Civil Litigation - Defendant - ODC

The appellant purchaser entered into an agreement to buy a townhouse but failed to close the transaction due to financial difficulties.

The vendor retained the $35,000 paid by the appellant as a forfeited deposit.

The appellant sued for the return of the funds, claiming relief from forfeiture, but the trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant did not act reasonably and was therefore not entitled to relief from forfeiture.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissenting opinion arguing that the payments were not explicitly defined as a deposit in the main agreement.

The appellant was successful on appeal and cross-appeal and sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $30,000.

The Divisional Court found the claimed hours and rates disproportionately high and fixed the costs of the appeal at $17,500 all inclusive.

The court declined to exercise its jurisdiction to award costs of the trial, leaving that determination to the trial judge or an assessment officer due to a prior reservation of jurisdiction and a dispute over an agreement between counsel.

The appellant general contractor sued the respondent subcontractor for breach of contract after the respondent refused to commence work without an agreement for extra costs due to inaccurate tender documents.

The respondent counterclaimed for loss of profit and surveying costs.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's claim and awarded damages to the respondent.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found that the substantial errors in the tender documents constituted a fundamental mistake that rendered the contract void.

Consequently, neither party was entitled to damages.

The appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the trial judgment in favour of the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against the police for trespass, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and misfeasance in public office after officers shot and killed her pit bull terriers while executing an arrest warrant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, placing an onus on her regarding alternative steps the police could have taken, and failing to find causation for her psychological injury.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or his conclusion that the police acted reasonably in prioritizing human safety during a high-risk situation.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decision to decline making findings on causation given the lack of liability.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a settlement agreement reached by his former counsel with the respondent police board.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in law by failing to consider her discretion to continue the proceeding under Rule 49.09(b) and erred in fact by ignoring his evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly exercised her discretion to enforce the settlement, as the former counsel had ostensible authority to settle and the appellant's remedy for any allegedly negligent legal advice lay against his former counsel, not the respondents.

The Bank of Montreal sought leave to appeal a decision certifying two related class actions arising from a Ponzi scheme perpetrated by a bank customer.

The Bank argued that the motions judge erred in finding that the pleadings disclosed causes of action in knowing assistance and negligence, relying on section 437 of the Bank Act and the Anns test for duty of care.

The Bank also challenged the finding that the claims raised common issues.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's conclusions that it was not plain and obvious the claims would fail and that there was some basis in fact for the common issues.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision regarding a commercial sublease dispute.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence concerning its departure from the premises and whether the respondent was estopped from seeking damages due to an alleged agreement with the head lessor.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings that the appellant voluntarily vacated the premises and that there was no evidence of an agreement relieving the appellant of its sublease obligations.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision granting carriage of a class action against Armtec Infrastructure Inc. to a competing group of plaintiffs and staying his action.

The Divisional Court reviewed the test for determining carriage motions in class actions, confirming that the motion judge correctly identified and applied the test from Setterington.

The court held that the motion judge's qualitative analysis of the competing actions and his ultimate decision to grant carriage to the competing action was an exercise of discretion entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action for secondary market misrepresentation sought leave to appeal a decision quashing their summonses to two Manulife employees and refusing to compel the defendants to file affidavits on the upcoming leave motion under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which followed established jurisprudence that defendants are not required to deliver affidavits or be subjected to cross-examination if they do not intend to lead evidence on the leave motion.

The defendant Crown sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing its motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action alleged that the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) was negligent and breached a fiduciary duty by reinstating a defaulting payor's passport, allowing him to leave the country and evade support arrears.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the motion judge's conclusion that whether FRO owed a duty of care or a fiduciary duty to the support recipients were genuine issues requiring a trial.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a motion judge's decision to conditionally certify a class action on behalf of aboriginal people placed in non-aboriginal foster or adoptive homes.

The motion judge had found that the statement of claim did not disclose a cause of action but conditionally certified claims in negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, effectively pre-approving an amended pleading.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by predetermining the viability of the cause of action without conducting a full analysis and denying the defendant the opportunity to argue the certification criteria.

The statement of claim was struck with leave to amend, and the certification motion was ordered to be heard by a different judge.

The applicant, a resident and taxpayer of Mississauga, sought judicial review of the Report of the City of Mississauga Judicial Inquiry.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the application on the basis that the applicant lacked standing.

The court found that the applicant had no direct, personal interest in the inquiry's findings and therefore lacked private standing.

Furthermore, the court held that the applicant did not meet the test for public interest standing, as he was not directly affected and there were other individuals with a greater interest who could have challenged the inquiry.

The motion was granted and the application for judicial review was quashed.

The applicants, who operated an unlicensed rooming house, sought a stay of a writ of possession pending their appeal of the order granting it.

They argued the motion judge erred by proceeding while they were unrepresented.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding the applicants failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured them.

The respondent's cross-motion to quash the appeal was dismissed without prejudice due to lack of notice.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a decision conditionally certifying a class action against a parking management company with significantly narrower parameters than proposed.

The plaintiffs challenged the motion judge's dismissal of causes of action under the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, unjust enrichment, and unconscionability, as well as the imposition of a limitation period and the exclusion of punitive damages as a common issue.

The Divisional Court found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order and no conflicting decisions warranting leave.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed in its entirety.

The moving party sought an extension of time and leave to appeal a costs order following the consent dismissal of a long-standing action.

The motions judge had initially awarded costs to the moving party but, after receiving submissions on quantum, ordered no costs payable by either party.

The moving party argued a denial of natural justice.

The Divisional Court determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion, as the costs claimed were $125,000, exceeding the $50,000 limit for Divisional Court jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion was adjourned to the Court of Appeal.

The self-represented appellant appealed a Superior Court order striking his statement of claim without leave to amend.

The respondents moved to dismiss the appeal on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, delay, and being frivolous and vexatious.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the claim exceeded $50,000, the appellant failed to perfect the appeal on time, and the appeal was entirely without merit and an abuse of process.

The court also declared the appellant a vexatious litigant, prohibiting further proceedings without leave.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a cost award made by the motions judge following the certification of their class proceeding.

The plaintiffs argued the motions judge ignored established principles, such as costs following the event and the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, and improperly applied the principle of access to justice to the defendants.

The Divisional Court found that the motions judge properly exercised his discretion, considering all relevant factors and principles, and that there was no conflicting decision.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $7,500 for breach of contract.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by denying an adjournment, admitting an undisclosed document and a privileged settlement offer, intervening excessively, and misunderstanding evidence due to ill health.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors and concluding that the trial judge's credibility findings and ultimate decision were supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed two orders from the Small Claims Court that dismissed his actions against the respondents and prohibited him from commencing further proceedings.

The orders were made by the Small Claims Court judge on her own initiative, without a motion, notice, or an opportunity for the appellant to be heard.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Small Claims Court judge acted without jurisdiction and in breach of procedural fairness and natural justice.

The orders were set aside and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant appealed an order of a Master dismissing her wrongful dismissal action for delay.

The appellant argued the Master erred by measuring the delay from September 2006 and ignoring intervening factors, such as a previous order excusing delay and an amended statement of claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master properly considered the entire history of the litigation, correctly applied the law regarding inordinate and inexcusable delay, and properly found the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice.