CITATION: Joseph v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 2026 ONSC 2832
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-25-00000939-0000
DATE: 20260515
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
DIVISIONAL COURT
RE: Tyler joseph, Applicant
AND:
HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO and SOUTHERN SANITATION INC. o/a WASTECO, Respondents
BEFORE: D.L. Corbett, Schreck and Rees JJ.
COUNSEL: Peter Carey, for the Applicant
Mindy Noble, for the HRTO
Kathryn J. Bird, for Wasteco
HEARD at Toronto: May 12, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
The Court:
[1] Despite Mr Carey’s able arguments, we did not call on the respondents and dismissed this application on the day of the hearing, with these further reasons to follow in due course.
[2] The Applicant, Tyler Joseph, applies for judicial review of (i) the decision of Vice-Chair Tamburro of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (the “HRTO”) dated May 18, 2023 (2023 HRTO 796), dismissing Mr Tyler’s complaint as abandoned, and (ii) the Reconsideration Decision of Vice-Chair Tamburro dated October 30, 2025 (2025 HRTO 2731), declining to reconsider the original decision.
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
[3] There is no appeal from decisions of the HRTO (Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c. H.19 (the “Code”), s. 45.8). This court has jurisdiction over an application for judicial review of decisions from the HRTO pursuant to ss. 2(1) and 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, RSO 1990, c. J.1. The standard of review is reasonableness: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, paras. 8-14; Ontario (Health) v. Association of Ontario Midwives, 2022 ONCA 458, 161 O.R. (3d) 561, para. 47.
Facts
[4] Mr Joseph filed a discrimination complaint against his employer, the respondent Southern Sanitation Inc. o/a Wasteco (“Wasteco”).
[5] The HRTO issued directions to the parties to disclose and file documents prior to a Case Management Conference Call (the “CMCC”) it scheduled for May 15, 2023. These directions were sent to counsel for the parties, to the email addresses provided by counsel to the HRTO for service.
[6] Mr Joseph did not disclose and file documents as directed and did not appear at the CMCC.
[7] On May 23, 2023, the Tribunal dismissed Mr Joseph’s complaint as abandoned when he failed to comply with the HRTO’s directions and failed to attend the CMCC (2023 HRTO 796).
[8] Nearly 2.5 years later, counsel for Mr Joseph asked the HRTO to set aside the dismissal on the basis that the failure to attend the CMCC was an inadvertent error by counsel (not Mr Carey) and that Mr Joseph never intended to abandon the complaint.
Impugned Reconsideration Decision
[9] In the Reconsideration Decision, the Tribunal found (at para. 5) that Mr Joseph’s request for reconsideration was governed by s. 45.7 of the Code, which provides:
(1) Any party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may request that the Tribunal reconsider its decision in accordance with the Tribunal rules.
(2) Upon request under subsection (1) or on its own motion, the Tribunal may reconsider its decision in accordance with its rules.
[10] The Tribunal found that the rules applicable to a request for reconsideration are as follows:
Reconsideration requests are governed by Rule 26 of the Tribunal’s Rules. In accordance with Rule 26.1, a Request for Reconsideration must be made within 30 days of the date of the decision to which it relates. According to Rule 26.5.1, a Request for Reconsideration made more than 30 days after the decision to which it relates will not be granted unless the Tribunal determines that the delay was incurred in good faith and that no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by delay (para. 6).
[11] The Tribunal then noted that the Tribunal’s “Practice Direction on Reconsideration” provides that a request brought more than 30 days after the impugned decision “must include all information in support of the request that the reconsideration be accepted late” (para. 7).
[12] After summarizing the history of the matter, the HRTO found as follows:
Even if I were to assume that the applicant had acted in good faith prior to January 14, 2025 (I make no finding on that issue), counsel for the applicant became aware of the Impugned Decision on that date. It nevertheless took a further nine months for the applicant to file a Form 20 (a request for reconsideration). As such, it simply cannot be said that the applicant has acted with all due diligence, and the Request for Reconsideration will be denied as untimely (para. 12).
[13] On this application, the applicant focused on the reasons that applicant’s counsel missed the CMCC in May 2023, and inquiries made by applicant’s counsel to the HRTO between May and August 2023 (the “Inquiries”), and the failure of the HRTO to respond to the Inquiries until a further inquiry was made in January 2025. These arguments do not avail the applicant in light of the HRTO’s Reconsideration Decision, which assumed, without finding, that applicant’s counsel’s efforts between May 2023 and January 2025 could meet the “good faith” test that applies to a request for reconsideration brought more than thirty days after an impugned decision.
[14] Mr Tyler’s counsel delayed a further nine months before seeking reconsideration once he knew the application had been dismissed in May 2023. The Tribunal’s finding that this delay, in the circumstances, was inexcusable. That finding is, obviously in my view, reasonable.
[15] Mr Carey argued that all the delay in this case was the fault of counsel and not the fault of Mr Tyler. Counsel’s errors should not, he argued, be visited upon his client. Counsel knew a CMCC had been missed, in May 2023. When counsel learned, in January 2025, that the complaint had been dismissed by the HRTO in May 2023, this should have been treated as an urgent situation requiring immediate response. Even if we were to accept that the continuing delay was entirely the fault of counsel, there is no explanation for it – either before the HRTO or before this court. In the result, Mr Tyler may have a claim against his counsel for what has happened.
[16] I would dismiss the application for judicial review of the reconsideration decision: it is reasonable.
The Impugned Dismissal Decision
[17] Mr Tyler also asks this court to review the original dismissal decision, which was made on May 23, 2023. Subsection 5(1) of the JRPA provides that an application for judicial review shall be brought within 30 days of the impugned decision. This court has the discretion to relieve from this deadline: JRPA, s. 5(2). This application was brought more than 2.5 years after the dismissal decision.
[18] I would decline to extend the time to apply for judicial review of the dismissal decision for three reasons:
(i) The delay after counsel knew of the decision (in January 2025) to the date this application was commenced is not adequately explained. I would adopt the analysis and conclusion of the Tribunal in respect to the delay between January 2025 and October 2025: it is not reasonable or explained.
(ii) Applicant’s counsel made a series of inquiries to the Tribunal between May and August 2023. The Applicant then did nothing between August 2023 and January 2025. This period of inaction is not explained or reasonable. It is not reasonably explained on the basis that the Applicant was “waiting” for a response from the Tribunal.
(iii) Where the very issue of whether an extension should be granted has been heard and decided by the Tribunal, I would confine the Applicant’s right of redress to this court to a review of the reconsideration decision: the reconsideration process is an adequate right of redress for a situation such as that presented in this case, and even though this court has jurisdiction to entertain a judicial review of the original dismissal decision, I would decline to exercise that discretion on the basis that there is another adequate route of recourse available to the Applicant, a route which he has pursued unsuccessfully: JRPA, s. 2(5); Volochay v. College of Massage Therapists of Ontario, 2012 ONCA 541; Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, 1995 145 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3; Harelkin v. University of Regina, 1979 18 (SCC), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 561.
[19] Therefore, I would decline to grant an extension to permit Mr Tyler to apply for judicial review of the dismissal decision.
Disposition
[20] I would dismiss the application for judicial review, with costs to Wasteco of $10,000.00, as agreed, inclusive, payable by the Applicant within thirty days. There shall be no costs for or against the HRTO.
“D.L. Corbett J.”
I agree: “Schreck J.”
I agree: “Rees J.”
Date: May 15, 2026