Court of Appeal for Ontario
Date: 2018-04-16 Docket: C64242
Judges: Hoy A.C.J.O., MacPherson and Juriansz JJ.A.
Between
Her Majesty the Queen Respondent
and
Jerome Delton Williams Appellant
Counsel
Robert Sheppard, for the appellant
Peter M. Campbell, for the respondent
Heard: April 11, 2018
Appeal Information
On appeal from the sentence imposed on December 21, 2016 by Justice Peter B. Hockin of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting without a jury.
Reasons for Decision
Facts and Charges
[1] The appellant was sentenced on two sets of charges. The first set stemmed from the appellant's arrest on November 2, 2012 in possession of $9,565 in cash. When police subsequently searched his home, they found 65g of cocaine, a loaded .45 calibre semi-automatic handgun alongside ammunition, and drug paraphernalia. He was released pending trial.
[2] On October 2, 2013, while on bail, he was arrested again, this time in possession of 1.026 kg of cocaine and a 9mm Sig Sauer handgun, with ammunition. Police found 1.814 kg of marijuana at his home.
Convictions and Guilty Pleas
[3] On October 12, 2016, after a trial before a judge alone on the first set of charges, the appellant was found guilty of:
- Possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking,
- Careless storage of a firearm,
- Unlicensed possession of a firearm,
- Unauthorized possession of a restricted weapon, and
- Possession of a loaded handgun, possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number.
[4] Before he was sentenced on these convictions, the appellant pled guilty to the following charges arising out of his October 2, 2013 arrest:
- Possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking,
- Possession of cannabis for the purpose of trafficking,
- Carrying a concealed firearm,
- Possession of a restricted firearm with readily accessible ammunition, and
- Breach of recognizance (for possession of a firearm).
Sentencing Decision
[5] The appellant was sentenced for the two sets of convictions at the same time. The sentencing judge sentenced the appellant to an aggregate of 12 years imprisonment, less five years for time served, for the two sets of convictions.
[6] In his reasons the sentencing judge took into consideration the factors of denunciation, both specific and general deterrence, the need to separate the offender from society, rehabilitation, the relative youth of the appellant, and the principle of totality, recognizing, given the seriousness and number of offences, that any aggregate sentence would be significant. He also considered the many letters of support filed on the appellant's behalf.
[7] The sentencing judge proceeded by first determining what the appropriate sentence would be for each of the various offences, without taking into account mitigating circumstances. He concluded that the sum of the appropriate sentences for the two occurrences was 17 years.
[8] The sentencing judge then considered the mitigating factors and the principle of totality. He noted that the appellant was "relatively young… just 27 years of age", that the letters filed showed the appellant would have much support on his release, that the appellant had a nine-year-old son, and that he expressed his great regret and remorse. After considering the totality principle the sentencing judge reduced the aggregate sentence to 12 years, less a credit of five years for time served.
Court of Appeal Analysis
[9] While the sentencing judge noted the appellant's guilty pleas to the second set of charges in his narrative of events, his reasons do not indicate he took the guilty pleas into account in determining the appropriate sentence. Further, while the trial judge noted the appellant's relative youth at the time of sentencing, his reasons do not indicate he took into account that the appellant was just 23 years of age and a first offender at the time of the first set of offences or that a first penitentiary sentence should be the shortest possible that achieves the relevant sentencing objectives. Finally, we are of the view the sentencing judge did not accord sufficient weight to the factor that the appellant should not be crushed by the sentence. In our view, the sentence imposed all but eliminates the appellant's prospects for rehabilitation.
Decision
[10] In light of these considerations, we consider that the sentence imposed was unfit. We would grant leave to appeal and allow the appeal and vary the total sentence imposed to one of nine years imprisonment less a credit for five years for pre-sentence custody.
"Alexandra Hoy A.C.J.O."
"J.C. MacPherson J.A."
"R.G. Juriansz J.A."
