Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - ODC

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the costs portion of a Small Claims Court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $2,500 to the responding party.

The applicant sought a declaration that the licensing regime for temporary help agencies under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 is constitutionally invalid.

The respondent raised a preliminary issue regarding the Divisional Court's jurisdiction to grant such declaratory relief.

The court held that under section 2(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, it only has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief in relation to the exercise of a statutory power, which does not include the enactment of statutory amendments.

The application was transferred to the Superior Court of Justice.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a December 2025 decision of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding parties.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of the lower court judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing a motion for certification of a class proceeding against the respondents for alleged systemic negligence in connection with overcharging for electricity supply caused by a new billing system.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no common harm to the class, as the alleged systemic negligence produced a multiplicity of errors that were harmful, neutral, or beneficial to different class members.

The court concluded that the proposed common issues were not substantial ingredients of each class member's claim and that a class action was not the preferable procedure.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a 50% shareholder in a corporation, brought an oppression application against his brother, the other 50% shareholder, regarding the sale and lease-back of the corporation's real estate.

The appellant appealed two motion decisions: one dismissing his claim for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) and another denying an injunction to halt the sale.

The Divisional Court dismissed both appeals, finding that the shareholder dispute did not give rise to an interest in land to support a CPL, and that the motions judge made no palpable and overriding error in applying the RJR-MacDonald test to deny the injunction.

The court noted the purchaser could rely on the indoor management rule and the appellant's claim was readily quantifiable in damages.

The appellants appealed two orders: a dismissal of an application for financial disclosure and a finding of contempt for breaching a prior court order by placing a clown with a crucifix on their lawn and yelling at neighbours.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal of the dismissal order for lack of jurisdiction.

The court upheld the contempt finding against the husband but set aside the finding against the wife, as there was no evidence she actively placed the clown on the lawn.

The moving party sought an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal in the Divisional Court regarding a judgment dismissing his defamation action following a jury verdict, and a subsequent costs order.

The court applied the test for extending time, finding that while the moving party had a bona fide intention to appeal, his explanation for the nearly two-year delay was unsatisfactory.

Furthermore, the court found that the proposed appeal lacked merit given the high threshold for setting aside a jury verdict.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order directing the liquidation of Tarn Financial Corporation under the oppression provisions of the Business Corporations Act.

The application judge found that the appellant had engaged in self-dealing and diverted corporate funds for personal benefit, and ordered liquidation as the only viable remedy to separate the parties.

On appeal, the appellants argued the judge should have ordered a forced buyout instead.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge made no palpable and overriding error and properly exercised his discretion, as a forced buyout would leave the appellant in control of the valuation process and fail to ensure fair market value.

The applicant sought a contempt order against the respondent for failing to comply with an Ontario Labour Relations Board order to produce documents.

The respondent did not appear.

The Divisional Court adjourned the application, holding that because contempt is a quasi-criminal proceeding, the notice of application must be served personally on the respondent pursuant to Rule 60.11(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs appealed a Master's order releasing over $450,000 held in trust as security to the defendants.

The funds were deposited pursuant to an undertaking in exchange for the discharge of a construction lien.

The Master had ordered the release of the funds because the plaintiffs failed to set the action down for trial within two years, reasoning that the funds were akin to security paid into court to vacate a lien under the Construction Lien Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Master erred in conflating the discharge of a lien with vacating a lien, and that the undertaking clearly intended the funds to be held pending final resolution of the dispute.

The applicant, a self-represented lawyer, brought a motion within his application for judicial review regarding adoption disclosure.

He sought orders requiring the respondent Children's Aid Society to file a proper response to a Request to Admit, file a complete Record of Proceedings, permit him to file his own affidavit, and permit a 45-page factum.

The court dismissed the motion except for allowing the applicant to file his own affidavit, finding the respondent's 'not relevant' responses to the Request to Admit were proper and the Record of Proceedings was complete.

The plaintiff restoration company provided emergency water cleanup services after the defendant's basement flooded.

The plaintiff's owner assured the defendant that her insurance would cover the costs and did not provide an estimate before starting work.

When the insurer did not pay, the plaintiff invoiced the defendant for $5,070.42.

The court found the plaintiff had a duty to provide an estimate and that the invoice was exorbitant.

The court awarded the plaintiff $2,548.32, based on the defendant's concession, less $348.32 in costs awarded to the defendant.

The moving party/appellant brought a motion for an order staying an earlier order of the Associate Chief Justice, which had refused to extend the time to perfect her appeal and quashed the appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order.

The appellant had not paid rent for over 15 months.

The court applied the test for a stay, finding no serious issue, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the new landlord who required the premises for personal use.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The defendants appealed an interlocutory decision granting the plaintiff's motion to add a receptionist at the Ocular Health Clinic as an individual defendant.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the proposed pleading failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action against the receptionist personally for either negligence or wilful misrepresentation.

The court emphasized that employees are generally protected from personal liability unless their actions are tortious in themselves or exhibit a separate identity or interest from the employer.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file an application for leave to appeal a $40,000 costs order made following a summary judgment motion.

The applicant missed the 15-day deadline due to procedural confusion, mistakenly attempting to appeal directly rather than seeking leave.

The court granted the extension, finding the applicant had a firm intention to appeal, reasonably explained the delay, and the respondent would suffer no irrevocable prejudice.

The court ordered the leave application to proceed in writing.

The appellant brought a motion to admit fresh evidence on appeal.

The respondents opposed the motion on the basis that the appellant could not meet the due diligence criterion of the Palmer test.

The Divisional Court allowed the motion, finding that the interests of justice favoured admitting the evidence despite the lack of due diligence, given the uncertainty in the law, the nature of the evidence (procedural history), and the potential serious effect of denying admission.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an interlocutory costs order that reserved the costs of their successful injunction motion to the trial judge.

The plaintiffs argued there were conflicting decisions and good reason to doubt the correctness of the order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the motion judge properly exercised his discretion in ordering costs in the cause, consistent with the normal practice for interlocutory injunctions, and that differing outcomes in other cases reflected discretionary fact-specific determinations rather than conflicting legal principles.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its motion to restore a construction lien action to the trial list and denying it the right to deliver a defence to the respondents' counterclaim.

The Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence explaining the delay, which was largely due to the parties focusing on a companion action and the respondents' own delays in fulfilling undertakings.

The Court found the appellant met both the 'ready for trial' test and the test for explaining delay without causing non-compensable prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the action was restored to the trial list, and the appellant was permitted to file a defence to the counterclaim.

The appellant sought to appeal several interlocutory orders made by an Acting Referee under the Drainage Act, including an order dismissing a recusal motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on multiple grounds.

First, the appellant lacked standing as he was not the registered owner of the property.

Second, the orders appealed from were interlocutory and therefore final and not subject to appeal under section 106(3) of the Drainage Act.

Finally, the court found no unfairness in the Acting Referee hearing his own recusal motion, as this accords with usual practice.