Civil Litigation - Defendant - ODC

The court issued an endorsement as to costs following an appeal.

Having reviewed the written submissions from both parties, the court fixed the costs payable to the successful respondent at $4,000.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to certify a class proceeding against the City of Toronto.

The proposed class action alleged the City was negligent in failing to send statutory notices of rent reduction to tenants of rooming houses after municipal property taxes were reduced.

The motions judge had found it plain and obvious that the City owed no duty of care to the tenants.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that based on the statutory scheme and the specific relationship created by the Parkdale Pilot Project, it was not plain and obvious that the City owed no duty of care.

The proceeding was certified as a class action.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing his motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff had sued the moving party, a lawyer, in negligence for knowingly breaching a Mareva order by paying trust funds to his client.

The motion judge found that the claim raised a potentially novel cause of action that should be determined on a fully developed record at trial.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the recent Court of Appeal decision in Combined Air did not change the principle that novel causes of action are best determined at trial, and denied leave to appeal.

The applicant sought to set aside a motion judge's decision quashing his application for judicial review of a sports arbitration award.

The applicant argued that the arbitration panel exercised public powers and a statutory power of decision, making it subject to judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the arbitration was a private contractual matter and did not involve the exercise of a statutory power of decision, meaning declaratory relief under the Judicial Review Procedure Act was unavailable.

The City of Toronto brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review regarding the cancellation of an off-leash dog park designation at Ledbury Park.

The City argued the cancellation was an administrative or political decision not subject to judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the cancellation of the off-leash designation affected the legal rights, privileges, and immunities of dog owners, and therefore constituted the exercise of a statutory power of decision under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The defendants in an oppression action brought a motion to vary an order of a Superior Court judge who had dismissed their motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order.

The moving party relied on s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Divisional Court quashed the motion for want of jurisdiction, holding that s. 21(5) only permits a panel to vary a decision of a judge who has heard a motion in the Divisional Court, not a Superior Court judge acting in a gatekeeper capacity for leave to appeal.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order that declined to strike out claims of conspiracy and negligence against individual defendants.

The court found that the proposed appeal did not meet the test under Rule 62.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as there were no conflicting decisions and the discrete pleading issues did not transcend the interests of the parties.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion before a panel of the Divisional Court to set aside a decision of a single judge who declined to grant an interlocutory injunction preventing the enforcement of conditions on a liquor licence.

The applicant also sought to admit fresh evidence.

The court dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it would not have affected the outcome.

Applying the Housen standard of review, the court found the single judge made no error in applying the RJR-MacDonald test for interlocutory injunctive relief.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents on a substantial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision upholding the validity of a direction assigning the proceeding to the respondent law firm.

The appellant argued the direction was signed under duress and was superseded by a subsequent contingency agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the motion judge's assessment of the evidence and concluding that the appellant was merely attempting to re-litigate factual findings.

The appellant, an unauthorized sub-sub-contracted carrier, sought payment from the respondent consignee for transporting goods, relying on section 2 of the Bills of Lading Act.

The respondent had already paid its contracted transportation arranger, unaware of the unauthorized subcontracting chain.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant disentitled itself from relying on the Act by participating in the unauthorized subcontracting and concealing it from the respondent.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a $40,000 substantial indemnity costs award made against them after a motion to strike was resolved on consent.

The motions judge had awarded costs to the defendants for responding to a claim by a voluntarily dissolved corporation.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding strong grounds to question whether the defendants reasonably incurred such high costs given their position that the claim was certain to fail, and whether costs for an adjourned motion should have been awarded before its final disposition.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his claim for damages to his fence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in his application of the law of nuisance by requiring proof of causation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly identified causation as a pre-requisite to a finding of nuisance and made no error of law in dismissing the claim after finding the cause of the damage was completely unknown.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision that vacated an order for security for costs against two plaintiffs and reduced the quantum against a third in a solicitor's negligence action.

The court refused leave to appeal regarding the test of impecuniosity, as the issue of the plaintiffs' ability to borrow funds was not raised below.

However, the court granted leave to appeal regarding the quantification of security for costs, the reliance on inadequate evidence of financial needs, and the application of the victim's Bill of Rights, but only in respect of the third plaintiff.

Following an appeal of a Small Claims Court decision where the judgment was varied slightly from $1,520 to $1,480, the parties submitted written costs submissions.

The court found that the appellant was not successful on the appeal and denied his request for costs.

The successful respondent was awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $800.

The defendant in a wrongful dismissal action sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing its appeal from a Master's order.

The Master had refused to strike allegations in the Statement of Claim that the defendant had a practice or policy of terminating employees for just cause when none existed, to avoid providing notice or pay in lieu.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting lines of cases that remained good law following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., and no reason to doubt the correctness of the lower court's decision.

The garnishee appealed a motion judge's order requiring it to pay 100 percent of the compensation it paid to the debtor to the creditor, until the creditor's judgment was satisfied.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that under s. 72 of the Wages Act, 80 percent of a person's wages are exempt from garnishment.

The order was varied to require the garnishee to pay 20 percent of the debtor's compensation to the creditor, while 100 percent of any non-compensation debts or shareholder distributions remained subject to garnishment.

The respondent landlords brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order, or alternatively to lift the automatic stay of the eviction.

The tenant was $8,800 in rent arrears and claimed an equitable interest in the property, having registered a Certificate of Pending Litigation in a separate action.

The court found the motion to quash premature but ordered the stay lifted unless the tenant paid all rent arrears and ongoing monthly rent pending the appeal.

The applicant sought an interim injunction to stay conditions on a liquor licence that barred him from any connection with the licensed business, pending the hearing of his application.

The licensee had previously consented to these conditions.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the conditions due to the applicant's past history of non-compliance with liquor licensing laws.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order removing their counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The motion judge had found that the law firm had a current client relationship with one of the responding parties, a corporate affiliate of the moving parties' opponents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge applied the correct legal principles regarding conflicts of interest and that her decision was highly fact-specific.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal an order that set aside a judgment obtained after the defendants failed to attend trial.

The plaintiffs argued there was a conflicting decision and good reason to doubt the correctness of the order under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the motion judge properly exercised his discretion under Rule 52.01(3) to set aside the judgment on terms, and there was no conflicting decision or reason to doubt the order's correctness.