Administrative Law - ODC

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which confirmed a College committee's decision requiring him to complete a remedial program and attend for a caution.

The discipline stemmed from the physician making a mandatory fitness-to-drive report to the Ministry of Transportation following an argument with a patient, and subsequently disclosing the patient's personal health information to her father.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory immunity for reporting under the Highway Traffic Act does not oust the College's regulatory jurisdiction.

The Court further held that the Board's conclusions regarding the unsupportable nature of the report and the breach of patient confidentiality were reasonable.

The applicant appealed and sought judicial review of Licence Appeal Tribunal decisions dismissing her claims for income replacement benefits and medical expenses, and ordering the destruction of internal tribunal documents she submitted as evidence of institutional bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal and application, finding no error of law in the Tribunal's determination that the insurer's examination notices complied with the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Court also upheld the Tribunal's orders striking the applicant's reply evidence and directing the destruction and non-dissemination of internal documents, concluding that the Tribunal reasonably exercised its jurisdiction to control its process and properly applied the doctrines of solicitor-client privilege and deliberative secrecy.

The defendant hospitals brought a motion to quash the plaintiff's civil proceedings, which arose from the termination of his hospital privileges.

The plaintiff sought an adjournment of the motion pending the disposition of his related appeals before the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) and a review motion in the Divisional Court.

The court granted the adjournment, noting that the results of the administrative proceedings could impact the viability of the civil claims, and stayed the civil proceeding in the interim.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenants' appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) eviction order.

The tenants argued they were denied procedural fairness when the LTB proceeded with the hearing in their absence after they requested an adjournment.

The Divisional Court found the LTB followed its own rules, as the tenants failed to provide evidence supporting their adjournment request prior to the hearing.

The court also upheld the LTB's refusal to admit a doctor's note as fresh evidence on reconsideration, noting it lacked sufficient detail.

The motion to quash was granted and an eviction date was set.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed his eight complaints of discrimination and declared him a vexatious litigant.

The complaints primarily alleged discrimination based on ancestry and place of origin due to poor customer service.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Tribunal's dismissal of the complaints was reasonable as they were frivolous on their face.

The court also held that the Tribunal's process was procedurally fair and its declaration of the applicant as a vexatious litigant was justified given his history of bringing multiple meritless proceedings.

The applicant, LifeLabs LP, brought a motion seeking additional disclosure from the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario to complete the record for its application for judicial review.

The underlying application challenged a joint decision by the Ontario and British Columbia privacy commissioners rejecting LifeLabs' claims of privilege over documents related to a cyber-attack.

LifeLabs sought internal policies, correspondence between the commissioners, and documents generated during the decision-making process, alleging procedural unfairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the requested documents were protected by deliberative secrecy (adjudicative privilege) and that LifeLabs had not established a sufficient foundation of procedural unfairness to displace the privilege.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a 2016 Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his discrimination complaint against his former employer.

The application was brought more than five years after the HRTO decision.

The applicant claimed the delay was due to mental illness and recently recalled memories.

The court dismissed the application under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding the delay excessive, the explanations incredible, and the proceeding an abuse of process that ignored the principle of finality in litigation.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, awarding costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

A related motion to strike fresh evidence was dismissed as moot, as the court concluded it would not grant leave even if the evidence were admitted.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory production order made by the License Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court directed the parties to provide written submissions on whether the appeal should be dismissed as premature under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that there were no exceptional circumstances justifying interference with the ongoing administrative process.

The appeal was dismissed as premature, and costs of $2,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Toronto District School Board's decision to reduce the number of French immersion senior kindergarten classes at Palmerston Avenue Junior Public School from two to one.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the decision to reallocate programs did not affect the rights, interests, or privileges of the applicants, and therefore did not attract a duty of procedural fairness.

The court also found that the Board's decision was substantively reasonable and that the Board did not create a legitimate expectation that a different process would be followed.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering his eviction on the basis that the landlord sold the rental unit to her brother, who required it for personal use.

The tenant argued the Board denied him procedural fairness by curtailing his cross-examination and refusing to compel the unredacted agreement of purchase and sale.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that while the Board had discretion to control its process, it erred in law by precluding the tenant from testing critical evidence regarding the bona fides of the sale transaction, specifically the purchase price and payment terms.

The matter was remitted to the Board for a fresh hearing.

The applicant sought an interim publication ban pending a motion for a full publication ban.

The court granted the interim ban to preserve the applicant's ability to argue the privacy and security interests of her family, finding that the salutary effects outweighed any minimal deleterious effects on the media.

The applicant was directed to notify the media of the pending motion in accordance with the Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction.

The applicant appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB), which had upheld the dismissal of his complaints against certain doctors.

The tribunal had found the complaints incapable of proof and likely related to delusions.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 to determine if the appeal should be dismissed as frivolous or vexatious.

After reviewing the applicant's response, the court concluded that the appeal should not be dismissed at this stage due to the opacity of the tribunal's reasons.

A case management teleconference was ordered, and the individual respondents were excused from participating at this stage.

The appellant estate appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board denying reimbursement for out-of-country medical expenses incurred by the deceased in Texas for cancer treatment.

The Board found that the deceased did not seek prior approval and did not meet the requirement for post-approval because the services were not provided in 'emergency circumstances'.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's factual findings were supported by the evidence and its decision was reasonable.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel that reinstated a particular of professional misconduct in a Notice of Application, which had been struck by the Hearing Panel.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review, finding the Appeal Panel's decision defensible as the Notice provided sufficient information for the appellant to know the case to meet.

The court also upheld the Appeal Panel's order requiring the appellant to repay costs he had received from the Law Society, as the foundation for that costs award fell away when the Hearing Panel's decision was overturned.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant property assessment corporation appealed a decision declaring a student residence located on a college campus exempt from property taxation.

The college had entered into a 99-year land lease with a private developer to construct and operate the residence.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in concluding the college was the tenant of the land.

The Court held that the private developer was the tenant and paramount occupier of the land, making it liable for property taxes under the Assessment Act, and that the college lost its specific tax exemption when it ceased to solely occupy the land.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding they discriminated against the respondents, two Black men, by asking them for identification in a lawyers' lounge.

The Divisional Court quashed the Tribunal's decision, finding no evidence of differential treatment or a causal nexus to race.

The Court held that the Tribunal improperly reversed the burden of proof by requiring the applicants to provide a non-discriminatory explanation for routine identification checks without the respondents first establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.

The appellant physician appealed a four-month suspension imposed by the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The suspension resulted from the appellant's failure to maintain a narcotics log, which breached an undertaking he had provided to the College following previous disciplinary concerns regarding his prescribing practices.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found that the penalty was within the range of reasonable outcomes, emphasizing the importance of undertakings to the self-regulatory scheme and the need for general and specific deterrence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant School Board sought judicial review of two OLRB decisions that allowed a union to proceed with a construction grievance despite referring it to arbitration four months past the collective agreement's 14-day deadline.

The OLRB vice-chair had ruled the timelines were directory and that the OLRB had broad discretion under s. 133 of the Labour Relations Act to extend them.

The Divisional Court quashed the decisions, holding that the collective agreement's timelines were mandatory and that neither s. 48(16) nor s. 133 of the Act granted the OLRB jurisdiction to extend the time for referring a grievance to arbitration.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Municipal Board order regarding its jurisdiction to extend the boundaries of an adopted official plan amendment and to change the proposed uses.

The Divisional Court held that the Board has jurisdiction to do both as a matter of general principle, though it could exceed its jurisdiction by acting unreasonably.

However, the court quashed the appeal as premature because the Board had not yet made a decision on the specific modifications.