Civil Litigation - Defendant - ODC

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order certifying the plaintiff's action regarding allegedly defective organic asphalt shingles as a class proceeding.

The defendants argued that the claims for negligent design and negligent manufacture should have been pleaded separately, that there was no common defect, and that the claim for pure economic loss could not succeed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the certification order, and emphasizing the flexibility of the class proceedings process.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a costs order of $12,500 awarded to the defendants after the plaintiffs discontinued their action.

The plaintiffs argued that the parties had agreed to a discontinuance without costs and that the motion judge failed to address this agreement in his reasons.

The Divisional Court found that the evidence did not support the existence of such an agreement, as the defendants' offer was conditional on a similar agreement with another defendant, which was never reached.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to certify a class proceeding against the City of Toronto.

The proposed class action alleged the City was negligent in failing to send statutory notices of rent reduction to tenants of rooming houses after municipal property taxes were reduced.

The motions judge had found it plain and obvious that the City owed no duty of care to the tenants.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that based on the statutory scheme and the specific relationship created by the Parkdale Pilot Project, it was not plain and obvious that the City owed no duty of care.

The proceeding was certified as a class action.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision granting a non-suit motion and dismissing his slander action.

The Divisional Court raised the issue of its jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Because the appellant failed to set out the amount of his claim in the statement of claim as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court could not determine if the claim fell within its $50,000 monetary jurisdiction.

Consequently, the court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiffs appealed a trial judgment regarding a contract for the construction of a home that was destroyed by fire before completion.

The trial judge found the plaintiffs had terminated the contract and awarded the defendant $100,000 on its counterclaim for lost profits, while awarding the plaintiffs a small net judgment from insurance proceeds.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding that the plaintiffs terminated the contract but found the trial judge erred in calculating the insurance trust funds and the counterclaim damages.

The appeal was allowed in part, reducing the counterclaim to $20,000 and varying the net judgment in favour of the plaintiffs to $60,765.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his claim for damages to his fence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in his application of the law of nuisance by requiring proof of causation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly identified causation as a pre-requisite to a finding of nuisance and made no error of law in dismissing the claim after finding the cause of the damage was completely unknown.

The garnishee appealed a motion judge's order requiring it to pay 100 percent of the compensation it paid to the debtor to the creditor, until the creditor's judgment was satisfied.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that under s. 72 of the Wages Act, 80 percent of a person's wages are exempt from garnishment.

The order was varied to require the garnishee to pay 20 percent of the debtor's compensation to the creditor, while 100 percent of any non-compensation debts or shareholder distributions remained subject to garnishment.

Following an appeal of a Small Claims Court decision where the judgment was varied slightly from $1,520 to $1,480, the parties submitted written costs submissions.

The court found that the appellant was not successful on the appeal and denied his request for costs.

The successful respondent was awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $800.

The defendant in a wrongful dismissal action sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing its appeal from a Master's order.

The Master had refused to strike allegations in the Statement of Claim that the defendant had a practice or policy of terminating employees for just cause when none existed, to avoid providing notice or pay in lieu.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting lines of cases that remained good law following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., and no reason to doubt the correctness of the lower court's decision.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal an order dismissing his requests to add a counterclaim, consolidate proceedings, and stay a Small Claims Court matter.

The court applied the factors from Rizzi v. Mavros and found that while the moving party had an intention to appeal and a reasonable explanation for the delay, the proposed appeal lacked merit.

Given the moving party's overly litigious conduct and the lack of merit, the justice of the case required dismissing the motion to bring closure to the proceedings.

The respondent landlords brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order, or alternatively to lift the automatic stay of the eviction.

The tenant was $8,800 in rent arrears and claimed an equitable interest in the property, having registered a Certificate of Pending Litigation in a separate action.

The court found the motion to quash premature but ordered the stay lifted unless the tenant paid all rent arrears and ongoing monthly rent pending the appeal.

The applicant sought an interim injunction to stay conditions on a liquor licence that barred him from any connection with the licensed business, pending the hearing of his application.

The licensee had previously consented to these conditions.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the conditions due to the applicant's past history of non-compliance with liquor licensing laws.

The appellant, a judgment creditor of a corporation, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its oppression claim against the corporation's directors and shareholders.

The appellant argued the respondents acted oppressively by failing to set aside funds to satisfy its judgment while repaying shareholder loans and other creditors.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motions judge's finding that the respondents did not strip assets from a profitable company, but rather funded it, and the appellant had no reasonable expectation that a reserve would be maintained for its contingent claim.

The defendant sought leave to appeal a motion judge's order that allowed the plaintiffs to add her as a defendant in her personal capacity after the presumptive expiry of the limitation period.

The motion judge had made a final determination that the claim was not discoverable until December 2010, effectively precluding a limitation defence at trial.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision to make a final fact-finding determination on discoverability during a gatekeeping motion, and concluding that the scope of a motion judge's power under Rule 5.04 is a matter of general importance.

The appellants appealed a trial decision finding them jointly liable for a debt under a vehicle lease agreement.

The appellant argued her obligation was limited to a one-year guarantee based on a promise from her co-defendant, and that res judicata applied due to a prior default judgment against him.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the trial judge.

The written agreement did not limit the obligation to one year, and section 139(1) of the Courts of Justice Act allows judgment against one jointly liable party without precluding judgment against another.

The defendants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing their appeal of a Master's decision to set aside a Registrar's dismissal of the action for delay.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the appeal judge's decision, which properly deferred to the Master's findings.

The court also found no issue transcending the interest of the parties or conflicting lines of authority to justify granting leave.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their appeal from a Master's decision.

The Master had dismissed their motion for a further and better affidavit of documents from the defendant accounting firm, limiting the scope of relevant documents to those relating to the fraud identified in a forensic auditor's report.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order regarding relevance.

Although the motion judge erred in applying an overly restrictive standard of review, this error had no impact on the outcome.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion to strike a paragraph of the respondent's reply pleading.

The applicants argued the paragraph improperly referred to a privileged settlement offer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the law of settlement privilege and that the evidentiary record supported the conclusion that the communication was not privileged.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application, the respondent university sought costs.

The court awarded costs to the respondent university fixed at $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court noted that the application served no public benefit, was based on voluminous materials, and was presented in a laborious manner that added significantly to the university's costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to return $41,743.15 paid by the respondent under a written agreement for a leasehold interest.

The respondent had defaulted on payments, prompting the appellant to cancel the contract and sell the interest to a third party.

The trial judge characterized the agreement as a purchase and sale without a forfeiture clause and ordered the return of the funds.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge committed an error of law by failing to consider the appellant's evidence that the contract was a 'rent to own' agreement where payments were non-refundable rent.