WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:

This is a case under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act and is subject to one or more of subsections 48(7), 45(8) and 45(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 85(3) of the Child and Family Services Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

45.— (7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication.

The court may make an order (c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing, where the court is of the opinion that publication of the report would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.

(8) No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.

(9) Idem: order re adult.

The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

85.— (3) A person who contravenes subsection 45(8) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 45(7)(c) or subsection 45(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

Court File and Parties

Court File No.: Halton c75/14 Date: 2014-06-27 Ontario Court of Justice

Between:

Children's Aid Society, Region of Halton Applicant,

— And —

J.T. (mother) and Z.B. (father) Respondents

Before: Justice Sheilagh M. O'Connell

Heard on: March 27, April 17 and 24, 2014

Reasons for Decision released on: June 27, 2014

Counsel:

• Diane Skrow, for the applicant society
• Ann Stoner, for the respondent father, Z.B.
• Julius Omware, for the respondent mother, J.T.
• Archbishop Dorian A. Baxter, Founding National Chairman, The National Association for Public and Private Accountability (N.A.P.P.A.), on his own behalf

JUSTICE S.M. O'CONNELL:

1: INTRODUCTION

[1] The Reverend Archbishop Dorian A. Baxter, ("Reverend Baxter") Founding National Chairman of the National Association for Public and Private Accountability (N.A.P.P.A.) has brought a motion in this child protection proceeding seeking the following relief:

1. An order granting him "intervenor status" in his capacity as the founding National Chairman of the National Association for Public and Private Accountability; or

2. An order appointing him as amicus curiae, (a Friend of the Court); or

3. An order granting him party status in the child protection proceeding before me.

[2] In support of his motion, he relies upon subrules 1(7), 7(2), 7(5) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, as amended, and rules 13.01 and 13.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as amended.

[3] Reverend Baxter also sought substantive relief in his motion on behalf of the respondent mother. Specifically, he requests an order that mother's access to her child be significantly expanded; an order removing the child protection worker assigned and replacing her with a more objective worker; and an order requesting that the society videotape any and all supervised access visits between the mother and the child. I was not prepared to consider these requests for substantive relief until I ruled on the preliminary issue regarding Reverend Baxter's standing in this proceeding.

[4] The respondent mother ("the mother") supports the motion. The Children's Aid Society, Region of Halton ("the society") and the respondent father ("the father") oppose the motion.

[5] Reverend Baxter's motion was first heard on March 27, 2014. At the hearing on March 27, 2014, the mother was still without counsel, although she had applied for a legal aid certificate. Although I heard some submissions on that day, the motion was adjourned to April 17, 2014 so that the society could file responding materials. On the return of the motion, the mother was represented by counsel. At that time, I heard further submissions and received additional case law and written materials from the Reverend and the society. I then reserved my ruling to April 24, 2014.

[6] On April 24, 2014, I dismissed Reverend Baxter's motion with written reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

2: BRIEF BACKGROUND

[7] The respondents are the biological parents of the child, L.T., ("the child" or "L."), born in 2010. L. is their only child. The parties separated in 2009 before L.'s birth. The parties were involved in a lengthy custody and access proceeding before me in 2013. Following a nine-day trial, I made an order granting the parties joint custody of the child, with the child's primary residence being with the mother.

[8] On February 3, 2014, the society apprehended the child from his mother's care and placed him in his father's care. On February 7, 2014, the society commenced a protection application and a motion seeking an order placing the child in the temporary care and custody of the father subject to society supervision. I made a temporary 'without prejudice order' on that day and adjourned the motion and application to February 20th, 2014 to permit the mother to retain a lawyer and file responding materials.

[9] On February 20, 2014, at the return of the temporary care and custody motion, the mother had served and filed responding materials. The mother sought an order for the immediate return of L. to her care, subject to the supervision of the society. The father supported the society's motion.

[10] At the commencement of the hearing, Reverend Baxter attended on the mother's behalf and sought leave to assist the mother in the presentation of her argument. He described himself as a support person for the mother. The mother had prepared very detailed and comprehensive affidavit materials in response to the society's motion with the assistance of Reverend Baxter.

[11] Neither the father nor the society consented to the presence of Reverend Baxter during the hearing. As Reverend Baxter is not a lawyer or a licensed paralegal, I excused him from the proceedings, which are closed to members of the public and subject to a publication ban, pursuant to section 45 of the Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-11, as amended. The mother wished to proceed with the temporary care and custody hearing. She was assisted by duty counsel, who made submissions on her behalf on the basis of the affidavit evidence filed.

[12] I reserved my ruling to February 27, 2014. On that day, for lengthy oral reasons, I ordered that the child be placed in the temporary care and custody of the father, subject to the supervision of the society, with terms and conditions specified, and with access to the mother at a minimum of two times per week, to be supervised by the society. I then adjourned the protection hearing to April 24, 2014, to monitor and review the mother's access with the child, the terms and conditions of supervision and the expectations of the court on all parties moving forward.

[13] Shortly after my ruling on the temporary care and custody hearing, Reverend Baxter brought this motion for intervenor or party status.

3: REVEREND BAXTER'S POSITION

[14] Reverend Baxter submits that his requests are being made in his capacity as the Founding National Chairman of the largest accountability organization in Canada, the National Association for Public and Private Accountability (hereinafter referred to as 'NAPPA'). In his affidavit in support of his motion, he deposes that he founded NAPPA, which also gave birth to the 'Canada Court Watch Program', which he states was established "in his capacity as a responsible citizen seeking to bring checks and balances into a Family Court System that seemed somewhat oblivious to the need for a 'System of Justice'".

[15] Reverend Baxter explains the history behind the establishment of NAPPA and the Court Watch program in his affidavit. He asserts that he has been able to understand and assist amicable resolutions in hundreds of child welfare proceedings over the past 27 years.

[16] According to his affidavit, Reverend Baxter was contacted by the mother on or about February 5th, 2014 before she had retained legal counsel. He met with the mother and offered his assistance. He first offered to mediate, which was not successful. He then spent hours reading over various court documents and assisting the mother in preparing her affidavits for the temporary care and custody hearing.

[17] Reverend Baxter submits that, if he is granted intervenor status or appointed amicus curiae, he "can assist this family and the Legal System to steer a more 'Just' course that will better protect the right of all concerned, especially the child in question, L.T." He states that he can assist the court in providing the appropriate checks and balances to the society, which, in his view, has acted in bad faith and provided grossly misleading information to the court regarding the mother.

[18] At the return of his motion on April 17, 2014, after the mother had retained counsel, Reverend Baxter offered further reasons for the granting of his requests. In written submissions filed on that day, he states as follows:

It is my contention that I have a vested interest in the outcome of this case for two very important reasons:

1. Sadly, it would appear that this Honourable Court has received seriously misleading information from the Halton CAS in general and the Worker [C.M.] in particular! Given that the existing Temporary Order for Custody appears to be based on this misleading information which has been further obfuscated by what appears to be "Bad Faith" on the part of the "the Worker", I feel granting me "Intervener Status" can assist the Court by clarifying what has actually transpired.

2. It is also my sincere contention that my over 27 years of experience in dealing with "Child Protection Concerns" and my personal mission under the banner of NAPPA to seek checks and balances gives me an even stronger vested interest in seeking a "Fair and Just" outcome in this particular case. Recognizing that the guidelines re: qualification for "Intervener Status" are clearly focused on and seek to embrace a "raison d' ê tre" with ramifications beyond the case in question I am anxious to prove this to be seen to be inherent within the ultimate purpose of this motion.

4: THE SOCIETY'S POSITION

[19] The society submits that Reverend Baxter's motion be dismissed. It is confident that the court can and will adjudicate all of the issues in this protection proceeding in a fair and just way without the involvement of any non-parties. Further, the mother is now represented by experienced child protection counsel who will ensure her interests are advanced before the court. Adding a further party or intervenor to this case will only unnecessarily prolong the proceedings and this is not in the child's best interests.

[20] The society asserts that it is the court's role to provide checks and balances on the children's aid society and to ensure that justice is done. According to the society, the real motivation behind Reverend Baxter's involvement is an attempt to intervene to change the temporary order that was made on February 27, 2014, which was not appealed by the mother. The society further asserts that the reverend is attempting to cast serious aspersions on the child protection worker and the agency. The society filed an affidavit which contained a number of letters by Reverend Baxter delivered to the Director and Executive Director of the society. The letters made very serious allegations against the worker assigned which in the view of the society, bordered on libellous.

5: THE LAW AND ANALYSIS

5.1: The Request to Be Added as a Party under Rule 7 of the Family Law Rules

[21] A person can intervene in a child protection case by being added as a party. Although not a formal definition, subrule 7(1) of the Family Law Rules provides that a party is a "a person who makes a claim in a case or against whom a claim is made in a case." Subrule 7(5) provides that the court may order that any person who should be a party shall be added as a party, and the court may give directions for service on that person.

[22] The court in Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. S.H., S.W. and D.R., 118 A.C.W.S. (3d) 672, 16 O.F.L.R. 126, [2002] O.J. No. 4491, [2002] O.T.C. 916, 2002 CarswellOnt 4048 (Ont. Fam. Ct.), set out the following principles for the court to consider before adding a party to a child protection proceeding:

(i) whether the addition of the party is in the best interests of the child,

(ii) whether the addition of the party will delay or prolong proceedings unduly,

(iii) whether the addition of the party is necessary to determine the issues,

(iv) whether the additional party is capable of putting forward a plan that is in the best interests of the child, and

(v) whether the proposed party has a legal interest in the case.

[23] In Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. C.K., 2013 ONCJ 342, 229 A.C.W.S. (3d) 450, [2013] W.D.F.L. 4111, [2013] O.J. No. 2917, 2013 CarswellOnt 8525 (Ont. C.J.), Justice Stanley Sherr summarised the other principles that are relevant to the court's consideration at paragraphs 13 to 15 of that decision:

[13] The ability of an existing party to present a plan of placement of a child with a non-party can be a significant consideration in deciding whether to add that non-party. See: Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. Dana H., 2009 ONCJ 2.

[14] That someone may have relevant evidence in a case does not elevate them from a witness to party status. See Noik v. Noik, 14 R.F.L. (5th) 370 (Ont. Fam. Ct.).

[15] It is not necessary for the court to determine at this stage whether the plan of the proposed added parties would be successful; the question at this stage is whether their plans merit consideration, despite the delay in bringing it. See Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. Dana H., supra.

[24] In this case, there is no claim made against Reverend Baxter or NAPPA by the existing parties, nor is he or his organization making a claim. He does not have a legal interest in the case. He is not advancing a plan of care or a plan of placement for the child. Whether or not he has any evidence or information for the court does not elevate him from being a witness to a party. Finally, adding a further party will unnecessarily prolong the proceedings. It is not appropriate nor is it in the child's best interests to add Reverend Baxter as a party in the case before me, given the time-sensitive nature of child protection proceedings.

5.2: The Request to Be Granted Intervenor Status as an Added Party or as Amicus Curiae (A Friend of the Court) under Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure

[25] The Family Law Rules have no provisions to grant a person who is not a party leave to intervene in a case. However, subrule 1(7) provides the following:

(7) Matters not covered in rules. — If these rules do not cover a matter adequately, the court may give directions, and the practice shall be decided by analogy to these rules, by reference to the Courts of Justice Act and the Act governing the case and, if the court considers it appropriate, by reference to the Rules of Civil Procedure. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 1(7).

[26] By invoking the above rule, I can consider both subrule 13.01(1) and rule 13.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, applicable to non-family law matters. Under this rule, a person who is not a party to a proceeding may nevertheless participate in one of two ways: first, by moving for permission to intervene as an added party (rule 13.01), or second, by moving to intervene as an amicus curiae, or friend of the court, without being added as a party (rule 13.02).

5.3: Rule 13.01: Leave to Intervene as an Added Party

[27] Rule 13.01 provides as follows:

13.01 Leave to intervene as added party. — (1) A person who is not a party to a proceeding may move for leave to intervene as an added party if the person claims,

(a) an interest in the subject matter of the proceeding;

(b) that the person may be adversely affected by a judgment in the proceeding; or

(c) that there exists between the person and one or more of the parties to the proceeding a question of law or fact in common with one or more of the questions in issue in the proceeding. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 13.01(1).

(2) On the motion, the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the determination of the rights of the parties to the proceeding and the court may add the person as a party to the proceeding and may make such order as is just. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 13.01(2).

[28] To be granted intervenor status under subrule 13.01(1), the moving party must have a definite and legal interest in the subject matter of the action. Family and Children's Services of Guelph and Wellington County v. Jessica Anne B. and Robert John S., 2011 ONSC 3946, 204 A.C.W.S. (3d) 514, [2011] W.D.F.L. 4977, [2011] O.J. No. 2898, 2011 CarswellOnt 5693 (Ont. S.C.).

[29] In J.A. v. J.B., 2010 ONCJ 767, [2010] O.J. No. 6169, 2010 CarswellOnt 11013 (Ont. C.J.), Justice Lawrence P. Thibideau concluded that rule 13.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is essentially the same as rule 7 of the Family Law Rules with respect to adding parties, but for non-family law matters. Justice Thibideau found that resort to rule 13.02 was therefore improper given its similarity to rule 7, although broader in application. In that case, the children's aid society was seeking intervenor status in an application for access under the Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-12, as amended, brought by a parent whose parental rights were terminated by a Crown wardship order under the Child and Family Services Act.

[30] In refusing the society's application for leave to intervene as an added party under rule 13.01, Justice Thibideau stated the following at paragraph [22] of his decision:

Reliance by the Society on Rule 13.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is problematic. The Rule appears to be a parallel rule for non-family matters using the same considerations as Family Law Rule 7 with respect to added parties. While the wording is different, the intent is essentially the same.

[31] I agree with this analysis. Further, a plain reading of rule 13.01 requires that the person seeking leave to intervene must have a legal interest in the case, be adversely affected by a judgment in the proceeding, or have a question of law or fact in common with one or more of the questions in issue in the proceeding. None of these criteria apply to Reverend Baxter or his organization.

5.4: Rule 13.02: Leave to Intervene as a Friend of the Court or Amicus Curiae

[32] Rule 13.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

13.02 Leave to intervene as friend of the court. — Any person may, with leave of a judge or at the invitation of the presiding judge or master, and without becoming a party to the proceeding, intervene as a friend of the court for the purpose of rendering assistance to the court by way of argument. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 13.02; O. Reg. 186/10, s. 1.

[33] The term "friend of the court" or amicus curiae has been used to describe a person who assists the court by advancing arguments in support of a public interest that might not otherwise be adequately represented by the parties to the proceeding. In J.A. v. J.B., supra, Justice Thibideau describes this status, unique from party status, as follows at paragraph [32]:

[32] The case law makes it clear that there is another kind of intervener status that is permitted. This relates to participation, usually by organizations with a vested interest in the outcome in a general way related more to societal interest or some identified segment of Society interest. Sometimes that interest is obviously aligned with one of the parties, sometimes it is more subtle and occasionally there is no such alignment.

[34] Rule 13.02 is the provision most applicable to Reverend Baxter's request for intervention. He stated during argument that he is not a lawyer nor is he seeking to be appointed as a legal representative or an advocate for the mother, as she is represented by counsel. He submitted that as President of NAPPA and founder of Court Watch, his goal is the greater public interest "to bring justice on a much grander scale to the citizens of Ontario" by ensuring that there are checks and balances to children's aid societies, starting with this agency in particular, given the improper conduct he has alleged.

5.5: The Threshold Issue of Jurisdiction

[35] In J.A. v. J.B., supra, my brother Justice Thibideau granted the children's aid society intervenor status as a public interest organization to provide expertise and assistance to the court on the issues of post-adoption access to crown wards in the context of an application for access under the Children's Law Reform Act. In my respectful view, the Ontario Court of Justice does not have the jurisdiction to grant intervenor status to public interest groups using the amicus curiae provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[36] The Ontario Court of Justice is a statutory court under the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43, as amended. My powers are limited to those set out under the Courts of Justice Act and the Child and Family Services Act. There is no statutory right to intervene by third party public interest groups in child protection proceedings under Child and Family Services Act. The Child and Family Services Act is a complete and comprehensive code. See Westell v. Jarrell and Cyprick, 34 O.R. (2d) 44, 130 D.L.R. (3d) 418, 24 R.F.L. (2d) 342, [1981] O.J. No. 3099, 1981 CarswellOnt 297 (Ont. C.A.), per Associate Chief Justice Bert J. MacKinnon, at page 49 [O.R.]. Child protection proceedings are private matters involving children and families, although with state involvement. The proceedings are closed to members of the public and subject to publication bans.

[37] In Ontario, the only courts with the inherent equitable power to appoint an amicus curiae as third party intervenors are the superior courts. This comprises the Superior Court of Justice (including the Family Court branch and the Divisional Court branch, but not the Small Claims Court), and the Court of Appeal. The Ontario Court of Justice is not a court of equity and enjoys no inherent powers in this regard. The reason for this is the jurisdictional boundaries established under section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867. See Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. Susan D. (1993), 13 L.W.C.D. 474, [1993] O.J. No. 1148 (Ont. Prov. Div.), at paragraphs [10] and [11].

[38] It is important to note here that while, in my view, I do not have the inherent jurisdiction to appoint amicus curiae to assist the court, this is fundamentally different from my jurisdiction to appoint publicly funded counsel to represent a litigant in a child protection proceeding. The Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that both superior courts and statutory courts are courts of competent jurisdiction for the purpose of granting a remedy under subsection 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, c. 11 (U.K.). See New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. J.G., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, 244 N.R. 276, 216 N.B.R. (2d) 25, 552 A.P.R. 25, 177 D.L.R. (4th) 124, 50 R.F.L. (4th) 63, 26 C.R. (5th) 203, [1999] S.C.J. No. 47, 1999 CarswellNB 305, at paragraph [51].

[39] In that case, the court held that the Charter applies to child protection cases and required the state to pay for counsel for an unrepresented parent. The court held that the principles of fundamental justice entitle a parent involved in child protection proceedings to a fair hearing, which include a right to be represented by publicly funded counsel where this is necessary for the effective presentation of the parent's case.

[40] This principle has been applied in a number of decisions in the Ontario Court of Justice. See Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society v. Yvonne C. and David Vernon B., 2010 ONCJ 82, [2010] W.D.F.L. 3530, [2010] O.J. No. 1071, 2010 CarswellOnt 1539 (Ont. C.J.), Family and Children's Services of Guelph and Wellington County v. Kelly F. and Gavin F., [2001] O.J. No. 4548, 2001 CarswellOnt 4084 (Ont. C.J.), and Children's Aid Society of Halton v. K.C.M., 2012 ONCJ 382, [2012] O.J. No. 2810, 23 R.F.L. (7th) 257, 2012 CarswellOnt 7793 (O.C.J.).

[41] However, in my view, the jurisdiction of the Ontario Court of Justice to appoint publicly funded counsel to represent a parent in a child protection case as a Charter remedy cannot be expanded to grant a public interest group leave to intervene as amicus curiae.

5.6: The Test for Intervenor Status as a Public Interest Group

[42] If I am wrong in my analysis of the threshold issue of jurisdiction, then applying the well-established legal principles to grant intervenor status, Reverend Baxter's motion still fails.

[43] Generally, at least one of the following criteria must be satisfied when intervenor status is granted to a public interest group under rule 13.02:

1. The intervenor has a real, substantial and identifiable interest in the subject matter of the proceeding;

2. The intervenor has an important perspective distinct from the immediate parties;

3. The intervenor is a well-recognised group with a broad identifiable membership and special expertise.[1]

[44] Courts have interpreted the intervenor status provision narrowly in private litigation as opposed to public or constitutional litigation. Intervention of third parties into essentially private disputes should be carefully considered and used sparingly, as any intervention can add to the costs and complexity of the motion regardless of an agreement to restrict submissions. See Childs v. Desormeaux, 67 O.R. (3d) 385, 177 O.A.C. 183, 231 D.L.R. (4th) 311, 44 C.P.C. (5th) 5, [2003] O.J. No. 3800, 2003 CarswellOnt 3696 (Ont. C.A); confirmed on appeal at Childs v. Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, 347 N.R. 328, 210 O.A.C. 315, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 257, [2006] R.R.A. 245, 39 C.C.L.T. (3d) 163, 30 M.V.R. (5th) 1, [2006] S.C.J. No. 18, 2006 CarswellOnt 2710.

[45] The onus is on the proposed intervenor seeking leave to establish that the court will benefit from the intervention. Proposed intervenors must be able to offer something more than the repetition of another party's evidence and argument or a slightly different emphasis on arguments raised by the parties. See Authorson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Attorney General for Canada, 147 O.A.C. 355, 9 C.P.C. (5th) 218, [2001] O.J. No. 2768, 2001 CarswellOnt 2377 (Ont. C.A) at paragraphs [8] and [9]; Stadium Corp. of Ontario Ltd. v. City of Toronto, 10 O.R. (3d) 203, 11 M.P.L.R. (2d) 68, [1992] O.J. No. 1574, 1992 CarswellOnt 491 (Ont. Div. Ct.)

[46] The factors to be considered by a court in determining whether to grant intervenor status to a public interest group are set out by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Regional Municipality of Peel v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd., 74 O.R. (2d) 164, 2 C.R.R. (2d) 327, 45 C.P.C. (2d) 1, 46 Admin. L.R. 1, [1990] O.J. No. 1378, 1990 CarswellOnt 393 (Ont. C.A.), at page 167 [O.R.] as follows:

1. the nature of the case;

2. the issues which arise, including whether the issues are essentially private or they involve a public interest;

3. the likelihood of the intervenor to make a useful contribution to the resolution without causing injustice to the immediate parties.

[47] This case does not involve broad public policy considerations or constitutional issues that require the assistance of an intervenor. Although the parents' Charter rights are clearly engaged, they are both represented by counsel to assist in a fair and just outcome. Ultimately, the issues for me to decide in this case are whether L. is a child in need of protection and if so, what disposition or placement is in his best interests. Reverend Baxter's organization does not have a real and identifiable interest in the subject matter of this litigation, nor in my view, is his perspective distinct from the perspective of at least one of the immediate parties.

[48] Notwithstanding Reverend Baxter's submission that his purpose in intervening is to serve a greater public interest, his role to date has been solely to act as both an advocate and a witness for the mother. He has helped her prepare affidavit material. He has documented and observed her interactions with the society worker. In his motion seeking intervenor status, he sought substantive relief on behalf of the mother. He has vigorously advanced the mother's cause.

[49] In his written submissions, he states that by granting him intervenor status, he can assist the court in clarifying what has "actually transpired" in this case and by correcting the "seriously misleading information" that the court received from Halton society in general and the worker in particular. He states that his goal is to assist the court in "seeking a fair and just outcome in this particular case" [emphasis added]. His supporting affidavit is very critical of the society worker and in his letter of complaint to the executive director of the Halton society, he writes the following:

[L.] has been ripped away from a secure, loving and luxurious home setting and thrust into a one-bedroom apartment with his biological father for no apparent reason than the whim of a Community Child Protection Worker who with absolutely no documented evidence whatsoever has accused [L.'s] mother of a mental illness!!!

[50] The mother has experienced child protection counsel who is acting as her advocate. The mother's counsel can and will advance arguments to assist the court in determining whether the society's investigation has been objective and fair to date and will advocate to ensure that the society will do so moving forward. Reverend Baxter's intervention under rule 13.02 will only unnecessarily repeat the evidence and arguments that the court will hear from mother's counsel.

[51] Finally, there was very little evidence before me regarding the membership of NAPPA and Court Watch, how well-recognised and representative the organization is, and what expertise and assistance it could offer the court. It is the court's role, not Reverend Baxter's role, on behalf of NAPPA or Court Watch, to ensure that the appropriate checks and balances are placed on the society's intervention in this family's life and to ensure that justice is done. Reverend Baxter cannot and should not offer the court assistance in this regard.

[52] Court Watch's involvement in other reported cases of this nature has only served to undermine the court's role and has seriously delayed the just resolution of the proceedings. See, in particular, Children's Aid Society of Kingston and Frontenac County v. C.N., 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 385, [2007] O.J. No. 1186, 2007 CarswellOnt 1827 (Ont. Fam. Ct.), at paragraphs [11] to [12]; C.S. v. M.S., 37 R.F.L. (6th) 373, [2007] O.J. No. 787, 2007 CarswellOnt 1267 (Ont. Fam. Ct.), at paragraphs [6] to [7].

[53] The paramount purpose of the Child and Family Services Act is to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children, a purpose that is undermined by a failure to resolve the issues before the court in a timely manner. Child protection proceedings are time-sensitive and governed by strict statutory time lines to ensure that the rights of the child and the family are not prejudiced. Every effort should be made to limit delay.

[54] In my respectful view, the proposed intervention by Reverend Baxter and his organization will not serve the best interests of L. nor make a useful contribution to the resolution of this case. It will only cause delay and prejudice to the parties and the child in particular.

6: CONCLUSION

[55] For the reasons above, Reverend Baxter's motion is dismissed. I thank everyone involved for their very helpful submissions and the case law provided.

Released: June 27, 2014

Signed: "Justice Sheilagh M. O'Connell"

[1] Attorney General for Ontario v. Dieleman, 16 O.R. (3d) 32, 108 D.L.R. (4th) 458, [1993] O.J. No. 2587, 1993 CarswellOnt 1093 (Ont. Gen. Div.).