Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18421/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while in contravention of a condition under s. 55.1(1)2 of the Act

Between:

Joe Gubicza

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

ADJUDICATOR:

Michael Beauchesne

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Joe Gubicza, Self-represented (did not attend)

For the Respondent:

Martin He, Representative

HEARD by Teleconference: May 11, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Joe Gubicza (the “appellant”) appeals the impoundment of his motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Thursday, February 26, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Christopher Tricco (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle while his driver's licence was subject to a condition that prohibits him from driving a motor vehicle due to a Criminal Code conviction as described in paragraph 2 of subsection 55.1(1). A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

NON-ATTENDANCE

The hearing proceeds without the appellant in attendance

2I ordered that the hearing proceed despite the non-attendance of the appellant.

3Rule 3.7.1 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023, (the “Rules”) requires the parties and/or their representatives to attend the hearing.

4Rule 3.7.1 also says if a party who has been given notice of a hearing in accordance with the Statutory Power Procedures Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (the “SPPA”), does not attend their in-person or electronic hearing within 30 minutes of the scheduled start time as stated in the hearing notice, the Tribunal may:

1. Proceed with the hearing in the absence of that party; and/or

2. Make any order it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

5This matter has a procedural history. A telephone hearing was scheduled to commence on April 17, 2026, at 1:30 p.m. The appellant did not attend within 30 minutes of the scheduled start time. Despite the respondent’s submissions that the hearing should nevertheless continue because proper notice had been afforded, the Tribunal ordered an adjournment. As part of its order, released to the parties on April 24, 2026, the Tribunal advised that the re-scheduled hearing was peremptory on the appellant’s attendance.

6The telephone hearing was, in fact, re-scheduled to May 11, 2026, at 1:30 p.m. I find the notice for this re-scheduled hearing, dated April 29, 2026, complies with section 6 of the SPPA that concerns electronic hearings. The notice was sent to the appellant via his e-mail address on file with the Tribunal and I accept two weeks constitutes reasonable notice. Further, the notice refers to the Act as the statutory authority under which the re-scheduled hearing would be held, as well as informs the appellant of the hearing time (i.e., 1:30 p.m. E.T.), purpose (i.e., to consider an appeal of an impoundment dated February 26, 2026), and the manner of hearing (i.e., by telephone at the provided coordinates). The notice also provides the requisite procedure for requesting an oral hearing in addition to advising that the Tribunal may decide the appeal in the appellant’s absence—and that he would not be entitled to any further notice in the proceeding—if he did not attend the hearing.

7The appellant did not attend the re-scheduled telephone hearing on May 11, 2026, at 1:30 p.m. The Tribunal made an unsuccessful attempt to contact the appellant and ascertain his attendance or reasons for non-attendance. No reason for the appellant’s non-attendance was provided. In accordance with Rule 3.7.1 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2023 (the “Rules”), the Tribunal waited until 2:00 p.m. before inviting submissions from the respondent on how to proceed. The respondent asked the Tribunal to proceed with the re-scheduled hearing or, alternately, that the Tribunal dismiss the matter without an appeal on the grounds of abandonment. The respondent added that the parties were given the opportunity to canvass their availability for the re-scheduled hearing, and that the appellant had indicated the selected hearing date as suitable.

8I was satisfied that the re-scheduled hearing should proceed in the absence of the appellant per Rule 3.7.1 and section 7(3) of the SPPA. An SPPA-compliant notice was issued to the appellant and reminders were subsequently sent to the appellant by the Tribunal on May 7, 2026, and the morning of the re-scheduled hearing. Both the April 2026 adjournment order and the re-scheduled hearing notice advised the appellant that the hearing may proceed in his absence should he not attend. The appellant did not raise any concerns of prejudice arising from an electronic hearing format and put no adjournment requests before the Tribunal to consider. Further, the respondent did not consent to the Tribunal ordering a second adjournment on its own initiative. After considering the respondent’s submissions and the factors set out at Rule 16.3, I ordered the hearing to proceed as scheduled.

ISSUE

9The appellant’s Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) indicates he appeals on the grounds that his vehicle was stolen at the time it was impounded. As such, the issue is:

1. Pursuant to section 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, whether the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

RESULT

10For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

11For the Tribunal to order the Registrar (the “respondent”) to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to section 55.1 the Act, the appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he satisfies one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in section 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The vehicle was not stolen

12I am not satisfied that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained to be impounded.

13In Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Ct.) (“Marshall”) the Divisional Court held that a vehicle is “stolen” in this context “when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily”.

14In other words, to establish that the vehicle was stolen for the purposes of section 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, the appellant must prove that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent, and that the driver intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily.

15In his NOA, the appellant indicates that his daughter had driven his car to a “gathering,” where the keys to his car were taken by the driver. The appellant relates that his daughter did not give the driver permission to do so, and sat in the passenger seat to maintain “the well-being of the vehicle” when the driver operated the vehicle upon leaving the gathering.

16The appellant did not lead evidence (i.e., neither testimony nor documents) to support his submissions and I find the appellant cannot meet his onus otherwise. In contrast, the respondent testified that it had not received any police report that confirmed the driver had been criminally charged with theft of the vehicle or even that a stolen vehicle investigation was undertaken. The respondent also reasoned that it is “tough” to say the driver intended to deprive the appellant of his vehicle when the appellant’s daughter was present as a passenger while the driver had care and control of the vehicle. I agree. The respondent cited Osipenko v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2026 CanLII 26831 ON LAT (“Osipenko”) as an analogous case. In Osipenko, a case where the owner’s vehicle was allegedly stolen while in the possession of her son, the Tribunal grappled with the difficulties of affording weight to testimony concerning events that were not directly observed (i.e. hearsay). While I find Osipenko is distinguishable from this case in several respects, I agree this matter presents with the same difficulties as Osipenko, in that there is no real way for the Tribunal to grapple with the facts at issue that this case could turn on without the testimony of the appellant’s daughter, let alone the appellant.

17When I consider that the appellant’s case—which the appellant has the onus to prove—amounts to only unsupported or “bald” assertions, I find he has not established that the impounded motor vehicle was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

ORDER

18The Tribunal orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

Released: May 20, 2026

__________________________

Michael Beauchesne

Adjudicator