Divisional Court

The Ministry appealed a costs order awarding the plaintiffs $150,000 in partial indemnity costs following a motion to join the Ministry as a party and amend the statement of claim.

The Ministry argued the costs were excessive for a pleadings motion and that the judge failed to properly apply Rule 57.01.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion was treated as a 'mini-trial' by the Ministry, the issues were of significant importance, and the judge properly considered the relevant factors in exercising his discretion to fix costs.

The appellant brought two appeals from the Landlord and Tenant Board and one application for judicial review regarding a Human Rights Tribunal decision.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the proceedings as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals, which raised no questions of law, and lacked jurisdiction to award damages on a judicial review application.

All three proceedings were dismissed.

The applicants (defendants) sought leave to appeal an order that upheld a Master's decision refusing to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for delay.

The Master had found that while there was inordinate and inexcusable delay creating a presumption of prejudice, the plaintiffs successfully rebutted this presumption by showing that documentary evidence had been preserved and a fair trial was still possible.

The Divisional Court found no error of law or principle in the lower court decisions and refused leave to appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The landlords brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order and to vacate the automatic stay.

The tenant did not respond or appear.

The court found the tenant's appeal failed to raise any legitimate question of law, was devoid of merit, and was brought merely to delay the proceedings following a history of non-compliance with court orders to pay rent.

The motion was granted, the appeal was quashed, the stay was vacated, and the eviction was ordered to be enforced forthwith.

The Applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Appeals Committee of the Real Estate Council of Ontario, which held that its jurisdiction to award costs under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002 was limited by section 17.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court determined that the applicable standard of review was reasonableness, as the Tribunal was interpreting its home statute and a closely connected statute.

The Court found the Tribunal's interpretation reasonable, concluding that because REBBA was enacted after February 14, 2000, and does not expressly state that it prevails over the SPPA, the SPPA's costs restrictions apply.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision confirming a Master's Report which found that a contract for the supply of light fixtures was between the respondent distributor and the respondent electrical contractor, rather than the appellant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the Master's factual findings regarding the identity of the contracting parties.

Leave to appeal the costs order was also denied.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision refusing to add a proposed defendant to their counterclaim due to an expired limitation period.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the date of performance or when the oppression claim arose could not be determined from the pleadings.

The court held it was an error in principle to refuse leave to amend at this stage, without prejudice to the respondents' right to plead the Limitations Act.

The tenant appealed a consent eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board on the last day before enforcement, triggering an automatic stay.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing it was devoid of merit and an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court found the tenant was 'gaming the system' to avoid paying rent, quashed the appeal, lifted the stay, and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the landlord.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing their motion to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) obtained ex parte by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, a second mortgagee, alleged a constructive trust and fraudulent conduct following a power of sale that resulted in a shortfall.

The court applied the strict test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) and found no conflicting decisions, no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's findings on triable issues or material non-disclosure, and no error in principle in the exercise of discretion to maintain the CPL.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The respondent children's aid society brought a motion to dismiss the appellants' appeal for delay.

The appellants brought a cross-motion to extend the time to perfect their appeal, citing delays in obtaining Legal Aid funding.

The court found that while the delay was not caused by the appellants, the proposed appeal had no chance of success.

The appeal raised a constitutional challenge regarding the definition of 'Indian' or 'native person' under the Child and Family Services Act, which the court found irrelevant as the children did not fall within the applicable definitions.

Given the lack of merit and the prejudice of further delay to the children, the court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing his wrongful dismissal claim.

The motion judge had found that the appellant abandoned his employment by failing to return to work, failing to provide medical documentation for short-term disability, and relocating to another province.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellant abandoned his position after 8.5 months of absences and warnings.

The court also upheld the finding that the employer had no independent duty to accommodate beyond its short-term disability plan.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering him to pay a real estate commission to the respondent brokerage based on a Buyer's Representation Agreement (BRA).

The appellant argued he never signed the BRA and had limited English comprehension.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact by misapprehending the appellant's evidence regarding his signature and failing to consider his language limitations.

The court concluded the appellant did not knowingly sign the BRA, set aside the trial judgment, and dismissed the action.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision that her action was statute-barred under the Carriage of Goods Regulation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by concluding the contract was for the carriage of goods without hearing any evidence.

The court held that determining whether the contract was for carriage of goods or bailment is a question of mixed fact and law requiring an evidentiary record.

The matter was remitted for a new trial.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review of the Director's issuance of a renewable energy approval, while simultaneously pursuing an appeal before the Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT).

The respondents brought a motion to quash the judicial review application on the basis of prematurity.

The court granted the motion and quashed the application, applying the doctrine of exhaustion.

The court found that the ERT had the power to provide an effective remedy (revocation of the approval) and there were no exceptional circumstances justifying early recourse to the courts.

The appellant, who had an extensive litigation history against the respondent municipality, appealed a costs order.

The application judge had declined to award costs on the appellant's application to quash two municipal resolutions banning him from municipal facilities, finding that success would have been divided had the matter been heard on the merits before the resolutions were repealed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge made no error in principle and that it was reasonably open to him to find that success would have been divided.

Following a successful appeal from a Small Claims Court decision, the personal defendant sought costs for six different steps in the proceeding, including two trials, two appeals, and two motions.

The Divisional Court awarded the personal defendant a total of $8,700 in costs payable by the plaintiff, while leaving the costs award against the corporate defendant intact.