LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL
HEARING DIVISION
Tribunal File No.: 23H-121
BETWEEN:
Law Society of Ontario
Applicant
- and -
Murray Neil Maltz
Respondent
Before: Lubomir Poliacik (chair), Suzanne Clément, Brigitte Pilon
Heard: March 11, 2026, by videoconference
Appearances:
Joshua Elcombe, for the applicant
Daniel Goldbloom, for the respondent
Summary:
MALTZ – Integrity – Respect for Administration of Justice – Responsibility to Lawyers and Others – Presumptive revocation did not apply – The Lawyer’s dishonest conduct undermined public confidence in the profession – He acted without integrity or honour, in a calculated dishonest fashion – There was no justification for the imposition of a fine – The Lawyer’s licence was revoked and he was ordered to pay $50,000 in costs to the Law Society.
REASONS FOR DECISION ON PENALTY AND COSTS
1Brigitte Pilon (for the panel):– We previously found that Mr. Maltz engaged in professional misconduct as set out in our reasons at Law Society of Ontario v Maltz, 2025 ONLSTH 147.
2We heard submissions on penalty and costs on March 11, 2026 and reserved our decision. The following are our reasons on penalty and costs.
3The Law Society’s position is that Mr. Maltz’s licence to practise law should be revoked and a fine of $10,000 imposed. The Law Society also submits that Mr. Maltz should be ordered to immediately pay costs of these proceedings in the amount of $50,000.
4Mr. Maltz’s position is that he should receive a suspension of his licence in the range of three to nine months, with a possible fine of $5,000. He further submits that he should pay $25,000 in costs over a period of two years.
5For the following reasons we revoke Mr. Maltz’s licence to practise law, and order costs in the amount of $50,000 payable within 30 days.
BACKGROUND
6Mr. Maltz is 66 years old and has been licensed to practise law by the Law Society since 1985.
7Mr. Maltz was a sole practitioner, practising in the areas of real estate and family law until October 31, 2024, when he retired from practice.
8Mr. Maltz has no prior disciplinary history with the Law Society.
9The merits hearing proceeded by way of a partial agreed statement of facts (ASF), affidavit evidence from the Law Society investigator and Mr. Maltz, and the oral testimony of Mr. Maltz.
THE MISCONDUCT
10Mr. Maltz was found to have engaged in professional misconduct in the context of the following events or transactions.
He removed the designation of matrimonial home from the title of properties which were the subject of a matrimonial application (the application), using a foreign divorce order that he knew or ought to have known was not in force.
He involved another lawyer in the removal of the designation. In instructions he provided to the lawyer and the Ontario Land Registry Office, he omitted information that the foreign divorce could not be safely relied on.
Without advising opposing counsel, and while he knew or ought to have known that she intended to secure a preservation order that included the matrimonial properties, Mr. Maltz assisted his client with the sale of one of the properties he had had the matrimonial designation removed from (the Lakeshore property) and acted as the witness on the assignment to third parties of his client’s interest in preconstruction properties.
While aware of his client’s failure to comply with court orders related to spousal support obligations and costs awards, Mr. Maltz distributed all of the sale proceeds from the Lakeshore property in a manner which defeated claims the opposing party may have had to the assets, including sending a significant portion of the funds to a foreign jurisdiction and paying himself legal fees.
Mr. Maltz misled opposing counsel and the court by preparing an affidavit for a preservation motion, which included an unsworn financial statement which specifically omitted any reference to the fact that the Lakeshore property had already been sold, proceeds distributed, and the interests in the pre-construction properties assigned to third parties.
He minimized concerns expressed in correspondence by opposing counsel regarding the preservation of assets in a manner that he knew, or ought to have known, would be misleading, while withholding information that the Lakeshore property had been sold and the preconstruction properties assigned.
Mr. Maltz was aware that his actions had made his client judgment-proof in Ontario.
Finally, while in court he approached the opposing party, who he knew was represented by counsel, and told her words to the effect that she would “never see a penny”. He then advised her and her counsel to read a Globe and Mail article which described how a husband had fled the jurisdiction and the wife had received nothing.
11Ultimately, we found that public confidence in the profession was undermined by the dishonest conduct of Mr. Maltz. We found him to have acted without integrity or honour and thereby engaged in professional misconduct.
12Having found that Mr. Maltz had engaged in misconduct, we considered the penalty to be imposed.
PENALTY
Law Society submissions
13The Law Society’s position is that the misconduct in this case is so egregious as to attract presumptive revocation in addition to the imposition of the maximum fine allowed under the Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8, in place at the time of the misconduct.
14The Law Society reviewed the case law relating to when the imposition of presumptive revocation is warranted. Counsel relied on the decision of Law Society of Upper Canada v Walton, 2015 ONLSTA 8, which adopts the principle from Bolton v Law Society, [1993] EWCA Civ 32, that proven dishonesty irrespective of it being criminal must attract revocation because of the importance of maintaining the reputation of the profession and public confidence in its integrity (the Bolton principle).
15The Law Society acknowledges that Mr. Maltz had a long career with no discipline history. Despite this, counsel relies on the decision in Bishop v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2014 ONSC 5057, in support of the submission that the essential issue is the “need to maintain among members of the public a well-founded confidence that any solicitor whom they instruct will be a person of unquestionable integrity, probity and trustworthiness.”
16The Law Society further submits that similar to the fact situation in the decision of the Law Society of Ontario v Manilla, 2021 ONLSTA 25, Mr. Maltz’s behaviour is at “the high end of the dishonesty spectrum in this case.”
17The Law Society argues that Mr. Maltz received a financial benefit from his conduct, in the form of legal fees. It submits that the fact that Mr. Maltz took $68,000 in legal fees from the sale proceeds should be taken as evidence that he benefitted from his own misconduct.
18Finally, the Law Society relies on Law Society of Ontario v Fuhgeh, 2021 ONLSTH 61 at para 32, and submits that serious misconduct can be found even if we find that Mr. Maltz did not personally benefit from his misconduct “…there is no reason in principle to place lower priority or value on obligations of candour, honesty and integrity to the administration of justice and the public generally if the trust issues arise outside the financial realm.” The Law Society adopts the statement in Fuhgeh, “…a licensee’s dishonesty in drafting or filing documents will constitute misconduct regardless of whether the licensee obtains an actual benefit as a result.”
19The Law Society relies on our characterization of Mr. Maltz’s conduct in our reasons regarding the merits to support its argument that the conduct in this case is so dishonest and without integrity that it warrants being considered as conduct that falls within the category for which presumptive revocation is the penalty. In particular, counsel references the following findings from the merits reasons to emphasize the point:
Mr. Maltz “acted in a reckless or wilfully blind manner when he assisted his client in removing the designation of the matrimonial home” (para 80).
Mr. Maltz “accepted little, if any, responsibility for these acts” (para 82).
Mr. Waltz was “knowingly misleading” about the enforceability of the divorce, and that he “knew that the validity and enforceability of the Lahore Divorce was a live issue” and he “involved an innocent participant, another licensee”, in his misconduct when he decided to omit this information (para 91).
These behaviours were “egregious” and “pervasive” (paras 95-96).
When Mr. Maltz surreptitiously distributed the proceeds of sale we found it “difficult to assign any motive to this behaviour but to, in part, defeat any claim the wife may assert to this asset” and he acted in a “reckless or was willfully blind” when he removed assets from the jurisdiction (para 97).
Mr. Maltz’s actions “were intentional and manipulated the proceedings such that they were prejudicial to the administration of justice” and as an officer of the court his conduct could not be justified by claims of having followed his client’s instructions (para 105).
Mr. Maltz was willfully blind that the affidavit he drafted and filed with the court, which omitted important information was “misleading, at best, and was false at worse” (para 112).
When Mr. Maltz took steps to assist his client to disobey court orders, he could not “normalize or legitimize” his client’s behaviour (para 115).
Mr. Maltz’s intentions where “irrelevant“ when he spoke to the other party without the presence of her counsel (para 121).
20The Law Society submits that because of the serious and dishonest nature of the proven misconduct, revocation is the starting point and the most important factor in our penalty consideration. Counsel submits that the penalty sought by Mr. Maltz would be entirely ineffective and would not reflect the seriousness of the misconduct.
21Finally, counsel submits that the conduct in question had a devastating impact on the opposing party. In the ASF dated June 23, 2025, Mr. Maltz acknowledges that the opposing party felt let down by the justice system and that she felt he was gloating when he spoke to her without her counsel present.
Licensee submissions
22Counsel for Mr. Maltz submits that the misconduct does not fall into the category of misconduct which attracts presumptive revocation, specifically misappropriation or mortgage fraud. He submits that we should exercise caution in considering expanding the categories of misconduct to which presumptive revocation applies.
23He argues that the legal fees paid to Mr. Maltz were for legal services rendered by him and cannot be considered to be misappropriated. He submits that lawyers are not required to act without compensation.
24He takes the position that while this is a case of dishonest conduct, Mr. Maltz did not act for his own benefit. He submits that Mr. Maltz was simply acting on his client’s instructions and that he improperly relied on his client with respect to the validity of the foreign divorce.
25He submits that Mr. Maltz has no discipline history in a 40-year career and that he has demonstrated remorse for his conduct and co-operated with the Law Society. He further submits that the extent and duration of the misconduct is over a period of a few months involving only one client.
26He submits that the cases (Bolton, Bishop, Abbott, and Fuhgeh) relied on by the Law Society reference conduct that ranges from mortgage fraud to conduct that lasted for several years.
27He directs us to consider the Law Society of Ontario v Mazinani, 2021 ONLSTH 72, as an example where the licensee had a remarkable record of misconduct, including breaching a court order and knowingly misleading the court. She lacked remorse and there were no extenuating circumstances. She was found to be reckless. In that case the licensee received a six-month suspension.1 Counsel argues that to support revocation in our case we need to be able to say that Mr. Maltz’s behaviour is more egregious than this behaviour.
28He argues that the mitigating factors and similar case law support the imposition of a penalty of a suspension in the range of three to nine months with a possible fine of $5,000.
ANALYSIS
Presumptive revocation
29It is evident that professional misconduct can occur in a variety of ways. The starting point of the analysis of the appropriate penalty must be identifying the nature and extent of professional misconduct. In Walton, above, the Appeal Division observed at para 7 that, “The starting point, and usually the most important factor, in any assessment of penalty, is the nature and extent of the misconduct committed by the Licensee.” That panel also noted at para 16, “We agree with counsel for both the Law Society and the Lawyer that no two cases are alike.”
30The application of the category approach to the consideration of presumptive revocation was recently reviewed by the Chair in Law Society of Ontario v Vitsentzatos, 2026 ONLSTH 52 (citations omitted):
8The penalty for some misconduct is revocation unless exceptional circumstances are shown. This has been called presumptive revocation.
9Presumptive revocation can arise in two different ways. One way is that the proven misconduct falls within a category of misconduct to which presumptive revocation applies. This is what Justice Nordheimer was referring to in Bishop when he wrote at para 30 that:
… there is nothing per se objectionable to a profession setting out presumptive penalties for breaches of different types of professional obligations. It is no different than appellate courts setting out presumptive penalties for certain types of offences. Moreover, it is not accurate to characterize such presumptive penalties as “mandatory minimums” with all of the attendant concerns that may accompany statutorily mandated sentences. Rather, presumptive penalties act as a guide, both for the entity imposing the penalty and for the persons who may be subject to such penalties.
10This category or type-based approach proceeds on the basis that all misconduct of a particular type presumptively warrants revocation.
11The other way is a case-by-case approach. Some misconduct attracts presumptive revocation on a case-by-case approach, by examining the specific misconduct rather than by determining the category in which the misconduct falls. This approach is sometimes described as being by the application of the Bolton principle although it is clearly a form of presumptive revocation.
12The Bolton principle refers to a decision of Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Bolton v Law Society, [1993] ECWA Civ 32, in which he observed that some misconduct should result in revocation irrespective of considerations which would ordinarily weigh in mitigation in order to ensure public confidence:
The most serious [cases involve] proven dishonesty, whether or not leading to criminal proceedings and criminal penalties. In such cases the tribunal has almost invariably, no matter how strong the mitigation advanced for the solicitor, ordered that he be struck off the Roll of Solicitors.
13In the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, presumptive revocation relies on the Bolton principle for two propositions. The first is that ensuring public confidence in the legal professions ordinarily justifies revocation where the Bolton principle applies. Specific deterrence and rehabilitation are of little, if any, importance in such cases. The second is that mitigation is of substantially diminished importance where the Bolton principle applies. Said another way, the focus in such cases is on the misconduct rather than on the circumstances of the licensee and risk of recurrence. That said, the Tribunal’s jurisprudence does not treat the Bolton principle as applying to any and all dishonesty nor does Bolton suggest that it does. The nature of the dishonesty is important in determining whether the Bolton principles does apply.
31Following Vitsentzatos we assessed the applicability of presumptive penalty to Mr. Maltz’s misconduct in two stages.
32First, does the proven conduct fall into a category of professional misconduct to which presumptive revocation applies? If so, the result will be revocation subject to proof of exceptional circumstances. Second, if the misconduct does not fall within those categories, is the proven dishonesty and misconduct in this case nevertheless of a nature or quality that attracts presumptive revocation (the case-by-case approach)?
33Applying the analytical framework set out above we determined that this is not a case that attracts presumptive revocation.
34In these proceedings the Law Society has not alleged, and we have not found, misappropriation or mortgage fraud on the part of Mr. Maltz and presumptive revocation by category does not apply.
35As to the case-by-case approach, we find that Mr. Maltz’s misconduct and dishonesty was very serious and egregious. Mr. Maltz acted in a calculated dishonest fashion designed to defeat his client’s spouse’s claims in the family litigation. Maintaining public confidence in the professions requires that such misconduct would be treated most seriously. It is arguable that presumptive revocation should be ordered given the specific misconduct absent exceptional circumstances. However, and given the somewhat unusual nature of the misconduct, we consider it more appropriate simply to undertake the ordinary penalty analysis. Because we conclude that the application of the ordinary approach requires revocation, nothing is served by addressing whether presumptive revocation is applicable under the case-by-case approach.
The ordinary (non-presumptive) penalty analysis
36Where the misconduct does not attract presumptive revocation, the ordinary approach to penalty is taken. This approach takes into account the purposes of penalty orders, the nature of the misconduct, mitigating and aggravating factors (the Aguirre factors) and comparable cases.2
37This assessment was guided by a consideration of the principles outlined in Law Society of Ontario v Strashin, 2025 ONLSTH 179 at para 35.
We considered the purpose of making the penalty order pursuant to Law Society of Upper Canada v Strug, 2008 ONLSHP 88. The purposes of making penalty orders, the primary of which are (i) specific deterrence, (ii) general deterrence, (iii) maintaining public confidence in the profession and its regulation and, (iv) where appropriate, matters such as rehabilitation, restitution, and improving competence.
A review of the misconduct and any mitigating and aggravating factors, following the principles approach set out in Law Society of Upper Canada v Aguirre, 2007 ONLSHP 46.
Finally, we reviewed decisions in comparable cases for guidance and for reasonable consistency and predictability: Law Society of Ontario v von Achten, 2022 ONLSTH 117.
Purpose and goal of penalty
38In considering the purpose of making the penalty order, we find that the goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, restitution, and improving competence are not of great concern. Mr. Maltz has no disciplinary record; he has been retired for almost two years.
39The character letters provided by Mr. Maltz speak to his being well-respected and of good character, but we would not expect otherwise. We acknowledge that with a 40-year career with no disciplinary record, a lawyer will be able to find people that can attest to his or her competence and good qualities. However, they are of little probative value in the determination of the issues to be decided in this proceeding.
40Given our findings in our merits decision and the clear effect of Mr. Maltz’s conduct on the opposing party in the underlying family litigation, we have determined that the totality of the evidence supports a finding that Mr. Maltz consistently engaged in acts characterized by serious dishonesty and a lack of integrity. This began with the reckless use of the foreign divorce to achieve what he could not achieve through the courts. He involved another solicitor in this deception. He then assisted his client in defeating court orders by distributing monies that he knew would be the subject of court proceedings he was involved in. He misled the court and other counsel when a preservation order was being sought. Finally, he compounded his dishonourable conduct by communicating inappropriately with the other party, who he knew to be represented by counsel. The impact of his professional misconduct was exacerbated by the persistent nature of his ongoing conduct.
41We are satisfied that our primary goal in determining the penalty is the need to maintain public confidence in the profession and its regulation. General deterrence remains a relevant goal, but it is of lesser weight in these circumstances.
Consideration of the Aguirre factors
42We next considered the Aguirre factors to inform our determination of the appropriate penalty. Applying the Aguirre factors, we considered the mitigating and aggravating factors relating to the professional misconduct of Mr. Maltz.
43With respect to the nature, extent, and duration of the misconduct, we found that the misconduct relates to one case over a period of approximately seven months with numerous incidents. When assessed individually, each element of the professional misconduct was characterized by a lack of integrity and honesty. They were however insufficient to rise to a level of seriousness that would attract the penalty of presumptive revocation. When we assessed these elements collectively, they supported a finding that Mr. Maltz had knowingly engaged in a pattern of dishonest and deceitful behaviour that had very significant consequences for the opposing party and the public confidence in the profession and the administration of justice.
44We found Mr. Maltz’s argument that there was sufficient equity in the remaining properties to meet the cost orders and that he was not familiar with foreign divorces to be self serving justifications for his behaviour.
45At the outset, Mr. Maltz knew the foreign divorce was possibly an issue and actively sought evidence to support his position that it was valid to allow the change to the property titles. When presented with information to the contrary he chose to ignore it and continued on his trajectory of dishonest conduct.
46The detailed accounting provided by Mr. Maltz of the monies he believed the other party was owed pursuant to court orders and the division of family assets cannot guide our decision. He provided documents that were unsupported by any objective evidence. We cannot speculate on what may or may not have been equitable between the parties, nor supplant the jurisdiction of the courts hearing the matter. Mr. Maltz attempted to usurp the jurisdiction of the courts by distributing the proceeds of sale and transferring assets in the face of outstanding court orders. We rejected his position and placed no weight on this evidence.
47We also found we cannot reconcile the fact that Mr. Maltz takes the position that the amount of monies owed to the opposing party could be covered with the remaining assets, yet felt it necessary to undertake actions covertly and to provide misleading information to the court and other counsel.
48We found the nature, extent and duration of the misconduct to be aggravating factors.
49We next considered the potential impact of the misconduct upon others.
50Mr. Maltz involved a lawyer colleague and the Land Registry System in his deception. His colleague was made the subject of a Law Society investigation as a result of Mr. Maltz’s behaviour. The Land Registry System relies on the integrity of the lawyers which use the system. Despite having intentionally looked into the validity of the foreign divorce, Mr. Maltz ignored its deficiencies to advance his client’s interests.
51Mr. Maltz’s client’s spouse expressed her disillusionment with the justice system. Ultimately, as a result of Mr. Maltz’s conduct, the court orders his client was subject to became unenforceable. The spouse could not access the proceeds of the sale of family assets that had been transferred to a foreign jurisdiction.
52Mr. Maltz’s conduct in the family court litigation resulted in costs awarded against him personally. We find the impact of the misconduct upon others to be substantial and the conduct of Mr. Maltz in this regard to have been intentional and without regard for others, and thereby lacking in integrity.
53Finally, we reviewed the factors principally related to Mr. Maltz.
54Mr. Maltz had no disciplinary record; his counsel argues that his lack of knowledge about foreign divorces and his reliance on his client’s information and instructions explained in part his misconduct. Mr. Maltz practised family and real estate law for more than 40 years. He may not have had specific knowledge of the validity of foreign divorces, but he was fully aware that the validity of the Pakistan divorce was disputed in the Ontario family law proceedings, yet he nevertheless proceeded to remove the matrimonial home designation from the property based on that document.
55His contention that he was following his client’s instructions cannot be given any weight. When balancing instructions from a client and their obligations as an officer of the court, the lawyer cannot usurp the duty to the administration of justice in favour of instructions from a client, especially when he seeks to excuse dishonourable behaviour. We find there were no extenuating circumstances that might explain, in whole or in part, the misconduct of Mr. Maltz.
56Mr. Maltz did not agree to an ASF until immediately prior to the commencement of the merits hearing. We agree with him that he has a right to mount a defense and do not consider whether Mr. Maltz has admitted misconduct and obviated the necessity of its proof as an aggravating factor. We did not find the existence of the very limited ASF in this case to be a mitigating factor.
57We find that Mr. Maltz sought to justify some of his behaviours. He continued to suggest that the remaining assets could cover the costs of the judgements, that his errors were made in good faith, and he followed the “black letter of the law.” He testified that in retrospect he would be more careful. We found that Mr. Maltz did not fully appreciate or understand the effect of his misconduct on others. There is little, if any, mitigation in this regard.
58Despite the incomplete acceptance of the harm occasioned by his actions and some constrained remorse, we have no evidence that the misconduct is likely to re-occur. In any case, his retirement from practice has removed any possibility of such re-occurrence.
Assessment based on comparable decisions
59We reviewed the decisions relied on by Mr. Maltz’s counsel to justify a suspension rather than revocation and found them distinguishable on their facts.
60In Law Society of Ontario v Masgras-Irshidat, 2025 ONLSTH 32 (appeal dismissed, 2026 ONLSTA 1), the panel determined despite the licensee’s serious misconduct it was not of the degree of seriousness requiring revocation. It concluded at para 112, “while the Lawyer’s conduct showed a distressing lack of judgement and restraint, and disregard for the Rules, it was not malevolent nor aimed at enriching or benefitting herself. No one profited or gained from her misconduct, and no one was ultimately cheated of or lost anything….” We found that Mr. Maltz’s misconduct was not based on lack of judgment, but rather his conduct was fundamentally dishonest.
61In Law Society of Ontario v Bastien, 2025 ONLSTH 53, the panel recognized the misconduct inflicted harm on two clients in the form of delay, added stress, and frustration with the court system. It also found that he had harmed the public interest when he did not co-operate with the Law Society’s investigation of a client’s complaint. The allegations varied in severity, but none on its own was at the high end of the scale of seriousness of misconduct and dishonesty.
62Although no two cases are the same, consistent themes are set out in the case law. Licensees who engage in persistent conduct characterized by dishonesty, lack of candour with opposing counsel and the courts, and engage other counsel in their acts of malfeasance, can expect significant responses. Steps will be taken to denounce such conduct and safeguard the integrity of the profession.
63In Law Society of Ontario v Owusu-Sechere, 2026 ONLSTH 46, and Law Society of Ontario v Mobberley, 2024 ONLSTH 15, the licensees had affirmed documents that contained false and misleading information and filed them. In Owusu-Sechere, the respondent signed an ASF admitting to the conduct and the parties had jointly proposed the penalty of a three-month suspension. In Mobberley, a 30-day suspension was imposed. Despite the seriousness of this conduct, it did not reach the level of Mr. Maltz’s misconduct. The devastating impact on his client’s spouse went much further than the impacts in these cases. We consider the knowing pattern of dishonest and deceitful behaviour in this case to be more egregious than the misconduct in these cases.
64The facts in Mazinani, above, involved breaches of confidentiality, mishandling of trust funds, acting without integrity, and threatening regulatory complaint. Without excusing the conduct of the lawyer in that case, the panel found that she was a relatively young lawyer who had worked hard to improve her practice through a commitment to professional education and further expertise. They also took into consideration that she was engaged in ongoing psychotherapy and was committed to addressing her behavioural issues. Again, the misconduct in this case is more serious.
65We find these cases are of limited assistance.
Conclusion
66We found Mr. Maltz acted in a calculated dishonest fashion designed to defeat his client’s spouse’s claims in the family litigation. His client and Mr. Maltz himself benefitted from this misconduct.
67Given the seriousness of Mr. Maltz’s misconduct, maintaining public confidence in the legal professions weighs most heavily in determining the appropriate penalty. Maintaining public confidence in the professions requires that such misconduct would be treated most seriously.
68While the misconduct here may not rise to the same level of dishonesty as misappropriation or mortgage fraud, it is no less destructive of public confidence in the legal profession. We do not accept the submission that something less than revocation is appropriate because the conduct did not result in Mr. Maltz realizing a financial gain. Mr. Maltz acted dishonestly to obtain a financial advantage for his client at the expense of another. He did so with intent, in a precise and calculating manner.
69Considering the Aguirre factors, we could find no factor which supported the imposition of a lesser penalty than revocation. The circumstances of Mr. Maltz have to be subordinated to the paramount need of ensuring that public confidence in the self-governance of the profession is maintained.
70For these reasons, we conclude that revocation is the appropriate penalty in these circumstances.
FINE
Submissions
71Given when the misconduct occurred, the parties agree that the maximum fine that could be awarded is $10,000 and not the current penalty maximum of $100,000, which came into effect in 2020.
72The Law Society submits that Mr. Maltz benefitted from his conduct in receiving approximately $68,000 in fees. Counsel also submits that Mr. Maltz’s conduct had a material impact on the opposing party when his conduct prevented her from accessing the monies from the sale of family assets and enforcing court orders against Mr. Maltz’s client.
73The Law Society submits that because Mr. Maltz is now retired, he will not feel the full effects of revocation. Counsel’s position is that a fine is necessary to make clear that the Law Society takes this kind of conduct seriously.
74The Law Society concedes that it is taking a novel position in seeking a penalty consisting of revocation and the imposition of a fine.
75Counsel for Mr. Maltz argues that he should not be additionally punished for choosing to retire. The misconduct case has lasted seven years and during this time he simply chose to retire at age 65.
Analysis
76Revocation is the most serious penalty that can be imposed on a licensee. Having found that Mr. Maltz’s licence to practise law is to be revoked, we do not find that a further sanction is warranted.
77Despite Mr. Maltz’s conduct having been found to be on the higher end of the dishonesty and lack of integrity scale, we do not find that a fine is necessary in order to achieve the goal of ensuring or protecting the public and the confidence in the administration of justice. Nor do we find that the members of the profession would be shocked if no fine is imposed.
78Mr. Maltz has lost his licence to practise; he has lost his standing in the profession and his community. He has lost his ability to support himself in a profession he worked in for 40 years. We find that he can do no further harm.
79We can find no justification for deviating from the norm and the need to impose a fine as a further penalty in this case.
COSTS
Submissions
80The Law Society seeks costs of $50,000 on a bill of costs of $50,080. The time spent by the investigator and student on the file has not been included in the bill of costs because they are no longer with the Law Society. We find that the costs requested by the Society are reasonable and we order that they be paid.
81The Law Society relies on Law Society of Ontario v Harris, 2023 ONLSTH 55, to support the general principal that the Law Society’s membership should not bear the costs of a successful prosecution and the underlying investigation. It also relies on the facts in Harris to determine the quantum of costs. That decision involved a lawyer who misled and failed to serve 15 clients over a period of 10 years. The lawyer agreed to revocation. The Law Society requested reduced costs of $70,000 but the panel ordered $50,000 in costs to be paid over five years based on the length of the case, the lawyer’s agreement to an ASF, and his changed financial circumstances.
82The Law Society submits that this case had complex underlying facts. Mr. Maltz filed multiple documents with supplementary submissions. Mr. Maltz provided only a partial ASF that was received just before the hearing began. This was a fully contested hearing.
83Counsel for Mr. Maltz disagrees and submits that it is rare that a costs award is granted which includes all the docketed time by the Law Society.
84He argues that the cost order sought by the Law Society should be reduced because of Mr. Maltz’s co-operation in agreeing to sign the partial ASF, thereby avoiding the need to call his client’s spouse as a witness. He argues that the hearing was reduced to a one witness case because they did not cross-examine the Law Society investigator and only filed a new affidavit to deal with admissibility issues raised by the Law Society.
85He submits that this is not a case where every step was contested. He relied on the case of Law Society of Ontario v Goyal, 2026 ONLSTH 50, involving a lawyer who engaged in professional misconduct related to mortgage fraud. The panel gave special consideration to reducing the costs due to the responsible and co-operative conduct of the lawyer and her counsel in the process. The parties agreed to an ASF and it, and other documents, were provided in advance of the hearing. In recognition of this, the panel reduced the costs award from the $60,000 sought by the Law Society to $25,000. He submits that the facts here are similar and that $25,000 is the appropriate cost award.
Analysis
86The case of Groia v The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2016 ONCA 471 at para 234 stated that “the general rule that the reasonable costs of investigating and conducting a disciplinary proceeding should not be borne by the profession as a whole where a determination adverse to the defending lawyer has been made.”
87This was a five-day hearing. The case was moderately complex due in part to the underlying fact situation, which included numerous motions and appeals of motions. The few facts admitted were contained in a partial ASF. Mr. Maltz did not make any further admissions during the four days of the hearing on the merits. It is only during the penalty hearing that he admitted for the first time that he may have made an error of judgment.
88Based on the principles in Law Society of Ontario v Perrelli, 2018 ONLSTH 80, and Law Society of Ontario v Khan, 2021 ONLSTA 7, we start by identifying an appropriate range of costs and then determining a place within that range after considering relevant factors as set out below:
the amount involved in the proceeding;
the complexity of the proceeding;
the importance of the issues;
the duration of the hearing;
the conduct of any party that shortened or unnecessarily lengthened the proceeding;
whether any step in the proceeding was improper, vexatious or unnecessary or taken through mistake or excessive caution;
the ability of the party to pay a costs award;
the reasonable expectations of the parties; the costs awarded in other cases;
the principle of proportionality; and
any other factors particular to the case.
89The Law Society relied on Harris, where the cost award was $50,000. Counsel for Mr. Maltz relied on Goyal, where the panel reduced the costs award from the $60,000 sought by the Law Society to $25,000. We also considered Khan, where after a seven-day hearing, costs of over $73,000 were awarded to the Law Society.
90In considering these decisions and the factors in Perrelli, we find the amount requested by the Law Society is reasonable and proportionate, given the length and complexity of the proceeding. The amount does not include the time attributable to the investigator and student.
91As noted above, the matter required five hearing days and necessitated a voluminous record and comprehensive written submissions. There were few factual admissions. We recognize that an ASF was utilized to avoid having a witness attend the hearing, but only at the last minute. As a result, the evidence was extensive.
92Mr. Maltz’s co-operation in these proceedings was substantially less robust than the respondent’s co-operation described in the Goyal decision, which included Ms. Goyal admitting the misconduct.
93Mr. Maltz provided no evidence or submissions that the costs sought by the Law Society would result in material financial hardship for him that would justify a reduction in costs.
94Considering all of the factors articulated above, we conclude that costs in the amount of $50,000 should be ordered.
ORDER
95For these reasons, we order:
Effective immediately, the respondent’s licence to practise law is revoked.
The respondent shall fully comply with the Law Society’s Guidelines for Former Lawyers Whose Licences Have Been Revoked or Who Have Been Permitted to Surrender Their Licences.
The respondent shall pay costs to the Law Society in the amount of $50,000, due July 6, 2026.
Interest shall accrue at the rate of 4% per year on any portion of the costs that remain unpaid after the deadline.
Footnotes
- Appeal granted in part on other grounds, 2022 ONLSTA 6 and 2022 ONLSTA 14; the penalty was not changed.
- Vitsentzatos at para 15.