Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18341/MVIA

In the matter of an appeal under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (the “Act”) from an impoundment of a motor vehicle under section 55.1 of the Act for driving while suspended

Between:

Denise Osipenko

Appellant

and

Registrar of Motor Vehicles

Respondent

DECISION

VICE-CHAIR:

Colin Osterberg

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

Denise Osipenko, Self-represented

For the Respondent:

Leila Periera, Representative

HEARD: By Teleconference Thursday, March 19, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Denise Osipenko, (the “appellant”), appeals the impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. H.8 (the “Act”). The appellant’s motor vehicle was impounded on Monday, February 2, 2026. At the time of the impoundment, Jacob Phillips (the “driver”) was driving the vehicle with a suspended licence. A Notice of Impoundment was issued for a period of 45 days.

2The appellant appeals on the grounds that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

3The appellant brought a motion to extend the time for appealing the impoundment.

4Section 9 of Ontario Regulation 641/98 provides that an appeal under s. 50.2 of the Act must be commenced within 15 days of the impoundment. The appeal was filed February 25, 2026, nine days after the appeal period expired.

5Section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch G gives the Tribunal the discretion to grant an extension of time where there are reasonable grounds for applying for the extension and for granting relief.

6In Manuel v. Registrar of Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, 2012 ONSC 1492, the Divisional Court ruled that, on a motion to extend the time to appeal, the overriding consideration is whether the justice of the case requires that the extension be granted. The factors to be considered are:

i. the existence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;

ii. the length of the delay;

iii. prejudice to the other party;

iv. the merits of the appeal.

7I have considered the evidence relating to each of these factors as they apply to this case.

Bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period

8It does not appear that the appellant had the intention to appeal within the appeal period.

9The appellant says that she received notice of the impoundment, which contained information regarding her right to appeal, on February 16, 2026, which is the last day of the appeal period. Since she only became aware of her right to appeal at that late date, it is not surprising that she only formed the intention to appeal after the period had expired.

10The Registrar points out that the date of the Notice of Impoundment and Release, which contains the appeal information, is February 3, 2026. The Registrar agrees that there is no evidence submitted that that was the date the Notice was actually mailed although the Registrar submits that that document is normally mailed soon after it is printed.

11According to the appellant she never received that document until February 26, 2026 after the appeal was commenced.

12Although the appellant did not have the intention to appeal within the 15 day appeal period, this factor does not weigh against her given the circumstances outlined above.

Length of the delay

13The appellant appealed the impoundment On February 25, 2026. This is 9 days after receiving notice of the right to appeal and 9 days after the appeal period had expired.

14The circumstances of the delay are relevant. Although the appellant became aware that the vehicle had been stolen and impounded by February 2, 2026, I accept that she was not aware at that time the circumstances or the basis upon which the vehicle was impounded. There are a number of reasons a vehicle may be impounded aside from the circumstances set out in s. 55.1 of the Act and it was not immediately apparent to the appellant that there might be an appeal available to her or the grounds she might have for appealing the impoundment.

15I find the reasons for a substantial portion of the delay in filing her appeal were not due to factors that were within the appellant’s control. In my view, the delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances.

Prejudice

16The Registrar benefits from a prompt hearing and would be prejudiced by an extension of the time for filing the appeal. If the appellant’s appeal is successful, the Registrar will be required to cover the cost of the impoundment. The earlier the appeal is dealt with, the less it will cost the Registrar to have the vehicle released. The prejudice to the Registrar is the risk of incurring greater expense than it would otherwise have been exposed to.

17Again, part of the prejudice experienced by the Registrar in the present case was the result of its own decision to rely on the expiration of the limitation period and failing to review the circumstances in order to come to a determination as to whether it would be reasonable to consent to an extension of the time to appeal.

18In my view, this factor is neutral in my determination of whether to extend the period to appeal.

Merits of the appeal

19On a motion to extend time, the appellant need not establish her case on a balance of probabilities but only that her version of events, if believed, could reasonably result in a favourable outcome.

20According to the appellant her son advised her that the vehicle had been stolen at the time it was impounded. Her son notified the police that the vehicle was stolen and has been cooperating with the investigation in that regard.

21In my view, the appellant’s version of events could reasonably result in a finding that the vehicle was stolen and therefore could result in a favourable outcome

Conclusions

22In summary, I find that the appellant has not demonstrated that she had a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period but did have a reasonable excuse for failing to do so. I find that his delay in filing the appeal is reasonable in the circumstances and of minor prejudice to the Registrar. I find that there is some likelihood that the appeal, if allowed to proceed, would be successful on its merits.

23I find that the justice of the case requires that the request for an extension be allowed.

24In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that I should exercise my discretion to extend the time for filing the appeal.

ISSUES

25The issue in dispute is whether, pursuant to s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded

RESULT

26For the reasons set out below the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.

ANALYSIS

27For the Tribunal to order the Registrar to release a vehicle that has been impounded pursuant to s. 55.1 the Act, an appellant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they satisfy one or more of the grounds for appeal set out in s. 50.2 of the Act. In all cases, the burden of proof lies with the appellant.

The vehicle was not stolen

28I am not satisfied that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

29In Marshall v. Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) [2002] O.J. No. 745 (Div. Ct.) (“Marshall”) the Divisional Court held that a vehicle is “stolen” in this context “when it is taken without the owner’s consent and when the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily”.

30In other words, in order to establish that the vehicle was stolen for the purposes of s. 50.2(3)(a) of the Act, the appellant must prove that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent, and that the driver intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle, either permanently or temporarily.

31The appellant gave evidence that on February 2, 2026 the vehicle had been in the possession of her son at his home since the middle of December 2025. She has been told by her son that he had taken his dog for a walk around 3:00 a.m. on February 2, 2026. The appellant says that on that date she was advised by the police that her vehicle had been impounded. She contacted her son and he told her that he did not know the vehicle was missing and when he realized that it was, he contacted the police and reported the vehicle stolen.

32The appellant says that she does not know the driver and that her son says that he does not know the driver either and has never had any interaction with him. The appellant says that her son has been cooperating with the police in their investigation as to the theft of the vehicle. She says that she has the police occurrence number but does not have the statement her son gave to the police or the police report regarding the incident.

33The onus is on the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that the vehicle was taken without the owner’s consent and that the perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of it, whether permanently or temporarily. This is a difficult matter to establish where the owner has given up possession of the vehicle to another person, in this case her son, and where that other person has not given evidence at the hearing.

34There are a number of factors which cause me to question whether it has been proven that the vehicle was stolen. We do not have the evidence of the appellant’s son, in whose possession the vehicle was left as to the events prior to the vehicle being driven by the driver. The vehicle was being driven using its keys rather than taken by some other means. The appellant had no reasonable explanation as to how the driver came into possession of the keys, or when he did so how he found the correct vehicle to use them in.

35According to the appellant, her son advised her that he does not know if or when he lost his keys to the car. It could have been when he was walking his dog or it could have been at some other time. She testified that her son usually keeps his keys in his jacket pocket so they may have fallen out somewhere. I am skeptical of this explanation. The appellant’s son was not present to provide this evidence himself and it seems unusual to me that he would have lost his keys and still been able to get into his apartment after walking his dog. Although it is possible that the son did not lock his apartment when he decided to take a walk at 3:00 a.m. and it is possible he keeps his apartment and car keys separate, there is no evidence that this occurred.

36Although the appellant has been told a number of facts by her son, and her son presumably told the same story to the police, there is no real way for the Tribunal to determine the truth of those statements. Even accepting that the son was present and gave the evidence relayed by the appellant, in my view that evidence amounts to not much more than a bald statement that the vehicle was stolen without presenting any further evidence to establish that the vehicle was in fact stolen. The fact that the car was driven using the son’s keys and that there is no evidence that the keys were taken from the son is evidence that the driver was using the car with the son’s permission. While the driver could possibly have found the keys and somehow determined which car they belonged to, that proposition would be difficult to establish and certainly was not established in evidence at the hearing.

37In my view, it is not enough to say that the keys were lost and the driver must have found them and taken the vehicle in order to establish that he vehicle was stolen in order to establish this as a ground of appeal under the Act.

38I find that the appellant has not established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

Conclusion

39I find that the appellant has not established that the motor vehicle that was impounded was stolen at the time it was detained in order to be impounded.

ORDER

40The Tribunal Orders that the impoundment of the vehicle is confirmed.