Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - ODC

The statutory third party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of J. Ramsay J. dated December 23, 2021.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and directed the appellant to schedule a case conference.

No costs were ordered.

The moving party defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order and a subsequent costs order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $3,500 to the responding party plaintiff.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order of MacLeod R.S.J. dated October 20, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $2,500 to the responding party.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to file fresh evidence for an upcoming judicial review hearing.

The court had previously struck the applicant's affidavit containing the same evidence on a motion by the respondent.

The court dismissed the current motion on its own initiative under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding it to be vexatious and an abuse of process because it sought to relitigate issues that had already been decided or ought to have been raised previously.

The moving party brought a motion to strike an affidavit filed by the responding party on an application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision.

The responding party sought to introduce documents not in the tribunal's record, claiming in her affidavit that she had served them prior to the tribunal hearing.

The court found the affidavit to be demonstrably false, as several attached documents did not exist at the time of the hearing.

The motion was granted, the affidavit was struck, and costs were awarded to the moving party.

The applicant, an advocacy group for strippers, brought a preliminary motion for an order permitting the anonymization of affidavits to be sworn by strippers in support of an application for judicial review challenging COVID-19 regulations.

The applicant argued that publicly identifying the affiants would put their economic and family safety at risk due to the stigma associated with their occupation.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court found that the applicant established a serious risk to the administration of justice and that there was no reasonable alternative to the order.

The court granted the motion, allowing the use of non-identifying initials in publicly available documents, provided that the respondent and the court have access to the affiants' full names in a sealed record.

The appellants appealed an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to strike the respondent's counterclaim for defamation and civil conspiracy.

The respondent, a former condominium board member, alleged he was the victim of a smear campaign orchestrated by the appellants that led to his removal from the board.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and struck the counterclaim without leave to amend.

The Court held that the respondent failed to plead a prima facie case of defamation against any specific individual, which is a prerequisite to relying on the modern, relaxed approach to defamation pleadings.

The civil conspiracy claim was also struck as it was entirely duplicative of the defective defamation claim.

The applicant brought a refusals motion in the context of an application for judicial review of decisions denying it financial support under an agricultural risk management program.

The applicant sought to compel the decision-makers to answer questions about who authored the decisions and who was involved in the deliberative process, arguing this was necessary to advance its claim of a denial of natural justice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the questions were irrelevant to the pleaded natural justice ground and amounted to an unwarranted fishing expedition into deliberative privilege.

The plaintiffs commenced an occupiers' liability action after one plaintiff allegedly struck her head on a staircase in the defendants' building.

At a pre-trial conference, the pre-trial judge ordered the appointment of a court expert to report on liability and human factors, despite objections from the defendants and the plaintiffs' objection to paying the costs.

The pre-trial judge provided no reasons for the order.

The defendants appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order, holding that the pre-trial judge erred by failing to provide reasons and by issuing an order that required the expert to investigate and weigh evidence, thereby usurping the role of the trier of fact.

The moving party sought an extension of time to serve and file a notice of appeal from a judgment under the Construction Act.

The moving party's former counsel mistakenly believed the appeal period was 30 days under the Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than the 15 days prescribed by the Construction Act.

The court granted the extension, finding that the moving party had a bona fide intention to appeal, the 14-day delay was explained by counsel's inadvertence, there was no prejudice to the responding parties, and the proposed appeal was not devoid of merit.

The appellant appealed two orders of a Master dismissing two separate actions against his grandfather for delay.

The actions involved allegations of oral promises regarding the transfer of properties and a business.

The grandfather died at age 96 before the actions were set down for trial.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's findings that there was inordinate and unexplained delay, and that the grandfather's death caused actual prejudice and a substantial risk that a fair trial was no longer possible, as the cases turned on the credibility of oral representations.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's decision dismissing a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing the action for delay.

The Divisional Court admitted new evidence showing the Master was inadvertently misled regarding the plaintiff's answers to undertakings and the timing of evidence on liability.

Finding that the Master made palpable and overriding errors of fact and that the defendant would suffer no prejudice, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the dismissal order.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a default judgment in a construction lien action.

The action against the appellant was based on a personal guarantee of a corporate defendant's obligations.

The Divisional Court upheld the master's decision, finding that service by registered mail complied with the Construction Lien Act.

The court also agreed that the appellant failed to meet the three-pronged test to set aside a default judgment, specifically failing to provide a plausible explanation for the default and delaying eight months before bringing the motion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants appealed an interlocutory injunction that prohibited them from publishing any material identifying the plaintiffs on the internet and ordered them to delete all references to the plaintiffs.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the injunction was overly broad and an unwarranted restraint on freedom of expression.

The court also held that two of the plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive relief because they failed to file affidavit evidence of irreparable harm, failed to provide an undertaking as to damages, and refused to attend examinations.

The injunction was set aside, replaced only by a narrow consent order regarding one specific article concerning one plaintiff.

The $35,000 costs award against the defendants was also set aside.

The appellant tripped and fell on a ramp while exiting the respondent's store, sustaining injuries including a torn rotator cuff.

At trial, the judge awarded $13,598 in damages after finding the appellant 50% contributorily negligent and concluding her shoulder injury was not caused by the fall.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors by ignoring medical and lay evidence regarding causation and misapplying the principles of causation and apportionment.

The Court reduced the appellant's contributory negligence to 15% and reassessed damages, awarding a total of $104,044.41.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages for an assault that occurred during a recreational hockey game.

The trial judge found that the appellant deliberately punched the respondent in the face after the referee had stopped play, causing dental injuries.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings that the respondent did not assume the risk of a deliberate, unprovoked attack and that the liability waiver did not bar recovery.

The court also upheld the award of special damages for future dental work, finding the respondent's dentist was qualified to provide opinion evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering it to pay the balance of a contract for boiler installation and related work.

The defendant alleged the plaintiff was part of an organized crime conspiracy to sabotage the project and that the trial judge improperly interfered with the presentation of its case.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and dismissed the conspiracy allegations as frivolous.

Although the trial judge's excessive interference in witness examinations amounted to an error in law, the court declined to order a new trial, concluding that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred given the complete lack of merit to the defence.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by a FSCO Director's Delegate, who had revoked an Arbitrator's award of statutory accident benefits and ordered a new hearing on the basis of inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court determined that the standard of review for the adequacy of reasons is correctness.

The Court found that the Arbitrator's reasons were sufficiently thorough to explain her rejection of the insurer's medical expert and her acceptance of the applicant's evidence.

The application for judicial review was allowed, the Director's Delegate's decision was set aside, and the Arbitrator's decision was restored.

The applicant sought an order directing the trustee of a pension plan, if found to be in breach of trust, to apply under s. 68 of the Pension Benefits Act for a partial winding up of the plan.

The respondent moved to strike the claim.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claim could not succeed.

The respondent appealed to the Divisional Court.

The majority of the Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appropriateness of the remedy could only be determined on a full factual record.

The applicant was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident and subsequently gave birth to a child.

An arbitrator awarded her nanny expenses as a rehabilitation benefit under s. 15(5)(l) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, finding as a fact that the expenses were rehabilitative.

The Director's Delegate set aside the award, holding that child care expenses could only be claimed as caregiver benefits under s. 13.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that the Director's Delegate's decision was patently unreasonable and incorrect in law.

The court restored the arbitrator's decision, confirming that child care expenses can be recovered as a rehabilitation benefit if they are factually found to be rehabilitative for the insured.