Human Rights - ODC

The applicant sought a declaration that the respondent municipality's refusal to post its anti-abortion advertisement on city buses violated its freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The respondent consented to post the advertisement and did not appear at the hearing.

The Divisional Court found that the Charter applied and the refusal limited the applicant's freedom of expression without a reasonable balancing of statutory objectives.

However, the court declined to issue a formal constitutional declaration due to the lack of an adversarial evidentiary record, instead issuing a consent order requiring the respondent to post the advertisement.

The appellant brought two appeals from the Landlord and Tenant Board and one application for judicial review regarding a Human Rights Tribunal decision.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the proceedings as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals, which raised no questions of law, and lacked jurisdiction to award damages on a judicial review application.

All three proceedings were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his involuntary committal under the Mental Health Act.

He argued that the Board erred in finding he met the criteria for committal, that his initial Form 1 assessment upon completion of a criminal sentence ('psychiatric gating') was defective, and that his ongoing detention violated his Charter rights.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by evidence of the appellant's mental disorders and risk of harm.

The court also held that the initial Form 1 was validly executed and that the civil committal regime under the Mental Health Act does not constitute arbitrary detention or double punishment, and thus does not violate the Charter.

The applicants sought judicial review of interim decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which declined to dismiss human rights applications under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The applicants argued that prior proceedings under the Police Services Act and the Regulated Health Professions Act should bar the human rights complaints based on issue estoppel and finality principles.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the Tribunal reasonably applied the Supreme Court's fairness principles from Penner to conclude that it would be unfair to dismiss the human rights applications, given the different purposes, lack of financial stakes, and statutory contexts of the prior proceedings.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing her nine applications on the basis of delay and having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant argued the HRTO failed to include all respondents she complained against.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to address why the HRTO's decisions were unreasonable and noting the HRTO correctly identified the named respondents.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding they discriminated against three Muslim employees by requiring them to taste pork, failing to accommodate religious holidays, and engaging in reprisals.

The applicants argued the Tribunal made unreasonable findings of fact, erred in its treatment of s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, and improperly ignored unsworn willsay statements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal's fact-finding was reasonable, the s. 45.1 argument was not raised before the Tribunal, and willsay statements of uncalled witnesses are not evidence.

The appellants, federal inmates, sought to certify a class action against the Crown after correctional officers seized t-shirts they had designed to commemorate inmates who died in custody.

The motion judge refused certification, finding that the inmate grievance process under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act was the preferable procedure for resolving the dispute.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in her preferability analysis.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge correctly applied the framework from AIC Limited v. Fischer and made no error in principle in concluding that the grievance process could provide meaningful redress and access to justice.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of two Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decisions finding it discriminated against an employee by failing to accommodate her disability and ordering her reinstatement with damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decisions on liability and remedy were reasonable and amply supported by the evidence.

The Court also rejected the applicant's arguments regarding procedural fairness and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The self-represented applicant brought three procedural motions within his application for judicial review of decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

First, he sought to strike the respondents' materials for late filing; the court dismissed this, allowing the materials nunc pro tunc as the delay was minimal and caused no prejudice.

Second, he argued the Tribunal's record of proceedings was incomplete; the court agreed and ordered the Tribunal to allow the applicant to select correspondence for a supplementary record, awarding him $150 in costs.

Third, he sought to remove respondent counsel for an alleged conflict of interest; the court dismissed this as the Tribunal had already decided the issue.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint of discrimination and harassment.

The complaint arose from sexist blog posts made by a union president during a labour dispute.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding it reasonable to conclude that the blog posts were not made 'in the workplace' and that the Tribunal appropriately considered the union president's Charter rights to freedom of expression and association when determining the posts did not constitute discrimination with respect to employment.

The applicants, a non-Catholic student and his father, sought an exemption from mandatory attendance at liturgies and religious retreats at a Roman Catholic secondary school.

The school board refused, arguing these activities were not 'programs or courses of study in religious education' under section 42(13) of the Education Act.

The Divisional Court held that liturgies and retreats are planned series of events with a central purpose of religious education and experience, thus qualifying as programs under the Act.

The application for judicial review was allowed, and the student was granted the exemption.

The applicant, a suppression firefighter, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that summarily dismissed his age discrimination complaint regarding mandatory retirement at age 60.

The Tribunal had dismissed the complaint under Rule 19A, finding no reasonable prospect of success based on a previous test case (Espey) that upheld the mandatory retirement provision as a bona fide occupational requirement.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's decision was reasonable, as the applicant failed to provide evidence demonstrating that the result in his case would differ from the established precedent.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed her discrimination complaint against her university and an arbitrator.

The applicant alleged that the arbitrator's report, which found her harassment allegations unfounded, was discriminatory and that the arbitrator lost adjudicative immunity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it to be a duplicative and meritless attempt to relitigate previous findings, and upheld the HRTO's conclusions on reasonable prospect and adjudicative immunity.

The appellant, who sustained a severe traumatic brain injury, appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board denying her request for pre-approved funding for in-patient rehabilitative services at an Alberta facility.

The facility was not licensed as a hospital and did not accept public funding.

The appellant argued the denial breached her rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that section 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the government to fund out-of-province medical treatments, and that the denial was based on the facility's licensing status, not the appellant's disability, thus not engaging section 15.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Ontario Labour Relations Board and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which dismissed his complaints for delay.

The applicant had filed complaints regarding his termination and a subsequent settlement agreement 18 months and over two years after the events, respectively.

The Divisional Court found that both tribunals reasonably exercised their discretion in determining that the applicant failed to provide a good faith explanation for the delay.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The respondent union brought a motion to dismiss four applications for judicial review commenced by the self-represented applicant.

The applicant had failed to set any of the applications down for a hearing, resulting in delays ranging from over two to nearly five years.

The court found the delay to be unacceptable and that it caused obvious prejudice in the employment context.

The court also noted the applicant's history of abusing tribunal processes and acting as a vexatious litigant.

The motion was granted, the applications for judicial review were dismissed, and the applicant's cross-motion was dismissed.

The applicant, a nurse, sought judicial review of two decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario regarding her complaints against her employer hospital.

The Adjudicator had found the hospital failed to accommodate her disability after October 2009 but dismissed claims of discrimination prior to that date, and awarded monetary compensation rather than reinstatement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Adjudicator's decisions on the merits and remedy were reasonable and supported by the evidence, and that there was no denial of procedural fairness in limiting witness testimony to individual rather than systemic claims.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her application, which alleged that the Ontario Sales Tax Transition Benefit discriminated on the basis of marital and family status.

The Tribunal had found it lacked jurisdiction because the benefit was an integral part of taxation and thus excluded from the definition of 'services' under section 10(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias in the Tribunal's reconsideration process and concluding that the Tribunal's interpretation of the Code was reasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding she discriminated against the respondents on the basis of sexual orientation and marital status by denying them a room at her bed and breakfast.

The applicant argued the room was unlicensed and therefore not a service available to the public.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the adjudicator's conclusion that the applicant withdrew the room offer upon learning of the respondents' same-sex relationship was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario summarily dismissing his complaint against the Toronto Police Service and Toronto Police Services Board.

The applicant alleged discrimination based on mental disability, race, and country of origin, as well as threats of reprisal.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Tribunal reasonably concluded there was no evidence of discrimination or reprisal.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness or bias.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.