Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - ODC

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding on behalf of York University students whose classes were disrupted by a 2008 strike, alleging breach of contract, breach of the Consumer Protection Act, and unjust enrichment.

The motions judge dismissed the certification motion, finding the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action because the claims improperly interfered with the university's academic discretion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motions judge's conclusion that the claims were barred by academic discretion and that the pleadings were insufficient to establish a contractual or statutory cause of action.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Case Management Master's decision dismissing a motion for her recusal based on a reasonable apprehension of bias in a construction lien proceeding.

The Divisional Court first determined it had inherent jurisdiction to hear the application despite the statutory prohibition on appeals from interlocutory orders under the Construction Lien Act, as the allegation went to fundamental fairness.

On the merits, the court applied the correctness standard and found that the applicant failed to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Master's procedural orders and expressions of frustration did not demonstrate bias to a reasonably informed bystander.

The application was dismissed.

The moving party (respondent on appeal) brought a cross-motion to quash the appellants' appeal from a Landlord and Tenant Board order and to lift the statutory stay under s. 25(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The underlying dispute involved possession of a residential property where the moving party claimed an illegal lockout and the appellants were prospective purchasers who subsequently became tenants.

The court found the appeal was not manifestly devoid of merit and was brought in time, as it appealed the Board's review decision rather than the original interim order.

The court also declined to lift the statutory stay, finding the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo until the appeal could be heard.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion to appoint a monitor over the plaintiff charity's financial affairs, as well as the associated costs award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no conflicting decisions under Rule 62.02(4)(a) and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision under Rule 62.02(4)(b).

The court also found no error in principle in the motion judge's discretionary costs award.

The successful respondent on an appeal from the Small Claims Court sought partial indemnity costs of $15,961.25.

The appellant argued the costs were disproportionate to the $9,129.02 at issue in the appeal.

The court considered the Rule 57 factors, noting that while the monetary amount was small, the legal issues regarding priority between a perfected security interest under the PPSA and an unregistered non-possessory lien under the RSLA were complex and important to the appellant.

The court fixed costs at $9,500 plus HST.

The appellant, a lawyer, sought to appeal a decision of an Appeal Panel of the Law Society that dismissed his appeal from an Appeals Management Tribunal's refusal to extend the time to appeal a professional misconduct finding.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found the Appeal Panel's decision was reasonable.

The court agreed that the appellant failed to meet the criteria for an extension of time, noting a lack of bona fide intention to appeal, no reasonable explanation for delay, prejudice to the Law Society, and no merit to the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent successfully defended an appeal of a Small Claims Court judgment and moved for costs of the appeal and the motion, seeking $12,500.

The court noted that the amount claimed was out of proportion to the $10,000 value of the Small Claims Court case.

Applying principles of proportionality and considering the limits on costs in Small Claims Court proceedings, the court fixed the costs of the appeal and the motion at $2,500.

The appellant appealed a Master's order refusing to set aside the administrative dismissal of her action for damages for sexual assault.

The appellant argued that because her claim involved sexual assault and was not subject to a limitation period, the Master erred by not applying a more lenient test for setting aside the dismissal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master correctly considered the nature of the claim as a contextual factor but properly concluded that the appellant's failure to move the action forward was unrelated to the nature of the assault, and that the respondents were entitled to expect compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendant, Dietrich Construction Limited, sought leave to appeal an order allowing the plaintiffs to amend their Statement of Claim to include claims for sand removal dating back to 1998.

The defendant argued the motion judge erred regarding the expiration of the limitation period and the conflict between the Limitations Act, 2002 and Rule 26.01.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflict in the law and that discoverability remained a factual issue for the trial judge.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a costs order made by a motions judge following a consent order settling an estate administration dispute.

The motions judge had fixed costs based on written submissions, awarding the applicants $20,000 and the respondents $15,000.

The applicants argued the judge erred by not awarding full indemnity costs and by not reviewing the entire court file.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no error in principle in the motions judge's exercise of discretion and no conflicting decisions or matters of general importance to justify leave.

The respondent brought a motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order of a motion judge.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to meet the threshold test set out in Rule 62.02(4)(a) or (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also noted that reasons for refusing leave to appeal an interlocutory order generally need not be given.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their application to reopen a dispute over solicitor fees.

The dispute had previously been resolved through Minutes of Settlement during an assessment proceeding under the Solicitors Act.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that attempting to reopen the settled dispute was an abuse of process, noting that a settlement of an assessment is not itself subject to assessment.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The mother, sister, and two brothers of a murder victim appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying them compensation for nervous shock.

The Board had denied compensation based on the deceased's contributory conduct and a finding that the claimants did not meet the criteria for nervous shock because they did not witness the murder.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal for three of the claimants, finding the Board erred in law by failing to conduct a proportionality analysis between the victim's conduct and the offenders' actions.

The Court also held the Board erred in its application of the nervous shock criteria, as the common law does not strictly require claimants to directly witness the event if they come upon the immediate aftermath.

The appellants appealed a decision declining to certify a class action regarding an alleged design defect in digital cameras that caused an 'E18' error message.

The motions judge had struck the evidence of the appellants' proposed expert on the basis that he lacked the necessary qualifications in camera design.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's decision, finding no error in the exclusion of the expert evidence or the conclusion that there was no basis in fact for the common issue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs had sued for water damage to their home, and the moving party argued the limitation period began when its technician caused holes in the roof.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's conclusion that discoverability could not be determined on the pleadings alone and required a full factual record.

The respondents in an application for judicial review brought a motion to strike over 100 paragraphs from the applicant's affidavit.

The applicant, a suspended police officer, sought judicial review regarding the disbandment of the Leamington Police Service and related severance and disciplinary issues.

The moving parties argued the challenged paragraphs were irrelevant, contained legal argument, or expressed personal opinions.

The Divisional Court agreed that the affidavit should be confined to relevant facts and non-contentious background.

The court struck the majority of the challenged paragraphs, finding they dealt with the merits of underlying charges not directly at issue, contained legal arguments better suited for a factum, or expressed unsupported personal views.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision dismissing her application to amend her statement of claim to include derivative claims under the Family Law Act after the limitation period had expired.

The Master had found the proposed amendment constituted a new cause of action.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Cahoon v. Franks.

The Court held that the factual situation entitling the appellant to damages was the respondents' negligence in the motor vehicle accident, and adding derivative claims based on her husband's injuries did not create a new cause of action.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside a previous consent judgment that had dismissed the respondent's action for lack of jurisdiction.

The motions judge had set aside the consent order based on a subsequent change in jurisprudence regarding the court's jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that a change in the law does not constitute 'facts arising or discovered after' an order is made under Rule 59.06(2)(a).

The court also found that the respondent's application to re-open the action was barred by cause of action estoppel.

The applicants brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order quashing their application for judicial review of ongoing regulatory disciplinary proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, agreeing with the motion judge that the application for judicial review was premature because the issues should be determined at first instance by the regulatory hearing panel.

Costs of $15,000 were awarded to the respondent on consent.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding the late property owner liable for annual levies for the maintenance of private roads and parklands in Wychwood Park.

The appellants argued that because the Trust Deed establishing the levies was not registered on title under the Land Titles Act, it was not binding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the common law doctrine of actual notice applies under the Land Titles Act, and the owner was bound by the Trust Deed because he had actual notice of it.

The court also declined to hear new arguments raised for the first time on appeal regarding positive covenants and the rule against perpetuities.