LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL

HEARING DIVISION

Date: March 11, 2026

Tribunal File No.: 25H-076

BETWEEN:

Law Society of Ontario

Applicant

• and -

Yura Kogan

Respondent

Before: Teresa Donnelly

Heard: November 27, 2025, by videoconference

Appearances:

Chad Skinner, for the applicant

Respondent, self-represented

Summary:

KOGAN – Motion – Admissibility – The Law Society commenced proceedings regarding the Paralegal’s conduct relating to matters before the OPSDT – Section 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act does not operate to shield a licensee’s behaviour when acting as a representative under the RHPA from regulatory scrutiny by the Law Society of Ontario – The Paralegal’s motion to prohibit use of OPSDT materials was dismissed – There are no costs because the motion raised an important issue not previously addressed.

REASONS FOR DECISION ON A MOTION

INTRODUCTION

1Teresa Donnelly: – The issue in this motion is whether materials provided by the Ontario Physicians and Surgeons Discipline Tribunal (OPSDT) to the Law Society of Ontario are admissible in a conduct application involving paralegal licensee Yura Kogan.

BACKGROUND

2The Law Society has commenced proceedings alleging that Mr. Kogan has engaged in professional misconduct and/or conduct unbecoming a licensee. The allegations relevant to this motion are that he failed to conduct himself with honour and integrity through his communications relating to matters before the OPSDT, thereby contravening Rules 2.01(1), 4.01, 6.01, and 7.01(3) of the Paralegal Rules of Conduct (the Rules).

3In support of these allegations, the Law Society seeks to rely on OPSDT decisions, transcripts, emails, and written submissions authored by Mr. Kogan.

4Mr. Kogan has brought this motion to oppose the Law Society’s reliance on such material. He states s 36(3) of the of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, SO 1991, c 18 (RHPA), and jurisprudence interpreting that section is applicable and determinative – the materials are inadmissible in this conduct proceeding against him.

5Section 36(3) of the RHPA provides that:

No record of a proceeding under this Act, a health profession Act or the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act, no report, document or thing prepared for or statement given at such a proceeding and no order or decision made in such a proceeding is admissible in a civil proceeding other than a proceeding under this Act, a health profession Act or the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act or a proceeding relating to an order under section 11.1 or 11.2 of the Ontario Drug Benefit Act.

6Mr. Kogan’s position is that the OPSDT matter is a proceeding under a health profession act and that as a result, s 36(3) applies to the materials the Law Society seeks to rely on. In his submission, s 36(3) renders evidence from the OPSDT proceeding inadmissible in conduct applications under the Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8 (the Act).

7The Law Society’s position is that the materials are admissible in the conduct proceeding under the Act and they demonstrate that Mr. Kogan has engaged in professional misconduct. It further submits that the licensee’s interpretation of s 36(3) is overly broad, legally flawed, and would lead to an absurd result by effectively immunizing lawyers and paralegals from professional accountability under the Act for conduct arising from their representation of a client before the OPSDT.

8The Law Society does not seek to rely on the substance of the OPSDT matter and if the materials are ruled admissible it would redact them to protect privilege and confidentiality.

9I conclude that the evidence in question is not rendered inadmissible by s 36(3) of the RHPA. Mr. Kogan, like other licensees under the Act, remains accountable before this Tribunal for professional conduct occurring in proceedings to which s 36(3) of the RHPA applies.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

10The modern approach to statutory interpretation is well established. In Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), at para 21, Justice Iacobucci explained that statutory interpretation involves more than a plain reading of the words of the statute. He adopted Elmer Driedger’s formulation in Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983) at p 87, which requires that the words “be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.”

11This approach has been consistently affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada including in Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, and more recently by Justice Jamal, for the majority, in Lundin Mining Corp. v Markowich, 2025 SCC 39 at para 46.

12In Québec v Directrice, Chief Justice Wagner provided further guidance at para 24, emphasizing that legislation:

… must be given a large and liberal interpretation that will ensure the attainment of its object and the carrying out of its provisions according to their true intent, meaning and spirit ... However, just as the text must be considered in light of the context and object, the object of a statute and that of a provision must be considered with close attention always being paid to the text of the statute, which remains the anchor of the interpretive exercise.

13This approach aligns with s 64(1) of Ontario’s Legislation Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 21, Sch F, which provides that legislation is to “be interpreted as being remedial and shall be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.”

14A further “principle of statutory interpretation is that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences”. As recognized in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), at para 27:

It is a well established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd consequences. According to Côté, supra, an interpretation can be considered absurd if it leads to ridiculous or frivolous consequences, if it is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, if it is illogical or incoherent, or if it is incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the legislative enactment (at pp. 378-80). Sullivan echoes these comments noting that a label of absurdity can be attached to interpretations which defeat the purpose of a statute or render some aspect of it pointless or futile (Sullivan, Construction of Statutes, supra, at p. 88).

15Section 36(3) must be interpreted in accordance with these principles.

PRIOR CONSIDERATION OF SECTION 36(3) OF THE RHPA

Cases not involving lawyers and paralegals

16The leading case on s 36(3) is F.(M). v Sutherland, 2000 CanLII 5761 (ONCA)in which a patient alleged sexual abuse by Dr. Sutherland. The patient pursued two routes of redress. One was a complaint to the College of Physicians and Surgeons (CPSO). The other was a civil suit against Dr. Sutherland. The civil action settled for $500,000, and at the time when the minutes of settlement were signed, the patient signed a sworn statement recanting the allegations of sexual abuse. As a result of the recantation, the complaint to the CPSO was withdrawn. After the CPSO complaint was withdrawn, Dr. Sutherland stopped payments on the civil settlement, claiming that the settlement was void because of fraud and bad faith by the patient. In response, the patient pursued a new civil claim against Dr. Sutherland for payment of the balance of the settlement. Dr. Sutherland’s pleadings in response to the new claim relied on the patient’s CPSO complaint and subsequent recantation. The patient moved to strike these references from Dr. Sutherland’s pleading, relying on the application of s 36(3) of the RHPA.

17Dr. Sutherland’s position was that s 36(3) did not apply when fraud or bad faith were alleged. The presiding judge, relying on s 36(3), granted the patient’s motion. The Divisional Court and Ontario Court of Appeal upheld that decision.

18In interpreting s 36(3), the majority of the Court of Appeal concluded that its purpose is:

…to encourage the reporting of complaints of professional misconduct against members of a health profession, and to ensure that those complaints are fully investigated and fairly decided without any participant in the proceedings – a health professional, a patient, a complainant, a witness or a College employee – fearing that a document prepared for College proceedings can be used in a civil action. This purpose would be defeated by reading a fraud or bad faith exception into s. 36(3).

19The majority found no reason to displace the ordinary meaning of the section. If an allegation of fraud or bad faith could displace the application of the section, it would defeat the purpose of the section to encourage the reporting of complaints. The majority recognized that if a complaint of professional misconduct is made in bad faith, it can be dealt with in the discipline process.

20The majority also recognized that the consequences of adopting the ordinary meaning of the section should be considered including whether it produces absurd results.

21The majority concluded that the ordinary meaning of s 36(3) does not produce an absurd result and that the provision was an absolute bar to admissibility of the complaint and recantation as evidence in the civil action. However, while s 36(3) precludes the admission of the information into evidence, the majority acknowledged that the “decision is not meant to preclude the trial judge from considering whether either [the patient’s] complaint or her sworn recantation may be used to challenge her credibility on cross-examination.”

22The Sutherland decision confirms that s 36(3) protects a complainant from having information from a health profession Act proceeding used by the subject of the complaint in a civil proceeding.

23Section 36(3) was also considered in Pouget v St. Elizabeth Health Care, 2012 ONCA 461, which considered whether a nurse whose employment was terminated could rely in her wrongful dismissal claim on materials prepared by her employer. The nurse sought to rely on materials prepared in the course of employment which were referred to or attached to the employer’s complaint to the College of Nurses.

24Relying on Sutherland, the court held that materials that had been prepared by her employer for a discipline proceeding initiated by the Ontario College of Nurses were inadmissible. However, documents created by the employer in the normal course of business and referred to or attached to a complaint to the College did not become inadmissible because they were contained in the complaint. The court held that such a finding would be inconsistent with the clear meaning of the section and would yield absurd results because the nurse would have no ability to prove a wrongful dismissal claim.

25The Pouget decision confirms that although the complaint is inadmissible, not all materials relating to the complaint are inadmissible.

Cases involving lawyers and paralegals

26Three cases relating to whether the protections in s 36(3) applied to lawyers and paralegals were relied on by Mr. Kogan and the Law Society, and a fourth case was cited in the Pouget decision.

27Mr. Kogan relies on Frank v Legate, 2015 ONCA 631, in support of the proposition that s 36(3) protects lawyers appearing on behalf of complainants at proceedings in which the RHPA applies in subsequent proceedings.

28In Frank v Legate, the appellant was a doctor who brought an action for malicious prosecution against the lawyers who represented the appellant’s former patients in complaints with the CPSO. Relying in part on s 36(3), the court held that an action for malicious prosecution was unavailable to the appellant as “nothing from the record of a complaint – from the initial statement given by a complainant to the final order made by the tribunal – is admissible in a civil action, including an action for malicious prosecution.”

29While Mr. Kogan is correct that s 36(3) protected the lawyers’ conduct on behalf of their clients in the proceedings to which the RHPA applies in a subsequent civil proceeding, that protection is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the section; is aligned with the purpose and scheme of the legislation to encourage both reporting of complaints against regulated health professionals and a full and fair process; and the consequences of adopting the ordinary meaning do not produce absurd results. Rather, if s 36(3) did not apply in the circumstances of Frank v Legate, it would have a chilling effect on the reporting of complaints against regulated health professionals as lawyers would be reluctant to assist clients in making complaints if the lawyers’ conduct could be scrutinized in a civil claim such as a claim for malicious prosecution.

30In Task Specific Rehabilitation Inc. v Steinecke (2004), 2004 CanLII 4853 (ON CA), which is relied upon in the Pouget decision, a similar result to that in Frank v Legate was reached. In Task Specific Rehabilitation, an occupational therapy assessment business sued a lawyer retained by the College of Occupational Therapists of Ontario to prosecute an occupational therapist who worked for the business. In its lawsuit, the business relied on documents from the College discipline proceedings. The court held s 36(3) barred the admissibility of the documents the business sought to rely upon and its claim against the prosecuting lawyer was dismissed as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

31In Law Society of Ontario v Fuhgeh, 2020 ONLSTH 75, the Tribunal considered the application of s 36(3) in the context of whether the Law Society, at a Law Society Tribunal hearing, could rely on a complaint made by a licensee to the College of Nurses and correspondence, submissions, and decisions in relation to that complaint in support of an allegation that the licensee engaged in conduct unbecoming. In the context of the matter before it, the hearing panel stated, “in the absence of a competing statutory provision that dilutes the strength of the s. 36 protection, we are not willing to carve out an exception for Law Society proceedings”: para 278.

32The panel held that the Law Society Tribunal proceeding constituted a civil proceeding for the purposes of s 36(3), with the result that the OPSDT materials were inadmissible.

33That holding is consistent with the purpose of s 36(3) of the RHPA, which as Sutherland stated is to encourage the reporting of complaints against members of a health profession, and to ensure that they are fully investigated and fairly decided “without any participant in the proceedings – a health professional, a patient, a complainant, a witness or a College employee – fearing that a document prepared for College proceedings can be used in a civil action” [emphasis added]. In Fuhgeh, the licensee was the complainant and as such was protected by s 36(3).

34In Simone v Law Society of Ontario, 2021 ONLSTH 114, the Tribunal considered the applicability of s 36(3) in the context of a good character hearing. In applying to become a paralegal, the applicant disclosed they had been a member of the College of Dental Hygienists of Ontario (CDHO) and there had been discipline proceedings. The Law Society obtained the discipline documents from the CDHO. The Law Society sought to rely on those documents in the good character hearing.

35The Tribunal in Simone adopted the reasoning in Fuhgeh and held that the Law Society could not rely upon any report, document, or thing prepared for, or a statement given at, the CDHO proceeding.

36That decision is consistent with the purpose of s 36(3) of the RHPA. As a health professional who was the subject of the complaint in the CDHO proceeding, the paralegal applicant was protected by s 36(3).

INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 36(3)

37While s 36(3) has been considered in the context of whether it applies to protect a complainant (Sutherland, Fuhgeh) and the subject of an investigation (Simone) in a proceeding to which the RHPA applies, s 36(3) has not been considered in the context of whether it protects the conduct of a Law Society licensee, acting as a Law Society licensee, in a proceeding to which the RHPA applies, to shield their behaviour from regulatory scrutiny by the Law Society of Ontario.

38It is my view that it does not.

The text of s 36(3)

39The language of s 36(3) is broad. It applies to “any participant in the proceedings” and, as Frank v Legate and Task Specific Rehabilitation Inc. v Steinecke demonstrate, is broad enough to capture lawyers or paralegals appearing for clients or prosecuting at a proceeding to which the RHPA applies.

40Section 36(3) makes information captured by the section inadmissible in:

a civil proceeding other than a proceeding under this Act, a health profession Act or the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act or a proceeding relating to an order under section 11.1 or 11.2 of the Ontario Drug Benefit Act.

41A conduct application under the Law Society Act is not “a proceeding under this Act, a health profession Act or the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act or a proceeding relating to an order under section 11.1 or 11.2 of the Ontario Drug Benefit Act.”

42Accordingly, based on the text of s 36(3), the question becomes whether this conduct application, which is a disciplinary proceeding, is a “civil proceeding”.

What is a “civil proceeding” in s 36(3)?

43The term “civil proceeding” is not defined by the RHPA. However, ss 7(2)(c), 32(3)(d), 45(2)(c), and 68(2)(c) of the RHPA expressly distinguish a “criminal proceeding” from a “civil suit or proceeding”.

44There is an ambiguity in s 36(3) in the definition of the term “civil proceeding”. Read in isolation, the term “civil proceeding” s 36(3) could be understood to mean any proceeding that is not criminal. On this interpretation, this conduct application might be characterized as a civil proceeding. That interpretation however appears to be undermined by ss 22.18(7) and 22.19(5) of the RHPA, which refer to “criminal, disciplinary, or other proceedings against the applicant in any jurisdiction whether in or outside Canada, relating to the applicant’s competency, conduct or character.” These provisions tend to demonstrate that the legislature did not use “civil proceeding” as a catch‑all for all non‑criminal processes, but instead treated civil, criminal, and disciplinary proceedings as distinct categories.

45The treatment of the term “civil proceeding” in s 36(3) as being a distinct category from criminal and disciplinary proceedings is supported by Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence which, in the context of an abuse of process analysis, considered this issue. Justice Rowe clearly stated for the majority of the court in para 54 of Law Society of Saskatchewan v Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29:

Disciplinary proceedings are neither civil nor criminal, but rather sui generis: MacKenzie [Lawyers & Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline], at § 26:2; Béliveau v. Barreau du Québec (1992), 1992 CanLII 8689 (QC CA), 101 D.L.R. (4th) 324 (Qc C.A.). They maintain discipline within a limited sphere of private activity. Thus, as stated before, they differ from criminal matters, which are of a public nature, intended to promote order and welfare within a public sphere of activity: [R. v Wigglesworth, 1987 CanLII 41 (SCC)], at p. 560; Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling, 2014 SCC 20, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 392, at para. 45.

46A Law Society conduct hearing is a disciplinary proceeding.

47On a plain reading, s 36(3) could nonetheless be read to imply that disciplinary proceedings fall within the category of “civil proceedings” given its exclusion of “a civil proceeding other than a proceeding under this Act, a health profession Act or the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act or a proceeding relating to an order under section 11.1 or 11.2 of the Ontario Drug Benefit Act” [emphasis added]. This express exclusion arguably would be unnecessary if a disciplinary proceeding is not a civil proceeding. That said, the exclusion may instead operate for greater certainty rather than to imply an expansion to the meaning of “civil proceedings”.

48Resolving the issue of the meaning of the term “civil proceeding” in s 36(3) in the context of the conduct application involving Mr. Kogan requires adherence to the principles of statutory interpretation which require an examination of more than just the text of the provision and requires consideration of the scheme and object of the Act and the intention of the legislature. Some of the jurisprudence interpreting s 36(3) assists in this analysis.

49Sutherland, Pouget, Frank, and Task Specific Rehabilitation do not assist with the meaning of “civil proceedings” as none were in respect of disciplinary proceedings.

50Fuhgeh and Simone did apply to disciplinary hearings and expressly concluded in the context of the cases before them that Law Society disciplinary proceedings should be treated as being civil proceedings for the purpose of s 36(3). However, the context for these conclusions is different than this case.

51While Fuhgeh observed that s 36(3) has been applied in range of administrative proceedings including at the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, the Information and Privacy Commissioner, the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal, and labour arbitrators, those proceedings involved claims by persons for redress for alleged wrongdoing. They did not involve a disciplinary proceeding brought by a professional regulator against its own licensee. Rather, the panel considered a complaint to the College of Nurses made by Mr. Fuhgeh. The legislative purpose of encouraging the reporting of complaints of professional misconduct and ensuring that those complaints are fully investigated and fairly decided was advanced by the Fuhgeh panel’s interpretation of s 36(3). The decision protected the complainant.

52In Simone, the panel addressed proceedings against Ms. Simone as a licensee of the College of Dental Hygienists of Ontario (CDHO). Protecting against collateral use of CDHO materials advances the legislative purpose of full investigation and fair decision making. The decision protected the subject of the complaint.

53The decisions in Fuhgeh and Simone are of limited assistance in the resolution of this motion for two reasons. One, neither panel considered the specific context addressed in Mr. Kogan’s case – whether it applies to the conduct of a Law Society licensee, acting as a Law Society licensee in a proceeding to which the RHPA applies, to shield their behaviour from regulatory scrutiny by the Law Society of Ontario. Second, both were decided prior to the release of Abrametz, above, which although addressing a different issue, concluded that a professional discipline proceeding is not a civil proceeding.

The purposes of s 36(3)

54The purposes of s 36(3) are authoritatively stated in Sutherland: “to encourage the reporting of complaints of professional misconduct against members of a health profession” and “to ensure that those complaints are fully investigated and fairly decided”.

55These purposes flow from the Minister’s statutory duty defined in s 3 of the RHPA:

to ensure that the health professions are regulated and co-ordinated in the public interest, that appropriate standards of practice are developed and maintained and that individuals have access to services provided by the health professions of their choice and that they are treated with sensitivity and respect in their dealings with health professionals, the Colleges and the Board.

56It is therefore in the public interest that complaints against health professionals be reported and fully and fairly addressed.

57Section 36(3) of the RHPA advances these objectives by preventing complainants’ statements being used against them in a subsequent civil proceeding. It shields the subject of a complaint from the complainant using the discipline process to build a civil claim against the subject of the complaint. It promotes all involved in the process being able to fully and frankly address concerns raised. It protects the integrity of the regulatory process of the RHPA by ensuing that there can be a full investigation of the complaint; it provides protection against a future claim of malicious prosecution; and ensures a fair decision is issued in a process that is not inhibited by fear of future use in a civil proceeding.

58However, Mr. Kogan is not a complainant in a proceeding in which the RHPA applies. Nor is he a licensee of a regulated health profession. He is a licensee of the Law Society of Ontario. When he interacted with the OPSDT, he was the legal representative of a participant in a proceeding in which the RHPA applies. The context of this case is very different than Fuhgeh and Simone.

59As the legal regulator, the Law Society has a duty “protect the public, to regulate the profession and to preserve public confidence in the profession”: Abrametz at para 53. This duty is analogous to the statutory duty imposed on the Minister under in s 3 of the RHPA.

60The duty to protect the public interest is an onerous obligation placed on professional regulators. In Pharmascience Inc. v Binet, 2006 SCC 48, the majority stated at para 36:

This Court has on many occasions noted the crucial role that professional orders play in protecting the public interest. As McLachlin J. stated in Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, 1990 CanLII 121 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232, “[i]t is difficult to overstate the importance in our society of the proper regulation of our learned professions” (p. 249). The importance of monitoring competence and supervising the conduct of professionals stems from the extent to which the public places trust in them. Also, it should not be forgotten that in the client‑professional relationship, the client is often in a vulnerable position. … The privilege of professional self‑regulation therefore places the individuals responsible for enforcing professional discipline under an onerous obligation. The delegation of powers by the state comes with the responsibility for providing adequate protection for the public. [Finney v Barreau du Québec, 2004 SCC 36] confirms the importance of properly discharging this obligation and the seriousness of the consequences of failing to do so.

61At para 37 of Pharmascience, the majority of the court recognized that to fulfil their important duties, professional regulators must have access to sufficient information:

In this context, it should be expected that individuals with not only the power, but also the duty, to inquire into a professional’s conduct will have sufficiently effective means at their disposal to gather all information relevant to determining whether a complaint should be lodged.

62The Law Society fulfils its mandate by ensuring the continuing competence of, and adherence to ethical standards by, lawyers and paralegals.

63In the application against Mr. Kogan, the Law Society seeks to demonstrate that in relation to matters before the OPSDT, Mr. Kogan contravened the Paralegal Rules of Conduct governing acting honourably and with integrity; advocacy before tribunals; encouraging respect for the administration of justice; and communicating professionally. These obligations are fundamental to protecting the public, regulating the profession, and maintaining public confidence in the legal professions.

64If a “civil proceeding” in s 36(3) is interpreted to include a Law Society conduct proceeding in the circumstances of this case, information necessary for the Law Society to fulfil its statutory mandate would be rendered inadmissible. Such an interpretation would interfere with the Law Society’s statutory duties. In enacting s 36(3), the legislature cannot have intended to interfere in another professional regulator’s ability to control its process and fulfil its statutory mandate.

65Interpreting “civil proceeding” in s 36(3) as applying to a Law Society disciplinary proceeding in which the subject licensee is neither a complainant nor a subject of a proceeding in which the RHPA applies such as to prevent the Law Society from scrutinizing the conduct of that licensee for professional misconduct or conduct unbecoming would also lead to an absurd result. Legal professionals engaged in such proceedings could abdicate their professional responsibilities of competence and ethical behaviour during the proceedings with the knowledge that they had absolute immunity. They would be shielded from a complaint to the Law Society based on their conduct.

66Such an interpretation would also mean that potential complainants, including OPSDT adjudicators who were concerned by the professional conduct of a lawyer or paralegal appearing before them, would have no ability to make a complaint to the Law Society. Such an interpretation would discourage the reporting of complaints about licensees to the Law Society, which is contrary to the Law Society’s statutory functions, duties, and powers under ss 4.1 and 4.2 of the Act, particularly its duty to protect the public interest.

67Such a result is inconsistent with the purposes of s 36(3) of the RHPA. Just as the public has an interest in encouraging complaints against regulated health professionals, the public has an interest in encouraging the reporting of complaints against lawyers and paralegals and in the full investigation and fair, timely resolution of those complaints.

68Legislation enacted to encourage the reporting and investigation of complaints against regulated health professionals cannot reasonably be interpreted as shielding regulated legal professionals from complaints or oversight by their own governing body. Such an interpretation is contrary to the section’s intended purpose and would produce an absurd result.

69The purposes of s 36(3) are not advanced by immunizing a Law Society licensee from accountability for their professional conduct as a representative of a party in a health Act proceeding. Doing so would undermine, rather than promote, the reporting of complainants and ensuring fair decision-making.

70In my opinion, s 36(3) of the RHPA should not be interpreted to apply to Law Society disciplinary proceedings involving the conduct of a licensee appearing as a legal representative in a proceeding in which the RHPA applies.

71Accordingly, I find that s 36(3) does not prevent the OPSDT materials from being admissible at Law Society proceedings involving Mr. Kogan’s conduct in relation to the OPSDT.

CONCLUSION AND COSTS

72In the context of these proceedings, s 36(3) does not apply.

73Although the motion is dismissed, it raised an important issue not previously addressed directly in the case law. As the motion has clarified the law in this area, there will be no order as to costs.

74I encourage the parties to redact materials from the OPSDT or to obtain appropriate orders under Rule 13 so that doctor-patient confidentiality is maintained.

ORDER

75For these reasons, I order that this motion is dismissed without costs.