Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - ODC

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding they breached a custom home construction contract and dismissing their counterclaim.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's dismissal of its claim for future lost profits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that the appellants caused the delay, that the Consumer Protection Act did not apply because the real substance of the transaction was the purchase of real property, and that the respondent did not commit trespass.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in failing to award the 20% markup as pure profit on the uncompleted portion of the cost-plus contract, and awarded the respondent $162,008.71 in damages.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict that assessed their damages from a motor vehicle accident at zero dollars.

The self-represented appellant argued the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance, specifically regarding the exclusion of medical consultation notes and limitations on expert testimony due to non-compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably balanced his duty to assist the unrepresented litigant with the need to ensure fairness to the defendants.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion for summary judgment.

They argued that the action was barred by a release executed by the parties in 2008.

The motion judge had found that the parties did not contemplate the specific claims when executing the release.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision regarding the scope of the release, the application of the incorrect summary judgment test, and the threshold for unconscionability.

The court noted the proposed appeal involves important issues concerning the ability of parties to settle uncontemplated claims.

The appellant, B.C.R. Construction Incorporated, appealed a trial judgment that awarded the respondent damages for breach of a real estate contract and dismissed the appellant's counterclaim regarding restrictive covenants.

The trial judge had found a binding agreement of purchase and sale, awarded damages for the cost differential and relocation of a house, and granted $100,000 in costs to the respondent due to the complexity of the dismissed counterclaim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings, legal conclusions, or costs award.

The appellants brought motions to stay the construction of two wind turbine projects pending their appeals of the Environmental Review Tribunal's decisions upholding the Renewable Energy Approvals.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction under the Rules of Civil Procedure or the Environmental Protection Act to stay the Director's approvals directly, treating the motions as requests for interlocutory injunctions.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried but concluded the appellants would not suffer irreparable harm prior to the appeal hearing, as the turbines would not be operational by then.

The motions were dismissed.

The appellant brought a medical malpractice claim in Small Claims Court against his former dentist.

After failing to produce a required expert report despite multiple orders, his claim was dismissed.

He subsequently sought an extension of time to appeal, which was denied by a motions judge.

A panel of the Divisional Court dismissed his motion to set aside the motions judge's order, finding no error in the conclusion that the justice of the case did not warrant an extension given the absence of an expert report.

Thirteen organizations and one individual brought motions for leave to intervene in an application for judicial review of the Law Society of Upper Canada's decision denying accreditation to Trinity Western University's proposed law school.

The court applied the Peel and Bedford criteria, emphasizing the need for proposed intervenors to make a useful and distinct contribution without duplicating the parties or each other.

Eight organizations were granted intervenor status, while the remaining proposed intervenors were denied due to overlapping positions or lack of a sufficiently distinct perspective.

During the hearing of an application for judicial review, the applicant's counsel requested an adjournment and leave to file additional evidence towards the end of his submissions.

The opposing counsel objected, noting they had never seen the document.

The Divisional Court denied the requests, finding it totally inappropriate to raise the issue at the end of submissions when the application had been commenced over a year prior and listed for hearing for over nine months.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering her to return prepaid rent to the respondents.

The respondents conceded that the trial judge failed to provide procedural fairness by not allowing parties to testify or cross-examine witnesses.

The Divisional Court set aside the judgment and ordered a new trial.

However, the court declined the appellant's request to order the return of funds garnished by the respondents, noting the funds were properly released when the appellant temporarily lost her appeal rights due to her failure to perfect the appeal on time.

The appellants, an engineer and his company, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario finding them guilty of professional misconduct and negligence in the design of a manure storage tank.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Discipline Committee breached procedural fairness by adjudicating an allegation regarding a 'cut-out' in the tank wall without providing proper notice to the appellants.

Furthermore, the Court held that the Discipline Committee erred by relying on expert evidence that it had previously ruled inadmissible regarding the standard of practice.

The findings of professional misconduct were set aside, and the matter was remitted for a re-hearing before a differently constituted panel.

The appellant franchisor appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent franchisee a return of their initial franchise fee.

The Deputy Judge had found that the franchise agreement was frustrated because the franchisor failed to secure a lease for the specific location contemplated in the agreement.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application of the doctrine of frustration.

The court also rejected the argument that frustration could not be found because it was not explicitly pleaded, noting that strict pleading standards do not apply in Small Claims Court.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $7,500 in damages for defamation.

The appellant, president of a housing co-operative, had sent an email to board members accusing the respondent of theft after she allegedly took a confidential document from a meeting.

The trial judge found the statement defamatory and concluded the appellant acted with malice, defeating his defence of qualified privilege.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's determination that the appellant lacked an honest belief in the truth of his statement and acted with malice.

The appellant client appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering him to pay outstanding legal fees to the respondent lawyer.

The appellant argued the trial judge made several errors of law, including failing to consider the factors for assessing a lawyer's account and making improper evidentiary rulings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law and concluding that the trial judge's findings of fact did not amount to palpable and overriding errors.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that permitted a student-at-law to be present as a passive observer during a defence in-home future care costs assessment of the plaintiff, and that denied the defence expert's request to conduct a functional capacity evaluation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the motions judge properly exercised his discretion under Rule 33.

The court held there were no conflicting decisions on the matter and no reason to doubt the correctness of the order to warrant granting leave under Rule 62.02(4).

Following a successful application for judicial review where the court found a denial of procedural fairness by the Town, the applicant sought costs on a full indemnity basis for the application and several related motions.

The Divisional Court held it lacked jurisdiction to award costs for the related motions or to set aside a previous costs order.

However, the court awarded the applicant substantial indemnity costs of $44,329.66 for the judicial review application, citing the Town's conduct that unnecessarily lengthened the proceeding and the denial of procedural fairness.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring it to post $140,000 in security for costs before trial.

The plaintiff argued there were conflicting decisions regarding the test for initiating a motion after a matter is set down for trial under Rule 48.01(1).

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, noting the plaintiff had conceded it could post the security without prejudice.

The appellant issued two claims in Small Claims Court against her former criminal defence lawyer for professional negligence.

A deputy judge consolidated the claims to prevent claim splitting, limiting the total claim to $25,000.

The appellant's motion to set aside the consolidation was dismissed by another deputy judge.

The appellant appealed both orders to the Divisional Court.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, holding that it has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory orders of the Small Claims Court.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her claim for negligent issuance of a building permit as statute-barred.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, arguing she did not discover the claim until receiving freedom of information documents.

The Divisional Court denied the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the requisite test.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the claim was issued beyond the two-year limitation period and rejected arguments of procedural unfairness.

The appellants appealed a Master's order striking their statement of defence and counterclaim for failing to comply with a prior order to answer discovery refusals and produce records.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master erred in law by stating she had 'no choice' but to strike the pleadings, thereby failing to exercise her discretion.

Conducting a de novo review, the Court held that striking pleadings is an extreme remedy of last resort and granted the appellants a 'last chance' order to comply within a short timeframe.

The respondent sought costs following a proceeding.

The court found the time spent and rates claimed by the respondent's counsel to be reasonable.

However, the court made a downward adjustment to the costs claimed because the court had appointed amicus curiae, which raised real legal issues that the respondent was obliged to address.

Costs were fixed at $6,250 payable by the opposing party to the respondent.