His Majesty The King v. Kevin Goudreau, 2024 ONCJ 239

DATE: May 10, 2024 ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

KEVIN GOUDREAU

Before: Justice B. Green

Sentencing submissions heard on: April 9th, 2024 Reasons for Judgment released on: May 10th, 2024

Counsel: Ms. Kingsmill................................................................. counsel for the Crown Mr. Goudreau........................................ Self Represented for the Sentencing

Green J.:

A. Introduction

[1] Mr. Goudreau was convicted of two counts of criminal harassment for repeatedly communicating with the victims and a single count of breaching his probation order by failing to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. Two other counts of uttering death threats were stayed pursuant to the principles enunciated in R. v. Kienapple, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729.

[2] Most of the facts were not disputed at trial apart from a few details. On March 31st, 2022, Mr. Goudreau engaged in a very loud, racist, homophobic rant in the backyard outside his basement apartment at nighttime. Amid shouting “Heil Hitler” and various offensive homophobic, misogynist, and racial epithets, he uttered threats to cause bodily harm and death along with invitations to come outside and have a “chat” with him. A gay couple who resided above him heard the threats along with the hate fueled, offensive words.

[3] Counsel did not dispute that the victims were terrified by Mr. Goudreau’s words and actions or that Mr. Goudreau engaged in threatening conduct. Counsel narrowly focussed on discrete legal issues with respect to whether the facts made out all the essential elements of each of the offences. It was disputed whether Mr. Goudreau intended the victims to receive the threats, that he was communicating with them and/or whether his conduct constituted repeatedly communicating with them. Mr. Goudreau was not called as a witness during the trial to provide an alternate explanation for his behaviour.

[4] Despite counsel’s able submissions, I found that the crown had proven the essential elements of each of the substantive offences beyond a reasonable doubt. The only offence that was admitted was the breach of probation. Counsel conceded that, because Mr. Goudreau was on probation at the time, the reprehensible and disruptive conduct he engaged in that night interfered with his neighbours’ lawful use and enjoyment of their homes which was not keeping the peace and being of good behaviour.

[5] Mr. Goudreau had the benefit of counsel during the trial, but he chose to represent himself during the sentence hearing.

[6] During the sentencing submissions, the Crown relied on a range of sentences for hate motivated crimes contemplated in different decisions and the guiding legal principles set out in the Criminal Code. She submitted that the primary principles of sentencing, denunciation, and deterrence both specific and general, necessitate a sentence that unequivocally expresses condemnation for Mr. Goudreau’s crimes. The crown requested a sentence of 6 months of incarceration with a 743.21 order prohibiting him from contacting the victims while he is in custody, to be followed by a period of three years of probation, a section 109 order for 15 years and a DNA order.

[7] Mr. Goudreau submitted that he has changed significantly over the past two years since the date of these offences. He successfully completed anger management classes and an extensive program for alcohol abuse. He achieved sobriety in December of 2022. He committed these offences when he was extremely intoxicated, and he assured me that he is a different man when he is sober. In addition, he recently completed a 4-month conditional sentence for other offences without any incidents which demonstrates that he is not a danger to the community. He advocated that a conditional sentence in the range of 12 months will fairly balance the aggravating factors and the mitigating considerations.

[8] This is a difficult case because Mr. Goudreau’s conduct on the night of these offences was disgraceful and caused the victims considerable suffering. They understandably felt targeted by the hateful words he spoke because they are gay. They were very worried and frightened. They fled their home shortly afterwards which resulted in financial losses and missed work in addition to lasting fear for their safety. In contrast, while Mr. Goudreau used abhorrent language, he is adamant that he did not know the victims were gay, so the offences were not “motivated” by prejudice. Rather, he asserted that he was engaged in drunken rambling and shouting about all sorts of things that night.

[9] To arrive at a just sanction, I must balance competing considerations, apply the predominant principles of sentencing, and review any guiding case law. I have cautioned myself that a criminal hearing is not a popularity contest so I must not punish Mr. Goudreau for his despicable personal views. I can, however, consider the hateful language Mr. Goudreau used during the commission of the offences as aggravating factors that were hurtful to the victims and the broader community.

[10] There is a creative sanction that will effectively express denunciation for these crimes, specifically deter Mr. Goudreau and other like-minded offenders but will also encourage Mr. Goudreau’s ongoing sobriety. It is essential to review all the considerations that informed my decision with respect to this unusual sentence.

B. Facts

i. The offences

[11] In February of 2021, Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead moved into an apartment above Mr. Goudreau’s place. He is taller than them, older and gruff looking. In contrast, they are two youthful, petite women. In addition to their size and age differences, Mr. Goudreau has a noticeable swastika tattooed on his chest and they are a gay couple. They were understandably worried about him being their neighbour.

[12] Considering the proximity of their dwellings, the placement of their windows and a previous conversation between them, Mr. Goudreau was quite aware that, if he was outside, close to their windows or in his sitting area, his upstairs neighbours could hear him if he was shouting or making loud noises.

[13] Around 7:30 p.m. on March 31st, 2022, the couple heard a “commotion” and a loud voice outside. Mr. Goudreau was making a lot of noise which was not unusual. He would often “blast” his stereo. Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead closed their windows and tried to tune him out by making noise within their apartment. Initially, they were able to ignore him until they received a call or text from a neighbour who was concerned for their safety because of what Mr. Goudreau was saying outside. They turned off anything that was muffling the noise and began to pay attention to what Mr. Goudreau was saying in close proximity to their home.

[14] Mr. Goudreau was very agitated and pacing around outside about fifteen feet away from their home. He was yelling and screaming while waving his arms in the air. Ms. Larke heard him shout, “faggot”, “bitches”, “I am going to kill you” and “come outside I want to talk to you”. At points, he used some “futuristic” language about what he was “going” to do and “just wait”. There was no one else outside with him, not even his dog. Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead did not hear any other voices. He was alone while he was engaging in this conduct.

[15] Mr. Goudreau was moving around but, at one point, he faced the victims’ kitchen window and stood there while shouting threats and invitations to come outside. Ms. Larke testified that it could not have been clearer to her, at that time, they were being targeted and his comments were directed at them.

[16] Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead were quite panicked. They turned off the lights and hid from his view. They opened their kitchen window slightly and used their phone to record some of the words that he was shouting. The recording was tendered as an exhibit. Parts of it were inaudible because Mr. Goudreau was walking around the back area. The parts that were audible captured some of his rants. He was very loud; his tone was aggressive and angry and what he was saying was abhorrent. Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead explained that Mr. Goudreau’s shouting sounded much louder in person than in the recording. Mr. Goudreau spued hateful pejorative words, profanity, and threats throughout the recording.

[17] Mr. Goudreau’s ranting occurred over the course of about an hour. In between the death threats and invitations to come outside, he engaged in all sorts of other disruptive and frightening behavior targeting various groups. He stopped yelling occasionally and mumbled, laughed and/or kicked the ground but then he went back to communicating more invitations to come out and “chat”, more warnings about what was going to happen and repeated threats to kill and cause harm to “queers” and “faggots”.

[18] Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead were so afraid that, after about twenty minutes of indecision, they finally called the police. When officers arrived, they watched one of them approach Mr. Goudreau and speak with him. Afterwards, he retreated into his home.

[19] During the sentencing submissions, Mr. Goudreau provided an alternate explanation for his behaviour that night. He insisted that he was very drunk and reverted to rantings and hateful language that don’t reflect his present beliefs. He vehemently denied that he knew that his neighbours were a gay couple or that he targeted them because they were gay. He emphasized that, before this night, he had a cordial relationship with his neighbours, and they resolved an issue that arose without any problems between them. He went on to provide an explanation for what precipitated his lengthy outburst.

[20] Mr. Goudreau made an informed choice not to testify during the trial. Accordingly, I cannot assess the credibility and reliability of his version of events. I explained to Mr. Goudreau that I will not rely on the exculpatory account that he gave during his submissions. Nevertheless, Mr. Goudreau highlighted some mitigating factors and the absence or attenuation of some aggravating factors that are relevant to the sentencing.

[21] Sections 723 and 724 of the Criminal Code provide that:

Submissions on facts

723(1) Before determining the sentence, a court shall give the prosecutor and the offender an opportunity to make submissions with respect to any facts relevant to the sentence to be imposed.

Submission of evidence

(2) The court shall hear any relevant evidence presented by the prosecutor or the offender.

Hearsay evidence

(5) Hearsay evidence is admissible at sentencing proceedings, but the court may, if the court considers it to be in the interests of justice, compel a person to testify where the person

(a) has personal knowledge of the matter;

(b) is reasonably available; and

(c) is a compellable witness.

Information accepted

724(1) In determining a sentence, a court may accept as proved any information disclosed at the trial or at the sentencing proceedings and any facts agreed on by the prosecutor and the offender.

Jury

(2) Where the court is composed of a judge and jury, the court

(a) shall accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty; and

(b) may find any other relevant fact that was disclosed by evidence at the trial to be proven, or hear evidence presented by either party with respect to that fact.

Disputed facts

(3) Where there is a dispute with respect to any fact that is relevant to the determination of a sentence,

(a) the court shall request that evidence be adduced as to the existence of the fact unless the court is satisfied that sufficient evidence was adduced at the trial;

(b) the party wishing to rely on a relevant fact, including a fact contained in a presentence report, has the burden of proving it;

(c) either party may cross-examine any witness called by the other party;

(d) subject to paragraph (e), the court must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities of the existence of the disputed fact before relying on it in determining the sentence; and

(e) the prosecutor must establish, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of any aggravating fact or any previous conviction by the offender. [emphasis mine]

[22] Pursuant to these sections of the Criminal Code, I could have given Mr. Goudreau an opportunity to testify during the sentencing hearing with respect to certain mitigating considerations and/or the absence of particularly aggravating factors. I did not embark on this process because it was not in the interests of justice at this stage of the proceedings. I can, however, rely on three facts that Mr. Goudreau submitted are relevant to the sentencing. These facts are supported by the evidence heard during the trial and the information in the presentence report which was filed as an exhibit.

[23] First, Mr. Goudreau submitted that his judgement was substantially impaired by the consumption of alcohol that night. I listened carefully to the recording that was tendered during the trial. Mr. Goudreau was intermittently rambling and mumbling, and his speech was slurred at points. The presentence report referenced Mr. Goudreau’s long standing issues with alcohol abuse and an unchallenged statement from him that “for every criminal charge he has incurred he was intoxicated at the time, explaining that he is “completely different" when he is sober” (p. 9 of the PSR).

[24] I accept that Mr. Goudreau was very drunk when he engaged in this offensive and frightening misconduct. I also accept that he has been sober since the winter of 2022 and that he completed a sixteen-week relapse prevention program through Forecast in the fall of 2023 (p. 10 of the PSR).

[25] Secondly, Mr. Goudreau vehemently maintains that he did not know his neighbours were a gay couple. In contrast, the crown alleges that these were hate “motivated” offences. The crown is required to prove this substantially aggravating fact beyond a reasonable doubt.

[26] It is important to review the findings of fact upon which the convictions were based to decide this issue. During the trial, counsel did not dispute the hateful words the victims heard or that they were understandably frightened by Mr. Goudreau’s offensive misconduct. Rather, counsel premised some of his submissions on the argument that the crown had to prove that Mr. Goudreau knew that the victims were gay to be found guilty of the offences. I did not agree. I specifically found that the crown was not required to prove that Mr. Goudreau knew that this couple was gay.

[27] Mr. Goudreau was found guilty of repeatedly yelling and screaming outside, at night, near an apartment where he knew that his two female neighbours were present, and they could see and hear him. I found that he knew that two, younger, physically smaller women, who lived together, could hear him while he shouted death threats along with homophobic and misogynist epithets including “queers” and “bitches”. He issued warnings that were received by them to wait for what would happen next and invitations to join him.

[28] Mr. Goudreau’s volume, agitation so close to their home, the nature and manner of the words that he was yelling and that he faced the victims’ window at points, was important context to decide his intentions that night. The only available reasonable inference was that he would have perceived that the threats that he uttered were conveyed or caused to be received by the occupants of that home.

[29] Undoubtedly, Mr. Goudreau’s ranting was full of hateful, racist, homophobic, misogynist slurs that are antithetical to the norms and values of Canadian society. He engaged in reprehensible conduct and repeatedly communicated with the victims in a manner that caused them to feel harassed and, in all the circumstances, they were reasonably in fear for their safety. I found that:

Mr. Goudreau intentionally and emphatically expressed hostile opinions, expressed hatred, uttered intimidating and frightening threats and “imparted” information between himself and anyone who was within hearing range of his rants. He knew that he was very close to his neighbours’ apartment. He knew that they were home. He was speaking and gesturing aggressively while yelling and shouting. At one point, he faced Ms. Larke’s and Ms. Stead’s apartment window while he was yelling threats to “queers”. The only available reasonable inference from these collective facts is that Mr. Goudreau knew or, at the very least, he was reckless or wilfully blind that his communications, the message he intended to impart that night, would harass Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead.

[30] I did not find that Mr. Goudreau targeted the victims because they were gay. Rather, in a drunken state, he engaged in reprehensible misconduct in which he was, at the very least, reckless, or willfully blind as to whether the statements he communicated to the victims would criminally harass them.

[31] It is important to recall the evidence heard during the trial. Prior to the night of Mr. Goudreau’s tirade, whenever Ms. Larke or Ms. Stead parked their car, they passed by the sitting area outside of Mr. Goudreau’s home. If they saw each other, they were pleasant and cordial. On one occasion, Mr. Goudreau’s partner accidently damaged their car. They were able to resolve the situation amicably. Mr. Goudreau paid for the damages. Shortly thereafter, he vented to Ms. Larke about some financial pressures he had been experiencing and he was upset about some bills.

[32] There was one previous encounter with Mr. Goudreau that scared the couple but that was attributable, in part, to a large swastika that is tattooed on his chest and his general demeanour. He was not threatening towards them. This interaction did not have anything to do with their sexual persuasion. It was about noise issues. There was no perceived animosity between Mr. Goudreau and the victims until the night of these offences.

[33] Considering Mr. Goudreau’s swastika tattoo, Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead were justifiably worried that they would suffer harassment or reprisals if their neighbour found out that they were gay. As a result, they tried to conceal the nature of their relationship in public. As far as they were aware, Mr. Goudreau did not see them acting like a couple together. Mr. Goudreau had not been invited inside their home. I do not know if he knew the size of the couple’s apartment or whether it was a one bedroom or a two bedroom.

[34] I cannot determine whether the pejorative language that Mr. Goudreau use to refer to gay people was intended to be directed at the victims. He shouted homophobic slurs as well as references to “bitches”, an insulting word often used to refer to women, racial slurs with respect to black people and Nazi slogans. He was offensive in general to various identifiable groups and people who are vulnerable to discrimination.

[35] Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead speculated about what Mr. Goudreau may have overheard or what he may have been told by his roommate. They believed that they were the only gay couple in the building. However, since they were not close to all the tenants, they could not say if they were the only gay people residing there.

[36] There was no direct or compelling circumstantial evidence that Mr. Goudreau knew his neighbours were a gay couple as opposed to roommates or friends. Accordingly, the crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factor that Mr. Goudreau targeted the victims because he knew that they were gay or that he was making these slurs or threats about their homosexuality or their relationship.

[37] Unquestionably, the words Mr. Goudreau shouted were frightening, alienating, and harmful. He engaged in a despicable rant, that included threats which were received by the victims, and he repeatedly communicated with them, knowingly or recklessly or while being wilfully blind, in a manner that caused them to feel harassed and fear for their safety.

[38] Thirdly, as noted, there is no evidence that the relations between these neighbours were anything but cordial before he committed these offences despite Mr. Goudreau’s repulsive personal views. Mr. Goudreau submitted that his behaviour that night was precipitated by an unrelated encounter that had nothing to do with the victims, rather, they got caught in the crossfire of his angry outburst.

[39] I accept that in his drunken state, Mr. Goudreau’s anger and frustration bubbled over, and he began spewing hatred without any regard for how that behaviour may negatively impact the innocent people around him. I also accept that his hour-long tirade was the unplanned, spontaneous rambling of a drunk and narrow-minded man who criminally harassed his neighbours and caused them to receive death threats.

[40] Each of these factors are important considerations. The offences were spontaneous, impulsive and the consumption of alcohol impaired Mr. Goudreau’s judgement. While Mr. Goudreau’s ranting was full of morally repugnant words which is an aggravating factor, the crown has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that his crimes were “motivated” by hate in the sense that he targeted this couple because he knew that they were gay. This is not a distinction without a difference when it comes to the determination of the just and appropriate sentence.

ii. Victim Impact

[41] That night, Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead received a call from a neighbour who was concerned for their safety and well being. Other residents of the area were impacted and worried because of Mr. Goudreau’s offensive and threating conduct. This case would have been a suitable one for a community victim impact statement. This kind of hateful language is harmful to any member of the targeted groups and the community at large.

[42] The night after the incident, Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead couldn’t sleep because they were so scared especially since Mr. Goudreau could access the interior door to their apartment. They immediately looked for a new apartment and moved out within days. They had just paid their rent for the month, so they lost April’s rent, missed work and incurred needless moving costs.

[43] In their jointly filed victim impact statement, they explained that:

“This incident completely upended our lives, as we decided that we could no longer live with such an unpredictable and belligerent neighbour.”

“Following the incident, we experienced severe anxiety and distress, leaving us on edge and unable to live with a sense of security.”

iii. The offender

[44] Mr. Goudreau is 48 years old. His early life was quite unstable with a very difficult relationship with his mother. He lost his biological father as a child. His mother had a few partners until she married his stepfather who he thought was a “good guy”. Mr. Goudreau has siblings however he has been estranged from his family for decades.

[45] Mr. Goudreau left home as a teenager. He eventually completed high school and took some post-secondary classes. He did not pursue his education further because he didn’t think it would help him to earn money and he felt that he would likely “get fired over my mouth and my opinions” (p. 8 of the PSR). He led a transient lifestyle for many years while travelling across Canada.

[46] He had a partner at some point, and he is the father of two children. Mr. Goudreau described his relationship with the mother of his children as “toxic” until they broke up (p. 7 of the PSR). Like the rest of his family, Mr. Goudreau does not maintain any contact with his children who are in their twenties.

[47] Mr. Goudreau has a long criminal record dating back twenty years to 2004. Notably, all his convictions between 2004 and 2013 were in Oshawa so he had some stability in his life. During this time, he was in and out of custody with short jail sentences like a revolving door. He had a multitude of convictions for failing to comply with various court orders, assaults, threatening and criminal harassment. In 2015 and 2016, his criminal convictions continued in Peterborough. He was convicted of assaults, breaches of court orders and possession of weapons. The author of the presentence report accessed Mr. Goudreau’s records and ascertained that at least three of his probation orders during this time were for “domestic related offences against two different victims” (p. 12 of the PSR).

[48] Mr. Goudreau received several short custodial sentences in the past that appeared to have no specifically deterrent effect on him until December of 2016. Despite a terrible record of recidivism at that stage, a judge took a chance on Mr. Goudreau and gave him an intermittent sentence. There are no entries on his record for being unlawfully at large from that sentence. Afterwards, there was a 6-year hiatus from the criminal justice system which was remarkable considering the previous 12 years of back-to-back convictions.

[49] Mr. Goudreau’s criminal record resumed in 2022 when he was convicted of operating a conveyance with more than the legal limit of alcohol in his system. Presumably, between 2016 and 2022, Mr. Goudreau maintained some semblance of sobriety such that he was not in conflict with the law. However, in 2022 he must have relapsed. After the drinking and driving conviction, on March 1st of 2022, he was convicted of mischief and ordered to pay a fine and abide by a 12-month period of non-reporting probation which included a term to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. That sentence did not deter Mr. Goudreau from committing further offences involving alcohol. Within that same month, he committed these offenses while bound by the recent probation order.

[50] Mr. Goudreau submitted that his behaviour on the night of these offences inspired him to get sober. I do not accept that submission. He committed further offences while on release for these crimes and while still bound by the probation order. He was convicted of uttering death threats and failing to comply with probation on November 22nd, 2023.

[51] Mr. Goudreau has struggled with alcohol abuse for decades. The probation officer noted that during his previous supervision between 2015 and 2017, “alcohol use remained a primary area of concern for the supervising officer as the subject continued to minimize the seriousness and impact his use had on his life and criminal activity” (p. 13 of the PSR).

[52] There has been an important change in Mr. Goudreau’s life. He has been sober since December of 2022 which is a laudable accomplishment:

Alcohol use has been an ongoing issue for the subject, as he acknowledged that his entire criminal record was due to him being intoxicated at the time of his offences. He reported that he now sees the problems his substance use was causing him, and he stated he last drank on Christmas Day 2022. He also reported involvement with FourCAST and this writer was able to verify the subject’s completion of a sixteen-week Relapse Prevention Program in the Fall of 2023. The subject also completed seven sessions of an eight-session Anger Management Program in the Fall of 2023 as well (p. 14 of the PSR).

[53] Mr. Goudreau supports himself on Ontario Works, but he has been trying to start up a business in “home renovations”. He is hopeful that he can turn this business into a profitable endeavour. He explained to probation that “when he is working consistently, he makes three or four grand a month, no problem, but currently finances were tight” (p. 8 of the PSR).

[54] Mr. Goudreau uttered morally repugnant words and ideology the night of these offences. These were not isolated or spontaneous declarations of hate and bigotry. He has a large swastika tattooed on his chest which speaks volumes about the depths of his ignorance and callous disregard for the devastation associated with this offensive symbol. Mr. Goudreau submitted that the tattoo is 25 years old and that he is not the same person anymore. He assured the court that if he could afford to have it removed, he would do so. He may want to remove his tattoo, but his personal opinions have not substantially changed as evidenced by the words he spoke loud enough for anyone in that neighbourhood to hear, including shouting “Heil Hitler”.

[55] Mr. Goudreau was under the influence of alcohol which inhibited and impaired his judgement the night of these offences, however, alcohol does not cause a person to be a thoughtless, cruel, bigot. The hate that he spewed that night reflects his longstanding intolerance that has no place in country that is proudly multicultural and diverse. The probation officer noted that:

MSG file information indicated that throughout the subject’s most recent period of previous supervision from 2015 to 2018, he organized or attempted to organize several local rallies. It was noted that in March 2017, the subject organized a 'white pride' rally in downtown Peterborough.

When asked about this at the time, file information indicated that the subject’s response was"you can have pride for everything else...gay pride, black pride, so why can't we celebrate white pride too?" The subject explained to his supervisor at the time that he was against "third-world immigration" and that all of "these people" from such places are coming to Canada and trying to implement their laws and beliefs instead of assimilating to Canadian values. It was further noted that the subject does not believe in multi-culturalism and would prefer that Canada return to a mainly European make-up, as well as Indigenous People, because “they were here first." MSG file information noted that the subject did not consider himself to hold racist beliefs or attitudes and stated that his goal was "to educate people”.

During his interview for this report, the subject was asked about his attitudes towards others. He replied that he is the founder of the Canadian Nationalist Front. He stated that he believes in “bringing back and preserving Canada’s traditional culture” which includes individuals from European descent, and Indigenous Peoples. The subject stated that he would be most closely associated with the People’s Party of Canada in terms of his political affiliations. The subject stated that his attitudes towards immigration have not changed or wavered. He also acknowledged his more recent protests against ‘Drag Story Time’ in downtown Peterborough in early 2023 (pages 10 and 11 of the PSR).

He denied any additional rallies or outward political activism in the last eight months.

Discussing his current circumstances before the Court, the subject reported that he was found guilty of the above offences. He minimized his actions and denied that his comments and behaviour were directed towards the victims. He did acknowledge that he was “wasted” at the time and that he did not remember “half of it [the incident].” The subject expressed his intentions to appeal his guilt, stating that he did not want this offence in particular on his criminal record. (p. 12 of the PSR)

The subject denied the occurrence of the offences and that his actions were directed at the victims. He expressed that he “couldn’t believe” he was arrested and that he was “guilty of being drunk and stupid, but not of these charges.” (p. 13 of the PSR)

[56] Mr. Goudreau lacks any insight into how the words that he shouted that night were hurtful, harmful and would be frightening to any individual who heard him, especially any person who belonged to the groups he demeaned and insulted. Mr. Goudreau expressed regret for scaring Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead. Nevertheless, he is not remorseful for the pain he inflicted because of the hateful words he uttered, whether he knew that these two women were gay or not. He minimized the seriousness of his crimes.

[57] There are significantly mitigating factors that are absent. Mr. Goudreau did not enter pleas of guilty. He has no insight into how publicly expressing reprehensible opinions and derogatory name calling while shouting threats of violence were harmful to the victims and other members of this community. There is little hope for rehabilitation or redemption with respect to this aspect of Mr. Goudreau’s offending behaviour.

C. Sentencing considerations

i. Principles of sentencing

[58] The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.

[59] Section 718 of the Criminal Code provides that any sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. As a result, depending on the circumstances of the offence and the circumstances of the offender, a Court may focus on specific principles of sentencing as the most important factors to guide the Court’s decision.

[60] The crown submitted that the predominant sentencing principles in a case where vulnerable members of our society are targeted and victimized are general deterrence and denunciation. The Criminal Code was recently amended to reiterate the importance of these sentencing principles when victims are particularly vulnerable:

Objectives — offence against vulnerable person

718.04 When a Court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person who is vulnerable because of personal circumstances — including because the person is Aboriginal and female — the Court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence. [emphasis mine]

[61] As a gay couple, Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead are vulnerable to verbal attacks and abuse from narrow-minded, discriminatory people. Their vulnerability is evidenced by the fact that they felt compelled to hide the nature of their relationship out of fear of reprisals and hatred for simply being who they are. No one should be made to feel that way. Accordingly, I shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

[62] The crown highlighted that, in addition, section 718.2 of the Criminal Code specifically directs that a Court “shall also take into consideration”, when sentencing Mr. Goudreau, the following statutorily aggravating factors:

(i) evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression, or on any other similar factor; [emphasis mine] and

(iii.1) evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation.

[63] The words that Mr. Goudreau uttered were evidence of his personal “bias, prejudice and hate”. As the crown advocated, during her eloquent and compelling submissions, this language is antithetical to Canadian norms and values and should be denounced in the strongest terms. Nevertheless, there is a difference between uttering hateful and hurtful words during the commission of offences, which is still an aggravating fact, and offences “motivated by” hate and prejudice.

[64] For section 718.2(i) of the Criminal Code to apply, the crown must present evidence that Mr. Goudreau’s motivation or stimulus or incentive for the commission of these offences against Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead was bias or prejudice or hatred. Sometimes, that motivation can be inferred from the language used during the commission of an offence. This is not one of those cases, especially since the crown relied on the argument during the trial that they did not have to prove that Mr. Goudreau knew the couple was gay to find him guilty of the offences.

[65] The crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Goudreau was motivated to victimize Ms. Stead and Ms. Larke because they are gay. Rather, he intentionally or recklessly terrified them while shouting threats and all sorts of hateful words. I recognize that the detrimental impact on the victims is the same regardless of the offender’s motivation, which is an aggravating fact. Nevertheless, the intention required for hate motivated crimes has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

[66] Mr. Goudreau’s crimes had significant lasting negative impacts on Ms. Stead and Ms. Larke personally and to their sense of safety in this community. They lost their home, time, days of work, and money. They were scared and legitimately felt targeted by Mr. Goudreau because of their homosexuality. Whether Mr. Goudreau knew they were gay or not, hateful words are harmful to the victims who receive the threats and the broader community who feel vulnerable and attacked for being who they are.

[67] The predominant principles of sentencing are denunciation and deterrence, both specific and general, however, rehabilitation remains an important goal with any sentencing. The main mitigating factors are that:

• Mr. Goudreau has achieved sobriety which he believes will ensure that he does not commit similar offences in the future.
• He has not committed any further offences since 2022 which demonstrates his current commitment to follow a different path.
• He was recently sentenced to a four-month conditional sentence throughout which he demonstrated a willingness and ability to comply with community-based supervision.

[68] Any period of incarceration will have a negative impact on Mr. Goudreau’s life. He has achieved residential stability and he may lose that home if he is incarcerated for a significant period. He also has a fledgling business, and he will lose any clients if he is in custody for a prolonged period.

[69] While I acknowledge these factors, the impact of this sentence on his life is not my only concern or the main focus. I must also be guided by the harm that he caused to the victims and other vulnerable members of this community. A message must be sent to Mr. Goudreau and other like-minded offenders that, when an offender spews hateful language while committing crimes, the penalty will be severe. The objectives of denunciation, deterrence both specific and general, must take precedence.

[70] Ultimately, I must sentence Mr. Goudreau to the shortest period of incarceration that fairly achieves all the sentencing objectives, reflects the seriousness of these offences as well as the mitigating facts of this offender; particularly the fact that he has achieved and maintained sobriety.

[71] To arrive at a sentence that balances these opposing considerations, it is helpful to review any sentencing precedents that have considered the appropriate sentence ranges for these types of cases.

[72] Before I review the cases in which a period of incarceration was imposed, I will address the appropriateness of imposing a conditional sentence as opposed to a jail sentence.

ii. Whether a conditional sentence is appropriate

[73] This offence is serious and merits a denunciatory and deterrent sentence, but incarceration is not the only means to achieve these sentencing goals. A conditional sentence can achieve both these sentencing objectives.

[74] All available sanctions must be considered when determining what is reasonable in the unique circumstances of this offence and this offender. Mr. Goudreau submitted that there is an appropriate, alternative sanction of serving a jail sentence in the community that may achieve the sentencing goals of denunciation and deterrence.

[75] While a conditional sentence would be the least restrictive penalty, I must consider whether it is statutorily available and whether it would appropriately balance the competing sentencing considerations. Section 742.1 of the Criminal Code lists five criteria a judge must consider before imposing a conditional sentence:

1. The offender must not be convicted of an offence that is specifically excluded.
2. The offence must not be punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment.
3. The court must impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years.
4. The safety of the community must not be endangered by the offender serving his or her sentence in the community; and
5. A conditional sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2.

[76] First, the offences are not specifically excluded from consideration. Secondly, there is no minimum term of imprisonment for the offences. Thirdly, the crown is requesting a sentence of incarceration of 6 months. It is the last two prerequisites to the imposition of a conditional sentence that are at issue.

[77] With respect to the fourth consideration, I am concerned about Mr. Goudreau’s lack of insight into the seriousness of the offences. There is little, if any, potential for rehabilitation with respect certain aspects of his offending behaviour. There is no potential that Mr. Goudreau will change his offensive personal views and opinions that were reflected in his use of Nazi slogans and derogatory name calling. In addition, the crown astutely submitted that Mr. Goudreau committed these offences while he was in his own backyard just outside his apartment. This fact should be sufficient proof that incarcerating him in that same home will endanger the safety of his neighbours.

[78] In contrast, I have considered the following factors:

• A condition prohibiting Mr. Goudreau from consuming any alcohol while serving a conditional sentence will address some of the concerns with respect to further similar offending behaviour.
• He has complied with the terms of his undertaking with respect to these offences. He also recently served a conditional sentence of four months without any incidents.

[79] I am satisfied that the safety of the community and the victims would not be endangered if Mr. Goudreau was ordered to serve his sentence in the community with very strict conditions. Any safety concerns could be addressed by very strict house arrest terms with ankle monitoring, for the full duration of the order, as well as prohibiting him from drinking alcohol outside his home or engaging in hateful tirades.

[80] It is the fifth criteria, that a conditional sentence must be consistent with the fundamental principles of sentencing, that is not met in this case.

[81] A conditional sentence would not adequately address the primary principles of deterrence and denunciation, in the unique facts of this case, even after considering the mitigating facts. Although factually distinguishable, I adopt the rational of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Macintyer-Syrette, 2018 ONCA 706 at para. 21 that:

This offence requires denunciation, as an affirmation of the dignity of the complainant, and no appropriate sentencing proposal or sanction, short of a custodial disposition, appears to be available.

[82] A very strong message must be sent to Mr. Goudreau, to the public and to likeminded offenders that a heavy price will be paid by anyone who shouts Nazi slogans and various epithets while threatening people. The sentence must unequivocally communicate these types of offences will not be tolerated or condoned by our courts.

[83] The sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of these offences and Mr. Goudreau’s responsibility for the commission of the crimes. The need for denunciation and deterrence is so pressing that the only means to sufficiently express condemnation for these offences is with a period of incarceration.

[84] To achieve a fair sentence that addresses each of the principles of sentencing, it is essential to review the authorities provided by the crown that considered sentence ranges for similar offences and where or whether Mr. Goudreau’s sentence should fall within that range.

iii. The principle of parity

[85] In addition to the guiding sentencing principles, the principle of parity set out in subsection 718.2 (a) of the Criminal Code requires that:

A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.

[86] While this is a worthy goal, each individual case is often so unique that it is difficult to achieve parity in sentencing. Ultimately, considering the distinctiveness of each offence and each offender, it is often challenging to find comparable cases. As Chief Justice Lamer stated in R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 at paragraph 92:

...Sentencing is an inherently individualized process, and the search for a single appropriate sentence for a similar offender and a similar crime will frequently be a fruitless exercise of academic abstraction.

[87] The crown relied on two decisions to support the position of 6 months of incarceration as the appropriate sentence:

R. v. Lelas, [1990] O.J. No. 1587 (Ont.C.A.): A self proclaimed racist, white supremacist and Nazi, damaged targeted properties, including a synagogue, by spray painting them with hateful words and Nazi symbols. Like Mr. Goudreau, Mr. Lelas blamed alcohol and drugs for his crimes. Mr. Lelas’ crimes were planned and deliberately directed at Jewish people. In addition, his crimes sparked a series of similar offences. The case drew national media attention.

The Court of Appeal noted at paras 24 and 27 that:

In considering the fitness of the sentence imposed by the trial judge, I wish to make it clear at the outset that Lelas is not to be sentenced for his political or social beliefs, repugnant as those beliefs may be. The charge is mischief, not the promotion of hatred, and save where the beliefs of the respondent serve to explain his actions, I do not propose to take them into account.

Whether the Jews are a racial or religious group is, in my view, irrelevant. An offence which is directed against a particular racial or religious group is more heinous, as it attacks the very fabric of our society.

The Court found that a sentence of 6 months was not sufficient to meet the needs of general deterrence and to show society’s abhorrence for the acts. The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was increased to 1 year of incarceration to ensure that “the message must go out loud and clear that conduct such as that engaged in by the respondent will not be tolerated in Canadian society, and if it is engaged in, it will be met with a severe penalty.”

R. v. Porco, 2017 ONCJ 676: the accused defaced public property with anti-Muslim statements. The Court did not have the benefit of a community impact statement, but the learned jurist took into account the proliferation of “incidents motivated by bigotry and hate” in the community. The court found at paras 33 and 34 that:

In committing the mischief, Mr. Porco chose specific language, which is unambiguous. There cannot be any other meaning except a message that connotes hate, bias or prejudice based on religion. He targeted a specific segment of the Durham community: Muslims. He did so in a way to make his intention clear: he wanted everybody who used a bus shelter or drove or walked past the bus shelter to read his message. With respect to the defence position, it does not matter that he wasn't charged with a specific hate crime because this was a hate crime disguised as a mischief. It's unclear why the police didn't charge him with a hate crime. Regardless, I find this to be a statutorily aggravating factor on sentence.

In addition, the fact that Mr. Porco's actions were done in public and not on or inside a religious institution is also aggravating. By picking a public place, Mr. Porco had a wider audience. He wanted to share his hateful message, not keep it for himself or his echo chamber. It does not diminish the aggravating nature of his offence. Indeed, it becomes more aggravating when I consider that he did this not just once, but repeatedly. This was not a moment of weakness or frustration. Mr. Porco is not a graffiti artist or as Mr. Hendry says, a wayward youth who was tagging. Rather, he was persistent in his efforts and I can safely assume that had he not been apprehended, would have continued with his hateful scrawls.

Mr. Porco pled guilty and expressed remorse. However, the court reviewed a PSR that was very negative and reflected that Mr. Porco had not responded well to community supervision in the past. Moreover, his criminal record was described as long and “unrelenting”. He was sentenced to 5 months incarceration to be followed by 15 months of probation with cultural sensitivity training and community service work.

[88] Both these decisions are factually distinguishable. Unlike cases that involved a series of preplanned offences defacing different properties, Mr. Goudreau engaged in one drunken rant that frightened a vulnerable couple. He did not target a place of worship or this specific couple because they were gay. Of course, that does not attenuate the aggravating factor he shouted hateful, racist, sexist, homophobic, profane, alienating, and pejorative words along with threats of violence and nazi slogans. Mr. Goudreau’s conduct was reprehensible.

[89] Mr. Goudreau is unapologetically racist and espouses biased personal opinions. It is essential to distinguish between condemnation for his crimes and punishing his opinions and beliefs. Throughout these proceedings, I found the cautionary comments of the dissenting judge in R. v. Lelas, [1990] O.J. No. 1587 (Ont.C.A.) at para 35 to provide helpful guidance:

It is not easy to decide upon a sentence which will express society's abhorrence of this kind of conduct and yet not impose, or give the appearance of imposing, punishment for the respondent's beliefs and opinions. Arriving at a fair balance between those two competing principles, each of which has latent emotional impact, is a delicate exercise.

[90] I agree with the crown’s submission that a period of incarceration is essential to express condemnation for Mr. Goudreau’s offences, but restraint is an important sentencing consideration. The sentence imposed must be the shortest period of incarceration that achieves all the sentencing objectives.

[91] There is a creative sentence that combines a custodial sentence with the deprivation of other aspects of Mr. Goudreau’s liberty interests like his freedom of expression. The goal of this sanction is to balance the competing sentencing considerations, demonstrate restraint and hopefully achieve some restorative justice by protecting other vulnerable members of this community from similar conduct in the future.

iv. A creative sentence

[92] When crafting a proportionate sentence, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized in R. v. Hills, 2023 SCC 2 at para 62, that:

Sentencing is a highly individualized and discretionary endeavour. Each sentence is to be custom tailored to match the particular offence, as well as the offender. There is no "one size fits all" penalty, as sentencing is "an inherently individualized" and "profoundly subjective process" (R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 92; R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, at para. 46):

The determination of a just and appropriate sentence is a delicate art which attempts to balance carefully the societal goals of sentencing against the moral blameworthiness of the offender and the circumstances of the offence, while at all times taking into account the needs and current conditions of and in the community.

[93] While a jail sentence is essential to reflect the aggravating factors, I will impose a sanction that is “tailored” to these unique facts by combining an intermittent sentence with unique terms of probation to achieve some form of restorative justice. In R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 at para 18, the Supreme Court of Canada explained that:

Restorative justice is concerned with the restoration of the parties that are affected by the commission of an offence. Crime generally affects at least three parties: the victim, the community, and the offender. A restorative justice approach seeks to remedy the adverse effects of crime in a manner that addresses the needs of all parties involved. This is accomplished, in part, through the rehabilitation of the offender, reparations to the victim and to the community, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.

[94] The victims and this community were adversely impacted by Mr. Goudreau’s conduct of shouting threats and hateful epithets. Regardless of Mr. Goudreau’s personal opinions about certain issues, he expressed some insight during the sentencing that he should not have been shouting those words in any public place. Terms of probation can be crafted that are intended to protect other innocent people from similar harmful outbursts by Mr. Goudreau in the future.

[95] There is undoubtedly a punitive aspect to the terms that I will impose on Mr. Goudreau, but the primary focus is rehabilitative in the sense of ensuring his “good conduct” going forward. A sentence that is responsive to the unique facts in this case, will also reinforce the message to victims that their suffering as well as that of vulnerable community members has been recognized and addressed.

[96] Section 732.1 of the Criminal Code sets out the compulsory terms and conditions of a probation order. It also lists various discretionary terms that a court can order, including that an offender must:

(h) comply with such other reasonable conditions as the court considers desirable, subject to any regulations made under subsection 738(2), for protecting society and for facilitating the offender’s successful reintegration into the community.

[97] I am aware that the discretion of a sentencing judge to rely on this section and tailor terms of probation that are responsive to the facts is not limitless. The terms must be reasonable and must have some nexus between the offender and the objectives outlined in the section.

[98] In R. v. Shoker, 2006 SCC 44, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the wording in this section:

Such language is instructive, not only in respect of conditions crafted under this residual power, but in respect of the optional conditions listed under s. 732.1(3): before a condition can be imposed, it must be "reasonable" in the circumstances and must be ordered for the purpose of protecting society and facilitating the particular offender's successful reintegration into the community. Reasonable conditions will generally be linked to the particular offence but need not be. What is required is a nexus between the offender, the protection of the community and his reintegration into the community. See, for example, R. v. Kootenay (2000), 150 C.C.C. (3d) 311 (Alta. C.A.), and R. v. Traverse (2006), 205 C.C.C. (3d) 33 (Man. C.A.), where appellate courts have upheld conditions requiring abstinence from alcohol or drugs even though these played no part in the commission of the offence for which the offender was sentenced. On the other hand, conditions of probation imposed to punish rather than rehabilitate the offender have been struck out. In contrast, punitive conditions may be imposed pursuant to s. 742.3(2)(f) as part of a conditional sentence: Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, at para. 34. [some citations omitted]

The residual power to craft individualized conditions of probation is very broad. It constitutes an important sentencing tool. The purpose and principles of sentencing set out in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code make it clear that sentencing is an individualized process that must take into account both the circumstances of the offence and of the offender. It would be impossible for Parliament to spell out every possible condition of probation that can meet these sentence objectives. The sentencing judge is well placed to craft conditions that are tailored to the particular offender to assist in his rehabilitation and protect society. However, the residual power to impose individualized conditions is not unlimited. The sentencing judge cannot impose conditions that would contravene federal or provincial legislation or the Charter. Further, inasmuch as the wording of the residual provision can inform the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion in imposing one of the listed optional conditions as I have described, the listed conditions in turn can assist in interpreting the scope of "other reasonable conditions" that can be crafted under s. 732.1(3)(h).

[99] In R. v. Zora, 2020 SCC 14 at para 87, the Supreme Court reviewed a court’s authority with respect to ordering various terms of judicial interim release. There is a significant difference between bail terms which apply to a person who is presumed innocent and terms of probation for a convicted offender. Nevertheless, this decision is instructive.

[100] Terms included in court orders must be reasonable in the sense that they are rationally connected to the objectives of the applicable section. Furthermore, an terms should be clear and should not be so difficult to comply with that the offender is being set up for failure. Finally, terms that infringe on constitutional rights, like freedom of expression, should only be ordered if they are necessary to address an identifiable risk that the offender poses to the safety of the community in the context of a release order. In summary:

Conditions must be clear, minimally intrusive, and proportionate to any risk. Conditions will also only be reasonable if they realistically can and will be met by the accused, as "[r]equiring the accused to perform the impossible is simply another means of denying judicial interim release" by setting them up to fail, as well as adding the risk that the accused will be criminally charged for failing to comply. As noted by Rosborough J. in Omeasoo, removing an unreasonable condition will not cause any more risk to the community than imposing a condition that is impossible for the accused to respect (para. 39). Reasonable conditions also must not limit the Charter rights of an accused, such as their freedom of expression or association, unless that condition is reasonably connected and necessary to address the accused's risk of absconding, harming public safety, or causing loss of confidence in the administration of justice [emphasis mine]

[101] There are two different terms that are “reasonably connected and necessary to address” the risks Mr. Goudreau poses, they are not difficult to comply with and he is not being set up for failure.

[102] First, Mr. Goudreau does not dispute that when he is drunk, he poses a risk to the safety of the community. He has been sober for a significant period, but alcoholism is an illness. There is always the chance that he may relapse and, in so doing, reoffend. I do not want to set him up for failure by ordering him not to possess or consume any alcohol absolutely. Instead, to ensure his ongoing rehabilitation and the safety of the community, for the first year of his probation order, he will be subject to a term of probation as follows:

You will not be outside your place of residence unless with 0 blood alcohol concentration in your system.

[103] If Mr. Goudreau relapses, then he must stay inside his home. This term will serve to protect the public, it is reasonably connected to the offender and the objectives set out in section 732.1 (h) of the Criminal Code.

[104] Secondly, Mr. Goudreau did not acknowledge the harm he caused to the victims and the community. Instead, he excused and minimized his behaviour as drunken rambling. Words can be very hurtful to the recipients. Whether he likes it or not, Mr. Goudreau resides in a wonderfully diverse community with residents of various ethnicities, religious beliefs, and sexual persuasion. He is entitled to his thoughts and beliefs but that does not entitle him to breach the public peace by shouting disparaging words and Nazi slogans amidst threats of violence.

[105] A strong message of condemnation for Mr. Goudreau’s crimes can be communicated through a custodial sentence that is served on the weekends, if that sentence is coupled with specific terms of probation that restrict Mr. Goudreau’s freedom of expression. For the first year of the probation order, Mr. Goudreau will be subject to the following terms and conditions:

While you are in any public places or places where you can be overheard by members of the public:

• You are not to utter words or wear clothing or hold signs that express, have, or depict any racial, ethnic, antisemitic, homophobic slurs and/or threats of violence or death.
• You are not to utter words or wear clothing or hold signs that express or have or depict any Nazi slogans including but not limited to “Heil Hitler”.

[106] These terms of probation are rationally connected to the offences, the protection of vulnerable members of the community and they are intended to ensure Mr. Goudreau’s peaceful cohabitation and integration within a diverse community.

[107] The restrictions on Mr. Goudreau’s freedom of expression are punitive but that is not the primary goal. Rather, the terms are intended to ensure that he does not victimize other vulnerable members of the gay community as well as other residents who should feel safe, secure, and protected from further verbal barrages.

D. Conclusion

[108] A period of incarceration is essential to address the aggravating factors, to send a strong message that vulnerable members of this community deserve protection, to recognize the harm done and to reflect the predominant sentencing principle. However, despite his record, there is potential that Mr. Goudreau will not reoffend in the future considering his current sobriety, the completion of alcohol counseling, his burgeoning business venture, and his compliance with recent court orders.

[109] A fair and just sentence should be tailored to unique facts of each case. Mr. Goudreau is being sentenced to a shorter period of incarceration than requested by the crown, in the intermittent range, so that he can continue with the stability and sobriety he has achieved over the past two years. This sentence will benefit him as well as the community. To address the aggravating factors and to prevent future harm, Mr. Goudreau will also be deprived of other liberty interests, like limiting his freedom of expression, and ensuring that he is not outside of his home except while in an alcohol-free state.

[110] Mr. Goudreau is sentenced to 60 days intermittent sentence concurrent on each count of criminal harassment. For the breach of probation, he is sentenced to 30 days intermittent, consecutive to the criminal harassment. There will be a section 109 order for 10 years. Mr. Goudreau will be required to provide samples of his DNA. Considering Mr. Goudreau’s limited income, the victim fine surcharge will be waived.

[111] In addition, he must comply with three years of a non-reporting probation order. The terms are as follows:

• Keep the peace and be of good behavior.
• Appear before the court when required to do so.
• Notify the court or probation officer in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the court or probation officer of any change in employment or occupation.
• You must attend at the jail to serve your intermittent sentence on time, in a sober condition, with a blood alcohol concentration of zero, and not be under the influence of or in possession of any controlled substances unless you are taking that controlled substance pursuant to a lawfully obtained prescription.
• Do not contact or communicate in any way, directly or indirectly, by any physical or electronic or other means with Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead.
• Do not be within 100 meters of any place where you know Ms. Larke and Ms. Stead to live, work, go to school or any place that you know the person to be EXCEPT while attending at required court appearances.
• You are not to post any information about, depictions of, recordings of or photographs of Ms. Larke or Ms. Stead on any social media site.
• For the first 12 months of this order:
  • You will not be outside your place of residence unless with 0 blood alcohol concentration in your system.
  • While you are in any public places or places where you can be overheard by members of the public:
    • You are not to utter words or wear clothing or hold signs that express, have, or depict any racial, ethnic, antisemitic, homophobic slurs and/or threats of violence or death.
    • You are not to utter words or wear clothing or hold signs that express or have or depict any Nazi slogans including but not limited to “Heil Hitler”.