Morwald-Benevides v. Benevides
Ontario Reports Court of Appeal for Ontario
Lauwers, van Rensburg and L.B. Roberts JJ.A.
December 24, 2019
148 O.R. (3d) 305 | 2019 ONCA 1023
Case Summary
Family law — Practice — Amicus curiae — Mother in contentious family law proceeding dismissing five lawyers and choosing to represent herself — Trial judge appointing one of the former lawyers as amicus curiae — Father's lawyer removing herself from the record and trial judge appointing her as a second amicus — Trial ultimately proceeding with both amicus participating, rendering Crown's appeal of appointments moot — Court of Appeal hearing the matter regardless, setting out principles governing appointment of amicus curiae in private family law cases — Trial judge did not properly apply the principles and appeal would have been allowed if not moot.
In a highly contentious matter involving child custody and support, the mother had dismissed five counsel before deciding to represent herself. The trial judge appointed one of the dismissed lawyers as amicus curiae to "assist the Court in making decisions that relate to the best interests of the children". The amicus largely acted as counsel for the mother throughout. Midway through the trial, the father ran out of money and his lawyer moved to get off the record. The trial judge granted the motion and immediately appointed the lawyer as amicus to assist with the presentation of the father's case, resulting in the lawyer simply carrying on as the father's counsel. The trial judge dismissed the Crown's motion to set aside both amicus curiae orders. When the Crown appealed to the Superior Court of Justice, the appeal judge appointed the same two lawyers to act as amicus before him. The Court of Appeal set aside the amicus appointments and remitted the matter to the appeal judge, who appointed a single amicus and dismissed the Crown's appeal of the trial judge's decision appointing amicus. The Crown appealed. The trial was completed with both amicus participating so the appeal was moot, but the Court of Appeal issued a judgment setting out the principles governing the appointment of amicus curiae in private family law cases.
Held: The appeal should have been dismissed as moot.
First, the assistance of amicus must be essential to the adequate discharge of the judicial functions in the case. Second, a party has the right to self-represent, but the trial judge is responsible for ensuring that the trial progresses reasonably. Third, while amicus may assist in the presentation of evidence, amicus cannot control a party's litigation strategy, and, because amicus does not represent a party, the party may not discharge amicus. Fourth, the authority to appoint amicus should be used sparingly and with caution, in response to specific and exceptional circumstances. Fifth, the trial judge must consider whether he or she can personally provide sufficient guidance to an unrepresented party in the circumstances of the case to permit a fair and orderly trial without the assistance of amicus, even if the party's case would not be presented quite as effectively as it would be by counsel. Sixth, it will sometimes, though very rarely, be necessary for amicus to assume duties approaching the role of counsel to a party in a family case. Finally, the order appointing amicus must be clear, detailed and precise in specifying the scope of amicus's duties. The activities of amicus must be actively monitored by the trial judge to prevent mission creep, so that amicus stays well within the defined limits. The trial judge erred by appointing the mother's former counsel, who injected an adversarial element inconsistent with the impartial role of amicus. The appointment of a second amicus was contrary to principle. In the family context, it is hard to imagine a situation in which appointing two counsel as amicus to represent adversarial interests would be appropriate, rather than a single state-funded friend of the court. The fact that one party is represented does not justify the appointment of amicus for the other party. The trial judge provided insufficient notice and prepared no litigation plan to guide and govern the activities of the amicus.
Cases Referred To
Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43 — followed
Dujardin v. Dujardin Estate, 2018 ONCA 597
Gionet v. Pingue, 2018 ONCA 1040
Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) v. A. (J.), 2006 MBCA 44
Morwald-Benevides v. Benevides (2015), 127 O.R. (3d) 165, 2015 ONCJ 532
Morwald-Benevides v. Benevides, 2015 ONSC 7290 (S.C.J.)
Morwald-Benevides v. Benevides, 2017 ONCA 699
Morwald-Benevides v. Benevides (2019), 146 O.R. (3d) 472, 2019 ONSC 1136 (S.C.J.)
New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.)
O. (C.C.) v. V. (J.J.), 2019 ABCA 292
R. v. Imona-Russel, 2019 ONCA 252
Zomparelli v. Conforti, 2018 ONSC 610
Statutes Referred To
Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 89(3.1) and 112
Authorities Referred To
Dickens, B.M., "A Canadian Development: Non-Party Intervention" (1977), 40 Mod. L. Rev. 666
Flaherty, Michelle, "Best Practices in Active Adjudication" (2015), 28 Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 291
Flaherty, Michelle, "Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias: Issues in Administrative Law" (2015), 38:1 Dal. L.J. 119
Hughes, Jula, and Philip Bryden, "Implications of Case Management and Active Adjudication for Judicial Disqualification" (2017), 54:4 Alta. L. Rev. 849
Treaties and Conventions Referred To
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Can. T.S. 1983, No. 35
Appeal
APPEAL from the order of Koke J. (2019), 146 O.R. (3d) 472, 2019 ONSC 1136 (S.C.J.).
Baaba Forson, for appellant non-party Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario.
Sandra J. Meyrick, appearing as amicus curiae.
Judgment
The judgment of the court was delivered by
LAUWERS J.A.:
I. The Procedural Context
[1] What are the principles governing the appointment of amicus curiae in private family law cases? That is the issue in this appeal.
[2] The trial judge, a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice, made orders appointing counsel to represent both parents in a contentious family law dispute. He appointed Andrew Thomson as amicus on behalf of the applicant mother, Melinda Morwald-Benevides (the "mother"). Midway through the trial, he appointed Bonnie Oldham as amicus for the respondent father, Jeffrey Mark Benevides (the "father"), immediately after he permitted her to get off the record as his counsel for non-payment of fees.
[3] The trial judge dismissed the Crown's motion to set aside the amicus curiae orders. The Crown appealed to the Superior Court of Justice.
[4] The appeal judge appointed the same two lawyers to act as amicus before him. He dismissed the Crown's motion to set aside the amicus appointments and stayed the Crown's appeal, noting, at para. 6 of the decision: "The stay can be lifted when the AG and the amici have negotiated a mutually acceptable rate of compensation for the amici, or pursuant to further order of this court."
[5] This court set aside the amicus appointments and remitted the matter to the appeal judge. The appeal judge then appointed Ms. Meyrick as a single amicus. He went on to dismiss the Crown's appeal of the trial judge's decision appointing amicus. The Crown appeals.
[6] The appeal is technically moot because the trial has been completed with both amicus participating; nothing substantive between the parties to the family law case remains to be resolved. Amicus were paid by the Crown on a without prejudice basis to permit the trial to be completed, while preserving the Crown's right of appeal.
[7] As I will explain, the trial judge made several errors in principle regarding the purpose and role of amicus. He erred in appointing both the mother's and the father's former counsel as amicus. It would be rare in a family law case to appoint one amicus, and the circumstances would virtually never justify the appointment of two. In more general terms, the fact that one party is represented does not justify the appointment of amicus, even though trial judges would prefer both parties to be represented by competent counsel; maintaining a level playing field is not a valid consideration in appointing amicus.
[8] Had the appeal not been moot because the underlying family law case has been resolved, I would have allowed it for the reasons that follow.
[9] Before addressing the issues raised by the Crown, I set out the factual context.
II. The Factual Context
[10] The appeal judge's introduction sets out the factual circumstances concisely in paras. 2-9, which I largely paraphrase.
[11] The applicant mother brought an application for an order for custody of the three children of the marriage, then aged six, 11 and 13 years, an order prohibiting access, or in the alternative, supervised access to the respondent father and an order for spousal and child support.
[12] The litigation was highly contentious with numerous court appearances. The father lived in Bermuda. The mother's position was that the father should not have access in Bermuda because she feared that he would not return them after an access visit, arguing that Bermuda courts have a poor record of compliance with the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the "Hague Convention"). In addition to logistical and scheduling issues, the father's residence in Bermuda raised complications for grossing-up child support because of different tax treatment of income in the two jurisdictions, and the treatment of tax deductions for child support and for travel expenses to facilitate access. The father argued that the mother was alienating the children from him. The mother alleged abuse.
[13] After dismissing five counsel, including Mr. Thomson, the mother decided to represent herself at trial. She brought an unsuccessful motion at the outset of trial for an adjournment on medical grounds. The trial judge described the mother's behaviour on the first day of trial as bordering on hysterical. Just before noon she collapsed in the courtroom and was rushed to hospital by ambulance. In the afternoon her brother attended court on her behalf.
[14] The trial judge decided to appoint Mr. Thomson as amicus to assist with the presentation of the mother's case because he had previously acted for her and was familiar with her and with the issues. This was the first amicus order. Based on the record, it is fair to say that the mother did not support the appointment of amicus for her, but she did co-operate with him. This sense emerges from paras. 67, 72, 75, 96 and 97 of the reasons, and from the transcript.
[15] In his written endorsement, the trial judge wrote that he had appointed amicus "to assist the court in relation to the interest of the applicant". However, his formal order stated that amicus was "to assist the Court in making decisions that relate to the best interests of the children". The record shows, as the Crown submitted, that despite the text of the order, Mr. Thomson largely acted as counsel for the mother throughout, with the limited exceptions when he resisted the mother's instructions on two contentious issues: the psychological assessment of the mother and whether the judge should appoint amicus for the father.
[16] The trial was originally scheduled for four days and began in the Ontario Court of Justice on April 11, 2014. Remarkably, despite the pretrial estimate of its length, the trial stretched intermittently over 23 days and finished in late June 2015.
[17] Midway through the trial, the father ran out of money. His lawyer, Ms. Oldham, brought a motion to get off the record. The trial judge granted the request, and then immediately appointed her as amicus to assist with the presentation of the father's case. His written endorsement stated that he was making an amicus order in favour of the father "in the usual form". The second formal amicus order is in the same terms as the first, but Ms. Oldham simply carried on as counsel for the father.
III. The Issue
[18] As noted at the outset, the issue in this appeal can be concisely stated: What are the principles governing the appointment of amicus curiae in private family law cases? (Child protection cases involve different considerations and are not the subject of this decision.)
[19] The adversarial system, under which our system of justice operates, was designed for and works best when counsel represent the parties. However, increasingly, and in most family law trials, one or both of the parties are self-represented. Trial judges routinely resolve family law disputes about property, spousal support, child support and child custody and access without counsel on both sides.
[20] This is the context within which the amicus issue is addressed. This court should give guidance to trial courts about the appointment of amicus, even though the particular appeal is moot: New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), at paras. 45-47. The circumstances of this case, the full exposition of reasons by the trial judge and the appeal judge, and the representation of both perspectives by counsel (the Chief Justice of this court appointed Ms. Meyrick to serve as amicus in this appeal in order to provide submissions opposing the Crown's submissions), provide an opportunity to address the issue in an appropriately adversarial setting.
IV. Analysis
(1) The Principles Governing the Appointment of Amicus in Private Family Law Cases
[21] The precedent governing the appointment of amicus is the decision of the Supreme Court in Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43 ("CLA").
[22] What is an amicus curiae? Speaking for the majority, Karakatsanis J. said, at para. 2: "It is not disputed that a court may appoint a lawyer as 'amicus curiae', a 'friend of the court', to assist the court in exceptional circumstances; or that the Attorney General is obligated to pay amici curiae when appointed." She explored the genesis of the ancient and venerable concept of amicus, at paras. 44-47, noting, at para. 46: "the ability to appoint amici is linked to the court's authority to 'request its officers, particularly the lawyers to whom the court afforded exclusive rights of audience, to assist its deliberations'", quoting from B.M. Dickens, "A Canadian Development: Non-Party Intervention" (1977), 40 Mod. L. Rev. 666, at p. 671.
[23] Speaking for the minority, Fish J. did not disagree, and said, at para. 87: "[C]ourts may appoint an amicus only when they require his or her assistance to ensure the orderly conduct of proceedings and the availability of relevant submissions." He added that "once appointed, the amicus is bound by a duty of loyalty and integrity to the court and not to any of the parties to the proceedings".
[24] It is common ground that a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice has the implied jurisdiction to appoint amicus to assist the court. It extends to those family law matters in which the appointment is essential for the court to adequately discharge its judicial functions: CLA, at para. 112.
The Principles
[25] The principles governing the appointment of amicus have developed in the context of criminal proceedings in which the liberty interests of the unrepresented party, the accused, are especially acute, and in which the Crown is always well represented, while the accused faces a loss of liberty. By contrast, private family law cases involve disputing citizens, although they often have important public aspects because protecting the best interests of children is a longstanding public commitment reflected in the courts' parens patriae jurisdiction.
[26] In the delicate exercise of determining when amicus will be appointed and for what purposes, the relevant principles from CLA must be applied to family law litigation with necessary modifications. The principles or factors that have emerged thus far in the cases are set out below, but the list is not exhaustive.
[27] First, the assistance of amicus must be essential to the adequate discharge of the judicial functions in the case: CLA, at para. 47. The stakes must be high enough to warrant amicus. This is a circumstantial determination within the trial judge's discretion.
[28] Second, a party has the right to self-represent: CLA, at para. 51. However, the trial judge is responsible for ensuring that the trial progresses reasonably. There are situations in which the appointment of amicus might be warranted, such as when the self-represented party is ungovernable or contumelious, when the party refuses to participate or disrupts trial proceedings, or when the party is adamant about conducting the case personally but is hopelessly incompetent to do so, risking real injustice: see, e.g., R. v. Imona-Russel, 2019 ONCA 252; Zomparelli v. Conforti, 2018 ONSC 610.
[29] Third, relatedly, while amicus may assist in the presentation of evidence, amicus cannot control a party's litigation strategy, and, because amicus does not represent a party, the party may not discharge amicus: Imona-Russel, at para. 67.
[30] Fourth, the authority to appoint amicus should be used sparingly and with caution, in response to specific and exceptional circumstances: CLA, at para. 47. And see O. (C.C.) v. V. (J.J.), 2019 ABCA 292, at para. 50. This is in part a recognition of the financial exigencies, which is ultimately a political question under our separation of powers doctrine, as CLA noted at paras. 27-31, 83.
[31] A trial judge should consider whether a Legal Aid certificate would be available and whether the matter should be adjourned to permit a party to apply for it. A trial judge should also consider whether other resources could be gathered together to suffice. For example, where the interests of children are involved, the judge may request the participation of the Office of the Children's Lawyer under ss. 89(3.1) and 112 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. There are several modalities of participation available including, most recently, Voice of the Child reports. However, the consideration of any such services would need to be expedited to avoid delay, particularly in a case that involves children.
[32] Self-represented parties are increasingly routine in family law cases. The system recognizes this fact and does provide some resources. That one or both parties are self-represented is not a sufficient reason to appoint amicus, in itself, nor is it sufficient based on the idea that since one party is represented, amicus is necessary to level the playing field. As is sometimes noted in criminal cases, a party is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial: R. v. G. (S.G.), at para. 101; R. v. Harrer, at para. 45.
[33] Fifth, the trial judge must consider whether he or she can personally provide sufficient guidance to an unrepresented party in the circumstances of the case to permit a fair and orderly trial without the assistance of amicus, even if the party's case would not be presented quite as effectively as it would be by counsel: Imona-Russel, at para. 69.
[34] It is no longer sufficient for a judge to simply swear a party in and then leave it to the party to explain the case, letting the party flounder and then subside into unhelpful silence. As this court has noted, "it is well-accepted that trial judges have special duties to self-represented litigants, in terms of acquainting them with courtroom procedure and the rules of evidence": Dujardin v. Dujardin Estate, 2018 ONCA 597, at para. 37, repeated in Gionet v. Pingue, 2018 ONCA 1040, at para. 30. The court added, at para. 31 of Gionet: "In ensuring that a self-represented litigant has a fair trial, the trial judge must treat the litigant fairly and attempt to accommodate their unfamiliarity with the trial process, in order to permit them to present their case", citing Davids v. Davids, at para. 36. See, also, Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) v. A. (J.), 2006 MBCA 44, at paras. 19-20.
[35] A trial judge requires the necessary evidence on which to base a sound decision and getting the evidence can be difficult when a party is unrepresented, is unfamiliar with the process and the venue, or is tongue-tied for other reasons. Recognizing this reality, a common practice has developed in which trial judges walk a self-represented party through the essential documents, giving the party every opportunity to explain under oath, line by line, his or her pleading, financial statement and any pertinent documents, and doing the same with respect to the other party's pleading, financial statement and pertinent documents, requesting the party's responding position and evidence. Once the evidence of a party has been received, then the other party may cross-examine.
[36] This active approach on the trial judge's part can only work if the judge explains the purpose and nature of the exercise beforehand, and maintains a calm and impartial temperament throughout. The trial judge should not cross-examine a party. Doing so would cross the line into the adversarial representation of a party, which would give rise to possible bias allegations.
[37] Importantly, it is only in rare cases that the assistance provided by the trial judge will be insufficient to ensure trial fairness. Only then might the appointment of amicus be considered.
[38] Sixth, it will sometimes, though very rarely, be necessary for amicus to assume duties approaching the role of counsel to a party in a family case. While the general role of amicus is to assist the court, the specific duties of amicus may vary. This is a delicate circumstantial question. If such an appointment is to be made and the scope of amicus's duties mirror the duties of traditional counsel, care must be taken to address the issue of privilege, as in Imona-Russel, at para. 89.
[39] Finally, the order appointing amicus must be clear, detailed and precise in specifying the scope of amicus's duties. The activities of amicus must be actively monitored by the trial judge to prevent mission creep, so that amicus stays well within the defined limits.
[40] Ideally, the need for amicus can be identified and considered at the pre-trial case management conference, but sometimes the need only becomes evident at trial. A case management judge or a trial judge faced with a trial that might require the appointment of amicus should prepare an order detailing the expected role and work of amicus. Amicus could, for example, be asked to lead some evidence, cross-examine a witness, or make submissions on specific issues. The goal should be to use the services of amicus only where and to the extent necessary. The order would be a work in progress and would be open to change as circumstances demand, with changes made formally on the record.
(2) The Principles Applied
[41] While the trial judge did not fully observe the principles set out above, I would not be unduly critical of his approach, because every trial takes on a life of its own, as this one did. The trial judge asserted that this was the first amicus order in a family law case of which he was aware and he had nothing outside of the criminal law cases to assist him. The appointment of one neutral amicus with a clearly and properly defined role in the very difficult circumstances described by the trial judge would not have been an objectionable exercise of his discretion. However, that is not what occurred here.
[42] The trial judge determined that the assistance of amicus was necessary in the circumstances of this case. He noted that the mother was incapable of representing herself. She was "bordering on hysterical" and collapsed in the courtroom. He considered himself to be in a "crisis situation". The primary reason for the appointment of amicus was to "stabilize the proceeding". He did not think he could manage the mother in the courtroom on his own. Further, because of "the intensity and desperation as to her deeply rooted fear of the father . . . [s]he needed a buffer".
[43] Given the mother's attempts to adjourn the trial, the trial judge considered it important for amicus to be appointed, because she then could not dismiss him. Further, amicus "could proceed even if she did not attend court". He noted that the appointment of Mr. Thomson as amicus had a "significant impact on the potential emotional volatility of the mother" and that, in his view, "she calmed down significantly" and the "proceeding[s] stabilized".
[44] In addition, the trial judge considered the issues to be complex. He noted that this was not a "garden variety case" because it involved the interpretation and application of the Hague Convention, and the consideration of multi-jurisdictional tax implications.
[45] The trial judge addressed the possibility of adjourning the trial to permit the mother to apply for legal aid. He noted that delay was the major issue and would have prolonged the dispute. This was a relevant consideration.
[46] The problems of scheduling and delay are real, and delay is especially problematic in cases involving child custody and access. Family law trials are stressful, perhaps especially so for self-represented parties. It is not unusual for trial judges to face adjournment requests. Sometimes one party does this repeatedly in the pre-trial process and then presses the request again at the outset of trial. Dealing with parties who frequently seek adjournments requires judicial patience, determination and a steady hand, to get cases resolved expeditiously and to avoid the waste of scarce judicial resources.
[47] For the purpose of future guidance, I would point out a number of features of this trial that were problematic regarding the appointment of amicus. As I will explain, the trial judge erred in principle in appointing amicus to carry on effectively in their roles as counsel for each of the parties.
[48] First, the trial judge appointed Mr. Thomson, who had previously been the mother's lawyer. He did this on the basis of efficiency and the likely acceptability of the appointment to the mother. But appointing Mr. Thomson immediately injected an adversarial element that was inconsistent with the impartial role of amicus. The appointment of a party's former counsel as amicus was an error in this case.
[49] Second, the later appointment of a second amicus to represent the father was contrary to principle. A single amicus could have addressed the court's questions about the application of Hague Convention Principles as well as the complex tax implications inherent in the multi-national dimensions of this dispute had the initial error in appointing the mother's former counsel as amicus not been made.
[50] The appointment of the second amicus flowed in part from the appointment of Mr. Thomson, who could never be seen as neutral because he had previously acted as counsel for one of the parties. Mr. Thomson's appointment turned out to be problematic when the husband's lawyer quit, because it took away from the trial judge the ability to deploy the skills of amicus in a neutral fashion with respect to both parties.
[51] If it would be rare in a family law case to appoint one amicus, the circumstances would virtually never justify the appointment of two. In this case, the first appointed amicus could not fairly act as amicus with respect to the father after his counsel was permitted to get off the record. But that is an unusual situation I would not expect to see again.
[52] Third, the decision in CLA does not preclude the possibility of court-appointed defence counsel in a criminal case with amicus-like features, as in Imona-Russel. Appointing a single counsel dedicated to a party might make sense in the context of, for example, a constitutional challenge to a family law provision where the Attorney General is present to represent the other side. Otherwise, a single amicus appointment should almost always be able to satisfy the basic requirements of the court. In the family context, it is hard to imagine a situation in which appointing two counsel as amicus to represent adversarial interests would be appropriate, rather than a single state-funded friend of the court.
[53] Fourth, in more general terms, the fact that one party is represented does not justify the appointment of amicus for the other party. Most family law cases have this feature. And while in an ideal world all parties would be represented by competent counsel in maintaining a level playing field, it is not practical, as preferable as that might be to a trial judge. This underpinned the trial judge's comment: "Because of the sharp polarization and conflict of the expected evidence, I wanted amicus to play an adversarial role to properly test the evidence, so I can make findings of fact and credibility -- which would then allow me to effectively adjudicate on the best interest test" (emphasis in original). He added: "[T]here would be a significant imbalance wherein the father's evidence would not be properly tested, whereas the mother's would; leaving me in a deficit position on the material facts and legal issues." I do not accept these as legitimate considerations in most private family law cases.
[54] Fifth, any judge considering the appointment of amicus should give notice so that counsel for the Attorney General can make submissions on the advisability of the appointment in the circumstances of the case.
[55] Finally, there was no litigation plan prepared by the trial judge or proposed by counsel to guide and govern the activities of amicus throughout the case. It is not possible to know from this record whether amicus could have played a reduced role focussed on specific issues such as the leading of some witnesses but not all, the cross-examination of some witnesses but not all, or cross-examination limited to specific issues, or submissions limited to the application of the Hague Convention and the tax questions, to suggest a few choices. Going forward, an amicus appointment order in a family law case should be as precise and detailed as possible in terms of setting out the parameters of the amicus's role, and should not be as open-ended in its expression or in its operation as the orders in this case.
V. Disposition
[56] Had the appeal not been moot because the underlying family law case has been resolved, I would have allowed it for the reasons set out above.
Appeal dismissed.
Notes
(2015), 127 O.R. (3d) 165, 2015 ONCJ 532.
[2015] O.J. No. 7163, 2015 ONSC 7290 (S.C.J.).
[2016] O.J. No. 4233, 2016 ONSC 3505, 88 R.F.L. (7th) 183 (S.C.J.).
[2017] O.J. No. 4683, 2017 ONCA 699, 416 D.L.R. (4th) 711.
(2019), 146 O.R. (3d) 472, [2019] O.J. No. 2387, 2019 ONSC 1136 (S.C.J.).
The majority and minority in CLA did not differ on the issue of the proper scope of an amicus order, but only on whether the trial judge had power to fix the fees of amicus in the order, with the majority concluding that the trial judge did not have such power.
See, e.g., the following links to resources for family law litigants in the OCJ and in the SCJ: http://www.ontariocourts.ca/ocj/files/guides/guide-family.pdf; http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/family/resources/.
See Michelle Flaherty, "Best Practices in Active Adjudication" (2015), 28 Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 291; Michelle Flaherty, "Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias: Issues in Administrative Law" (2015), 38:1 Dal. L.J. 119; and Jula Hughes and Philip Bryden, "Implications of Case Management and Active Adjudication for Judicial Disqualification" (2017), 54:4 Alta. L. Rev. 849.
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