LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL

APPEAL DIVISION

Date: May 7, 2026 Tribunal File No.: 26A-003

BETWEEN:

Antonio Franco De Bartolo Appellant

• and -

Law Society of Ontario Respondent in appeal

Before: Malcolm M. Mercer (Chair) Heard: In writing

Appearances: Pradeep Chand, Affan Ahmad, and Hishaam Shah, for the appellant Elaine Strosberg and Tomilayo Ojuile, for the respondent in appeal

DE BARTOLO – Stay Motion – Public Access – The Lawyer was found to have engaged in serious misconduct and his licence was revoked – While the appeal is not frivolous the hearing panel’s decision should stand until dealt with on appeal – The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The panel concluded that publishing the reasons would not post a serious risk to an important public interest – Tribunal openness is of fundamental importance – The negative effects of restricting openness in this context would far outweigh the benefits of restricting openness – The motion for a publication ban was dismissed.

REASONS FOR DECISION ON MOTIONS

1Malcolm M. Mercer:– Antonio Franco De Bartolo seeks a stay pending appeal and an order restricting openness.

2Mr. De Bartolo’s licence was revoked on January 12, 2026: Law Society of Ontario v De Bartolo, 2026 ONLSTH 69. He was ordered to pay costs of $60,000 and to make payments to the Compensation Fund in certain circumstances.

3Until it was revoked, Mr. De Bartolo’s licence had been suspended on an interlocutory basis since September 14, 2023: Law Society of Ontario v De Bartolo, 2023 ONLSTH 134.

THE TEST FOR A STAY PENDING APPEAL

4The test for a stay pending appeal is well-established. As said in Law Society of Upper Canada v Abbott, 2015 ONLSTA 9 at paras 7-10:

[7] First, the Appellant must establish that the appeal raises a serious issue to be decided. The Appeal Division does not determine the merits of the appeal on the scant material that is before it on a stay motion, and the moving party is not required to show that his appeal will succeed. The standard has sometimes been phrased in terms of showing that the appeal is “arguable” and “not frivolous”. In assessing the strength of the appeal to this extent, principles of deference, and the resultant standard of review to be exercised by the Appeal Division – reasonableness on questions of fact and mixed fact and law, and correctness on questions of law – must be taken into account.

[8] Second, he must show irreparable harm if a stay is not granted, in the sense that he will suffer a significant loss that cannot be recovered if his appeal is successful.

[9] Third, Mr. Abbott must show that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the stay. The protection of the public interest, and public confidence in self- regulation by the legal profession, figures prominently in this analysis.

[10] Although these three criteria, which originate in RJR – MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, are expressed as all of them being required, the ultimate question after applying the three criteria is whether the overall interests of justice favour the issuance of the stay.

ANALYSIS OF THE STAY REQUEST

Serious issue to be decided

5Mr. De Bartolo appeals on the basis that his adjournment request was denied contrary to principles of procedural fairness and natural justice.

6The hearing panel rejected Mr. De Bartolo’s last-minute request for an adjournment. Mr. De Bartolo did not participate further in the hearing after his adjournment request was denied: Law Society of Ontario v De Bartolo, 2025 ONLSTH 172.

7Mr. De Bartolo sought the adjournment on the basis that he reasonably understood that he would be represented by counsel and that he learned otherwise at the last minute. The hearing panel concluded that this was not plausible. Applying the Practice Direction on Adjournment Requests which articulates the factors established in Law Society of Upper Canada v Igbinosun, 2009 ONCA 484 at para 37, the hearing panel refused the adjournment.

8The hearing panel applied well-established law in exercising its discretion to dismiss Mr. De Bartolo’s adjournment request. Its discretionary decision will presumably be subject to deference on appeal. The core likely issue will be the factual premise of the adjournment decision, namely whether Mr. De Bartolo understood that he would be represented at the hearing and only learned otherwise shortly before the hearing. This finding of fact will presumably be subject to review on the standard of palpable and overriding error.

9While not strong, I conclude that the appeal is not frivolous.

Irreparable harm

10Mr. De Bartolo was not able to practise prior to revocation because of the interlocutory suspension, which proceeded on consent. Mr. De Bartolo’s licence was suspended effective September 14, 2023. If the revocation order is stayed, the interlocutory suspension will continue in effect because the order terminating the interlocutory suspension will be stayed. This is not a case of a practice being disrupted by revocation. There is no irreparable harm in this regard.

11Mr. De Bartolo’s position is that the costs order and the compensation order give rise to irreparable harm. However, if Mr. De Bartolo is successful on appeal and has made costs and compensation payments, he can recoup those payments from the Law Society. Monetary payments are classically “reparable” assuming a solvent payee: Sorrentino v Certas Home and Auto Insurance Company, 2025 ONCA 835 at para 14.

12Mr. De Bartolo’s further position is that he will suffer irreparable reputational harm in the event that his licence remains revoked and he is ultimately successful on appeal. His evidence is conclusory. While reputational harm can be irreparable harm, I do not accept that this has been shown in this case. Mr. De Bartolo is not currently practising as he was suspended on an interlocutory basis. While it makes sense that there could be some limited incremental stigma if Mr. De Bartolo is successful on appeal and his licence revocation set aside, this does not establish a high degree of probability that permanent harm will in fact occur: Sorrentino at para 14.

13If there is irreparable harm, it is quite limited.

Balance of convenience

14Because Mr. De Bartolo will remain suspended pending appeal if his revocation is stayed, there is no risk of harm from practice if a stay is ordered.

15That said, it is generally accepted in stay pending appeal motions that public confidence in the administration of justice and the professions’ ability to self-regulate would be undermined if a stay were granted and the appeal is ultimately dismissed.

16If a stay is granted and the appeal is ultimately dismissed, the Law Society will have been delayed in enforcing its monetary entitlements. However, I put no weight on this as the Law Society made no submissions on this point.

17In considering the balance of convenience, irreparable harm to the appellant is balanced against harm of a stay to the respondent if the appeal is not successful. The balance may take into account the strength of the appeal.

18Because Mr. De Bartolo will not be able to practise in any event, the weight is diminished on both sides of the balance of convenience. If Mr. De Bartolo is suspended pending the appeal hearing, the risk of harm arising from any per-hearing conduct is obviously limited. However, public confidence in effective self-regulation is put at risk where a revocation order is stayed and then reinstated after an unsuccessful appeal.

19Before considering the strength of the appeal, it does not appear to me that the balance of convenience favours a stay. Taking into account the strength of the appeal, which is based on findings of fact in the context of a discretionary adjournment decision, I conclude that the balance clearly does not favour a stay.

Interests of justice

20Mr. De Bartolo has been found to have engaged in serious misconduct, including using his trust account to participate in/facilitate money laundering and advance fee fraud. His licence has been revoked. There is a significant public interest in maintaining a revocation order in these circumstances, unless and until set aside.

21Looked at in terms of the legal test, Mr. De Bartolo’s appeal is not frivolous but not strong. If there is irreparable harm, it is of limited weight given that Mr. De Bartolo will not be permitted to practise in any event. The balance of convenience does not favour a stay.

22In my view, the interests of justice do not support a stay pending appeal.

23The motion for a stay is dismissed.

DEPARTURE FROM OPENNESS

24Mr. De Barolo seeks a publication ban on the revocation decision pending determination of this appeal.

25The merits reasons have been on since November 2025. The penalty reasons have been on since January 2026.

26The Tribunal website has posted the revocation order and links to these reasons for decision on since they have been available.

27The parties accept the test from Sherman Estate v Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, for departures from openness as codified in Tribunal Rule 13. Mr. De Bartolo must show that:

• openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;
• the order is necessary to prevent this risk because reasonable alternative measures will not be effective; and
• the benefits of the order will outweigh its negative effects.

28Mr. De Bartolo submits that privacy and dignity are important public interests. While it is true that Sherman Estate recognized protection of human dignity as an important public interest, a general privacy interest was not accepted as being an important public interest to be considered.

29As Justice Kasirer concluded in Sherman Estate at para 46, “an unbounded interest in privacy [does not qualify] as an important public interest under the test for discretionary limits on court openness”.

30At para 56, Justice Kasirer further observed, “It is a matter of settled law that open court proceedings by their nature can be a source of discomfort and embarrassment and these intrusions on privacy are generally seen as of insufficient importance to overcome the presumption of openness.”

31However, while Justice Kasirer concluded that the protection of dignity could be seen to be an important public interest in this context, he said at para 63:

… the protection of dignity should be understood to be seriously at risk only in limited cases. Nothing here displaces the principle that covertness in court proceedings must be exceptional. Neither the sensibilities of individuals nor the fact that openness is disadvantageous, embarrassing or distressing to certain individuals will generally on their own warrant interference with court openness….

32As he went on to say at para 65:

In my view, there is value in leaving individuals free to restrict when, how and to what extent highly sensitive information about them is communicated to others in the public sphere, because choosing how we present ourselves in public preserves our moral autonomy and dignity as individuals.

33But Mr. De Bartolo does not seek to limit sensitive personal information. He seeks to limit access to findings by a tribunal about his professional conduct and to the status of his licence. This is not about moral autonomy and dignity as an individual.

34I do not accept that publication of the reasons and orders pose a serious risk to an important public interest.

35Even if I were to find otherwise, the benefits of a publication ban would not outweigh its negative effects. Openness in respect of professional regulation and adjudication is of fundamental importance, particularly in a self-governing profession. While there may be times when the results of conduct adjudication should be kept secret, doing so is properly exceeding rare: Law Society of Ontario v Xynnis, 2014 ONLSAP 9 at paras 10-13, and Law Society of Ontario v Masterson, 2025 ONLSTH 123 at paras 122-123.

36The negative effects of restricting openness in this context would far outweigh the benefits of restricting openness.

37The motion for a publication ban is dismissed.

38I note that notice to the media was not given under Rule 13.3(4). Had I been inclined to make an order departing from openness, I would have required notice to the media before reaching a decision. In the circumstances, doing so was not necessary.

COSTS

39The costs of this motion are reserved to the appeal panel.