Divisional Court

The appellant mother appealed a consent order making her daughter a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption.

She argued that she did not understand she was consenting to adoption and believed the children's aid society was withdrawing its application.

The Divisional Court reviewed the record, including the signed consent document and the appellant's subsequent communications, and found that she had independent legal advice, read the document, and understood its contents.

The court concluded the consent was valid and dismissed the appeal.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion in writing for leave to appeal a final child support order made under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court held that leave to appeal was not required because the order was final, not interlocutory.

However, the applicant was out of time to file the appeal.

Rather than dismissing the motion, the court stayed it and granted the applicant leave to amend the motion to proceed as a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his claim that his union breached its duty of fair representation.

The union had refused to seek judicial review of an arbitration award that upheld the applicant's termination for insubordination and time theft.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board reasonably concluded the union's decision was not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.

Following the quashing of the defendant's appeals, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the defendant's conduct constituted an abuse of process.

The court reviewed the standard for elevated costs and found the defendant's conduct was not reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $6,000.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion for summary judgment, which had argued that the plaintiff's claim for unpaid legal fees was statute-barred.

The Divisional Court denied leave, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The court noted that the defendants' undertakings to protect the plaintiff's account likely estopped them from relying on a limitation period defence, and suggested the matter proceed to a summary trial.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board approving a subdivision plan, arguing it was denied natural justice because it did not receive notice of the hearing.

The moving party held an easement over land near the proposed subdivision but was not on the municipal tax roll.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding that the Board followed its standard notice procedures and was not required to notify an easement holder it could not have known about.

The court also found no error in the Board Chair's refusal to review and re-open the decision.

The plaintiff was injured in a slip and fall at a Mike's No Frills store but mistakenly named Dickie's No Frills as the defendant in the statement of claim.

After the limitation period expired, the plaintiff sought and was granted leave by a Master to amend the claim to name the correct store operators based on the doctrine of misnomer.

The appellants appealed the Master's decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Master's application of the 'litigating finger' test, as the intended defendants shared an insurer with the named defendant and their staff were aware of the incident, meaning they would have known they were the intended defendants.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing his motion to set aside a Registrar's dismissal of his motor vehicle accident action for delay.

The action was dismissed after the appellant's counsel inadvertently missed the deadline to set the matter down for trial.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master made palpable and overriding errors in assessing the Reid factors and failed to take a contextual approach.

The court noted the appellant's clear intention to proceed, the solicitor's inadvertence due to staff changes, and the lack of prejudice to the respondents.

The dismissal order was set aside and the action revived.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry's alleged decision to exempt a wind farm project from compliance with the Endangered Species Act regarding the Redside Dace.

The Ministry had communicated via email that there were no Redside Dace issues in the project area, and thus the proponent did not need to apply for a permit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Ministry's emails did not constitute an exercise of a statutory power of decision subject to judicial review, applying the precedent from Sierra Club.

The appellants appealed a mistrial ordered by the trial judge in a civil fraud proceeding within a matrimonial context.

The trial judge declared a mistrial after thirteen days of evidence, citing the impact of extensive delay as the trial would have to continue on an installment basis.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion and her decision was entitled to great deference.

The court provided directions for the new trial to minimize further delay, including preserving the evidence and rulings from the mistrial.

The respondent husband sought leave to appeal an interim order requiring him to pay retroactive spousal support of $25,894 per month.

He argued there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the order because the motion judge failed to consider the tax implications of retroactive support, which might not be deductible.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the interim nature of the order meant the trial judge retained discretion to adjust the support amount upwards or downwards to address any unfair tax consequences.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his motion to change child and spousal support.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the children did not spend 40% of their time with him and in her assessment of his income.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in her factual findings regarding the parenting schedule, the imputation of income, and the lack of a material change in circumstances.

The applicant lawyer sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing his motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action involved claims by investors that the applicant breached duties and knowingly assisted in breaches of trust related to mortgage investments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the motions judge's decision to require a trial for complex factual and legal issues did not give rise to a question of broad significance or general application affecting the development of the law.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario Discipline Committee Panel, which found him guilty of professional misconduct and sexual abuse of a former patient.

The panel's decision was split 3-2, with the minority finding the sexual abuse allegations unproven.

The appellant argued the majority's credibility assessments and factual findings were unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the majority's findings were reasonable, supported by the evidence, and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board confirming the revocation of its licence to operate a long-term care home.

The appellant argued that the revocation order was issued without notice, breaching procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the hearing before the Board was a hearing de novo, which cured any prior procedural defects regarding notice.

The court also noted that any prejudice suffered by the appellant stemmed from the appointment of an interim manager, an order the appellant chose not to appeal.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent landlord $10,747.65 for rent arrears, repairs, misappropriation of glass doors, and clean-up costs following the end of a commercial lease.

The landlord cross-appealed the finding that track lighting constituted chattels or trade fixtures.

The Divisional Court applied the palpable and overriding error standard of review and found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact and mixed fact and law.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.