Neutral Citation: 1998 ONICDRG 45, 1998 ONFSCDRS 45

FSCO A97-000788

FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMISSION OF ONTARIO

BETWEEN:

AGNES OWUSU

and

VIDA PREMPEH

Applicants

and

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA

Insurer

DECISION

Issues:

The Applicants, Agnes Owusu and Vida Prempeh, were injured in a motor vehicle accident on March 14, 1996. They applied for and received statutory accident benefits from Allstate Insurance Company of Canada ("Allstate"), payable under the Schedule¹ Allstate terminated Ms. Owusu's weekly income replacement benefits ("IRBs", section 7) and Ms. Prempeh's weekly education benefits ("EDBs", section 15) on May 15, 1996. Ms. Owusu and Ms. Prempeh claim under section 40 of the Schedule, the cost of rehabilitation treatment provided by Prevent

Assessment & Rehabilitation Clinic ("Prevent"). They also claim under section 36 of the Schedule, the expenses for prescriptions, doctors' certificates and notes, and various medical reports and rehabilitation assessments. Allstate requests payment by the Applicants of its expenses under subsection 282(11) of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, as amended (the "Act") and the payment of an award by the Applicants under subsection 282 (11.2) of the Act on the basis that their claims are frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process. The Applicants also seek their expenses incurred in the arbitration. Allstate withdrew its claim under section 70 of the Schedule for repayments by the Applicants of benefits paid through error or fraud. Ms. Prempeh withdrew her claim under section 53 of the Schedule for transportation expenses. The parties were unable to resolve their disputes through mediation, and Ms. Owusu and Ms. Prempeh applied for arbitration at the Financial Services Commission of Ontario² under the Act.

The issues in this hearing are:

1. (a) Is Ms. Owusu entitled under section 7 of the Schedule to ongoing weekly IRBs from May 16, 1996, when benefits were terminated, until June 9, 1997, when she returned to work?

(b) Is Ms. Prempeh entitled under section 15 of the Schedule to weekly EDBs from May 16, 1996, when benefits were terminated, until June 1, 1997, when she returned to school?

2. Is Ms. Owusu and/or Ms. Prempeh entitled under section 40 of the Schedule to payment for the expenses incurred for rehabilitation treatment by Prevent?

3. (a) Is Ms. Owusu entitled under section 36 of the Schedule to expenses associated with the assessments and functional capacity evaluation conducted by Prevent, the medical certificate by Dr. Ames and Dr. Kachooie's medical reports?

(b) Is Ms. Prempeh entitled under section 36 of the Schedule, to expenses for the cost of Dr. Safieh's medical certificate and notes and prescription medication?

4. Is Ms. Owusu and/or Ms. Prempeh entitled under subsection 282 (11) of the Act to her expenses incurred in respect of the arbitration?

5. Is Ms. Owusu and/or Ms. Prempeh obliged to pay Allstate any of its expenses under subsection 282 (11) of the Act?

6. Is Ms. Owusu and/or Ms. Prempeh obliged to pay an award to Allstate under subsection 282 (11.2) of the Act?

Ms. Owusu and Ms. Prempeh also claim interest on overdue payments as prescribed under section 68 of the Schedule.

Result:

1. (a) Ms. Owusu is not entitled to further IRBs under section 7 of the Schedule.

(b) Ms. Prempeh is not entitled to further EDBs under section 15 of the Schedule.

2. Neither Ms. Owusu nor Ms. Prempeh is entitled under section 40 of the Schedule to payment for expenses incurred for the rehabilitation treatment provided by Prevent.

3. (a) Ms. Owusu is not entitled under section 36 of the Schedule to payment for the cost of the assessments and the functional capacity evaluation conducted by Prevent, the medical certificate by Dr. Ames or Dr. Kachooie's medical reports.

(b) Ms. Prempeh is not entitled under section 36 of the Schedule to payment for the cost of Dr. Safieh's medical notes and certificate or for the cost of prescription medication.

4. Neither Ms. Owusu nor Ms. Prempeh is entitled under subsection 282 (11) of the Act to her expenses incurred in respect of the arbitration.

5. Allstate is not entitled to payment of any of its expenses by Ms. Owusu or Ms. Prempeh under subsection 282 (11) of the Act.

6. Allstate is not entitled under subsection 282 (11.2) of the Act to the payment of an award by Ms. Owusu or Ms. Prempeh.

Hearing:

The hearing was held at the offices of the Financial Services Commission of Ontario in North York, Ontario, on September 8, 9 and 10, 1998 before Arbitrator Beth Allen. Mr. Peter Manu, of Omnicom Professional Language Inc., provided translation services at the hearing. The exhibits filed at the hearing and the persons in attendance are listed on the Schedule to this decision.

Evidence and Findings:

The Applicants 'pre-accident circumstances

At the time of the accident, Ms. Owusu (aged 40) was employed but on a sick leave related to her pregnancy. She had been in receipt of disability benefits from her employer's disability carrier. As a result of her accident-related injuries, Ms. Owusu claims weekly IRBs under section 7 of the Schedule from the date of benefit termination until her return to work. For the period from the benefit termination date until her return to school Ms. Prempeh, Ms. Owusu's daughter (aged 18), claims weekly EDBs under section 15 of the Schedule on the basis of her injuries from the accident.

Before the accident, Ms. Owusu worked full-time at Cargill Foods ("Cargill"), a meat processing company, as a meat packer. Her work involved standing while doing various jobs on an assembly line. Her main job was to lift chickens from boxes placed on the line at waist-level, and to place them on hooks hanging at shoulder level above the line. Part of her job entailed pushing boxes of chickens that travelled down the line on wheels. Other jobs involved cutting chickens into pieces and placing them on trays that also travelled down a line. Occasionally, Ms. Owusu was required to clean and pack beef and pork after the male workers had cut it into pieces. Ms. Owusu indicated that she was only required to lift chickens and indicated that they were not very heavy. She could not estimate how many chickens she lifted in a shift. Ms. Owusu claims that the injuries to her neck, back and leg which she sustained in the accident substantially disabled her from resuming the essential tasks of this job until she returned to it on June 9, 1997.

At the time of the accident, Ms. Prempeh attended English as a second language ("ESL") classes, five days weekly, from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. daily. She indicated that she got two breaks from class each day, one for 15 minutes and the other for 30 minutes. Ms. Prempeh indicated that her classes involved about three hours of reading time and about one and a half hours of lectures daily. She indicated that she knew the teacher would not permit her to stand if she were uncomfortable. The program involved only the classroom work and no other work outside the class. Ms. Prempeh indicated that she travelled to school by bus carrying two or three books in a knapsack over her shoulder.

Ms. Prempeh claims that she was unable to return to school after the accident due to her head, neck and waist pain. She indicated that she resumed school at some point, but her evidence as to when she returned is inconsistent and confusing. In chief she testified that the ESL program relocated shortly after she resumed, and shortly after the relocation, in August 1997, she enrolled in a hairdressing program which began in September 1997. Contrary to this evidence, she also stated in chief that she resumed her ESL classes a few months after she completed her rehabilitation treatment at Prevent, which ended on September 13, 1996. In cross-examination Ms. Prempeh indicated that she resumed school while she was still attending rehabilitation treatment at Prevent.

The accident

The testimony of both Applicants about the accident conflicted with their own prior written statements to Allstate and with information contained in the Motor Vehicle Accident Reports completed at the Prevent facility. The Applicants indicated in their statements to Allstate that the statements were translated to them in their native language.

The Applicants' testimony about the accident is as follows: On March 14, 1996 at around 9 p.m, Ms. Owusu was driving with Ms. Prempeh, and a male friend as passengers. Ms. Owusu was about six months pregnant at the time. The male friend was seated in the front passenger seat beside Ms. Owusu and Ms. Prempeh was seated in the rear seat behind her mother. Ms. Owusu was stopped at an intersection waiting to turn left when another vehicle, oncoming from the left, sideswiped her car scraping it along the driver's side to its rear left side. The other car did not remain at the scene. The Applicants claim that following the collision, the male passenger called the police and ambulance, but neither arrived at the scene. He then drove Ms. Owusu and Ms. Prempeh directly to the police station where the police advised them to go to the hospital. At the hospital, medical staff monitored Ms. Owusu's baby and physically examined Ms. Owusu and Ms. Prempeh.

In testimony, Ms. Owusu stated that the other car hit her car "very hard" but denied that she hit her head, had any other contact with the interior of the car or was bruised. She testified that she felt dizzy after impact and complained at the hospital of pain throughout her body, especially in her neck, head and waist. Ms. Owusu testified that her body did not move inside the car with the collision. Ms. Prempeh testified that she was wearing her seat belt and that with impact she hit her head on the back of the driver's seat. She testified that no other part of her body struck the interior of the car, but complained that she experienced pain in her neck, waist and back.

Ms. Owusu's and Ms. Prempeh's testimonies depart from their prior written statements in certain key areas. Ms. Owusu and Ms. Prempeh signed statements prepared by Mr. William Gold, a Claims Consultant with Allstate. Ms. Owusu's statement is dated April 30, 1996 and Ms. Prempeh's is dated May 2, 1996. In their statements, contrary to their evidence at the hearing, both Applicants stated that at the time of the accident, Ms. Prempeh was seated as the front passenger and the male passenger was in the rear seat behind Ms. Owusu. Although Ms. Owusu testified that the other car hit her car "very hard," her statement to Allstate indicated that her car "did not move with the collision." However, Ms. Prempeh indicated in her statement to Allstate that their car was moved to the right with impact. In contrast to her testimony, Ms. Prempeh also stated that at the time of impact, the right side of her head struck the right front passenger window, that no other part of her body made contact with the car's interior and that she was not wearing a seat belt at the time. In the Allstate statement Ms. Prempeh also indicated that she did not recall striking her knee.

Vehicle Accident Reports (both undated and unsigned) were completed at Prevent to provide a basis for the Applicants' rehabilitation plans. These reports were completed on the first day of attendance at Prevent which for Ms. Owusu was on June 24, 1996 and for Ms. Prempeh, on May 24, 1996. They contain further conflicting information about the accident. Although the reports contain the Applicants' names, it is not clear who completed them. According to Ms. Owusu's form, her head made contact with the dashboard, windshield and an unknown object; her elbow hit the windshield and steering wheel; her knee hit the dashboard; and her ankle hit an unknown object. Ms. Prempeh's form indicates that she struck her head and knee but did not refer to the point(s) of contact with the car.

Dr. Kachooie, a physiatrist, to whom Ms. Owusu's counsel referred her, prepared reports dated September 13, 1996, December 4, 1996 and December 14, 1996. The details of the accident, as contained in the September 13 and December 14 reports, further confuse the evidence with yet another version of what happened. Dr. Kachooie's reports state that Ms. Owusu was "thrown forwards, struck the interior of the car, experienced blurred vision, could not see, felt she lost consciousness for a few seconds." These words are enclosed in quotation marks in the reports, and since Dr. Kachooie indicates that he referred to no other documents in preparing the reports, I can reasonably conclude that the quoted words originated from an account by Ms. Owusu. Ms. Owusu did not comment on this in testimony.

The true circumstances of the accident are not at all clear. If I were inclined to accept any version of the accident, I would accept as the most reliable, the Applicants' accounts as contained in the Allstate statements since they were taken at the time closest to the accident and signed by the Applicants. However, because of the numerous discrepancies in the evidence as a whole, I am not prepared to come a finding as to what happened in the accident. The discrepancies in the versions of the seating arrangement in the car and the accounts of the effect of the impact on the Applicants' bodies, cause me great concern. To my mind, these are not the types of details one is likely to forget or confuse over two-and-a-half years, in connection with what appears to have been a minor collision where memory loss is not being alleged. The fact that both Applicants, in their testimonies, appear to have colluded in adjusting the details of the seating arrangement arouses even more suspicion. Since the Applicants did not explain this, I am left to ponder why accounts of the accident changed so radically. In any event, the end result is that the Applicants' credibility in other areas of their evidence has been gravely undermined by these inconsistencies.

Medical evidence and rehabilitation treatment and assessment

Ms. Owusu and Ms. Prempeh saw their treating family physician, Dr. Patrick Safieh, on the day following the accident. Dr. Safieh recommended rehabilitation treatment for the Applicants.

Dr. Daniel Contogiannis, the owner and chiropractor at Prevent (who testified for the Applicants) diagnosed moderate whiplash injuries for both Applicants, which he indicated were due to the Applicants' flexion/extension movements during the accident. In conjunction with a massage therapist and a kinesiologist, Dr. Contogiannis treated the Applicants with active and passive modalities. Ms. Owusu's treatment began on June 24, 1996 and ended on November 22, 1996 and Ms. Prempeh's program ran from May 24, 1996 until September 13, 1996. Ms. Owusu commenced her program following the delivery of her baby in June 1996. Both Applicants first attended three sessions a week for several weeks, then two sessions weekly, ending with a few weeks of one session weekly "to wean them off" their programs. Dr. Contogiannis stated that he released the Applicants from treatment after successful completion of their programs.

Dr. Contogiannis testified that he based the Applicants' treatment programs on information he obtained from the Vehicle Accident Reports, the Applicants' verbal reports of the accident and their self-reports of their medical history. He relied on no documented medical histories or formal accident reports. This is clearly problematic in light of the serious discrepancies in the Applicants' evidence. For instance, Dr. Contogiannis testified in cross-examination that he in part based Ms. Owusu's diagnosis of whiplash on information (or an assumption) that she was thrown forward and backward with impact; and yet Ms. Owusu's testimony was that her body did not move upon impact and she made no contact with the steering wheel or any other part of the car.

There were also serious flaws in Dr. Contogiannis's assessments of Ms. Owusu's and Ms. Prempeh's abilities to return to their pre-accident activities. When asked under cross-examination, he failed to locate in Ms. Owusu's records any document providing a description of her job-related tasks. He admitted that he based her functional capacity evaluation ("FCE") on a standard description of a meat packer/packager job as found in a standard occupational manual and not, as the accident benefits scheme requires, on information about her actual tasks as a meat packer at Cargill. For instance, the FCE was based on a job description where a worker is required to lift 15 pounds. There is no evidence that Ms. Owusu was required to lift objects of this weight. Dr. Contogiannis also admitted that he did not know whether Ms. Owusu was required to stand on her job. Further, there is no evidence that Dr. Contogiannis based the assessment of Ms. Prempeh's ability to resume school on information of the physical demands of her attending class.

The accident benefits scheme provides various benefits for insured persons who are disabled by impairments arising from accidents. In light of the significant evidentiary problems in this case, I cannot reasonably conclude that the conditions Dr. Contogiannis observed when examining the Applicants, and upon which he based their treatment programs, were accident-related impairments. Under the circumstances, I find that Dr. Contogiannis had no reliable knowledge of the circumstances of the accident or its effects on the Applicants when he treated them. For these reasons, I do not accept his assessments of the Applicants' capacities or his opinion that the disabilities he treated were accident-related.

Dr. Safieh's medical evidence was not very useful in supporting the Applicants' evidence about their disabilities. In Health Practitioners Certificates ("HPCs)³ prepared several months after the Applicants had successfully completed their programs, Dr. Safieh recommended, "regular" physiotherapy for Ms. Owusu and, "comprehensive, intensive active/passive" physiotherapy for Ms. Prempeh. Dr. Safieh did not provide a medical basis for his recommendations and opinions nor did he explain why he felt the Applicants needed further treatment. For this reason, I do not accept as reliable his opinions that the Applicants were substantially incapable of returning to their essential schooling and employment activities.

I place little weight on the opinions in Dr. Kachooie's reports since his assessment was based on an unreliable account of the accident. Dr. Kachooie's reports also contain numerous inaccuracies about Ms. Owusu's circumstances. For example, he referred to her pre-accident job as "heavy labour," when there was no evidence of this. He also stated that she worked at the "Ford Company" instead of Cargill Foods.⁴ Furthermore, Dr. Kachooie reviewed no documentation of Ms. Owusu's medical history or employment tasks in association with his assessment.

Entitlement to weekly benefits

I had significant problems with the Applicants' credibility in this case. I received conflicting and untrustworthy evidence in crucial areas. Regarding the details of the accident, both Applicants contradicted their own evidence and each other's evidence in oral and written statements. Ms. Prempeh also gave conflicting evidence about when she returned to school. The evidence of Drs. Safieh, Contogiannis and Kachooie was unreliable, for the reasons already discussed.

Ms. Owusu and Ms. Prempeh claim to have suffered from disabling pain from soft-tissue injuries sustained mainly to their necks and backs as a result of the accident. In view of the inorganic nature of their injuries, a finding on the extent of the Applicants' disabilities depends largely on an assessment of the credibility of their evidence. I find the inconsistencies in the Applicants' evidence very confounding, so much so that in the end, I have no idea what actually happened to the Applicants in the accident and to what extent, if at all, they sustained disabling injuries. Under the circumstances, and without having to consider Allstate's evidence, the Applicants did not satisfy me, on the balance of probabilities, that they are entitled to further weekly benefits. I find therefore that Ms. Owusu has not established her entitlement to further IRBs under section 7 and Ms. Prempeh has failed to establish her entitlement to further EDBs under section 15.

Entitlement to rehabilitation and medical benefits

Ms. Owusu and Ms. Prempeh claim, under section 40 of the Schedule, the cost of their rehabilitation treatment at Prevent, $5,081 and $6,239 respectively. Ms. Owusu claims the cost of an assessment and an FCE by Prevent ($740) and the cost of Dr. Kachooie's reports ($880) and Dr. Ames' HPC dated June 2?, 1996 ($100). Ms Prempeh claims medical expenses for the cost of prescriptions ($21.40) and Dr. Safieh's HPC dated March 15, 1997 ($100) and his clinical notes ($154).

To establish that they qualify for rehabilitation and supplementary medical benefits under sections 40 and 36, insured persons must prove they have sustained an "impairment" as a result of an accident. Because their evidence about the accident was unreliable, the Applicants have not satisfied me, on the balance of probabilities, that they suffered impairments requiring treatment. I therefore conclude that Allstate is not obligated to fund the Applicants' medical and rehabilitation expenses.

Even were I to find that the Applicants required treatment, I conclude from the evidence that the rehabilitation and medical expenses claimed were not reasonable as required by the provisions under the Schedule.

Regarding the rehabilitation expenses associated with Prevent's treatment, Dr. Contogiannis's testimony revealed fundamental deficiencies in his assessment and record-keeping practices. He established the Applicants' treatment programs on unreliable information about the mechanics of the accident and without background documentation on the Applicants' medical histories or the physical demands of their job and schooling. Under these conditions, I find he could not have established an effective and reasonable treatment plan. Furthermore, under cross-examination, Dr. Contogiannis admitted he did not maintain records of the length of the Applicants' sessions and he could not satisfactorily justify his $135 an hour fee. His evidence was that, irrespective of whether a particular modality was offered in a session or not, the fee would be $135 an hour. Dr. Contogiannis could only estimate the length of sessions and in testimony stated an average length for the Applicants' sessions which actually conflicted with both Applicants' evidence in this area. For these reasons as well, I find that the Prevent programs were not reasonable measures.

I also find that the medical expenses claimed by Ms. Owusu were not reasonable for the following reasons: Regarding the Prevent assessments and FCE, I find that the expenses claimed are not reasonable by virtue of the deficiencies in Prevent's assessment and evaluation methods, as I discussed above. Prevent assessed Ms. Owusu without knowledge of her medical history or a reliable account of the accident. The FCE was conducted without knowledge of the physical demands of her pre-accident job. She was tested based on a standard job description and not on her own job, thereby rendering the FCE an unreliable indicator of her capacity to return to work. Therefore, I conclude that these expenses were not reasonable. As noted earlier, Dr. Kachooie's reports were flawed by a number of significant inaccuracies as well as by the fact that he did not base his assessment on an understanding of Ms. Owusu's medical history. I therefore do not accept this expense as reasonable. The claim for Dr. Ames' HPC is equally unreasonable in light of the fact that, given Ms. Owusu's practice of misrepresenting the circumstances of the accident and its impact on her, Dr. Ames' opinions and recommendations would be flawed accordingly.

Regarding Ms. Prempeh's claim for the cost of prescriptions, she did not persuade me that this expense was incurred as a result of an accident-related impairment. For the reasons discussed in connection with the Applicants' weekly benefit claims, I find that it would not be reasonable to require Allstate to pay the expenses associated with Dr. Safieh's medical certificate and notes. Dr. Safieh suggested further active and passive rehabilitation treatment for the Applicants several months after they had successfully completed this type of treatment at a facility he had recommended. Dr. Safieh provided no medical explanation for his recommendation.

Expenses:

I decline to award Ms. Owusu and Ms. Prempeh their expenses under section 282 (11) of the Act. While the Dispute Resolution Practice Code (April 15, 1997), section 73 provides that the success of a party at arbitration is a criterion for an arbitrator to take into account when determining an expense claim, other criteria can also be considered. In arriving at this decision, I took into account my unfavourable determination on the merits, as well as the Applicants' conduct. The Applicants engaged in the dishonest and misleading practice of presenting conflicting evidence to the Insurer, medical practitioners and to the tribunal through their testimonial and documentary evidence. In assessing the inconsistencies in the evidence, I am mindful that any recounting of events can give rise to minor discrepancies, sometimes resulting from poor recollection or perceptual differences. However, I am not concerned here with minor discrepancies, but rather with what I consider to be significant inconsistencies in the evidence such as conflicting accounts of the seating arrangement and the physical impact of the collision on the Applicants' bodies. I find under these circumstances that the Applicants are not deserving of an award of expenses.

Allstate requests, under subsection 282 (11) of the Act, that Ms. Owusu and Ms. Prempeh pay its expenses incurred in respect of the arbitration. Allstate also requests, under subsection 282 (11.2), an award in the amount of its assessment of $3,000 on the basis that the Applicants' claims are frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process. Section 73.2 (c) sets out some criteria which I think are pertinent to concerns presented in this case, and which require an examination of the parties' conduct and the nature of their claims. This subsection requires the arbitrator to consider, "whether the proceeding or any position taken by the insurer or the insured person during the proceeding was manifestly unfounded, frivolous, vexatious, fraudulent or an abuse of process."

For the following reasons, I decline to order the Applicants to pay any of Allstate's expenses of the arbitration: In spite of the discrepancies in the evidence, I accept that the Applicants were involved in an accident. Allstate called the evidence of a mechanical engineer to assess the mechanics of the accident and its impact on the Applicants. His evidence was that the damage to the vehicle indicated that it had been sideswiped on the left very much as the Applicants had described in testimony. For this reason, I do not find the Applicants' claims to be manifestly unfounded, frivolous or vexatious. I also took into account that the version of certain material facts presented at the hearing, which, while it conflicted with other versions, did not appear to be directed at enhancing the Applicants' case. For instance, in sworn testimony, Mrs. Owusu stated that her body did not move with impact. Ms. Prempeh testified that her head hit the back of the driver's seat rather than the front passenger's side window, as she had earlier stated. I assume that body impact with a hard window might be more injurious than with the back of a seat. Under these circumstances, I do not find that Ms. Owusu's and Ms. Prempeh's claims were fraudulent or akin to fraud. For this reason, I do not accept that their claims are an abuse of the Commission's process. For the same reasons, I decline, under section 282 (11.2) of the Act, to allow Allstate an award in the amount of its assessment.

Order:

I dismiss Ms. Owusu's and Ms. Prempeh's claims against Allstate without an award of expenses to any of the parties.

September 30, 1998

Beth Allen Arbitrator

Date

SCHEDULE

Present at the Hearing:

Applicant:

Agnes Owusu

Mrs. Owusu's

Jeffrey Gauze

Representative:

Barrister and Solicitor

Allstate's

Colin S. Jackson

Representative:

Barrister and Solicitor

Allstate's

William Gold

Officer:

Witnesses:

For the Applicants:

Agnes Owusu

Vida Prempeh

Dr. Daniel Contogiannis

For the Insurer:

Mr. William Gold

Mr. Thomas H. Prescott

Exhibits:

Exhibit 1

Applicant's Arbitration Brief

Exhibit 2

Insurer's Arbitration Brief

Exhibit 3

Statement of Agnes Owusu dated April 30, 1996

Exhibit 4

Statement of Vida Prempeh dated May 2, 1996

Exhibit 5

Correspondence from Prevent to William Gold, dated July 19, 1996 August 30, 1996, October 11, 1996 and November 8, 1996.

Exhibit 6

Letter from Allstate to Prevent dated June 6, 1997 and letter from Prevent to Allstate dated June 9, 1997

Exhibit 7

Letters from Prevent to Allstate dated July 5, 1996 and August 30, 1996

Exhibit 8

Vehicle Accident Report

Exhibit 9

Curriculum Vitae of Mr. Thomas H. Prescott

Exhibit 10

Report dated November 1, 1996 from Mr. Thomas H. Prescott of Forensic Engineering Inc.

Footnotes

1. 1The Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule —Accidents after December 31, 1993 and before November 1, 1996, Ontario Regulation 776/93, as amended by Ontario Regulations 635/94, 781/94 and 463/96.
2. 2Effective July 1, 1998, the Ontario Insurance Commission was changed to the Financial Services Commission of Ontario, pursuant to the Financial Services Commission of Ontario Act, S.O. 1997, c.28.
3. 3The HPC prepared for Ms. Owusu is dated March 15, 1997 and March 14, 1997 for Ms. Prempeh.
4. 4Dr. Kachooie's report dated December 4, 1996, at p. 2.