result of the criminal charges before this Court. She mentioned his “extreme anxiety” that has hampered his ability even to leave his home and be social.
Victim Impact
16 I received two victim impact statements, one from the Victim and one from her mother H.M.
17 The Victim said she feels hurt, angry, scared, sad, and tired because of the offences. She said the forced vaginal intercourse was painful. She continues to have people go with her when she goes out so she can feel safe.
18 H.M. said when she heard from police what had happened, “my world was shattered.” After she moved the Victim to a new residence a significant distance away, she had to take time off work without pay to visit her. She has missed additional work as a result of the stress she’s felt throughout the court process. Like many parents in her situation, she blames herself for not protecting her daughter.
Principles of Sentencing
19 The Criminal Code prescribes several principles to guide judges in crafting fit sentences. Section 718 states the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society. Further, sentencing should contribute to a respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society. Sentences should reflect certain objectives, such as denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and where necessary, the separation of offenders from society.
20 Building on that section, s. 718.04 requires a court to emphasize denunciation and deterrence when an offence is committed against a vulnerable victim.
21 All available sanctions other than imprisonment should be considered by a sentencing court, so long as they are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or the community.
22 Section 718.2(b) sets out the principle of parity. Similar offenders committing similar offences should be treated similarly. While this is an important facet of the sentencing process, it is often difficult to find past cases with truly similar offenders or similar offences. Sentencing must be individualized, but other cases can often be instructive and helpful for sentencing courts.
23 Fundamentally, a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. This principle takes into consideration the objective seriousness of the offence, but also the more subjective consideration of the offender’s degree of responsibility.
Caselaw
24 Both parties have filed caselaw in support of their positions. While I may not refer to every case filed, I have reviewed all of them in arriving at my decision.
25 For the defence, counsel relies primarily on the case of R. v. Small Legs 2023 ABCJ 236, a decision of the Alberta Provincial Court. The offender was convicted after trial of sexually assaulting a 16-year old indigenous female victim. The offender was also indigenous. He had significant cognitive disabilities, to the extent that the defence brought an unsuccessful application to have him declared not criminally responsible for his actions. At the time of the offence, the offender was 19 years old. His cognitive impairment arose from complications at birth, when he was both premature and hypoxic. At the time of sentencing, he lived with his parents in a rural area of a reserve near Brocket, Alberta.
26 The Crown in Small Legs made a similar argument to the one made in the present case. That is, the disabilities of the offender did not play a role in the commission of the offence and so should not be considered when determining a fit sentence. There, the Crown sought a three-year sentence. The defence sought a maximum length conditional sentence followed by probation.
27 In imposing a conditional sentence of two years less a day, the sentencing judge had the benefit of detailed assessment reports generated as part of the NCR application. In the present case, I have one psychological assessment, conducted over three years ago. Further distinguishing Small Legs from the case at bar is the offender’s youth and his indigeneity. At paragraph 120 of the decision, Justice Pharo stated:
I am very mindful that the imposition of a CSO for a major sexual assault is very unusual and should not be done except in exceptional circumstances. In my view, because of the number of mitigating factors here, and especially because of the weight that must be accorded to the Gladue factors and mental health issues , this case is one of those exceptional circumstances. (Emphasis added)
28 This is not to say the Small Legs decision is entirely distinguishable. There were some similarities. That offender also had no previous record, and his intellectual functioning made daily care a necessity. He also enjoyed a supportive family and community.
29 Another similarity shared by the Offender and Mr. Small Legs is the disproportionate impact incarceration would likely have on them. Justice Pharo had the benefit of a doctor’s report that spoke of the offender’s gullibility and the likelihood he would be taken advantage of in custody. In the present case, the psychological assessment mentioned the Offender’s mother’s concerns about his choice of friends. The report states, “D. is very trusting, is taken advantage of, and is very vulnerable.” The letter from Ms. Baz-Ficociello notes, “He often requires a high level of support to make positive social connections as he can be vulnerable to engaging with people that are poor influences on him or that may take advantage of him. His supports, both formal and informal, help him to navigate these decisions within his daily life. The loss of these supports if D.N. were to enter a custodial setting would be detrimental to his well-being and overall safety.” His sister Ms. D. stated “D.’s biggest problem is misreading people. He assumes everyone is good and wants to be his friend. Many times, over the years he has been taken advantage of in different ways.”
30 Incarceration is never an easy experience, especially for someone with no prior record. I find that in the present case, the Offender’s intellectual disability would make custody disproportionately difficult, if not dangerous. He would be vulnerable to exploitation and mistreatment by other inmates. The supports he relies on every day would be missing. Custody would be unduly difficult.
31 The defence also cites R. v. Proulx 2000 SCC 5. This seminal case sets out many principles behind conditional sentences. Then-Chief Justice Lamer noted that conditional sentences were created to address issues of over-incarceration (see paragraph 16). Further, while a conditional sentence might be seen to emphasize rehabilitation and reintegration, it is also capable of achieving denunciation and deterrence (see paragraph 22).
32 Counsel argues the facts of this case bring it within the conditional sentence regime found at s. 742 of the Criminal Code. Sexual assault does not have a minimum sentence, nor is it an enumerated ineligible offence. Beyond that, counsel submits a fit sentence for these offences would be less than two years, that a conditional sentence would not endanger the safety of the community, and that it would be consistent with the Criminal Code’s overarching purpose and principles of sentencing.
33 The Crown supports its request for a penitentiary sentence with several cases. Primary reliance is placed on the Court of Appeal for Ontario decision in R. v. A.J.K. 2022 ONCA 487 and the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Friesen 2020 SCC 9.
34 In A.J.K. , the Court considered appropriate sentencing ranges for sexual assaults. Associate Chief Justice Fairburn addressed the anomaly that saw intimate partner sexual assaults treated less seriously than stranger sexual assaults. In removing that anomaly from the law, Her Honour noted the seriousness of all sexual assaults (see pars. 74-75). One of the most quoted passages from the case is found at paragraph 77:
Absent some highly mitigating factor, the forced penetration of another person will typically attract a sentence of at least three years in the penitentiary. While Bradley and the cases following it suggest that the range is three to five years, this is of course just a range, a quantitative sentencing tool designed to assist busy trial judges with where to start: Parranto, at paras. 15-17. Accordingly, there will be circumstances where a departure from the range, either above or below the range, is entirely appropriate.
35 The Crown also relies generally on the Friesen decision in that it calls for a general increase in the sentences imposed in cases of sexual violence. More specifically, the case of R. v. K.B. 2019 ONSC 6953 considered what courts should do when the victim of such violence is over the age of 18 but is intellectually delayed and has the capacity of a child. In those cases, Justice Monahan (then of the Superior Court) supported the notion that the offence should be considered tantamount to the sexual assault of a child.
36 This equivalency was maintained by Justice Monahan (now of the Court of Appeal) in the case of R. v. W.V. 2023 ONCA 655.
37 The Crown argues that given the limitations of the Victim in this case, I should treat the offences as if they were committed on a child and impose a longer sentence than I might otherwise.
38 The difficulty with this position is I have no evidence the Victim suffers from cognitive impairment. In the application to permit her testimony with an iPad and computer keyboard, I asked if the issue was one of comprehension or exclusively communication. I was told it was solely a problem with communication. I have been given no evidence to suggest the Victim suffers from intellectual limitations such that I could find her to be functionally equivalent to a child. The Crown has invited me to take judicial notice of her intellectual shortcomings based on how she presented herself in the witness stand and the evidence of her mother. I have reviewed H.M.’s evidence. There is nothing in her testimony to suggest cognitive impairment of the Victim. She mentions that sometimes the Victim will exaggerate things like how long she’d been waiting for someone, or that if she is asked a complex question, she has difficulty answering, but neither of those are conclusive evidence of intellectual disability. The former, a tendency to sometimes exaggerate, is not an uncommon personality characteristic. The latter is as likely to result from difficulties communicating as from difficulties comprehending. In the circumstances, given the potential impact of a finding that the Victim is the functional equivalent of a child for sentencing purposes, I cannot take judicial notice of that contention, nor can I make such a finding in the absence of supportive evidence.
39 The Crown has also filed the case of R. v. Nnadede 2024 ONCJ 83. In that case the offender received a sentence of five years for three incidents of forced vaginal intercourse on a very vulnerable victim who at the time of the offences was a homeless refugee claimant. The assaults took place over a number of months. Factually the case is very different from the case at bar and not really helpful in determining a fit sentence here.
40 The case of R. v. S.W. 2024 ONCA 173 was a successful Crown appeal of sentence. In that case, the offender and victim were in a relationship. Over the course of one night, while the victim pretended to be asleep, the offender vaginally penetrated her with his penis and ejaculated, each time without a condom. After finding the offender guilty, the trial judge imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day. On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario determined that sentence to be manifestly unfit and imposed a sentence of three years. Justice Favreau found the trial judge disregarded the seriousness of the offence and unjustifiably went below the sentencing range set out in A.J.K.
41 There are features in that case that are not present in the matter before me. That case dealt with four separate incidents of vaginal penetration on an apparently sleeping victim. Factually, that is quite different and, respectfully, more aggravating than the case at bar. It also appears the trial judge did not explain his reasoning for going below the A.J.K. range. At paragraph 45, Justice Favreau stated:
In his reasons, the trial judge did not provide any rationale for the length of the sentence he imposed. Presumably, he chose a period of two years less a day to avoid a penitentiary sentence so the respondent would be eligible for a conditional sentence. The trial judge then imposed the conditional sentence itself by stating that there were "exceptional" circumstances in this case. However, he provided no explanation or rationale for this finding. Notably, he failed to recognize the seriousness of this offence. He made no findings that would justify a conclusion that the respondent's moral blameworthiness was lowered. Many of the mitigating circumstances cited by the trial judge were irrelevant, such as the respondent's failure to get a driver's licence and his unsuccessful attempt to work as a personal support worker. Accordingly, it is not possible to understand how the trial judge reached the conclusion that would justify a conditional sentence or even a sentence below three years in this case.
42 As much as this was an appeal against a manifestly unfit sentence, it would also seem to have been an appeal of insufficient reasons. Justice Favreau confirmed that going outside the range was not de facto prohibited; there just needs to be a good reason, and that reason needs to be explained. This is from paragraph 44:
Again, the trial judge's failure to identify and apply the appropriate sentencing range does not constitute an error in principle on its own nor does it necessarily make the sentence unfit. While the three to five year range was the appropriate starting point for a sexual assault of this nature, there may nevertheless be circumstances that would justify a sentence below this range, in which case it would not be appropriate for this court to find that the sentence was demonstrably unfit. In addition, as reviewed above, the trial judge was not required to find that there were "exceptional" circumstances to justify a sentence that would fall outside the appropriate range. However, his reasons must demonstrate that he considered appropriate factors in imposing a sentence that fell far below the appropriate range.
43 The reference to exceptional circumstances “as reviewed above” referred to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Parranto 2021 SCC 46, [2021] S.C.J. No. 46. At paragraph 36 and onward, Justices Brown and Martin gave the following directions with regard to sentencing ranges:
36 The key principles are as follows:
Starting points and ranges are not and cannot be binding in theory or in practice (Friesen, at para. 36);
Ranges and starting points are "guidelines, not hard and fast rules", and a "departure from or failure to refer to a range of sentence or starting point" cannot be treated as an error in principle (Friesen, at para. 37);
Sentencing judges have discretion to "individualize sentencing both in method and outcome", and "[d]ifferent methods may even be required to account properly for relevant systemic and background factors" (Friesen, at para. 38, citing Ipeelee, at para. 59); and,
Appellate courts cannot "intervene simply because the sentence is different from the sentence that would have been reached had the range of sentence or starting point been applied" (Friesen, at para. 37). The focus should be on whether the sentence was fit and whether the judge properly applied the principles of sentencing, not whether the judge chose the right starting point or category (Friesen, at para. 162).
These principles settle the matter. Contrary to the Crown's submission, it is not an open question whether sentencing judges are free to reject the starting-point approach. Sentencing judges retain discretion to individualize their approach to sentencing "[f]or this offence, committed by this offender, harming this victim, in this community" (R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 80 (emphasis in original)). There is no longer space to interpret starting points (or ranges) as binding in any sense.
37 Having made clear that starting points and ranges are tools and not straitjackets, we turn to the role that a sentencing range or starting point plays in appellate sentence review.
38 As we have already stated, sentencing is an individualized process, and parity is secondary to proportionality. Therefore, departures from the starting point or sentences above or below the range are to be expected. Even significant departures are not to be treated as a prima facie indication of an error or demonstrable unfitness. Fitness is assessed with reference to the principles and objectives of sentencing in the Code, not with reference to how far the sentence departs from quantitative appellate guidance.
39 Ultimately, the sentencing judge's reasons and the record must allow the appellate court to discern whether the sentence is fit in light of the principles and objectives in the Code. Section 726.2 requires the sentencing court to provide reasons for the sentence imposed. This is not a new standard in criminal law. In sentencing, as with any decision, the reasons must, when read in conjunction with the record, show why the judge reached a particular result.
40 Most particularly, and irrespective of the modality used, the trial judge's reasons and the record must demonstrate why the sentence is proportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the offender and the gravity of the offence. This may involve adopting appellate guidance such as this Court's comments in Friesen on the harms of the offence. Quantitative appellate guidance may also be part of the jurisprudential background informing the gravity of the offence. As noted, it is not an error in principle for the sentencing judge to fail to refer to a starting point. Since starting points and ranges reflect the gravity of the offence, however, the sentencing judge's reasons and the record must allow the reviewing court to understand why the sentence is proportionate despite a significant departure from the range or starting point. This applies regardless of whether the reasons refer to the starting point or not. At the very least, the appellate court must be able to discern from the reasons and the record why the sentence is fit in the circumstances of the offence and the offender. We emphasize, however, that it is inappropriate for appellate courts to "artificially constrain sentencing judges' ability to impose a proportionate sentence" by requiring "exceptional circumstances" when departing from a range (Friesen, at paras. 111-12; R. v. Burnett, 2017 MBCA 122, 358 C.C.C. (3d) 123, at para. 26). Departing from a range or starting point is appropriate where required to achieve proportionality.
44 Further, as noted by Associate Chief Justice Fairburn in A.J.K. at paragraph 77, a sentencing range is “a quantitative sentencing tool designed to assist busy trial judges with where to start.”
Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
45 In mitigation, I note the Offender has no prior record. At the time of the offences, he was 52 years old and had lived a law-abiding life. I am advised he now has other outstanding charges that arose after these offence dates, however he is before me as a first-offender.
46 He also has strong family support. He lives with his mother and son, and has the support and care of his sister. The Offender also enjoys supports in the community through various agencies that assist him with the activities of daily living and encourage him to participate in social outings.
47 He has expressed a willingness to undergo counselling. Certainly, counselling done in a way that resonates with the Offender will help reduce any risk of recidivism.
48 A key mitigating factor is the Offender’s limited intellectual capacity. To be clear, he understood what he was doing when he committed the offences. He confirmed to police that he knew he was touching the Victim without her consent. He admitted he should not have done that. Voluntariness of his statement to police was not contested. I do, however, find his intellectual limitations are mitigating in that they impact his moral blameworthiness and influence the appropriateness of various sentences. As I have already noted, incarceration would present a disproportionate burden and risk on the Offender. His cognitive limitations are mitigating in this specific, narrow context.
49 In aggravation, I have the impact these offences have had on the Victim and her mother. It is clear they continue to suffer from the effects of these assaults years later. The Victim was a vulnerable person, making denunciation and deterrence paramount considerations.
50 It is also aggravating that there were multiple incidents of sexual assault. Additionally, they escalated in gravity from touching to intercourse. Despite knowing the Victim didn’t want sexual contact, the Offender persisted. This disregard for the Victim’s wishes and for her sexual autonomy is aggravating.
Sentence
51 This is an unusual case. It involves two serious sexual assaults committed on a vulnerable victim. It is notable, however, that the Offender was convicted not on the testimony of the Victim but on his own statement to police. Had he not given that statement, or had it been ruled inadmissible following a voir dire, the outcome of this case may have been very different.
52 I am also now aware of the extent of the Offender’s intellectual limitations. Without repeating what I have already said in these reasons, I find his limitations, as corroborated by letters and a psychological report, place him in a position where custody would be onerous and likely dangerous. He is now a 56-year old man with no prior record, who receives substantial community and family assistance in his daily life.
53 I acknowledge the sexual assault sentencing range of 3-5 years as set out in A.J.K. In my view, this is a case where departure from that range is warranted. Imposing a conditional sentence of imprisonment of the maximum allowable length, followed by probation, also of the maximum allowable length, will meet the objectives of sentencing. It will be sufficiently punitive as to achieve deterrence and denunciation while recognizing the need for rehabilitation. It will also allow the Offender to continue to receive the supports he clearly needs. As the Supreme Court said in Parranto, “parity is secondary to proportionality”. The individualized process of sentencing must be able to allow departure from established ranges in appropriate cases. This is one such case.
54 The sentence will be as follows:
(1) A custodial sentence of two years less one day, to be served in the community; (2) Three years of probation to follow the conclusion of the conditional sentence; (3) A s. 109 weapons prohibition for a period of ten years; (4) DNA samples to be provided on each count to the Windsor Police on or before 30 November 2024; (5) SOIRA registration for a period of twenty years; and (6) $200 victim surcharges on each count, for a total of $400. There will be 12 months to pay those surcharges.
55 Conditional sentence terms will be the following:
(1) Report in person to a supervisor within two working days of today’s date and after that, at all times and places as directed by the supervisor or any person authorized by a supervisor to assist in your supervision. (2) Cooperate with your supervisor. You must sign any releases necessary to permit the supervisor to monitor your compliance and you must provide proof of compliance with any condition of this order to your supervisor on request. (3) Live at a place approved of by the supervisor and not change that address without obtaining the consent of the supervisor in advance. (4) The home confinement condition will be in effect for the full duration of the sentence. You are to remain in your residence or on the property of your residence at all times. I will hear from counsel as to proposed exceptions. (5) Do not contact or communicate in any way, either directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic or other means, with L.G.M. or H.M. (6) Do not be within 100m of any place where you know any of the persons named above to live, work, go to school, frequent or any place you know the persons to be except for required court attendances. (7) Do not possess any weapons as defined by the Criminal Code. (8) Do not buy, possess or consume alcohol or other intoxicating substances. (9) Do not possess or consume any unlawful drugs or substances except with a valid prescription in your name or those available over the counter. (10) Attend and actively participate in all assessment, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed by the supervisor and complete them to the satisfaction of the supervisor.
56 If the Offender breaches any of the terms of the conditional sentence order, the presumption will be that he spend the remainder of the sentence left at the time of the breach in custody.
57 Probation terms will be the following:
(1) Report in person to a probation officer within two workings days of the end of your conditional sentence and after that at all times and places as directed by the probation officer or any person authorized by a probation officer to assist in your supervision. (2) Cooperate with your probation officer. You must sign any releases necessary to permit the probation officer to monitor your compliance and you must provide proof of compliance with any condition of this order to your probation officer on request. (3) Do not contact or communicate in any way, either directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic or other means, with L.G.M. or H.M. (4) Do not be within 100m of any place where you know any of the persons named above to live, work, go to school, frequent or any place you know the persons to be except for required court attendances. (5) Do not possess any weapons as defined by the Criminal Code. (6) Attend and actively participate in all assessment, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed by the probation officer and complete them to the satisfaction of the probation officer.
58 If the Offender breaches the terms of his probation order, he should know that he can be arrested, charged, and held in custody.
59 I wish all parties to this matter the best in the future. Thank you once again to counsel for your assistance. As I indicated, I will hear from counsel regarding house arrest exceptions on the conditional sentence order.
Released: 8 October 2024 Signed: Justice S. G. Pratt