Divisional Court

The defendant municipalities sought leave to appeal a Case Management Judge's order requiring them to cease and desist an opt-out campaign directed at class members, which the judge found created undue influence.

The plaintiff class representatives sought leave to cross-appeal, arguing the judge should have ordered the removal of existing communications.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the Case Management Judge's findings or the discretionary remedy granted.

The appellant, Smartech Installations, successfully appealed a trial judgment obtained by the respondent, Yvan Rolland Pilon, resulting in an order for a new trial.

The appellant sought partial indemnity costs for the appeal.

The court noted that the respondent had refused a substantial settlement offer during the appeal hearing.

Applying section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded the appellant partial indemnity costs fixed at $5,122.55.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering him to repay a $20,000 loan, arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that part payments made by the appellant's company extended the limitation period for both the company and the appellant.

Furthermore, the court held that an email sent by the appellant acknowledging the debt and containing his name constituted a signed acknowledgement in writing under section 13 of the Limitations Act, 2002, which also extended the limitation period.

Metrolinx brought a motion to quash Unimac's application for judicial review of a security for costs order made by a Master in a construction lien action.

Unimac alleged procedural unfairness based on communications between the Master and Metrolinx's counsel, and errors in the Master's treatment of evidence.

The Divisional Court found the communication complaints to be utterly devoid of merit and the evidentiary complaints to be matters for an appeal, not judicial review.

Since the Construction Lien Act prohibits appeals of interlocutory orders, the court held that the judicial review application was an abuse of process attempting to circumvent this prohibition.

The motion to quash was granted.

The defendant appealed a master's order dismissing its motion to amend its statement of defence and counterclaim to add the plaintiff's sole director and his other corporations as parties.

The master had dismissed the motion due to a lack of evidence supporting the amendments and a finding that the pleadings did not disclose a tenable cause of action.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that evidence is not required on a motion to add a party absent prejudice or abuse of process.

Furthermore, the proposed pleadings, which alleged the director used his corporations interchangeably to shield himself from liability, disclosed a tenable claim for alter ego liability.

The appellant mother appealed orders determining that Ontario had jurisdiction to deal with custody and access of the parties' child under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The family had moved to Hawaii in 2010, but the child returned to Ontario for the summer.

The Divisional Court found the motion judge erred in concluding the child was habitually resident in Ontario and that the child would suffer serious harm if returned to Hawaii.

The appeal was allowed, and the orders were set aside, as Ontario lacked jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering him to pay $12,000 to the respondent, his former common-law partner, for an unpaid loan.

The appellant argued that the Small Claims Court lacked jurisdiction under section 21.8 of the Courts of Justice Act because the parties had signed a separation agreement, making it a family law matter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the pith and substance of the claim was a simple common law action in debt arising from a discrete loan agreement, not a claim created by the family law relationship or the separation agreement.

The appellant appealed a decision enforcing a settlement between the parties.

He argued the motion judge erred by ignoring an alleged fraud against a third party, a payment issue, and the respondent's early departure from the home.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly exercised her discretion, properly credited the appellant for payments made, and correctly interpreted the settlement terms regarding the home.

The court also found the motion judge's reasons were adequate.

The appellant bank appealed an interlocutory order adjourning its summary judgment motion.

The motion judge had adjourned the motion to hear oral evidence regarding whether the bank knew or should have known that the respondent's brother was using a line of credit, secured by the respondent's condominium, for his own benefit contrary to a trust agreement.

The appellant argued that under Hryniak v. Mauldin, the motion judge was required to determine if there was a genuine issue for trial based solely on the paper record before ordering oral evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Hryniak does not restrict a motion judge's inherent equitable jurisdiction to adjourn a motion and hear oral evidence to determine if a genuine issue for trial exists.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding them jointly and severally liable for breach of a home renovation contract.

The individual appellant argued that only his corporation should be liable.

The Divisional Court allowed the introduction of fresh evidence because the appellant was self-represented at trial.

However, the court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the individual appellant failed to make it clear he was contracting solely on behalf of his corporation.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision upholding his ineligibility for an enhanced allowance under Peel's Investment and Affordable Housing program.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness and that the eligibility requirement of living in a self-contained unit was ambiguous.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of procedural fairness as the applicant was given reasons and opportunities to respond.

The court also held that the determination that the applicant's rooming house accommodation was not a self-contained unit was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing her appeal of a final order that found no material change in circumstances to justify continuing spousal support.

The Divisional Court upheld the lower court's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the determination that the appellant failed to prove a material change in circumstances under section 37(2) of the Family Law Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring him to pay temporary child support.

The motion judge had imputed his income at $40,000 and dismissed his cross-motion for spousal support because he failed to comply with court directions regarding filing materials.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions or good reason to doubt the correctness of the order, and concluding that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of such importance to warrant granting leave.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision certifying the respondent union and refusing reconsideration.

The applicant argued it was denied procedural fairness because the Board failed to contact it by telephone, and that the Board's finding regarding delivery of the certification application was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the procedural fairness argument was not raised before the Board and the Board's decision on delivery was reasonable based on the evidence.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondent union.

The appellant, an IT contractor, appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for unpaid fees and expenses against the respondent placement agency.

The parties' contract contained a 'pay when paid' clause.

The third-party client terminated the appellant's services and refused to pay outstanding invoices after discovering the appellant's principal had undisclosed U.S. and Ontario securities convictions for insider trading.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in concluding that the respondent had made good faith efforts to collect the unpaid amounts before reasonably abandoning the collection efforts due to the appellant's material non-disclosure of penal offences.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment granting the respondent subcontractor's construction lien claim for unpaid work.

The appellants argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons for credibility findings and erred by failing to reduce the claim for incomplete work.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were more than sufficient and deferring to the trial judge's factual finding that the work contemplated by the contracts had been completed before the relationship broke down.