DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-26-00000079-0000
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
DMITRI DAVID FROLOV
Appellant
– and –
SADAF SHAKORI
Respondent
Self-represented
David Myers, for the Respondent
HEARD via videoconference: June 23, 2026
VERMETTE J.
reasons for DECISION
1The Appellant, Dmitri David Frolov, appeals from an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board (“LTB”) dated January 7, 2026, and amended on January 22, 2026: Shakori v. Frolov, 2026 ONLTB 2201 (“LTB Order”).
2The LTB Order was made after the Respondent landlord, Sadaf Shakori, applied to the LTB for an order terminating the tenancy and evicting the tenants, the Appellant and Svetlana Tern, because they did not pay the rent that they owed. The Respondent’s application was heard by the LTB on December 18, 2025. As stated above, the LTB Order granting the Respondent’s application was released on January 7, 2026 and amended on January 22, 2026.
3For the reasons set out below, the Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND – PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE LTB
4In order to understand and deal with a number of the grounds of appeal raised by the Appellant, it is necessary to review some of the prior decisions made by the LTB in relation to the tenancy in issue in this case.
1. Decision of the LTB dated May 26, 2025
5This was an application by the Respondent for an order to determine whether the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17 (“Act”) applied. The rental unit in issue had initially been rented through Airbnb, and the Respondent’s position was that the Act did not apply because the situation fell under the exemption set out in subsection 5(a) of the Act (i.e., living accommodation intended to be provided to the travelling or vacationing public or occupied for a seasonal or temporary period).
6The tenants (the Appellant and Ms. Tern) were represented by a legal representative. The tenants’ request for an adjournment was denied. The LTB found that the Appellant’s testimony that he was not aware of the hearing until a certain date was not credible, based, among other things, on an e-mail sent by the Appellant. The LTB concluded that the Appellant was aware of the application and the hearing date. The LTB also stated that “the claim the Tenant was not aware of the hearing until April 3, 2025 appears to be an attempt by the Tenant to delay the hearing.”
7The LTB ordered that the Act applied to the tenancy commencing on October 13, 2024. The LTB found that the tenancy was between the Respondent as landlord and both the Appellant and Ms. Tern as tenants.
2. Decision of the LTB dated June 20, 2025
8Ms. Tern requested a review of the LTB’s May 26, 2025 order. She alleged that the LTB had erred in determining that she was a tenant under the Act. Her request to review the order was denied.
3. Decision of the LTB dated June 26, 2025
9The Appellant also requested a review of the LTB’s May 26, 2025 order. The LTB found that since Ms. Tern had filed a review request on June 19, 2025, the Appellant could not file a review of the same order as the tenants’ interests were the same. The review request was denied on that basis. The LTB also stated that it was not satisfied that there was a serious error in the order or that a serious error occurred in the proceedings.
4. Decision of the LTB dated September 4, 2025
10The Respondent applied for an order to terminate the tenancy and evict the Appellant and Ms. Tern because they did not pay the rent that they owed. On September 3, 2025, the LTB issued an endorsement denying the tenants’ request to reschedule the hearing of the Respondent’s application. The tenants were taking issue with the hearing being rescheduled from November 19, 2025 to September 12, 2025. The tenants requested a review of the September 3, 2025 order. The LTB denied the request to review the order and stated that the rescheduling of a hearing from November 19, 2025 to September 12, 2025 was not a reviewable error.
5. Decision of the LTB dated September 18, 2025
11There were four applications before the LTB on September 18, 2025, three by the Appellant and one by the Respondent:
a. T2 Application by the Appellant alleging, among other things, that the Respondent had substantially interfered with the reasonable enjoyment of the rental unit by the Appellant.
b. T6 Application by the Appellant alleging that the Respondent had failed to meet the landlord’s maintenance obligations under the Act or failed to comply with health, safety, housing or maintenance standards.
c. T3 Application by the Appellant asking for a reduction of the rent charged for the rental unit due to a reduction or discontinuance in services or facilities provided in respect of the rental unit.
d. L1 Application by the Respondent for an order terminating the tenancy and evicting the tenants because they did not pay the rent that they owed.
12As a preliminary issue, the LTB found that as of October 13, 2024, the parties had agreed that rent was $1,000.00 per week. The LTB held that the legal rent for the unit was $1,000.00 per week, but that this determination was subject to the determination of the Appellant’s T3 Application. As noted below, the T3 Application was withdrawn on October 29, 2025.
13The LTB stated that the T2 and T6 Applications needed to be amended to include specific dates and descriptions of events. The LTB also stated that the format of the evidence disclosed by the parties was not in accordance with the LTB’s Practice Direction on Evidence. The matter was adjourned to allow for amendments to be made to the applications and to allow for proper disclosure of evidence to both the parties and the LTB.
14The LTB ordered that the four applications be scheduled to be heard together. The order also included the following terms:
On or before September 30, 2025, the Tenant shall provide the Landlord and file with the LTB amended T2 […] and T6 […] applications. The T2 and T6 applications will identify each incident that gave rise to the application and shall include the specific dates the issue was discovered, and if or when the issue was resolved.
On or before October 7, 2025, the parties shall provide each other and file with the LTB a copy of all documents, pictures and other evidence they intend to rely on at the hearing.
On or before October 12, 2025, the parties shall provide each other and file with the LTB a copy of all documents, pictures and other evidence they intend to rely on at the hearing in response to the evidence disclosed on or before October 7, 2025.
The parties are to follow the terms of the Practice Direction on Evidence. […]
If a party does not comply with the deadlines or terms for disclosure in paragraphs 6 to 9, the Member may refuse to accept the evidence or consider the issues not disclosed.
The Tenant shall pay the ongoing rent to the Landlord by the day it is due until this matter is resolved or the LTB orders otherwise.
If the Tenant does not comply with the requirement to pay the ongoing rent, the Member may refuse to accept or consider the Tenant’s evidence and submissions or may consider costs to the opposing party or the LTB.
15The LTB member who wrote this decision, Robert Brown (“LTB Member”), seized himself of these matters.
6. Decision of the LTB dated October 20, 2025
16On October 17, 2025, Ms. Tern requested a review of the September 18, 2025 order. The request to review was denied. Among other things, the LTB found that Ms. Tern had raised issues that had been previously determined on another application, that the finding that the rent was $1,000.00 per week was a final determination, and that there was not a serious error with respect to this finding.
7. Decision of the LTB dated October 21, 2025
17On October 18, 2025, the Appellant also requested a review of the September 18, 2025 order. The review request was denied. The LTB stated the following:
There is a pattern of the Tenants filing multiple Requests to Review (filed individually by both Dmitri David Frolov and Svetlana Tern). The Tenants are cautioned to not abuse the Board’s process by filing multiple Requests to Review on the same order.
On the basis of the submissions made in the request, I am not satisfied that there is a serious error in the order or that a serious error occurred in the proceedings. The Tenant cannot review the same order pursuant to Rule 26.19 when their interests are aligned.
8. Decision of the LTB dated November 4, 2025
18The matter came back before the LTB Member on October 29, 2025.
19At the October 29, 2025 hearing, the LTB allowed the tenants to make submissions with respect to the amount of legal rent. However, rent of $1,000.00 per week, due each Sunday, was affirmed at the hearing.
20With respect to the Respondent’s L1 Application, the LTB found that the notice that was served by the Respondent contained incorrect information, which rendered the N4 notice invalid. The Respondent chose to withdraw their application in order to bring forward a new application based on a new N4 notice.
21With respect to the tenants’ T3 Application, the LTB found that most of the issues raised were outside the LTB’s jurisdiction because they arose before the tenancy commenced. The tenants chose to withdraw this application.
22The LTB dismissed the tenants’ T2 Application because the tenants had failed to act in accordance with the September 18, 2025 order, and the application was “flawed to the point where it would procedurally be unfair to proceed”. The LTB noted that the tenants had filed another T2 Application that was a duplicate of the application that was being dismissed.
23The tenants asked to withdraw their T6 Application, and they acknowledged the existence of a duplicate T6 Application.
9. Decision of the LTB dated November 12, 2025
24The LTB Member granted the Respondent’s request to expedite the scheduling of their L1 Application. The LTB Member ordered that the L1 Application be heard with the duplicate T2 and T6 Applications that had been filed by the tenants. The LTB Member remained seized of the applications.
10. Decision of the LTB dated December 3, 2025
25The Appellant requested a review of the November 4, 2025 order. The request to review was denied.
11. Decision of the LTB dated December 9, 2025
26Ms. Tern also requested a review of the November 4, 2025 order. The only issue that she raised was that she was treated as a tenant. The LTB noted that the LTB had already told the parties three separate times that the issue of who the tenants were had already been resolved. The LTB held that Ms. Tern’s request to relitigate this issue again was denied, and that her continued attempts to litigate the same issue were an abuse of process.
12. Request to reschedule a hearing dated December 12, 2025
27On December 12, 2025, the LTB received a form from the tenants asking to reschedule the hearing scheduled for December 18, 2025. The main reason for the request was that the tenants’ legal representative had been served with a subpoena to witness requiring his attendance at the Ontario Court of Justice in Newmarket on December 18 and 19, 2025.
28The request was denied by the LTB Member on December 17, 2025. The following reasons were provided:
The request is made without the consent of the opposing party. This request is made contrary to the conditions set out in Rule 21.1 of the LTB-Rules of Procedure.
Although the Tenant Representative has stated that they are unavailable to attend the hearing, it is also noted that many representatives have been able to attend hearings in two separate forums in the past. The LTB can be flexible as to stand down a matter to allow the Tenant’s Representative to participate in the hearing at the Ontario Court of Justice.
The Board will hear submissions to adjourn at the hearing, however, submissions will be considered from both sides whether to grant or deny the request, and if granted, to consider any conditions that will be required of either of the parties.
Both parties should be ready to proceed with the hearings if the request to adjourn is denied.
II. Decision under appeal – the ltb order
29As stated above, the Respondent’s application was heard on December 18, 2025. The transcript shows that the hearing started at approximately 9:13 a.m. and it was conducted virtually. At the beginning of the hearing, the Appellant withdrew his T2 Application because he was not prepared to proceed. The T6 Application did not proceed on that day and was adjourned, but the reasons for the adjournment are unclear as important portions of the transcript of the December 18, 2025 hearing are missing.
30On January 7, 2026, the LTB ordered the following:
The tenancy between the Landlord and the Tenant [this defined term includes both the Appellant and Ms. Tern] is terminated unless the Tenant voids this order.
The Tenant may void this order and continue the tenancy by paying to the Landlord or to the LTB in trust:
- $44,559.58 if the payment is made on or before January 10, 2026. […]
OR
- $45,559.58 if the payment is made on or before January 17, 2026. […]
OR
- $46,559.58 if the payment is made on or before January 18, 2026. […]
If the Tenant does not pay the amount required to void this order the Tenant must move out of the rental unit on or before January 18, 2026.
If the Tenant does not void the order, the Tenant shall pay to the Landlord $41,271.93. This amount includes rent arrears owing up to the date of the hearing and the cost of filing the application. […]
The Tenant shall also pay the Landlord compensation of $142.47 per day for the use of the unit starting December 19, 2025 until the date the Tenant moves out of the unit.
If the Tenant does not pay the Landlord the full amount owing on or before January 18, 2026, the Tenant will start to owe interest. This will be simple interest calculated from January 19, 2026 at 4.00% annually on the balance outstanding.
If the unit is not vacated on or before January 18, 2026, then starting January 19, 2026, the Landlord may file this order with the Court Enforcement Office (Sheriff) so that the eviction may be enforced.
31In its decision, the LTB made the following findings, among others:
a. The LTB denied the request to remove Ms. Tern from the application as the LTB had determined in an order dated May 26, 2025 that Ms. Tern was legally considered a tenant in a joint tenancy agreement as of October 23, 2024.
b. The LTB denied the Appellant’s request to adjourn the hearing. The LTB held as follows: “I am satisfied that Mr. Frolov is capable of presenting the Tenant’s case. I also find that the Landlord would experience financial prejudice if this matter gets delayed again given the significant arrears and the Tenants’ refusal to comply with the Board’s interim order requiring payment of the new rent as it comes due.” The LTB also noted the following:
The Tenant’s legal representative, Mehran Bagheri, was not present at the hearing. Although Mr. Bagheri, in his correspondence with opposing counsel, stated that he would send an agent in his place to request an adjournment, no one acting as an agent for Mr. Bagheri attended the hearing.
The hearing was originally scheduled for December 9, 2025, however, due to my own medical issues, the hearing was delayed by an additional 9 days.
I noted that Mr. Bagheri was going to request to adjourn the December 9, 2025, hearing because he had just recently been retained, meaning he in fact had an additional 9 days to prepare.
c. The LTB denied the motion to find that service of the N4 notice was invalid. The LTB concluded that the service of the notice by email did not prejudice the Appellant and that the Appellant was clearly aware of the notice and application.
d. The LTB found that the N4 notice substantially complied with the statutory requirements. The LTB stated that “[w]hile the N4 notice does contain an error because it claims that an additional $1.42 is owing, I am satisfied that an error of 0.0004% is so negligible that it would be unreasonable to find that the N4 notice is invalid on this basis.” The LTB also noted that there was no evidence that the Appellant suffered any prejudice as a result of this minor error.
e. The LTB held that the rent arrears owing to December 20, 2025 were $41,373.58.
f. Based on the evidence before it, the LTB was not satisfied that that the Respondent had attempted to intimidate the Appellant.
g. The LTB stated as follows: “It is uncontested that as of November 28, 2025, the Tenant is not living in the rental unit and is currently living in another unit paying a monthly rent. However, the Tenant has stated that he wants to stay in possession of the rental unit.”
h. The LTB also stated the following:
The Tenant stated that as of November 28, 2025, which was the last day the Tenant stayed at the rental unit, the utilities, such as power and hydro, were still being provided. Therefore, I cannot find that there is any serious breach of the Landlord’s responsibilities.
The Tenant also presented evidence of having terminal illness. Although the Tenant has stated that his illness would prevent him from moving, the Tenant already has a new rental unit. The Tenant has effectively already moved, save for a few items. Therefore, there is no reason to consider providing the Tenant with additional time to vacate due to his chronic illness.
Although the Tenant testified that he wanted to stay in the unit, given that he has already entered into another monthly lease and moved most of his belongings, I see no compelling reason to grant relief from eviction given the significant arrears owing to the Landlord.
Having considered all the disclosed circumstances in accordance with section 83(2) of the Act, I find that it would be unfair to grant any relief from eviction.
32The only amendment made to the LTB Order on January 22, 2026 was the addition of the following sentence at the beginning of the reasons: “When the capitalized word “Tenant” is used in this order, it refers to all persons identified as a Tenant at the top of the order.”
III. Request to review the LTB Order
33The Appellant filed a request to review the LTB Order on February 6, 2026. On February 12, 2026, the LTB ordered that the LTB Order was stayed until it was determined whether the review request should be sent to a hearing.
34The review request was denied on March 31, 2026. The LTB stated the following:
a. The hearing recording shows that the Appellant participated fully in the hearing and provided testimony and evidence on the relevant issues. The LTB found no procedural unfairness in the denial of the Appellant’s adjournment request.
b. There was no error in the LTB Member’s conclusion that the Appellant had been properly served with the N4 notice in accordance with the Act.
c. The LTB Member did not seriously err in finding that the N4 notice was valid, even if it was not originally signed.
d. The determination that the legal rent was $1,000.00 had already been made in a prior order.
e. There was no error in refusing to remove Ms. Tern as a tenant.
f. The January 22, 2026 amendment was clerical in nature.
g. There was no error in the analysis under subsection 83(3)(a) of the Act. The LTB stated the following:
The Tenant also claims that the Tenant’s non-receipt of rental receipts and a “49-day disconnection that occurred months earlier” in February-April 2025, should have resulted in a mandatory refusal to grant eviction. The hearing recordings shows [sic], however, that the Tenant confirmed that utilities were working when the Tenant left the rental unit and confirmed the Landlord had not made any threats to shut off utilities at the time of leaving the rental unit.
As identified by the Member, section 83(3)(a) speaks to the present tense and “serious” breaches. As such, in the absence of evidence showing the Landlord was in serious breach at the time of the hearing, the member was under no obligation to deny eviction. As the Tenant has not shown that any alleged breaches were ongoing as of the date of the hearing and of such severity as to engage the mandatory denial provisions of section 83(3)(a) of the Act, I find no error in the member’s application of the relevant legal principles under section 83 of the Act to the situation at hand.
IV. AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL AND DIRECTIONS FROM THE COURT
35The Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal dated February 23, 2026 is 28 pages long. His main grounds of appeal are the following:
a. The LTB erred when it denied the adjournment despite the fact that the paralegal retained by the Appellant was subject to a subpoena to witness under the Criminal Code.
b. The December 18, 2025 hearing was managed in a way that denied the Appellant’s ability to make full answer and defence by making it practically impossible to secure Toronto Police Service officers as witnesses because they require approximately one month’s advance notice.
c. The LTB erred in law by providing reasons that are inadequate or unresponsive to key live issues, including with respect to credibility findings.
d. The LTB erred in law in its analysis under section 83 of the Act.
e. The LTB failed to address a chain of compounding defects undermining the legal foundation of the N4 notice and the application.
f. The LTB erred in law by accepting that the lawful rent was $1,000.00 per week, which converted an interim rent determination set in a prior proceeding into a permanent one.
g. The LTB erred by extending its order to Ms. Tern and treating her as a tenant.
h. The LTB erred by continuing to assess rent after November 28, 2025 when it was uncontested that the Appellant was not living in the rental unit and was living elsewhere.
i. The LTB erred in dismissing the Appellant’s T2 Application on November 4, 2025.
36On May 14, 2026, Justice O’Brien gave some directions with respect to the appeal. Her directions include the following paragraph:
This case conference was scheduled to discuss payment of interim terms pending appeal and the possible lifting of the stay of eviction pending appeal. The tenant is no longer living in the unit and agrees he has not made any rental payments since at least the LTB ’s order. Indeed, he has complained about the requirement that he continue to pay rent since he is not residing in the unit. Given that he is not in the unit, is not paying rent, and does not intend to pay rent, the stay of eviction is lifted and the landlord may re-rent the unit.
V. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
1. Position of the Appellant
37In his Factum, the Appellant submits that three central errors run through the LTB Order:1
a. The LTB denied a procedurally critical adjournment in circumstances where the Appellant’s retained paralegal was compelled by subpoena to attend the Ontario Court of Justice on the very date that the Appellant had indicated as unavailable.
b. The LTB discharged its mandatory obligation under section 83 of the Act in a single sentence (i.e., the sentence about the fact that the utilities were still provided on the last day that the Appellant stayed in the rental unit), without addressing a documented 49-day utility deprivation, alleged unauthorized entries and alleged police-assisted lockout efforts.
c. The LTB grounded its eviction jurisdiction on a N4 notice that the landlord never signed and that was served by e-mail without the prior consent required by the rules.
38The Appellant argues that these errors are independent errors of law and that any one of them is sufficient to set aside the LTB Order.
39With respect to the required analysis under section 83 of the Act, the Appellant states that an analysis confined to conditions on the last day of occupancy cannot discharge the LTB’s obligation under subsection 83(2) because the obligation requires the consideration of all the prevailing circumstances, not a snapshot at the end. The Appellant submits that the LTB’s truncated analysts is, on its face, an error of law.
40With respect to the N4 notice, the Appellant argues that an in-hearing oral acknowledgement of receipt of a notice does not constitute prior and written consent, as required by the Act and the Rules. The Appellant also argues that the LTB misapplied section 212 of the Act with respect to the $1.42 discrepancy between the amount in the N4 notice and the actual amount owing.
41The Appellant also complains about the continued accrual of daily compensation at $142.47 after he ceased occupying the rental unit as of November 28, 2025, which was uncontested.
42The Appellant challenges the adverse credibility findings made by the LTB. He submits that the findings are not based on evidence.
2. Position of the Respondent
43The Respondent’s position is that the appeal does not raise a genuine question of law within the meaning of section 210 of the Act and that the Appellant seeks to relitigate matters that were already heard and decided.
44The Respondent states that to the extent that the Appellant challenges the sufficiency, weight or interpretation of the evidence before the LTB, those arguments do not raise questions of law.
45The Respondent submits that determinations regarding relief from eviction under section 83 of the Act are discretionary, involve factual or mixed fact and law assessments, and are not appealable. The Respondent’s position is that the power under section 83 of the Act to grant additional time to the tenants to move out of the unit does not apply in this case because the tenants had already moved out.
46The Respondent states that any issue respecting the adequacy of service of a N4 notice is a question of mixed fact and law that cannot be appealed.
47The Respondent argues that the level or content of procedural fairness is a flexible and variable standard and one that requires a contextual analysis. The Respondent states that tribunals with authority to control their own process are owed considerable deference on procedural decisions because they have experience and expertise balancing the need to ensure fair participation by all parties and the need for the expeditious determination of the proceeding on its merits.
48The Respondent points out that the Appellant had a pattern of retaining paralegals at the last minute and requesting adjournments. The Respondent submits that the hearing could not be adjourned because the LTB was about to lose jurisdiction given its $50,000 jurisdictional limit.
VI. APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW
49Pursuant to subsection 210(1) of the Act, any person affected by an order of the LTB may appeal the order to the Divisional Court within 30 days after being given the order, but only on a question of law. The standard of review on questions of law is correctness.
50Questions of law are questions about what the correct legal test is. See Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., 1997 CanLII 385 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748 at para. 35.
51Considerable deference is owed to procedural rulings made by a tribunal with the authority to control its own process. The determination of the scope and content of a duty to act fairly is circumstance-specific, and may well depend on factors within the expertise and knowledge of the tribunal, including the nature of the statutory scheme. Any assessment of what procedures the duty of fairness requires in a given proceeding should take into account and respect the choices of procedure made by the tribunal itself, particularly when the statute leaves to the decision‑maker the ability to choose its own procedures, or when the agency has an expertise in determining what procedures are appropriate in the circumstances. See Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 15 at para. 231.
52An administrative tribunal is also entitled to deference on matters requiring the exercise of discretion, such as scheduling and adjournment requests. See Riddell v. Huynh, 2019 ONSC 2620 at para. 43
VII. DISCUSSION
1. Preliminary issue
53The transcript of the hearing held before the LTB on December 18, 2025 that the Appellant filed as part of his appeal materials is incomplete and does not include important portions, including most of the cross-examination of the Appellant by the Respondent’s lawyer and the Appellant’s request for an adjournment. The transcript includes the following mentions on at least three occasions:
… END OF EXCERPT AS REQUESTED
… START OF EXCERPT AS REQUESTED
54Paragraph 113 of the Consolidated Practice Direction for Divisional Court Proceedings states the following:
Unless the appellant is not relying on what transpired at the hearing before the Landlord and Tenant Board in the appeal, the appellant must request the audio recording of the hearing from the Board within 15 days after the commencement of the appeal. The appellant must promptly have the transcript prepared upon receipt of the audio recording.
55As set out below, the Appellant’s failure to obtain a complete transcript of the hearing before the LTB has a direct impact on his ability to establish a number of his grounds of appeal.
2. Analysis of grounds of appeal
56I will start with discussing the three main grounds of appeal identified by the Appellant in his Factum. I will then deal with other grounds of appeal raised by the Appellant.
a. Denial of request for an adjournment
57The Appellant’s ground of appeal based on the denial of his request for an adjournment must be rejected for the following reasons:
a. A request to adjourn a hearing does not raise a question of law, but instead raises a question of mixed fact and law that involves the exercise of discretion. It follows that the LTB’s decision not to grant the Appellant’s request to adjourn the hearing cannot ground an appeal to the Divisional Court. See Oz v. Shearer, 2020 ONSC 6685 at para. 35 and Bourgoin v. Schneider, 2025 ONSC 6735 at paras. 26-28 (“Bourgoin”).
b. A denial of procedural fairness, if proven, qualifies as an error of law. However, the denial of an adjournment request on a proper exercise of discretion is not a denial of procedural fairness and an appellate court will defer to a tribunal’s discretionary adjournment decisions absent an error in principle or a failure to account for relevant considerations. See Bourgoin at para. 29 and Anca International Holding Group Inc. v Zhao, 2024 ONSC 3397 at paras. 14-15.
c. The Appellant cannot establish any unfairness in the denial of the adjournment in this case given the absence of the portions of the transcript dealing with his request for an adjournment, which he has failed to obtain and file.
d. In any event, the LTB’s reasons do not reveal any error in principle. Among other things: (i) the paralegal retained by the Appellant had just been retained and, as a result, was not ready to proceed on the date on which the application had originally been scheduled, i.e., on December 9, 2026; (ii) the paralegal said that he would send an agent, but he did not; (iii) the hearing started at 9:13 a.m. and proceeded virtually, which should have allowed the paralegal to appear virtually before he was called to testify in the Ontario Court of Justice, but he did not; (iv) the May 26, 2025 decision also reflects the Appellant retaining a legal representative at the last minute and making an adjournment request; (v) the LTB Member was familiar with the parties and aware of the history of the matter, which had been going on for many months; (vi) the LTB Member was of the view that the Appellant was capable of presenting his case as a self-represented litigant, which he had done on a number of occasions in the past; (vii) the arrears were significant and the LTB’s jurisdictional limit would be reached and exceeded by the next hearing date if the matter was adjourned; (viii) the Appellant had not paid rent between September 18 and November 4, 2025, despite an interim order that he do so during that period of time. These considerations provide an ample basis for the LTB’s exercise of discretion to deny the Appellant’s request for an adjournment based on the unavailability of his recently retained and unprepared paralegal.
b. Issues with respect to the N4 notice and its service
58There is no merit to the grounds of appeal raised by the Appellant with respect to the N4 notice. The adequacy of service is not a question of law, but a question of mixed fact and law that cannot be appealed. See Shannon v Selim, 2024 ONSC 6576 at para. 10. In any event, the purpose of service is to ensure that the parties have notice of a proceeding, and there is no doubt that this purpose was achieved in this case. Section 191(2) of the Act provides that “[a] notice or document that is not given in accordance with this section shall be deemed to have been validly given if it is proven that its contents actually came to the attention of the person for whom it was intended within the required time period.” Here, the LTB found that the Appellant had received the notice and that was confirmed orally by the Appellant himself.
59Further, any issues with respect to the signature of the notice or the $1.42 error with respect to the amount claimed do not raise a question of law. The LTB’s finding pursuant to section 212 of the Act that the N4 notice was in substantial compliance with the Act is a conclusion of mixed fact and law that is supported by cogent reasons.
c. Analysis under section 83 of the Act
60I now turn to the Appellant’s argument with respect to the LTB’s analysis under section 83 of the Act.
61Subsections 83(1), (2) and (3) of the Act provide as follows:
Power of Board, eviction
83 (1) Upon an application for an order evicting a tenant, the Board may, despite any other provision of this Act or the tenancy agreement.
(a) refuse to grant the application unless satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that it would be unfair to refuse; or
(b) order that the enforcement of the eviction order be postponed for a period of time.
Mandatory review
(2) If a hearing is held, the Board shall not grant the application unless it has reviewed the circumstances and considered whether or not it should exercise its powers under subsection (1).
Circumstances where refusal required
(3) Without restricting the generality of subsection (1), the Board shall refuse to grant the application where satisfied that,
(a) the landlord is in serious breach of the landlord’s responsibilities under this Act or of any material covenant in the tenancy agreement;
(b) the reason for the application being brought is that the tenant has complained to a governmental authority of the landlord’s violation of a law dealing with health, safety, housing or maintenance standards;
(c) the reason for the application being brought is that the tenant has attempted to secure or enforce his or her legal rights;
(d) the reason for the application being brought is that the tenant is a member of a tenants’ association or is attempting to organize such an association; or
(e) the reason for the application being brought is that the rental unit is occupied by children and the occupation by the children does not constitute overcrowding.
62Section 83 of the Act requires that the LTB consider all of the prevailing circumstances before ordering an eviction. While the granting of relief under section 83 is discretionary, the consideration of all of the prevailing circumstances is not. The failure to take into account all relevant circumstance is an error of law. However, it is not necessary for the LTB to articulate expressly each and every factor that they have considered. The LTB deals with a high volume of cases and is not required to address every issue raised or argument made by the parties. See Musse v. 6965083 Canada Inc., 2021 ONSC 1085 at paras. 52, 54, 55, 58, and Cater v. Khakh, 2020 ONSC 6884 at para. 34.
63The interplay between subsections 83(1) and 83(3) of the Act was discussed in Gorscak v. Jarzabek, 2025 ONSC 4855 (“Gorscak”), where Faieta J. stated the following at paragraph 33:
The LTB submits that it routinely interprets and apply [sic] s. 83(3) of the RTA to mean that the breach of the landlord’s responsibilities under the RTA must be ongoing in order to engage the mandatory relieving power under s. 83(3) of the RTA. However, that provision is subject to the broader discretion under s. 83(1) of the RTA to refuse to grant an eviction application unless it would be unfair to refuse to do so in the circumstances. The fact that the usual remedy for a tenant’s illegal lockout from their apartment is damages or a rent abatement under T2 application does not mean that it is an irrelevant circumstance under s. 83(1) of the RTA. Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the “tenant protection focus” of the RTA […].
64In this case, the LTB considered subsection 83(3)(a) and found that there was no serious breach of the landlord’s responsibilities under the Act:
The Tenant stated that as of November 28, 2025, which was the last day the Tenant stayed at the rental unit, the utilities, such as power and hydro, were still being provided. Therefore, I cannot find that there is any serious breach of the Landlord’s responsibilities.
65As set out in Gorscak, the fact that none of the mandatory grounds for refusing the application listed in subsection 83(3) were present did not relieve the LTB from its obligation to consider all the circumstances when exercising its discretion under subsections 83(1) and (2). The Appellant alleges that the LTB did not do so and did not consider an alleged 49-day utility deprivation, alleged unauthorized entries and alleged police-assisted lockout efforts.
66The Appellant’s submission in his Factum that the LTB “discharged its mandatory s. 83 ‘all the circumstances’ obligation in a single sentence” is wrong. The LTB Order contains a section entitled “Eviction Relief” which starts at paragraph 42 with a reproduction of the text of subsections 83(1), (2) and (3) of the Act, and ends at paragraph 54 with the following conclusion: “Having considered all the disclosed circumstances in accordance with section 83(2) of the Act, I find that it would be unfair to grant any relief from eviction.”
67In the “Eviction Relief” section, the LTB discusses the following in addition to the utilities issue:
a. The fact that the Appellant has not been living in the rental unit since November 28, 2025, and is currently living in another unit paying a monthly rent.
b. The Appellant’s allegation that he felt intimidated by the Respondent’s actions. On this point, the decision includes a lengthy discussion about the Respondent’s alleged attempt to garner help via online chats to intimidate the Appellant physically. Based on the evidence before the LTB, the LTB Member was not satisfied that the Respondent had attempted to intimidate the Appellant by searching for help online for the purpose of intimidating the Appellant. The LTB found that the Appellant’s evidence that the Respondent had attempted to intimidate him was not credible.
c. The evidence that the Appellant has a terminal illness. The LTB stated the following on this point: “Although the Tenant has stated that his illness would prevent him from moving, the Tenant already has a new rental unit. The Tenant has effectively already moved, save for a few items. Therefore, there is no reason to consider providing the Tenant with additional time to vacate due to his chronic illness.”
d. The significant arrears owing to the Respondent.
68The LTB stated the following in paragraph 53:
Although the Tenant testified that he wanted to stay in the unit, given that he has already entered into another monthly lease and moved most of his belongings, I see no compelling reason to grant relief from eviction given the significant arrears owing to the Landlord.
69The transcript of the hearing shows that the LTB Member was alive to his obligation under section 83 of the Act and that he asked a number of questions of the Appellant on this issue.
70The Appellant’s complaint is that the LTB’s decision does not include an express discussion of certain factors. As stated above, it is not necessary for the LTB to articulate expressly each and every factor that they have considered. The LTB deals with a high volume of cases and is not required to address every issue raised or argument made by the parties. In my view, it was not an error for the LTB not to expressly discuss additional factors. Among other things:
a. The LTB was entitled to conclude that the fact that the Appellant had moved out of the rental unit and had entered into another monthly lease, as well as the fact that significant arrears were owing to the Respondent, were the overriding factors when exercising its discretion under subsections 83(1) and (2) of the Act.
b. The LTB found that the Appellant’s allegations that the Respondent had attempted to intimidate him online were not credible. In this context, the LTB did not have to deal with every single allegation of intimidation made by the Appellant.2
71Further, without a complete transcript, I am not prepared to find that the LTB made an error in its consideration of the circumstances under section 83 of the Act. The points that are alleged to be missing from the analysis by the Appellant are all allegations that are disputed by the Respondent. As stated above, most of the cross-examination of the Appellant by the Respondent’s lawyer has been omitted from the transcript, including the cross-examination of the Appellant on the issues of utilities and intimidation by the Respondent. This omission is significant, especially in light of the adverse credibility findings made by the LTB with respect to another allegation of intimidation.
72I also note that any issue with respect to the application of section 83 of the Act appears to be moot following the directions of Justice O’Brien dated May 14, 2026, lifting the stay of eviction and allowing the Respondent to re-rent the unit.
73Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the LTB has failed to take into account all the relevant circumstances when it exercised its discretion under section 83 of the Act or that it made an error of law in its analysis under that provision.
d. Failure to provide adequate reasons
74Another ground raised by the Appellant is that the LTB provided reasons that are inadequate or unresponsive to key live issues, including with respect to credibility findings.
75An appellate court is not given the power to intervene simply because it thinks that the lower court did a poor job of expressing itself. See R. v. Sheppard, 2022 SCC 26 at para. 26 (“Sheppard”). However, the absence or inadequacy of reasons may, in certain circumstances, amount to an error of law and justify intervention. See Sheppard at para. 46.
76The duty to give reasons is satisfied by reasons that are sufficient to serve the purpose for which the duty is imposed, i.e., a decision which, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, is reasonably intelligible to the parties and provides the basis for meaningful appellate review of the correctness of the decision. See Sheppard at para. 55(8).
77Appellate courts considering the sufficiency of reasons must adopt a functional approach and not conduct their analysis in the abstract. The inquiry should be directed at whether the reasons respond to the case’s live issues, having regard to the evidence as a whole and the submissions of the parties. See R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24 at para. 25.
78While a decision-maker has an obligation to demonstrate through their reasons how the result was arrived at, “this does not create a requirement to itemize every conceivable issue, argument or thought process.” See R. v. O’Brien, 2011 SCC 29 at para. 17. Further, it is not open to an appellate court to use an alleged insufficiency of reasons to substitute its own views of the merits of the case. See R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17 at para. 23.
79There is no issue in this case with respect to the adequacy of the reasons given for the LTB Order. The reasons are intelligible and provide the basis for meaningful appellate review of the correctness of the decision. They respond to the case’s live issues, having regard to the evidence as a whole and the parties’ submissions. Among other things, the basis for the LTB’s credibility findings is set out and explained in the reasons. The fact that the Appellant disagrees with the credibility findings does not have the effect of transforming a credibility issue into a question of law.
e. Other grounds of appeal
80The following issues are not properly part of the appeal:
a. The status of Ms. Tern as a tenant. This issue was determined in a prior decision which was not appealed. Further, the Appellant does not have standing to raise issues on behalf of Ms. Tern.
b. The amount of lawful rent. This issue was determined in a prior decision which was not appealed.
c. The date of the commencement of the tenancy. This issue was determined in a prior decision which was not appealed.
d. The dismissal of the Appellant’s T2 Application on November 4, 2025. This issue was determined in a prior decision which was not appealed.
e. The alleged lockout on January 10, 2026. This alleged lockout occurred after the LTB Order was issued, and was not considered by the LTB. The Appellant did not bring a motion to adduce fresh evidence on appeal.
81The Appellant alleges that the LTB erred by continuing to assess rent after November 28, 2025, when it was uncontested that he was not living in the rental unit and was living elsewhere. This ground is without merit. As stated in the LTB Order, the Appellant stated at the hearing that he wanted to stay in possession of the rental unit. The transcript reflects that the Appellant said that he had temporarily relocated, but that he would like to keep his tenancy. If the Appellant wanted to keep the tenancy, he had to pay rent. I note that the Appellant still had some belongings in the rental unit at the time of the hearing.
82The Appellant also argues that the December 18, 2025 hearing was managed in a way that denied the Appellant’s ability to make full answer and defence by making it practically impossible to secure Toronto Police Service officers as witnesses because they require approximately one month’s advance notice. This issue is either encompassed in the issue of the denial of the adjournment request (discussed above) and/or does not raise a question of law.
83Nevertheless, I note that the Appellant did not say at the hearing that the police officers were to testify with respect to the Respondent’s application. Rather, the discussion at the end of the transcript is that the police officers would be witnesses with respect to the Appellant’s T6 Application regarding maintenance.
84I also note that the Appellant states in his Factum that he filed requests to issue summonses for Toronto Police officers with the LTB on December 11, 2025. This appears to suggest that the Appellant had not sent summonses before the original hearing date of December 9, 2025, and would not have been ready to proceed in any event. As stated above, the hearing of the parties’ applications was supposed to take place on December 9, 2025, but was adjourned at the last minute because of the LTB Member’s medical issues.
85I have attempted to address above the substance of the grounds of appeal raised by the Appellant in his Amended Notice of Appeal and Factum. As stated above, the Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal is 28 pages long and is highly repetitive. The numerous grounds of appeal listed in it overlap and many of them relate to prior decisions. Ultimately, I have considered all the points raised in the Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal and Factum, and I find that none of them raise a meritorious question of law.
86Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
VIII. COSTS
87The Respondent is the successful party on the appeal and is entitled to costs.
88The Respondent seeks costs on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $51,042.10. The Respondent’s bill of costs reflects costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $38,352.20. The bill of costs is based on 112.3 hours having been spent by the Respondent’s lawyer at an hourly rate of $500.00. The bill of costs does not include any information as to how the time was spent and on which tasks (e.g., preparation of factum, preparation for the oral argument, etc.).
89As has been observed in many cases, costs on an elevated scale are exceptional and are reserved for those situations when a party has displayed reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous conduct: see Quickie Convenience Stores Corp. v. Parkland Fuel Corporation, 2021 ONCA 287 at para. 4. Although there have been issues with respect to the manner in which the Appellant has litigated against the Respondent, this Court’s focus is on this appeal. Further, I must keep in mind the fact that the Appellant is self-represented. Ultimately, it is my view that the Appellant’s conduct in the appeal does not rise to the egregious level required to award costs on an elevated scale. Therefore, the appropriate scale of costs is partial indemnity.
90In my view, a reduction of the amount of costs sought by the Respondent is necessary in light of: (a) the amount in issue in this appeal, the proportionality principle and the reasonable expectations of the parties; (b) the fact that the bill of costs contains no information as to how the time was spent; and (c) the fact that a party’s choice to have all or the bulk of legal tasks performed by a senior lawyer is not a choice for which the opposing party should be obliged to pay at senior counsel’s rate. See Romspen Investment Corporation v. 6711162 Canada Inc., 2014 ONSC 3480 at para. 4 and Browne v. Toronto Star Newspapers Limited, 2015 ONSC 2968 at para. 14.
91Taking the foregoing into account, as well as the factors set out in Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the reasonable expectations of the parties, I find that the fair and reasonable award of costs in favour of the Respondent is on a partial indemnity basis in the all-inclusive amount of $15,000.00. In my view, this is an amount that the Appellant should reasonably have expected to pay in the event that he was unsuccessful on the appeal.
IX. CONCLUSION
92The appeal is dismissed. The Appellant is ordered to pay costs to the Respondent on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $15,000.00 within 30 days.
Released: July 23, 2026
Footnotes
- The Appellant states in his Factum that these are not the only errors in the LTB Order, and points out that he has pleaded 30 grounds of appeal in his Amended Notice of Appeal. He also states that his Factum “focuses the Court on the strongest of those grounds and addresses the remainder thematically, while preserving the Appellant’s position that the grounds cumulatively confirm the Order cannot stand.”
- The allegations regarding the disconnecting of the utilities (heat and water) were akin to allegations of intimidation. For instance, the Appellant alleged during the hearing that the Respondent was just waiting for the winter to disconnect the utilities again.