CITATION: The Corporation of the Town of Bradford West Gwillimbury v. Ontario Land Tribunal et al, 2026 ONSC 2139

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-00000759-00JR

DATE: Apr 13, 2026

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE:

THE CORPORATION OF THE TOWN OF BRADFORD WEST GWILLIMBURY

Applicant

AND:

ONTARIO LAND TRIBUNAL, VINCE GAGLIARDI

Respondents

BEFORE:

KURKE, O’BRIEN, BROWNSTONE, JJ

COUNSEL:

LEO F. LONGO, KATHERINE R. COSTIN

Counsel for the Applicant

GORDON PETCH, STEPHANIE FLEMING ALI S. TEJANI

Counsel for the Respondent

HEARD:

April 9, 2026 by videoconference in Toronto

Reasons for Decision

O`Brien J. (orally):

1The applicant Town seeks judicial review of the order of the Ontario Land Tribunal dated November 7, 2024. The order arises from an appeal brought by the respondent Mr. Gagliardi.

2Mr. Gagliardi requested approval from the Town to establish a cemetery on a parcel of property he owns. He was required to obtain approval from the Town that the proposal was in the “public interest” under s. 84 of the Funeral, Burial and Cremation Services Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 33 (FBCSA). He was also required to obtain approval for a development in a site plan control area under s. 41 of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13. The Town refused both approvals. It held a public meeting and refused to grant approval under the FBCSA. The individual authorized to approve site plan applications also refused to approve Mr. Gagliardi’s application. Mr. Gagliardi appealed both refusals to the Tribunal.

3At the hearing, the Tribunal decided the site plan application appeal would be dealt with separately, and that the two matters would be heard one after the other. In its initial decision, the Tribunal therefore only determined whether Mr. Gagliardi’s proposed cemetery was in the public interest.

4The Tribunal found the proposal was in the public interest under the FCBCSA. Among other reasons, it concluded the Town’s concern about potential groundwater contamination affecting nearby property owners could be dealt with by a condition of the site plan approval. The Tribunal member stated he was not fettering the discretion of the member at the site plan hearing, but was satisfied it would be within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to order such a condition.

5At today’s hearing, the court asked the parties to address the preliminary question of whether the judicial review is premature. After hearing the parties’ submissions, we have decided it is.

6The Tribunal’s process is not complete. Absent exceptional circumstances, courts should not interfere in ongoing administrative proceedings until after they are completed. This prevents the fragmentation of administrative proceedings, reduces costs and delay, and respects the role of the administrative decision-maker.

7Here, the decision under review is not the Tribunal’s final decision with respect to Mr. Gagliardi’s proposal. There is a further step required in the appeal under the Planning Act. Although the appeals were ordered heard separately, they were initially scheduled together since they pertained to the approval of the same proposal. The Tribunal may dismiss the second appeal on the basis that planning requirements are not met. If that were to happen, the Town’s request for review by the court may be moot.

8Further, the Tribunal’s first decision finds the Tribunal has the ability to implement a condition on the second appeal. The Tribunal’s reasons in the decision currently under review leave open the question of whether a condition respecting groundwater will be ordered. If the condition is not ordered on the second appeal, there may be a question of how that result impacts the decision on the first appeal. In any event, whether or not the Tribunal agrees to add the recommended condition, the Tribunal is entitled to reach its decision about Mr. Gagliardi’s proposal without the fragmentation of its process. The court will also benefit from the Tribunal’s reasons on both appeals if one of the parties ultimately seeks to appeal or judicially review the Tribunal’s orders.

9We are not prepared to proceed with the parties’ proposal that the court address only the applicant’s argument about the needs assessment today. Doing so would involve fragmenting the Tribunal’s decision about the public interest into parts and reviewing only a single aspect of that decision. This is precisely the type of involvement the principle of prematurity is intended to avoid.

10The application is dismissed as premature. For clarity, the dismissal is without prejudice to the applicant’s entitlement to raise the same arguments before this court once the Tribunal’s process is complete. In addition, the applicant’s timeline for doing so would only start once the Tribunal has rendered a final decision on Mr. Gagliardi’s cemetery proposal.

11The costs of today are to be awarded in the cause.

Kurke, J.

O’Brien, J.

Brownstone, J.