Her Majesty the Queen v. Wilson et al.
[Indexed as: R. v. Wilson]
Ontario Reports
Court of Appeal for Ontario
G.J. Epstein J.A. (in Chambers)
March 21, 2017
135 O.R. (3d) 161 | 2017 ONCA 229
Case Summary
Criminal law — Bail — Sureties — Forfeiture
Accused absconding with his mother and girlfriend by chartering private plane shortly before hearing of his appeal and judicial review application in extradition proceedings. Primary surety being lax in supervisory obligations and allowing accused's mother and girlfriend to assume some of those responsibilities. Escape involving sophisticated planning which would not have been easy to detect. Primary surety helping authorities to locate accused. Other surety not complying with supervisory obligations at all. Other surety's financial circumstances worsening considerably after entering into recognizance. Crown's application for forfeiture of recognizances of $500,000 and $10,000 entered into by primary and secondary sureties respectively being allowed in part. Primary surety ordered to forfeit $200,000 and secondary surety ordered to forfeit $3,000.
Accused fled to Canada to avoid prosecution in the United States on serious fraud charges alleging that he diverted approximately $8 million of funds he was supposed to invest for his own purposes. He was arrested in Toronto on an extradition warrant and released on bail pending his extradition hearing. His sureties were his cousins, his mother and his girlfriend. Two cousins entered into recognizances in the amounts of $500,000 and $10,000, respectively, and accused was ordered to reside with primary surety. Accused was committed for extradition and the Minister of Justice ordered his surrender. Accused appealed the extradition order and applied for judicial review of the surrender order. He was granted bail pending appeal and judicial review on almost the same terms as the original release order. Shortly before the hearing of the appeal and judicial review application, accused chartered a private plane and flew to Vietnam with his mother and girlfriend. The Minister of Justice brought an application for orders that the recognizances entered into by the two sureties be forfeited in full.
Held, the application should be allowed in part.
Primary surety was lax in his supervisory obligations. When he was regularly away from Toronto on business two to three days per week, he came close to effectively delegating supervisory authority to accused's mother and girlfriend in circumstances in which he was unable to assure himself that accused was complying with the conditions of his bail. In addition, he was out of town for more than a week before accused's surrender date, the most important time during which accused's compliance with his bail had to be monitored. In addition, he relied entirely on accused for information about his court date, reflecting a disregard of the obligations of a surety to ensure that an accused person attends court. However, there were mitigating factors. Primary surety sought advice from accused's lawyers regarding what his obligations were when he was out of town, and followed the lawyers' advice to maintain reasonable contact by phone, e-mail or text. Accused's escape showed sophisticated planning that was not easy to detect. When he learned that accused had absconded, primary surety took immediate action, and he helped the authorities to locate accused in Vietnam. Forfeiture in the amount of $200,000 would take into account the unique circumstances of this case and would adequately ensure the integrity of the bail and surety system. Secondary surety lived and worked in Oshawa, so the court was aware when the release order was put in place that he could not be responsible for supervising accused on a daily basis. However, secondary surety made no efforts to ensure that accused fulfilled his primary obligation -- to show up for the appeal and judicial review hearing -- and did not even know when accused was supposed to surrender. The most significant consideration in secondary surety's case was the decline in his financial circumstances since he entered into the recognizance. While forfeiture was called for on the basis of secondary surety's failure to pay more than a modicum of attention to his responsibility to ensure that accused turn himself in on the day before the hearing, forfeiture in the amount of $3,000 would be appropriate.
Cases Referred To
- Canada (Attorney General) v. Horvath, 2009 ONCA 732, 255 O.A.C. 109, 248 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 71 C.R. (6th) 114
- R. v. Hanif, 2016 ONSC 7720
- R. v. Jackson, 2013 ONSC 7761, 110 W.C.B. (2d) 886
- R. v. Norman, 2014 ONSC 2005, 112 W.C.B. (2d) 596
- Romania v. Iusein, 2014 ONSC 623, 307 C.C.C. (3d) 266, 111 W.C.B. (2d) 738
Statutes Referred To
Authorities Referred To
- Trotter, Gary, The Law of Bail in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2010)
Application for Orders for the Forfeiture of Recognizances
Adrienne Rice, for applicant.
Taylor Wilson and Christopher Gould, acting in person.
Decision
[1] G.J. EPSTEIN J.A.: — In separate proceedings, this court released Michael Wilson on recognizances with sureties, pending a hearing in this court concerning efforts to extradite Michael back to the United States to face criminal charges. His two cousins, Taylor Wilson and Christopher Gould; his mother, Rosemary Wilson; and his then girlfriend, Marrida Yusuf, agreed to be sureties for a total recognizance of $937,000, of which Taylor was responsible for $500,000 and Christopher for $10,000.
[2] Michael did not surrender in accordance with the terms of his recognizance. In fact, he escaped to Vietnam just before the date set for his hearing. The Minister of Justice now seeks orders that the recognizances entered into by Taylor and Christopher be forfeited in full, pursuant to s. 771 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Taylor and Christopher argue that they should not be required to forfeit any portion of their recognizances, or at least not the full amount. While this matter was under reserve, Michael was returned from Vietnam to the United States to face the charges there. I will deal with this development later in these reasons.
[3] I have decided to grant the application in part. I order that Taylor forfeit the amount of $200,000 and Christopher the amount of $3,000.
Background
[4] Michael was charged in the United States with multiple counts of fraud and money laundering, following an investigation by the FBI into an investment scheme that he ran from 2008 to 2009. Michael gained access to substantial amounts of money by promising people that he would invest their money at unrealistic rates of return. Michael is alleged to have fraudulently diverted to his own use funds totalling approximately $8 million, that he spent on houses, cars, artwork and vacations, rather than on investments.
[5] On July 19, 2010, Michael fled to Canada, shortly after the United States Attorney's Office sent him a letter notifying him that criminal charges were being laid against him.
[6] On July 23, 2013, Michael was arrested in Toronto on an extradition warrant.
Bail Pending the Extradition Hearing
[7] Michael applied for bail pending his extradition hearing. The four sureties identified above came forward in support of his application: Taylor, Christopher, Rosemary and Marrida.
[8] On August 13, 2013, Garton J. granted Michael judicial interim release. Michael's release was ordered on strict terms. He was to reside with Taylor at his residence on Wellington Street in Toronto, and to notify the court in writing within 24 hours of any change of Taylor's address and inform the officer in charge a month in advance of any change in Taylor's address. In addition, he was to remain in Taylor's unit at all times between 10:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m., and could only leave between 9 a.m. and 10 p.m. if in the company of one or more of his sureties. It was also a condition of his bail that Michael deposit his passport and any other travel documentation with the police, and not apply for another one.
[9] On September 3, 2013, Michael entered into a recognizance in the amount of $937,000, consisting of a cash deposit of $300,000 and pledges by his sureties in the amount of $500,000 by Taylor, $125,000 by Rosemary, $10,000 by Christopher and $2,000 by Marrida.¹
[10] In her reasons, Garton J. reviewed the adequacy of the proposed plan of release. She acknowledged the Crown's argument that Rosemary was not an appropriate surety because her status in Canada was uncertain and her visitor's visa was set to expire in March 2014. Garton J. concluded:
If Rosemary Wilson were being proposed as the sole surety in this matter, I would perhaps give more weight to the concerns raised by the respondent with respect to her suitability as a surety. However, pursuant to the plan of release, she is only one of four proposed sureties. It is proposed that Taylor Wilson be the surety with the heaviest financial obligation -- $500,000 -- which represents a large percentage of the equity in the homes that he owns. He has no other assets. In my view, it is appropriate in the circumstances that Taylor also bear the heaviest burden in terms of supervising [Michael] and that [Michael] should live with him under house arrest and with strict conditions. Such terms will adequately address the concerns in this case with respect to both the primary and secondary grounds.
[11] On January 23, 2014, Michael's recognizance was varied to allow him to live with Rosemary in a unit in the same building in which Taylor lived. Otherwise, the terms of Michael's release were not varied.
[12] On October 20, 2014, O'Marra J. ordered that Michael be committed to custody pursuant to s. 29 of the Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18 to await the Minister of Justice's decision on surrender. On March 11, 2015, the Minister of Justice ordered Michael's surrender to the United States.
Bail Pending Appeal and Judicial Review
[13] Michael applied for bail pending his appeal and judicial review of the committal order and the surrender order. On October 23, 2014, I ordered Michael's release on recognizance on almost the same terms as the release order from the Superior Court. However, the residence and curfew conditions were changed. The requirement that Michael live with Taylor in his unit on Wellington Street was reinstated. Michael's curfew condition was also changed to allow him to leave this residence between 10:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m., in the company of one or more of his sureties. It was a term of his release that he was to surrender into custody by 6:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing of his appeal and judicial review, or on January 20, 2015, whichever came earlier.
[14] The judicial interim release was varied twice to extend the date of surrender. The last extension was granted by Pardu J.A. on May 6, 2015. It required Michael to surrender into custody by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing of the appeal and judicial review. The appeal and judicial review were scheduled to be heard by this court on February 11, 2016.
Breach of Recognizance and Disappearance
[15] Michael reported at the police station regularly as required from September 3, 2013 to February 2, 2016, the final date on which he is recorded as reporting.
[16] On or about February 5, 2016, Michael flew to Vietnam with Marrida, Rosemary and his three dogs, in a private plane he had chartered.
[17] Taylor sent text messages to both Rosemary and Michael on February 10, 2016 to coordinate Michael's attendance in court, asking Rosemary if he should pick her and Michael up in the morning. Rosemary responded by text that Michael was going to spend the night at her home and that they would be going to court together in the morning with Marrida. Later that day, Taylor and Michael exchanged texts confirming that they would see each other in the morning.
[18] Michael did not surrender into custody on February 10, 2016 as required by the terms of his release order. The following day -- the day on which the appeal and judicial review were scheduled to be heard -- Michael's counsel informed Taylor that Michael had failed to surrender himself into custody. Taylor advised Christopher of Michael's default.
[19] When Michael failed to appear on February 11, 2016, Roberts J.A. dismissed his appeal and application for judicial review and issued a warrant for his arrest. She also ordered that the recognizance in the amount of $937,000 be noted in default.
[20] On June 29, 2016, Detective Constable Inal of the Toronto Fugitive Squad was informed that Interpol had arrested Michael in Vietnam.
The Applicable Principles
[21] A forfeiture hearing is governed by s. 771 of the Criminal Code, which provides that after giving the parties an opportunity to be heard, the presiding judge "may . . . in his discretion grant or refuse the application and make any order with respect to the forfeiture of the recognizance that he considers proper". Accordingly, whether to grant relief from forfeiture and the quantum of relief is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
[22] The onus is on the sureties to show why, on a balance of probabilities, the recognizance should not be forfeited: Canada (Attorney General) v. Horvath, 2009 ONCA 732, 248 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at para. 27; Gary Trotter, The Law of Bail in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2010), at pp. 13-16. Sureties asserting that they should be relieved from forfeiture of any amount of the recognizance have the obligation to adduce credible evidence to support their position: Horvath, at para. 52.
[23] In Horvath, the leading case in Ontario on forfeiture of a recognizance, this court recognized the preeminent importance of the "pull of bail" in the context of forfeiture. The court explained, at para. 41:
[T]he "pull of bail" is an important factor that serves as a reminder that, in attempting to do what is just and fair towards the sureties, the courts must be careful not to undermine the effectiveness of the bail system. Our system depends upon accused attending court and if accused came to believe that they could fail to attend court without their sureties suffering any penalty, the surety system would be ineffective . . . An overemphasis on a surety's lack of fault could undermine the "pull of bail" and have an adverse impact on the criminal justice system, which depends upon the accused complying with release conditions.
[24] However, this court rejected the argument that the only way to ensure the effectiveness of the bail system is to adopt a rigid rule of total forfeiture absent exceptional circumstances. The court did not take this approach as it concluded that a rigid rule of full forfeiture was inconsistent with the broad discretion granted in the Criminal Code allowing the presiding judge to order any forfeiture that is considered appropriate. The court recognized that the pull of bail can sometimes be vindicated by something less than total forfeiture: Horvath, at paras. 44-45.
[25] In Horvath, at para. 51, this court set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in determining whether there should be forfeiture, and in what amount relative to the amount in issue. They are:
- the amount of the recognizance;
- the circumstances under which the surety entered into the recognizance (with an emphasis on whether there was any duress or coercion);
- the diligence of the surety;
- the surety's means;
- any significant change in the surety's financial position after the recognizance was entered into and after the breach;
- the surety's conduct following the breach, including efforts to assist authorities in locating the accused; and
- the relationship between the accused and the surety.
[26] In cases such as this, involving significant sums of money, a more searching examination of the circumstances is called for: Trotter; R. v. Jackson, 2013 ONSC 7761, at para. 20. Frequently, such an examination centers on the impact forfeiture would have on the surety's financial circumstances.
Principles Applied
[27] Without diminishing the importance of a surety's obligations to supervise and enforce bail conditions other than attendance in court, Taylor, and secondarily, Christopher, were primarily responsible for ensuring that Michael attended court on the date when the appeal and judicial review were set to be heard. In terms of analyzing the degree of the breach of recognizance, this case presents the most serious of breaches in that Michael did not appear in court and, in fact, left the jurisdiction so as to avoid extradition to the United States: R. v. Hanif, 2016 ONSC 7720, at para. 37. As Speyer J. explains in Romania v. Iusein, 2014 ONSC 623, 307 C.C.C. (3d) 266, at para. 26, "[a]bscondment is more serious than most, if not all, the other breaches of recognizance".
[28] In their submissions, both Taylor and Christopher indicated that they understood the risk they were taking and the extent of their potential liability in becoming Michael's surety. They were prepared to support their cousin on the basis of friendship, family ties and their conviction that Michael appreciated the immense responsibilities they had assumed in becoming his sureties. They firmly believed that Michael would not do anything that would jeopardize the funds they had advanced. They had neither any reason to suspect their cousin would abscond nor any indication that the other two sureties were conspiring with Michael to craft a sophisticated plan to abscond.
Taylor
[29] As noted by Garton J. at the initial bail hearing, "Taylor bore the heaviest burden in terms of supervising [Michael]. He put up the most money. For most of the period of release, Michael was to live with him." However, Garton J.'s initial release decision and the variations that followed, including this court's release orders pending the appeal and judicial review, were made in the light of the fact that Taylor lived in Toronto approximately four to five days every week, and the rest of the time lived in London, Ontario for business purposes. It is clear that these living arrangements were a significant reason why the court put a multi-surety plan in place that contemplated that the other sureties would supervise Michael when Taylor was away.
[30] There is conflicting evidence about Michael's living arrangements while on bail.
[31] The Crown argues that although the release orders made in October 2014, January 2015 and May 2015 stipulated that Michael was to reside with Taylor, the Toronto Fugitive Squad's investigation revealed that Michael had actually been living with Rosemary and Marrida in another unit in Taylor's building, contrary to the terms of his bail.
[32] Taylor submits that Michael maintained primary residence in his (Taylor's) unit from October 2014 to February 2016. In support of his position, Taylor produced a text to all sureties that he sent following the October 2014 release order to ensure that they had a plan in place to supervise Michael. In that communication, Taylor explicitly stated that his cousin had to live at his (Taylor's) home, but that he could spend nights with Rosemary and Marrida. The text emphasized that although Michael no longer had a curfew, he always had to be with a surety and could only be alone at Taylor's house. Taylor also filed an affidavit of Milan Kukolj, a constable in the London Police Services, which stated that he consistently witnessed Michael residing with Taylor from September 2013 to January 2016.
[33] I find it is not necessary for me to resolve whether, from October 2014 to February 2016, Michael resided with Taylor, in accordance with the terms of his release. Either way, it is clear to me that Taylor allowed himself to be increasingly at the mercy of Rosemary's and Marrida's commitment to their supervisory responsibilities. When Taylor was away from Toronto, he came close to effectively delegating supervisory authority to Rosemary and Marrida, in circumstances in which Taylor was unable to assure himself that Michael was complying with the conditions of his bail. This contradicted the strict conditions of Michael's release given Taylor's responsibility as primary surety. Although sureties serve voluntarily and can terminate their commitment for any reason, they are not permitted to rewrite the conditions of release to suit their own circumstances, or to delegate their responsibilities to others: R. v. Norman, 2014 ONSC 2005, at paras. 29-30; Iusein, at para. 31.
[34] That said, it is significant that in August 2013 Taylor sought advice from Michael's lawyers regarding what his obligations were when he was out of town. Michael's lawyer advised Taylor to maintain reasonable contact by phone, e-mail or text to confirm that Michael was abiding by his conditions. Even though Taylor claims to have assiduously followed this advice, leaving Michael with Rosemary and Marrida for days at a time was fraught with obvious risk. I would echo the comments made by Trotter J., as he then was, in Norman, at para. 34: "[e]ven though Mrs. Norman received advice that the proposed plan was legal, I have a difficult time seeing how anyone could have thought that it was wise" (emphasis in original). As in Norman, the legal advice that Taylor received was simply not wise. The effective transfer of much of Taylor's responsibility as a surety to Rosemary and Marrida weakened the court-ordered surety plan and compromised Taylor's ability to supervise Michael. In the circumstances in which he found himself, Taylor should have either applied for a variation on a bail review or rendered Michael into custody.
[35] Instead, Taylor allowed the situation to worsen. And he did so at a particularly crucial time. He left Toronto for over a week just before the appeal and judicial review. In fact, the last time Taylor saw Michael was on February 2, 2016. Taylor left town on that day and was away until February 10, 2016. During this critical period, Taylor put himself in a position where he could not monitor Michael. Significantly, he was not in a position to observe conduct that might have foreshadowed a failure to appear.
[36] The record demonstrates that as the date of the hearing approached, Michael was engaged in activities that, had Taylor been keeping a closer watch, he may have learned of. For example, starting in January 2016, Michael had been selling furniture and ridding himself of his belongings. These actions may well have alerted Taylor that Michael was planning to abscond.
[37] Moreover, Taylor did not have any independent knowledge of when and where Michael was supposed to surrender into custody. Taylor never sought independent information regarding Michael's court dates. Rather, he relied on Michael to provide him with updates about the case and inform him of important court dates. Taylor's approach shows a disregard for the obligation the court places on sureties: it is their responsibility to know the timing and the circumstances surrounding the accused's obligations to attend court.
[38] In addition, Taylor did not ensure that Michael surrendered himself to police the afternoon before his appeal and judicial review, which was an express condition of Michael's recognizance. Taylor attempted to coordinate meeting with Michael and Rosemary at the court on the day of the hearing, but this did not comply with the condition placed on Michael pursuant to the recognizance. The recognizance was clear that Michael had to surrender into custody the day before the appeal. Taylor should have known that. He signed the recognizance.
[39] That said, when Taylor learned that Michael had absconded, he took immediate action. He reported Michael missing, contacted Christopher, and attempted to contact Rosemary and Marrida. Taylor sent Michael, Rosemary and Marrida texts encouraging them to return.
[40] Taylor's actions also proved helpful to the officers at the Toronto Fugitive Squad who were responsible for investigating Michael's disappearance. Taylor shared with them what he had learned about Michael's actions in January 2016 -- his having moved furniture out of Rosemary's apartment, given away his belongings and secretly married Marrida. Taylor advised the authorities that, based on his research and his experiences with Michael, Michael was likely in Vietnam, Cambodia or Indonesia. Taylor also provided the police with the names of Marrida's relatives, and three receipts with Rosemary, Michael and Marrida's names on them, dated January 13, 2016, for medical kits that one would purchase to travel to Asia.
[41] I now turn to Taylor's financial circumstances. Taylor is involved in a start-up business. He submits that the $500,000 he pledged represents his whole net worth. However, he does have considerable equity in two properties. At the time of the original bail hearing, Michael owned a house in London valued at approximately $700,000. The mortgage on the property was $386,000. He also owned a loft on 264 Seaton Street, Toronto that he rented out for $6,000 per month. The estimated value of the unit at the time was $1,100,000 with a mortgage of $648,000. The equity in these two properties totalled about $762,000.
[42] The Crown submits that Taylor's current net worth is $1 million, which is more than it was at the time he entered the recognizance. The Crown argues that Taylor has the means to fulfill his obligation.
[43] Applying the principles identified above, I have concluded that a forfeiture order should issue against Taylor, but not for the full amount. I come to this conclusion based on the following.
[44] First, the evidence supports a finding that at least by the time Taylor agreed to continue to act as Michael's surety pending the appeal and judicial review, he knew that Michael had come to Canada to avoid prosecution in the United States on serious charges. To Taylor's knowledge, Michael had proven that he had the willingness and capacity to abscond.
[45] Although Taylor played no role in Michael's complex escape plans, he was lax in his supervisory obligations. The record supports the conclusion that Taylor allowed Rosemary and Marrida to assume some of the supervisory responsibilities that were assigned to him under the terms of the release order. One of the more serious aspects of Taylor's failure to meet his obligations as a surety was his near total abdication of responsibility to ensure that Michael appeared in court on the date set for the hearing of his appeal and judicial review.
[46] There are, however, factors that militate against full forfeiture. Michael was particularly skilful in covering up his plans to abscond. He complied with his reporting conditions diligently for over two years by checking in at the police station at the beginning of every month. Michael's escape -- chartering a private plane -- showed sophisticated planning not easy to detect.
[47] Furthermore, as previously noted, Taylor did seek legal advice from Michael's lawyers regarding complying with the conditions of bail when he was out of town.
[48] Also relevant is the fact that Taylor provided considerable assistance to the authorities in their ultimately successful efforts to find Michael. And Michael is now back in the United States, where he is facing the charges against him. Rosenberg J.A. in Horvath, at para. 60, acknowledged that "the apprehension of the fugitive is relevant to the determination of what order, if any, should be made against the sureties in an estreatment proceeding".
[49] Taking all of these circumstances into consideration, I have concluded that forfeiture in the amount of $200,000 takes into account the unique circumstances of this case, and will adequately ensure the integrity of the bail and surety system. I appreciate that this is a sizeable amount of money. But there is no evidence, beyond a bald statement in his affidavit, that Taylor's financial situation has changed since he agreed to support Michael, or that forfeiture of this amount would create extreme hardship.
Christopher
[50] Christopher is a professor at Durham College in Oshawa. When the release order was put in place, the court was aware that he lived and had a job and a family an hour away from where Michael was ordered to reside. It was therefore clear that Christopher could not be responsible for supervising Michael on a daily basis. The understanding was that a couple of times a month he and his children would pick Michael up, spend the day with him and then return him to Taylor's home. Christopher undertook to ensure that Michael was constantly with him when they spent time together.
[51] That said, the record makes it clear that as the date of the appeal and judicial review approached, Christopher made no efforts to see that Michael fulfilled his primary obligation -- to show up for the hearing. He did not appear to take any steps to understand what Michael's responsibilities were or what his responsibilities were in ensuring Michael met his. This nonchalant attitude is particularly serious given that, like Taylor, Christopher knew that his cousin had fled from prosecution in the United States. In these circumstances, as the date of the hearing approached Christopher should, at the very least, have taken steps to ensure that he knew what his obligations were and that he did everything in his power to meet them.
[52] But he did not. After January 2016, Christopher had no further contact with Michael. In fact, Christopher did not even know when Michael was required to surrender into custody. Moreover, there is no evidence that he reached out to the other sureties to ascertain what they were doing to ensure Michael complied with this most important term of his recognizance.
[53] Immediately after he learned that Michael had breached his bail conditions by failing to appear in court, Christopher contacted the Durham Regional Police and the Toronto Police Service. He was told that he had to drive to Toronto to notify the authorities of Michael's breach of recognizance. He was unable to go to Toronto that day due to child care responsibilities, but did file a request to be removed as Michael's surety a few days later when he did get to Toronto.
[54] In my analysis of the Crown's request that Christopher forfeit the full $10,000, the most significant consideration is the change in his financial circumstances since becoming a surety. Since that time, Christopher and his wife have separated. They are currently in the midst of divorce proceedings. Christopher claims that the separation has left him with no assets other than one property valued at approximately $490,000 with a mortgage of $390,000. He has two dependent children, one who has significant medical needs. Christopher pays monthly child and spousal support.
[55] Again, I have concluded forfeiture is called for. I say this on the basis of Christopher's failure to pay more than a modicum of attention to his responsibility to ensure that Michael turned himself in on the day before the hearing.
[56] However, in determining the amount to be forfeited, I have taken into account that Christopher was not the primary surety, and the significant change in Christopher's financial situation since the time he agreed to help Michael. While Christopher does have equity in his home, the evidence supports the conclusion that all available resources are being directed toward the increased costs of supporting his family.
[57] Christopher does not appear to have had anything to do with Michael's abscondment. As in the case of Taylor, he was not complicit, rather, neglectful. That said, Michael's abscondment delayed rather than denied justice. The fact that he is in the United States awaiting trial merits some mitigation of the forfeiture order.
[58] In the light of these circumstances I order that Christopher forfeit $3,000.
Disposition
[59] I allow the application in part and order forfeiture of the following amounts: Taylor Wilson: $200,000; and Christopher Gould: $3,000.
[60] I feel compelled to comment on the assistance Taylor and Christopher offered the court in their capacity as self-represented litigants. In the almost 25 years I have been a judge, their submissions represent the gold standard in the capacity of self-represented litigants to assist the court. I thank them.
Application allowed in part.
Notes
¹ On September 20, 2016, Justice MacFarland ordered that Rosemary forfeit the $125,000 she had put forward, that Marrida forfeit the $2,000 she had put forward and that Michael forfeit the $300,000 deposit he had left at Superior Court.
End of Document