Law Society of Ontario v. Antonio Franco De Bartolo, 2026 ONLSTH 69

LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL

HEARING DIVISION

Date: April 7, 2026 Tribunal File No.: 24H-016

BETWEEN:

Law Society of Ontario Applicant

• and -

Antonio Franco De Bartolo Respondent

Before: Murray Walter Chitra (chair), Gisele Chretien, Lubomir Poliacik Heard: January 12, 2026, by videoconference

Appearances: Elaine Strosberg and Tomilayo Ojuile, for the applicant Ben ElzingaCheng, for the respondent

Summary: DE BARTOLO – Professional Misconduct – Penalty and Costs – The panel concluded that the Lawyer had engaged in professional misconduct including acting without integrity by advising a client to invest in a company that he knew had defaulted on a loan and failing to honour a related promissory note; using his trust account for purposes unrelated to the provision of legal services; and misleading a client and his counsel regarding the status of trust funds by providing them with fraudulent documents – The Lawyer’s licence was revoked immediately and he was ordered to pay costs of $60,000 to the Law Society.

REASONS FOR DECISION ON PENALTY AND COSTS

1Murray Walter Chitra (for the panel):– The Law Society filed a notice of application on February 8, 2024, alleging that Antonio Franco De Bartolo (the Lawyer) engaged in multiple acts of professional misconduct.

2It asserted that he had:

• acted without honour and integrity by advising Client A to invest in a company knowing that it had defaulted on a loan and then failed to honour or renew a personal promissory note he had given with respect to that investment contrary to Rule 2.1-1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct;

• used his trust account for purposes unrelated to the provision of legal services, contrary to By-Law 9, ss 8(2) and (3) and Rule 3.2-7. Those purposes being money laundering and advance fee fraud; and

• acted without honour or integrity by misleading Client B and his counsel about the status of trust funds, providing them with fraudulent documents, and by misleading the Law Society in its investigation by making false statements and withholding evidence.

3A five-day hearing into these matters was scheduled to commence October 20, 2025. At the beginning of the first day, the Lawyer brought an unscheduled oral motion without supporting material for an adjournment of unspecified duration. We denied it.

4Despite our cautions, the Lawyer withdrew from the hearing. We determined that it was appropriate to proceed in his absence as permitted by Rule 6.7 of the Law Society Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure.

5We heard evidence and submissions. That included expert testimony. As well, we were provided with an agreed statement of facts (ASF) in which the Lawyer admitted the facts and acknowledged the serious misconduct alleged in particular three.

6We reserved our decision. In written reasons dated November 21, 2025, we found that the allegations against the Lawyer had been established. We provided our reasons for this and our denial of the adjournment.¹

7We directed that a hearing on penalty and costs be scheduled. We informed the Lawyer that if he chose not to participate in the setting of this date that the hearing would be peremptory.²

8The Lawyer was contacted about scheduling. He did not respond. On December 3, 2025, the hearing was fixed to take place Monday, January 12, 2026.

9On Friday, January 9, 2026, the Tribunal received a written motion for an adjournment. We heard oral arguments at the commencement of the hearing and denied the request.

10After hearing submissions from the parties, we ordered that the Lawyer’s licence to practise law was revoked immediately. We directed he pay costs to the Law Society of $60,000 in three equal installments. These are our reasons.

MOTION

11The business day prior to the scheduled penalty hearing, a brief written motion was filed by the Lawyer for a second last-minute adjournment.

12Ben ElzingaCheng appeared and spoke to that motion. He stated that he had only been retained by the Lawyer as of January 8, 2026. He noted that the proposed penalty was revocation and he had just received an extensive Law Society bill of costs which he had yet to review.

13Mr. ElzingaCheng acknowledged that that the Lawyer had been consulted about the date for this proceeding but did not respond. He stated that the Lawyer did not engage because he was despondent. When he subsequently became aware of the date, he felt that he should retain counsel, but this was difficult given the limited time and holiday season.

14Ms. Strosberg spoke in opposition to the request for adjournment. She pointed to the history of this matter. The notice of application was filed on February 8, 2024. There had been extensive pre-hearing proceedings. The Lawyer has been much accommodated.

15Rule 6.3 makes it clear that once a hearing date is scheduled, it is firm, and adjournments will only be granted in exceptional circumstances. Guidelines to the Rule clearly state that late retention of counsel is generally not considered exceptional. The closer the request is to the hearing the more exceptional the circumstances must be.

16The Lawyer has known for some time that the Law Society would be seeking revocation of his licence. Further he was warned as far back as March 4, 2025, about the need to promptly retain counsel.

17Over the whole course of this proceeding, there has been no evidence of meaningful or timely steps on his part to secure representation. His ongoing failure to do so over 11 months in the face of clear direction is his decision alone.

18He was clearly told that a time would be fixed for this penalty proceeding. He was advised that if he did not participate the selection of the date would be peremptory. He did not respond and a date was selected several weeks in advance of this hearing. He did not subsequently inform the Tribunal or the Law Society that he was attempting to retain counsel.

19The Lawyer has not complied with the Tribunal’s Rules. He has failed to seek relief in a timely manner. He has ignored directions, abandoned a long-scheduled hearing in the face of a clear caution from us, and failed to proactively seek direction or engage with opposing counsel. His excuses ring hollow.

20He has presented no compelling reasons or evidence of exceptional circumstances that would justify the granting of the extraordinary relief he seeks. His second motion for adjournment was denied.

PENALTY

21Ms. Ojuile then spoke on behalf of the Law Society to the matter of penalty. She drew our attention to several cases. They all have their roots in Bolton v Law Society, [1993] EWCA Civ 32. This decision has been adopted in Ontario in Law Society of Upper Canada v Mucha, 2008 ONLSAP 5. Collectively, they stand for the proposition that certain cases involving serious dishonesty compel immediate revocation, absent exceptional circumstances.

22The matter before us involved findings of misconduct for money laundering and advanced fee fraud. We were provided with two cases that made it clear that such misconduct attracted the application of the Bolton principle, Law Society of Ontario v Davis, 2023 ONLSTH 13, and Law Society of Ontario v Meisels, 2023 ONLSTH 5.

23Further, the third admitted particular arose from the deliberate unauthorized removal of funds from trust; the creation of fraudulent documents; lying to a client and their lawyer; and withholding evidence and making false statements to the Law Society in the course of an investigation.

24Mr. ElzingaCheng acknowledged that the established facts in our decision fall within the ambit of Bolton and ground a presumption of revocation. He confirmed that Lawyer is unable to provide evidence of exceptional circumstances that suggest anything less than revocation was a possible disposition.

25We agree that the egregious nature of the established misconduct compels revocation. The Lawyer willingly and knowingly participated in the taking of client money for personal gain. He attempted to obscure his fraudulent actions using the umbrella of fiduciary relationships, solicitor-client privilege, and the implicit security of a lawyer’s trust account.

26The Lawyer lied, fabricated documents, and withheld evidence. He took elaborate steps to avoid scrutiny, obscure audit trails, and shield the identity of those involved.

27The Lawyer’s dishonesty has brought his profession into disrepute. Revocation is necessary to ensure specific deterrence, public safety and promote public confidence in the administration of justice. The Lawyer through his conduct has shown that he lacks the necessary moral character to occupy a position of trust.

28Ms. Ojuile also argued that we should order the Lawyer to reimburse two clients in specified amounts and order the reimbursement of any amounts that might be subsequently paid by the Law Society’s Compensation Fund to these clients for their related losses.

29We raised a number of questions about how the suggested amounts were calculated and the likelihood of compensation by the Fund.

30Mr. ElzingaCheng stated that the ordering of direct payment to the two clients was redundant given ongoing litigation and compensation claims. However, the respondent had no objection to an order for repayment to the Fund, if compensation was ultimately paid by it.

31We accepted that such an order for the repayment of any Compensation Fund grant was appropriate.

COSTS

32The Law Society tabled a bill of costs for fees and disbursements totalling $66,666.64. It included the costs for the motion for the initial interlocutory suspension of the respondent’s licence.

33Ms. Strosberg identified the governing case in the payment of costs as Law Society of Ontario v Perrelli, 2018 ONLSTH 80. For comparative purposes she drew two cases to our attention. These were Meisels, above ($75,000), and Law Society of Ontario v Davis, 2023 ONLSTH 29 ($57,000).

34She asserted that these demonstrated that the expenses incurred were reasonable.

35She highlighted the amount of work required to move matters forward. She noted there was no evidence concerning the respondent’s inability to pay. In the absence of this the Law Society was seeking immediate payment of the full amount billed.

36Mr. ElzingaCheng took no issue with the costs for the Law Society’s expert witness. He acknowledged that the total amount claimed was “not beyond the pale” but questioned the need for two counsels for every aspect of the process.

37He indicated that the respondent was not pleading inability to pay but required as much time as possible.

38We concluded that costs in the amount of $60,000 payable in three installments over two years was appropriate.

ORDER

39We ordered:

1. The respondent’s licence to practise law is revoked, effective immediately.

2. The respondent shall comply fully with the terms of the Law Society’s Guidelines for Former Lawyers Whose Licences Have Been Revoked or Who Have Been Permitted to Surrender Their Licences.

3. The respondent shall pay to the Law Society’s Compensation Fund any amount paid by the Fund after the date of this order in relation to any claims by Client A and B.

4. The respondent shall pay costs to the Law Society in the amount of $60,000 in three equal installments of $20,000:

a. The first installment by February 11, 2026;

b. The second installment by January 12, 2027; and

c. the third installment by January 12, 2028.

Interest shall accrue on any overdue part of these costs at a rate of 4% per year.

Footnotes

1. 1Law Society of Ontario v De Bartolo, 2025 ONLSTH 172.
2. 2De Bartolo at para 154.