LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL

HEARING DIVISION

Date: March 11, 2026

Tribunal File No.: 23H-032

BETWEEN:

Law Society of Ontario

Applicant

• and -

Christos Vitsentzatos

Respondent

Before: Malcolm M. Mercer (Chair), Ingrid Berkeley, Neha Chugh

Heard: January 29, 2026, by videoconference

Appearances:

Elaine Strosberg, for the applicant

Naomi Mary Lutes, for the respondent

Summary:

VITSENTZATOS – Penalty – Costs – The panel earlier found that the Lawyer engaged in professional misconduct and in conduct unbecoming – The panel found that while some cases of knowing participation in fraud can and do attract presumptive revocation, the caselaw does not establish that this is invariably so – The panel concluded that the misconduct here, should result in loss of licence, absent exceptional circumstances, because of the public interest in maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the profession – No exceptional circumstances were found – The Lawyer’s licence was revoked and he was ordered to pay $35,000 in costs to the Law Society.

REASONS FOR DECISION ON PENALTY AND COSTS

1Malcolm M. Mercer (for the panel):– In our merits decision, we found that Christos Vitsentzatos engaged in professional misconduct: Law Society of Ontario v Vitsentzatos, 2025 ONLSTH 145.

2For the following reasons, we have revoked Mr. Vitsentzatos’ licence to practise law and order that he pay costs of $35,000 to the Law Society.

3In our merits decision, we found that Mr. Vitsentzatos’ engaged in professional misconduct as follows:

In respect of his client AX

1. He acted in a conflict of interest due to his romantic relationship with his client (“AX”);

2. he failed to obtain AX’s fully informed and voluntary consent to represent her given his conflict of interest;

3. he failed to act with integrity when he told a Law Society of Ontario (“LSO”) Investigator that he obtained AX’s fully informed written consent on May 10, 2019 to represent her despite his conflict of interest when he knew that was not true; and

4. he failed to honourably carry on the practice of law and to discharge all responsibilities to clients and the public when he made discriminatory comments about Jews and Asians in text messages to his client AX.

In respect of a vehicle transfer

5. He assisted in, encouraged and/or facilitated dishonesty and fraud by causing AX to sign a Ministry of Finance Sworn Statement for a Family Gift of a Used Vehicle in the Province of Ontario form (the “Form”) which contained an untrue statement;

6. he failed to act with integrity when he caused or otherwise facilitated his brother’s signature to be forged on the Form as the commissioner of oaths;

7. he failed to act with integrity when he caused or otherwise facilitated the filing of the Form with Service Ontario;

8. he failed to act with integrity when he advised an LSO Investigator that he purchased AX’s truck for $5,000 in cash through his friend and client Rick Wilson when that was untrue; and

9. he failed to act with integrity when he caused or otherwise facilitated a false statement by Rick Wilson to the LSO, namely that Rick Wilson purchased AX’s truck for $5,000 cash on behalf of the Respondent.

In respect of his traffic stop involving his daughter

10. He failed to act with civility in his dealings with officers of the London Police Service during his daughter’s traffic stop; and

11. he threatened without reasonable and lawful justification to initiate proceedings against and/or to make a complaint to a regulatory authority about an officer of the London Police Service on behalf of his daughter in an attempt to gain a benefit for her.

4We also found that Mr. Vitsentzatos engaged in conduct unbecoming in his dealings with officers of the London Police Service during his daughter’s traffic stop.

THE PENALTY POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

5The Law Society submits that revocation should be ordered because the proven misconduct attracts presumptive revocation and a lesser penalty is not justified by exceptional circumstances.

6Mr. Vitsentzatos submits that presumptive revocation does not apply and that the appropriate penalty is a six or nine-month suspension, taking into account the misconduct and relevant mitigating factors. If presumptive revocation applies, Mr. Vitsentzatos submits that exceptional circumstances exist that justify a suspension rather than loss of licence.

THE DETERMINATION OF A PROPER PENALTY

7It is useful to start with an overview of the approaches taken to the determination of a proper penalty:

Presumptive revocation

8The penalty for some misconduct is revocation unless exceptional circumstances are shown. This has been called presumptive revocation: Law Society of Upper Canada v Mucha, 2008 ONLSAP 5, Bishop v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2014 ONSC 5057, and Law Society of Upper Canada v Abbott, 2017 ONCA 525.

9Presumptive revocation can arise in two different ways. One way is that the proven misconduct falls within a category of misconduct to which presumptive revocation applies. This is what Justice Nordheimer was referring to in Bishop when he wrote at para 30 that:

… there is nothing per se objectionable to a profession setting out presumptive penalties for breaches of different types of professional obligations. It is no different than appellate courts setting out presumptive penalties for certain types of offences. Moreover, it is not accurate to characterize such presumptive penalties as “mandatory minimums” with all of the attendant concerns that may accompany statutorily mandated sentences. Rather, presumptive penalties act as a guide, both for the entity imposing the penalty and for the persons who may be subject to such penalties.

10This category or type-based approach proceeds on the basis that all misconduct of a particular type presumptively warrants revocation: Law Society of Ontario v Manilla, 2021 ONLSTA 25.

11The other way is a case-by-case approach. Some misconduct attracts presumptive revocation on a case-by-case approach, by examining the specific misconduct rather than by determining the category in which the misconduct falls. This approach is sometimes described as being by the application of the Bolton principle although it is clearly a form of presumptive revocation:¹ Law Society of Ontario v Wilkins, 2021 ONLSTA 15, Law Society of Ontario v Grillone, 2025 ONLSTH 48, Law Society of Ontario v Masgras-Irshidat, 2026 ONLSTA 1 at para 157, and Law Society of Ontario v Mazinani, 2026 ONLSTH 14 at para 66.

12The Bolton principle refers to a decision of Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Bolton v Law Society, [1993] ECWA Civ 32, in which he observed that some misconduct should result in revocation irrespective of considerations which would ordinarily weigh in mitigation in order to ensure public confidence:

The most serious [cases involve] proven dishonesty, whether or not leading to criminal proceedings and criminal penalties. In such cases the tribunal has almost invariably, no matter how strong the mitigation advanced for the solicitor, ordered that he be struck off the Roll of Solicitors.

13In the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, presumptive revocation relies on the Bolton principle for two propositions. The first is that ensuring public confidence in the legal professions ordinarily justifies revocation where the Bolton principle applies. Specific deterrence and rehabilitation are of little, if any, importance in such cases. The second is that mitigation is of substantially diminished importance where the Bolton principle applies. Said another way, the focus in such cases is on the misconduct rather than on the circumstances of the licensee and risk of recurrence. That said, the Tribunal’s jurisprudence does not treat the Bolton principle as applying to any and all dishonesty nor does Bolton suggest that it does. The nature of the dishonesty is important in determining whether the Bolton principles does apply.

14The distinction between presumptive revocation based on the category/​type of the misconduct and presumptive revocation on a case-by-case examination of the specific misconduct may be understood by analogy to the distinction between class privilege and case-by-case privilege. The latter requires examination of the specific facts rather than a categorization: Lizotte v Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, 2016 SCC 52 at para 32.

The ordinary approach

15Where the misconduct does not attract presumptive revocation, the ordinary approach to penalty is taken. This approach takes into account the purposes of penalty orders, the nature of the misconduct, mitigating and aggravating factors (the Aguirre factors) and comparable cases: Law Society of Upper Canada v Strug, 2008 ONLSHP 88, Law Society of Upper Canada v Aguirre, 2007 ONLSHP 46, and Law Society of Ontario v Di Giacomo, 2023 ONLSTA 5.

Ungovernability

16There is another approach to penalty, which we include for completeness. It is not applicable in this case. Where a licensee is found to be ungovernable, whether for progressive discipline or that the licensee is simply unwilling or unable to comply with regulatory requirements, revocation is ordinarily ordered: Law Society of Upper Canada v Shifman, 2014 ONLSTA 21, and Law Society of Ontario v McEachern, 2021 ONLSTH 62.

PRESUMPTIVE AND NEW CATEGORIES

17The parties disagree whether the proven misconduct in this case falls into an established category to which presumptive revocation applies. If it does not, the question arises whether a new category should be recognized. It is therefore useful to generally discuss category-based presumptive revocation at the outset.

18To repeat, Justice Nordheimer observed in Bishop that:

there is nothing per se objectionable to a profession setting out presumptive penalties for breaches of different types of professional obligations. … [P]resumptive penalties act as a guide, both for the entity imposing the penalty and for the persons who may be subject to such penalties.

19In Mucha, the appeal panel established presumptive revocation for mortgage fraud on the basis that the Tribunal had not imposed a penalty other than revocation for knowing participation in a mortgage fraud. Experience had shown that mortgage fraud was a useful categorization, because all cases of mortgage fraud led to revocation. Mucha explained why revocation was the appropriate result on the basis of the Bolton principle.

20Experience has also shown that misappropriation is treated in the same way as mortgage fraud. revocation is the penalty that is ordinarily ordered, which makes sense under the Bolton principle: Wilkins at paras 99-106.

21There have been recent attempts to expand the categories of misconduct to which presumptive revocation applies without the benefit of an established pattern of revocation such as existed for mortgage fraud and misappropriation. Care is required because some categories are more diverse than they may seem to be on first impression. “Knowing false representation in documents” is a good example. “False documents” is too diverse a category to permit a consistent penalty: Manilla at paras 56 and 59.

22“Failure of integrity” is another example of a category that is too diverse to properly permit a consistent penalty: Manilla at para 59, and Law Society of Ontario v Strashin, 2025 ONLSTH 179 at paras 63-68.

23To be clear, some false documents cases and some failures of integrity properly result in revocation of licence, absent exceptional circumstances, but not all such cases do. The application of the Bolton principle properly results in revocation where a careful examination of the proven misconduct shows that the Bolton principle applies.

24The categories of misconduct which attract presumptive revocation are not closed. But care is required in establishing new categories especially where experience has not shown that a categorization is reliable. As said in Manilla at para 68, new categories “should be analogous to knowing participation in mortgage fraud or misappropriation in that they are in a different register, or of a different quality, than other lawyerly misconduct.” As said by the Appeal Division in Law Society of Ontario v Barnwell, 2024 ONLSTA 15 at para 109, “any expansion should be approached cautiously to ensure that the animating rationale of presumptive revocation applies”.

25Finally, we observe that the establishment of new categories can be a useful tool, where appropriate, to simplify the penalty analysis and to send clear signals to the professions and the public about the type of misconduct that is not tolerated.² But establishing inappropriate categories can lead to inappropriate and unfair penalties and the watering down of important messages. Little is lost and much is gained by careful case-by-case application of the Bolton principle rather than needless and potentially problematic establishment of new categories: Mazinani at paras 67-72.

PRESUMPTIVE REVOCATION AND THE MISCONDUCT IN THIS CASE

Does presumptive revocation apply here because of the category of the misconduct?

The vehicle transfer raises the issue

26The Law Society relies on Mr. Vitsentzatos’ conduct in respect of the vehicle transfer in submitting that presumptive revocation applies.

27Mr. Vitsentzatos acquired a vehicle from AX. The vehicle was transferred to Mr. Vitsentzatos using a statutory declaration (the declaration) given by him and AX. The declaration was apparently sworn before Mr. Vitsentzatos’ brother, who is also a lawyer:

• The declaration states that AX was Mr. Vitsentzatos’ spouse. This was false.

• The declaration states that the vehicle was acquired as a gift for no consideration. This was false. While there is a factual dispute as to the actual consideration for the transfer, both AX and Mr. Vitsentzatos testified that there was consideration.

• The declaration was purportedly sworn by AX and Mr. Vitsentzatos before Mr. Vitsentzatos’ brother. This was false and the signature was not Mr. Vitsentzatos’ brother’s signature.

• A tax-free assignment of the ownership of the vehicle from AX to Mr. Vitsentzatos occurred because of the false declaration.

28The declaration is dated August 29, 2019. On August 28, 2019, Mr. Vitsentzatos discussed the transfer of the vehicle with AX by text messages. The following exchange is part of that discussion:

Mr. Vitsentzatos: I will get the form for you to sign to gift it to me, my wife

Love your husband

AX: Hahaha, will that work?

Mr. Vitsentzatos: It should

AX: Can we scam the government in any other way? I’m broke.

Mr. Vitsentzatos: Well we can see

(emoticons not included)

29We found in our merits reasons that Mr. Vitsentzatos:

• assisted in, encouraged and/or facilitated dishonesty and fraud by causing AX to sign the declaration;

• facilitated the making of the false declaration; and

• caused or otherwise facilitated the filing of the false declaration with Service Ontario.

The positions of the parties

30The Law Society’s position is that presumptive revocation applies to knowing participation in any and all forms of fraud. The Law Society relies on the following cases.

31In Manilla, the appeal panel stated in a general discussion at para 41 that:

…knowing participation in mortgage fraud is not the only misconduct for which termination of licence is the presumptive disposition. Knowing participation in other kinds of fraud has been found to attract presumptive revocation. Law Society of Upper Canada v. Kelly, 2014 ONLSTA 16 at para. 29 and Law Society of Ontario v. Spiegel, 2018 ONLSTH 57 at para. 12.

32In Grillone, the hearing panel, citing Manilla, stated generally at para 92 that:

The Tribunal’s jurisprudence has identified some types of misconduct that attract presumptive revocation. Misappropriation and knowing participation in fraud are two of those types of misconduct.

33In Kelly, above, the appeal panel addressed what it described as knowing participation in bankruptcy fraud. The panel concluded that:

In our view, the appellant’s conduct, when viewed cumulatively, ordinarily or presumptively would warrant revocation of his licence. Indeed, his deliberate lie under oath in the bankruptcy proceedings, motivated by his desire to immunize his payment to his mother from scrutiny or reversal constituted fraudulent activity that, standing alone, would ordinarily justify revocation. ...

34In Law Society of Ontario v Spiegel, 2018 ONLSTH 57, the hearing panel stated generally at para 12 that “Knowingly participating in fraud attracts the presumptive penalty of revocation” and at para 13 that:

Mr. Spiegel submitted documents he knew were misleading to insurance companies from whom his clients were making claims, in order to attempt to obtain benefits for clients and for himself. In our view, the principles from Bolton and Mucha lead to the presumption of revocation here.

35In Law Society of Ontario v Hamilton, 2023 ONLSTH 43, the hearing panel concluded that presumptive revocation applied to a case of misappropriation, fraudulent billing and fabricating of official court documents. This application was unopposed.

Our analysis and conclusion

36With respect to these cases, we observe that:

• Manilla does not go so far as to say that knowing participation in any fraud attracts presumptive revocation, only that knowing participation in some types of fraud have done so. Grillone, which summarizes Manilla in this respect, does not consider whether presumptive revocation applies to any and all cases of knowing participation in fraud.

• Kelly appears to take a case-by-case approach, rather than a categorical approach, in concluding that the proven misconduct attracted presumptive revocation.

• Speigel includes a categorical statement with respect to knowing participation in fraud but goes on to conclude that presumptive revocation should apply taking a case-by-case approach to the specific misconduct.

• Hamilton, an unopposed case, had multiple bases for the application of presumptive revocation and so did not have to determine the question that arises here.

37Mr. Vitsentzatos relies on the following cases in response:

• In Law Society of Ontario v Mobberley, 2023 ONLSTH 106, and 2024 ONLSTH 15, the hearing panel declined to apply presumptive revocation despite having found that the respondent “was dishonest when he swore and filed an affidavit containing misleading information” on the basis of “knowing recklessness”. Despite this finding, the panel concluded that Mr. Mobberley’s conduct “fell close to the border of negligence”. The panel concluded that “Mr. Mobberley’s dishonesty was in no way analogous to knowing participation in either mortgage fraud or misappropriation” and that, on the facts, this was a “lesser failure” of integrity. In its merits decision, the panel found Mr. Mobberley’s conduct to be “inexplicable” and that it ”provided no benefit to the client”.

• In Law Society of Ontario v Twizell, 2024 ONLSTH 38, the hearing panel concluded that presumptive revocation did not apply. In the context of an appeal to the Social Security Tribunal, Ms. Twizell had wilfully tampered with a letter from her employer to eliminate a material fact. The altered letter was not submitted because the alteration was discovered before it could be submitted. The hearing panel concluded at para 20:

The conduct at issue here – knowingly altering the Employer’s Letter – raises serious issues of integrity but is not analogous to knowing participation in mortgage fraud or misappropriation. Unlike Spiegel where there was a pattern of dishonesty, the conduct here was on one occasion. Unlike Spiegel, where the dishonest conduct was in the course of professional practice, the conduct here was in Ms. Twizzel’s private life.

38With respect to these cases, we observe that:

• Mobberley was not framed as knowing participation in fraud and so does not assist on the question of whether this is a category that should attract presumptive revocation. Mobberley is a case in which preparation of a false document was found not to lead to revocation.

• Twizell is significant in that the panel distinguished that case from other cases on the basis that Ms. Twizell’s misconduct was in her personal life.

39While it is clear that some cases of knowing participation in fraud can and do attract presumptive revocation, the cases do not establish that this is invariably so for all types of participation and all types of fraud.

40In this case, the vehicle transfer was in Mr. Vitsentzatos’ personal life. His legal work for AX was not part of his assistance or participation in the way that transactional legal work assists in mortgage fraud. As his counsel put in in her submissions:

What I’m focusing on is that it is fraud, a fraud not in his professional capacity, meaning a fraud as a lawyer on a court, as opposed to a fraudulent conduct in his personal capacity. That’s the distinction I'm trying to draw. And I appreciate, again, this is dishonest. This is a fraud. I’m trying to put it on a spectrum of types of fraud and types of dishonesty, because I’m pushing back on the notion that every type of fraud necessarily invokes presumptive revocation.

41In para 78 of Abbott, Justice Lauwers notes that, “The key point made in all of the mortgage fraud lawyer discipline cases is that dishonest misconduct presumptively results in revocation. It is in a different register, or of a different quality, than other lawyerly misconduct.”

42In Bishop, Justice Nordheimer observed at para 30 that “there is nothing per se objectionable to a profession setting out presumptive penalties for breaches of different types of professional obligations”.

43We highlight the reference to “lawyerly misconduct” and “professional obligations”. Consistent with Twizell, these references indicate that presumptive revocation is ordinarily meant to deal with professional conduct. This is consistent with presumptive revocation originally addressing misappropriation and mortgage fraud. Both are particular types of professional misconduct that it makes sense, as a matter of policy, to forcefully say to the profession and the public that such actions will ordinarily lead to revocation. Both are categories in which all misconduct properly attracts the same treatment.

44This is an unusual case. Mr. Vitsentzatos’ acquisition of the vehicle from AX was not in the course of his legal work for her. His participation in sales tax fraud was not in the course of his legal practice. Law Society scrutiny of this conduct was the collateral consequence of an investigation into the lawyer-client relationship between Mr. Vitsentzatos and AX.

45We do not accept that presumptive revocation applies in this case simply because this misconduct falls within the “knowing participation in fraud” category or type of misconduct.

Does presumptive revocation apply here on a case-by-case basis?

46The following facts are significant in determining whether this specific misconduct that has been found, absent exceptional circumstances, should result in revocation:

• AX was Mr. Vitsentzatos’ client.

• Mr. Vitsentzatos blurred his professional life and his personal life by being both AX’s lawyer and romantic partner at the same time.

• Mr. Vitsentzatos chose to involve AX in a fraudulent scheme which put her at risk and which would have affected her view of his integrity as a lawyer and potentially of the integrity of the legal profession.

• Statutory declarations are a legal means by which important statements are made to the government. While all fraudulent statements are dishonest, a false statutory declaration by a lawyer is more serious.

• The declaration was substantively false both in stating that AX and Mr. Vitsentzatos were spouses and in stating that the vehicle was a gift.

• The declaration was not actually a sworn document; no oath or affirmation had been administered. The declaration falsely appeared to be a sworn document.

• Mr. Vitsentzatos’ brother was implicated. Without his knowledge, the brother’s name was added to the declaration as commissioner. His signature was forged. The declaration was false in this respect as well.

• Mr. Vitsentzatos did not pay retail sales tax on the vehicle transfer until the week before the merits hearing. His evidence is that the tax payable was approximately $5,000.

47The case of Strug, above, has long been cited for the proposition that penalty orders are directed primarily to (i) specific deterrence, (ii) general deterrence, (iii) rehabilitation and other matters and (iv) maintaining public confidence in the legal profession. Strug says that maintaining public confidence in the legal profession is the most fundamental purpose.

48In Abbott, Justice Lauwers observed in the context of presumptive revocation for knowing assistance in mortgage fraud that “priority is to be given to the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the profession”.

49Counsel for Mr. Vitsentzatos submitted that the essential question was whether revocation, absent exceptional circumstances, is required because of the public interest in maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the profession. We accept this submission in the context of this case. At this stage of the analysis, we are not concerned about specific deterrence. This case is sufficiently unusual that general deterrence of similar misconduct is not in issue, although deterrence of fraud and dishonesty generally is relevant.

50We conclude that the misconduct that we have found, in its context, should result in revocation, absent exceptional circumstances, because of the public interest in maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the profession.

51We reach this conclusion because:

• The involvement of Mr. Vitsentzatos’ client AX, whom he dishonourably asked to participate in a fraud, and which put her at personal risk, would reasonably be expected to have compromised her trust in his integrity and her trust in the integrity of lawyers generally.

• AX was likely vulnerable to this improper request given that the request was made by her lawyer, with whom she had a sexual relationship, and who had been retained recently to assist with the difficult termination of her prior lengthy abusive relationship.

• The use of a statutory declaration, given the importance of declarations and affidavits part of the functioning of the legal system.

• The fact that the declaration was not actually sworn despite appearing to be; given the importance of sworn documents as an important part of the operation of the legal system.

• The use of Mr. Vitsentzatos’ brother’s name and purported signature, dishonoured his brother, a family member and a fellow licensee, and put his brother at personal and professional risk.

• Fraud, including retail tax fraud, is dishonourable, dishonest, and a failure of integrity.

52As discussed above, this is an unusual case. It could be seen as being personal misconduct rather than lawyerly misconduct. But we consider the conduct to be properly treated as being lawyerly misconduct for several reasons. The first is that Mr. Vitsentzatos involved his client AX in the scheme. The second is that the means by which the fraud was effected was a statutory declaration which is an important legal instrument involving sworn evidence. The third is that, while not necessarily required, legal expertise can facilitate tax fraud given the legal technicalities of tax law. The first two reasons are of greater importance.

53We consider this misconduct, fraud on the government involving a client and a statutory declaration, to be of a different register and quality than other lawyerly misconduct.

54In our opinion, reasonable members of the public would not accept the continued licensing of a lawyer that has engaged in this type of misconduct, absent exceptional circumstances. We conclude that maintaining public confidence in the legal profession and maintaining the integrity of the profession requires revocation, absent exceptional circumstances.

Exceptional Circumstances

55At this stage in our reasons, we address the legal test for exceptional circumstances. We will then review the evidence from the penalty hearing which was submitted both to support the claim of exceptional circumstances if presumptive revocation is found to apply and, if not, to inform the ordinary penalty assessment applying the Aguirre factors.

56In Mucha, the appeal panel described exceptional circumstances at para 28 saying:

By way of illustration only, there may be compelling psychiatric or psychological evidence that, among other things, credibly indicates not only that the misconduct was out of character and unlikely to recur, but explains why it occurred. [Emphasis in Mucha.]

57In Bishop, Justice Nordheimer observed at para 31 that:

…the mitigating factors that will amount to exceptional circumstances in any given case are not restricted to only certain types or forms. Medical reasons or financial desperation or situations of duress serve as examples of the type of mitigating factors that may amount to exceptional circumstances but those situations are not exhaustive of such factors. That said, it remains the case that any such factors will normally have to be ones that would rise to the level where it would be obvious to other members of the profession, and to the public, that the underlying circumstances of the individual clearly obviated the need to provide reassurance to them of the integrity of the profession. I would add, on that point, that factors that provide an explanation for the conduct of the lawyer will generally be ones that would most likely reach that requisite level of mitigation but they are not the only ones that may achieve that result. [Emphasis added in Abbott]

EVIDENCE SUBMITTED DURING THE PENALTY HEARING.

58Mr. Vitsentzatos submitted affidavit evidence and oral evidence during the penalty hearing. There were no other witnesses. However, Mr. Vitsentzatos submitted unsworn letters of support from 12 people.

59Mr. Vitsentzatos testified with respect to his circumstances in 2018 and 2019.

60Mr. Vitsentzatos is married with three children. In 2018, he had a busy practice. He was forgetting some things in 2017/2018 which concerned him. He sought medical assistance but it does not appear that any medical basis for his forgetfulness was ascertained.

61In November 2018, Mr. Vitsentzatos was arrested for solicitation of prostitution and mischief. His evidence is that he has no memory of the events. According to Mr. Vitsentzatos, the charges were ultimately withdrawn after diversion and provision of medical information about his PTSD and state of mind. This medical information is not in evidence here.

62Mr. Vitsentzatos’ arrest and the resulting publicity led to him leaving the family home. He lived in his office for much of 2019. His relationship with his wife and children was at least strained.

63Mr. Vitsentzatos was prescribed medication for depression by his family doctor in January 2019. Mr. Vitsentzatos also suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder. He was referred by his family doctor to Dr. Mammoliti, a psychiatrist, in 2019. She confirmed the diagnoses of depression and PTSD and ultimately diagnosed him with ADHD. Mr. Vitsentzatos was under the care of this psychiatrist from 2019 to 2023. We do not have any medical records or opinion from the family doctor or from Dr. Mammoliti.

64After Dr. Mammoliti left London, it took until October 2025 for Mr. Vitsentzatos to obtain a new psychiatrist, Dr. Hertzman. Dr. Hertzman has provided a letter which confirms that he has been meeting with Mr. Vitsentzatos since October 2025. Dr. Hertzman’s letter states that Mr. Vitsentzatos has been prescribed three medications for his psychiatric symptoms. The letter does not provide any history, diagnosis or prognosis. The letter indicates that Mr. Vitsentzatos is seen approximately monthly and that he participates in what appears to be an active and accessible manner and that he appears to be integrating suggestions that have come from these discussions.

65According to Mr. Vitsentzatos, the three prescribed medications are for insomnia, depression and ADHD.

66When AX became a client in April 2019, Mr. Vitsentzatos was depressed and living in his office. His family was not speaking to him. While he was still practising, he was in “a really low, low spot”. His evidence is that the depression medication was starting to work and that he was less depressed than he had been and that he had recently started ADHD medication.

67Mr. Vitsentzatos testified that he had reestablished his relationship with his family prior to the release of the merits decision, although he was not living in the family home. The release of the merits decision has had an adverse effect on his relationship with his family.

68We accept that Mr. Vitsentzatos was separated in the spring of 2019 and that he had mental health difficulties. However, the lack of any medical records from 2018/2019 limits our ability to make findings as to the impact, if any, of Mr. Vitsentzatos’ depression, PTSD and ADHD on the events of 2019.

69In this regard, we note that Mr. Vitsentzatos’ sexual relationship with AX started in April/May 2019 and continued until August/September 2019. The vehicle was transferred in late August 2019. The discriminatory comments were made in late August 2019. The police stop incident occurred in November 2019. It appears to be Mr. Vitsentzatos’ evidence that his health was improving during 2019.

70Mr. Vitsentzatos expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for some of his actions while he gave his evidence.

71With respect to AX, Mr. Vitsentzatos expressed his “deepest and most sincere apologies to AX and to the Law Society for my actions, which fell far short of the standards expected of me as a licensed legal professional” and states that he is “profoundly sorry for the harm and distress I have caused AX”. He accepted that “engaging in an intimate relationship with AX, as a client … was a clear breach of my professional obligations and a betrayal of the trust she as a client placed in me”.

72Mr. Vitsentzatos expressed shame for his discriminatory communications which he says he now recognizes were not only unprofessional but disrespected the Jewish and Asian communities. Mr. Vitsentzatos has described in some detail steps that he has taken to gain insight into antisemitic and anti-Asian discrimination and discriminatory and racialized behaviours more generally.

73With respect to the vehicle transfer, Mr. Vitsentzatos apologizes for his “complete failure to admit to and take full responsibility for paying the provincial sales tax at the time [he] took possession of the vehicle.” This is a limited statement which relates simply to the failure to pay sales tax. Mr. Vitsentzatos makes no reference to the declaration discussed above or how it came to be that he did not pay sales tax.

74The merits decision sets out two principal findings relating to the police traffic stop. Mr. Vitsentzatos has been found to have been uncivil in his dealings with the police constable who had stopped his daughter. Mr. Vitsentzatos has also been found to have falsely accused the constable with having taken an envelope containing money from his daughter’s vehicle and to have threated to make a complaint about the constable in that regard.

75With respect to the police stop, Mr. Vitsentzatos takes “responsibl[ity] for how [he] interacted with the police constable in what [he accepts] was an uncivil manner at the traffic stop, which [he] can now appreciate had the effect of intimidating him. This was unprofessional and entirely unacceptable for [him] to do so.” Mr. Vitsentzatos appears to accept that his conduct was objectively improper and had an intimidating effect. However, Mr. Vitsentzatos makes no reference to threatening the officer with respect to the purported envelope. His acceptance of responsibility is limited.

76Mr. Vitsentzatos has filed 12 unsworn letters of support. Six are from clients, three are from other lawyers, two are from other professionals, and one is from a friend and church colleague. Some of the clients and other lawyers have become friends. Two of the 12 letters are from women; one lawyer and one other professional. The backgrounds of the authors of the letters are diverse. The authors speak well of Mr. Vitsentzatos, his character and professionalism, and indicate that the misconduct that we have found is out of character. Some of the letters confirm Mr. Vitsentzatos’ shame and remorse. Several of the letters confirm the authors’ awareness of Mr. Vitsentzatos’ mental health difficulties. One author wrote:

I am aware of the personal challenges he faced—including Depression, ADHD, and his separation in 2019—which had a significant impact on him at the time. It is clear that he has worked through these difficulties and is now in a healthier and much more stable place than he was several years ago.

ASSESSMENT OF EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONCLUSION

77Counsel for Mr. Vitsentzatos submits that the following facts support a conclusion of extraordinary circumstances.

78Mr. Vitsentzatos has no relevant disciplinary record. The events of late 2018/2019 are obviously out of character. Nothing like what happened during this period happened prior to or after this period. The support letters that have been filed confirm that this misconduct is anomalous.

79Mr. Vitsentzatos has been, and is being treated, for psychiatric symptoms. By 2019, he was experiencing the impact of his family breakup, the stress and notoriety of criminal proceedings and depression, ADHD and PTSD.

80Mr. Vitsentzatos has expressed deep remorse and acceptance of responsibility for some of his misconduct. Where he has not expressed remorse and acceptance of responsibility, he is fully entitled not to do so.

81As to Mr. Vitsentzatos’ prior conduct, the evidence cited is somewhat reassuring but of limited weight. Few lawyers have disciplinary records. Most lawyers will have friends and acquaintances who are supportive. The support letters only speak to the individual experiences of the authors. While we place no negative weight on it, we note that Mr. Vitsentzatos had decided prior to being retained by AX to avoid acting for women because of prior experiences. In any event, it is not uncommon for misconduct that justifies revocation to be conduct that is otherwise apparently out of character for that licensee.

82We more easily accept that Mr. Vitsentzatos was under particular stress and strain in early 2019 with the impact of the criminal charges, his family separation together with symptoms of depression which were being treated with medication. However, we have very limited insight into Mr. Vitsentzatos’ mental health and its impact given that, for whatever reason, we have no medical records and no medical evidence for this period.

83In Mucha, the panel indicated that exceptional circumstances would include compelling psychiatric or psychological evidence that, among other things, credibly indicates not only that the misconduct was out of character and unlikely to recur, but explains why it occurred.

84Other than the short letter from Dr. Hertzman that addresses current treatment and medications, there is no evidence from a psychologist or a psychiatrist. All that we have, in terms of diagnosis and treatment, is Mr. Vitsentzatos’ evidence as to what his doctors told him. We do not have any admissible psychiatric or psychological evidence as to Mr. Vitsentzatos’ mental health in 2019, let alone any compelling psychiatric or psychological evidence.

85Mr. Vitsentzatos’ evidence as to his own health does not credibly establish that his misconduct was out of character and unlikely to recur. Mr. Vitsentzatos’ evidence does not credibly explain why his misconduct occurred.

86To be more specific, we do not have a sufficient evidentiary basis on which to conclude that Mr. Vitsentzatos’ mental health resulted in risk-taking behaviour that affected his conduct or that it somehow explains his misconduct from April to August and in November 2019. We do not have a basis to conclude that, if mental health caused or contributed to this misconduct, that such conduct is unlikely to recur.

87As a matter of common sense, we accept that there would likely be some connection between Mr. Vitsentzatos’ separation from his family and his choice to become involved with AX in April/May 2019. But we do not find any connection between those circumstances and the conduct relating to the vehicle transfer which we have found engages presumptive revocation.

88We recognize that Mucha does not limit what may be exceptional circumstances and that Justice Nordheimer observed in Bishop at para 31 that:

Medical reasons or financial desperation or situations of duress serve as examples of the type of mitigating factors that may amount to exceptional circumstances but those situations are not exhaustive of such factors. That said, it remains the case that any such factors will normally have to be ones that would rise to the level where it would be obvious to other members of the profession, and to the public, that the underlying circumstances of the individual clearly obviated the need to provide reassurance to them of the integrity of the profession. I would add, on that point, that factors that provide an explanation for the conduct of the lawyer will generally be ones that would most likely reach that requisite level of mitigation but they are not the only ones that may achieve that result.

89Considering Bishop, we do not find exceptional circumstances that provide any explanation for Mr. Vitsentzatos’ conduct relating to the vehicle transfer, which we have found engages presumptive revocation. We find nothing that would rise to the level where it would be obvious to other members of the profession, and to the public, that the underlying circumstances of Mr. Vitsentzatos clearly obviated the need to provide reassurance to them of the integrity of the profession.

90It is exceedingly rare for there to be exceptional circumstances that justify a penalty of less than loss of licence in a case to which presumptive revocation applies. This is not such a case.

91Having concluded that presumptive revocation applies because of the nature of the conduct involving the vehicle transfer and finding no exceptional circumstances, we conclude that the appropriate penalty is revocation. There are no exceptional circumstances that permit a lesser penalty than revocation and certainly not a suspension.

Assessment of penalty under the ordinary approach

92Because Mr. Vitsentzatos submits that presumptive revocation does not apply, we independently consider the appropriate penalty under the ordinary approach.

93Following the ordinary approach to determining a penalty we start by reminding ourselves that the goals of a penalty order are principally specific deterrence, general deterrence and maintain public confidence and, where appropriate, rehabilitation: Law Society of Upper Canada v Strug, 2008 ONLSHP 88.

94In considering the appropriate penalty, we consider the misconduct itself together with mitigating and aggravating factors relating to the misconduct and to the licensee by reviewing the so-called Aguirre factors and any other factors which may apply. A restated list of the Aguirre factors is as follows:³

1. factors principally related to the misconduct:

a. the extent and duration of the misconduct and

b. the potential impact of the misconduct upon others.

2. factors principally related to the licensee:

a. the existence or absence of a prior disciplinary record;

b. whether there are extenuating circumstances (medical, family-related, systemic racism, disability or other personal hardship or others) that might explain, in whole or in part, the misconduct;

c. other adverse consequences resulting from the misconduct;

d. whether the licensee has since complied with his or her obligations;

e. whether the licensee has admitted misconduct, and obviated the necessity of its proof;

f. the existence or absence of remorse, acceptance of responsibility or an understanding of the effect of the misconduct on others; and

g. evidence as to whether the misconduct is likely to recur.

Factors principally related to the misconduct

95As to extent and duration of the misconduct:

• Mr. Vitsentzatos was in romantic relationship with AX from early May to approximately the end of August 2019. His related misconduct was lengthy and was not a momentary failure of judgement. Indeed, he recognized that there was an issue and addressed it, albeit ineffectively.

• The misconduct related to the vehicle transfer took place over a relatively short period of time. However, the misconduct was a calculated scheme, and the related misconduct includes subsequently misleading the Law Society about the original misconduct.

• There were two discriminatory messages sent over a short period of time.

• The misconduct related to the traffic stop took place over a relatively short period of time. However, the misconduct was more than a few misguided intemperate words.

96As to the potential impact of the misconduct upon others:

• AX has provided a victim impact statement. Mr. Vitsentzatos has accepted that his misconduct had a serious adverse impact on AX. The misconduct compromised AX’s trust in Mr. Vitsentzatos and in the legal profession generally. The misconduct led to the wasted time and expense and added stress of AX retaining a new lawyer. The misconduct could have adversely affected the performance of legal work for AX. The misconduct may well have compromised public confidence in the trustworthiness of lawyers.

• Mr. Vitsentzatos’ conduct relating to the vehicle transfer resulted in tax not being paid (although the tax ultimately was paid, just prior to the merits hearing). Mr. Vitsentzatos’ conduct put AX at personal risk by involving her in a tax fraud. This misconduct would have compromised confidence, for AX and the public, in Mr. Vitsentzatos’ trustworthiness and the trustworthiness of lawyers generally. Misleading the Law Society risked compromising effective regulation and public confidence in effective regulation.

• The Law Society filed an impact statement from the Chair and a board member of the Alliance of Canadians Combatting Antisemitism (ALCCA) which explained the significant prevalence and adverse impact of antisemitism on the Jewish community and of the significance of antisemitic tropes. This statement thoughtfully takes care not to say that Mr. Vitsentzatos bears the weight of this racism. However, he has contributed to it. While not supported by an impact statement, anti-Asian statements have a similar effect. Further, we note that statements such as the ones Mr. Vitsentzatos made can normalize the making of discriminatory statements to recipients such as AX. It can compromise the professional credibility of a lawyer who makes such statements and the reputation of lawyers generally.

• With respect to the traffic stop, Mr. Vitsentzatos’ conduct no doubt adversely affected the police officer with whom he was uncivil and whom he threatened. Mr. Vitsentzatos’ conduct also compromised the administration of justice. Making a false claim of theft by a police officer in an attempt to cause the officer to drop charges is a very serious matter.

97The misconduct that we have found is collectively very serious misconduct. Some of the misconduct is more serious and some is less serious. The extent, duration, and effect of the misconduct are all aggravating.

Factors principally related to Mr. Vitsentzatos

98Mr. Vitsentzatos does not have a discipline record. The absence of a discipline record is the norm and is to be expected. Most licensees, including those who have engaged in very serious misconduct, do not have a discipline record.

99Other than with respect to his relationship with AX, we are not satisfied that there are extenuating circumstances (such as medical, family-related, disability, or other personal hardship) that might explain, in whole or in part, the proven misconduct. With respect to AX, the breakdown of Mr. Vitsentzatos’ relationship with his family and the aftermath of his arrest in November 2018, might explain, in limited part, his choice to become romantically involved with AX. We accept that judgement about new relationships can be impaired by the recent failure of prior relationships.

100As to other adverse consequences resulting from the misconduct, we accept that our findings of misconduct have adversely affected Mr. Vitsentzatos’ relationship with his family and his reputation. This is to be expected when there are findings of misconduct such as this.

101This is not a case of alleged ongoing misconduct such as, for example, failure to co-operate. Mr. Vitsentzatos has not “come into compliance” with his obligations. With respect to the investigation stage, Mr. Vitsentzatos further misconducted himself as we have found. He fully defended this application, as he is entitled to do.

102Mr. Vitsentzatos did not admit misconduct, thereby obviating the necessity of its proof. To be clear, this is not aggravating, but there is no mitigation in this regard.

103As to the existence or absence of remorse, acceptance of responsibility, or an understanding of the effect of the misconduct on others, there is some mitigation. Mr. Vitsentzatos’ accepts responsibility and expresses remorse in respect of his relationship with AX. He accepts responsibility and expresses remorse in respect of his antisemitic and anti-Asian messages, although he continues to maintain that he did not realize the meaning and import of what he said. He accepts responsibility and expresses remorse in respect of his uncivil communications with the police officer. He accepts responsibility and expresses remorse for not paying retail sales tax – but that is not the alleged and proven misconduct.

104As to whether the misconduct is likely to recur or not, we are not able to reach a conclusion either way. Mr. Vitsentzatos’ expressions of remorse and responsibility are limited. The absence of a discipline record provides some comfort but the absence of a disciplinary record does not establish prior good conduct. The fact that Mr. Vitsentzatos ceased taking on female clients because of prior problems suggests caution. The absence of cogent medical evidence means that we do not have a satisfactory explanation for what happened in November 2018 or in 2019. The volume of misconduct in 2019 could suggest something unusual was going on, but we do not know. The volume of misconduct can also be seen as being ominous. The number and diversity of letters of support are comforting.

105By way of overall assessment, we see the nature, extent and duration of the misconduct to be very serious. There is some mitigation from some focused expression of remorse and acceptance of responsibility. There is some comfort from the letters of support. We do not find a mitigating explanation, in whole or in part, for much of the misconduct and we are not able to reach any conclusion from the evidence as to the risk of future misconduct. We conclude that the nature, extent and duration of the misconduct is somewhat mitigated by factors relating to Mr. Vitsentzatos, but the mitigation is not powerful.

Comparable cases submitted by the parties

106As the Law Society submitted that presumptive revocation applied, it did not submit cases in which similar misconduct was found and presumptive revocation did not apply. While not framed this way, the Law Society’s effective position is that revocation is the appropriate penalty for the knowing participation in fraud and that revocation is even more the appropriate penalty given the substantial other misconduct that has been found.

107Mr. Vitsentzatos submitted four cases as relevant.

108Two of these cases deal only with sexual relationship with and sexual harassment of clients: Law Society of Upper Canada v Macri, 2017 ONLSTH 19, and Law Society of Ontario v Tweyman, 2021 ONLSTH 166. The penalties in these cases were a two-and-a-half month and a two-month suspension respectively. These cases would be useful if the only misconduct was the relationship with AX. But that is not the case.

109The other two cases were Law Society of Ontario v Masgras-Irshidat, 2025 ONLSTH 32,⁴ and Law Society of Ontario v Rapoport, 2022 ONLSTH 17, in which the penalties were suspensions of nine months and two years respectively.

110We do not consider Masgras-Irshidat to be of assistance. While Masgras-Irshidat involved very serious misconduct involving multiple acts of misconduct, the nature and context of the specific misconduct is not like the misconduct in this case. The penalty issue in Masgras-Irshidat was whether the multiple acts of misconduct should attract revocation or a high-end suspension.

111Without intending to diminish the seriousness of the misconduct found in Masgras-Irshidat, we do not think the gravity of the fraudulent declaration, as described above, is matched by the misconduct in Masgras-Irshidat. We do not see this as a comparable case because the most serious misconduct is very different, even though both cases involve multiple instances of misconduct of varying degrees of seriousness.

112We also note that the hearing panel in Masgras-Irshidat rejected revocation at para 112 on the basis that:

Having weighed the Aguirre factors and the submissions of the parties, as indicated above we found that revocation is not warranted in this case. While the Lawyer’s conduct showed a distressing lack of judgement and restraint, and disregard for the Rules, it was not malevolent, nor aimed at enriching or benefitting herself. No one profited or gained from her misconduct, and no one was ultimately cheated of or lost anything, apart from suffering the mental and emotional distress that the Lawyer’s conduct engendered.

113In contrast, fraudulent avoidance of sales tax is ill-intentioned and aimed at benefiting oneself. Threatening and abusing a police officer to avoid charges or impounding of a vehicle is ill-intentioned and aimed at avoiding a detriment. Entering into an impermissible sexual relationship with a vulnerable client benefitted Mr. Vitsentzatos to the ultimate detriment of his client. This case is not like Masgras-Irshidat.

114As to Rapoport, we start by noting that a two-year suspension is truly extraordinary. A nine-month suspension is a high-end suspension in our proceedings. It is difficult to appreciate why a two-year suspension would ever be appropriate rather than revocation given what is required to attract a suspension of that length.

115In any event, the hearing panel in Rapoport observed as follows at para 69, explaining why revocation was not ordered. There is no comparable explanation in this case as we see it:

… However, we find that this case is not equivalent to cases of dishonesty and breaches of trust sanctioned in most revocation cases, dealing with mortgage or other fraud, or misappropriation of funds. The Lawyer’s family situation sets it apart, and provides an explanation, although not an excuse.

116The context of the two-year suspension also is unusual. Mr. Rapoport was a 74-year-old lawyer whose licence had already been revoked. His licence revocation was under appeal. Unless the appeal was successful, the suspension order would never come into effect.

117We do not find Rapoport to be of assistance.

Conclusion

118We conclude that three penalty goals are engaged. The most important goal is public confidence in the professions and their regulation. Having considered the nature of the misconduct and the Aguirre factors, we conclude that taking into account both the most serious misconduct and the breadth, nature and amount of the misconduct overall, public confidence requires revocation. We do not think that a reasonable, informed member of the public or of the profession would accept that Mr. Vitsentzatos should be permitted to return to practice after a lengthy suspension.

119We reach the same conclusion with respect to general deterrence. It should be clear to the legal professions that misconduct such as we have found here is treated most seriously, as a strong deterrent against comparable misconduct.

120As to specific deterrence, we are not confident that Mr. Vitsentzatos has fully learned from his misconduct. That said, we consider that a lengthy suspension, together with the collateral effects of his misconduct, would likely deter Mr. Vitsentzatos from future misconduct.

121As to comparable cases, we consider the most relevant cases to be those that led to revocation through presumptive revocation. This is unsurprising given our analysis as to presumptive revocation.

122Accordingly, we conclude, applying the usual approach to determination of the appropriate penalty, that Mr. Vitsentzatos’ licence to practise law should be revoked.

123Whether on the basis of presumptive revocation or on the application of ordinary approach to penalty, we come to the same conclusion.

INTERLOCUTORY SUSPENSION

124After the merits decision was released, the Law Society filed a motion for an interlocutory suspension pending the outcome of the penalty hearing.

125We decided to hear this motion at the same time as the penalty hearing. The primary reason for not hearing the motion prior to the penalty hearing was concern that to do so would require us to consider issues that should be decided after evidence and submissions at the penalty hearing. We did not think it was appropriate to do so in the circumstances.

126We decided not to order an interlocutory suspension pending release of our penalty decision because we were not satisfied that there was sufficient risk to the public or the public interest in the administration of justice during this period to justify an interlocutory order. Additionally, having to address the test for an interlocutory suspension adds complexity to consideration of a fair and proper penalty.

127While there may be cases in which there appears to be sufficient risk after a misconduct finding and before a penalty decision to justify an interlocutory suspension, our conclusion was otherwise in this case, given that a decision could and would be promptly made after the penalty hearing.

COSTS

128The Law Society seeks costs of $48,605.17 which is the amount of costs incurred according to the Law Society’s bill of costs.

129Mr. Vitsentzatos accepts that the costs sought are not unreasonable but submits that he should not have to pay the costs of the Law Society’s document examiner given our findings. We agree. This would reduce the amount sought to $45,450.

130Approximately $45,000 is clearly reasonable and proportionate for the investigation of this matter, the number of pre-hearing appearances, and the length of the hearing.

131However, Mr. Vitsentzatos submits that we should exercise our discretion to apply a global reduction, having regard to the obvious inference that either revocation or a lengthy suspension will result in financial hardship.

132We accept that revocation will result in financial hardship and that this is properly taken into account. Rather than extend the time to pay costs, we reduce costs by approximately $10,000 for this reason.

133On this basis, we order costs in the amount of $35,000 payable immediately.

ORDER

134For these reasons, we ordered:

1. The respondent’s licence to practise law is revoked, effective immediately.

2. The respondent shall comply with the Law Society’s Guidelines for Former Lawyers Whose Licences Have Been Revoked or Who Have Been Permitted to Surrender Their Licences.

3. The respondent shall pay costs to the Law Society in the amount of $35,000 immediately. Interest will accrue on any unpaid portion at a rate of 4% per year.

Footnotes

1. 1It would be analytically correct, but wordy, to refer to presumptive revocation by category and presumptive revocation on a case-by-case basis.
2. 2Legal Aid billing fraud provides a useful example of a new category. There is an important public interest in protecting access to legal services through Legal Aid. The category is inherently narrow. Legal Aid billing fraud is “lawyerly misconduct” that is of similar register and quality to mortgage fraud and misappropriation. Legal Aid billing fraud, like mortgage fraud and misappropriation, is a specific problem that is properly and usefully addressed by signaling to the profession and the public that it will not be tolerated.
3. 3Law Society of Ontario v Di Giacomo, 2023 ONLSTA 5 at para 68.
4. 4Affirmed on appeal in Law Society of Ontario v Masgras-Irshidat, 2026 ONLSTA 1.