Court File and Parties

CITATION: Talpade v. Yaeck, 2026 ONSC 1219

COURT FILE NO.: DC-25-00000702-0000

DATE: 20260227

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: Vineet Talpade and Twisha Talpade, Moving Parties

and

James Yaeck and AMJ Campbell Toronto East, Responding Parties

BEFORE: Schreck J.

COUNSEL: Vineet Talpade and Twisha Talpade, Moving Parties, self-represented

J. Di Biasi, for the Responding Parties

HEARD: In writing

ENDORSEMENT

[1] Vineet Talpade and Twisha Talpade have initiated proceedings to appeal an order of Sutherland J. of the Ontario Superior Court dismissing their motion for an interlocutory injunction and other remedies. They have been given notice by the Registrar of this court pursuant to r. 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, that the court was considering making an order pursuant to r. 2.1.01(1) dismissing the proceeding on the basis that it appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court and were invited to provide submissions in response. They were asked to address concerns that (1) the proceedings before Sutherland J. were a collateral attack on an earlier order by another judge dismissing a motion for the same relief and which had been the subject of proceedings in the Ontario Court of Appeal; and (2) the history of the proceedings demonstrated an ongoing abuse of the court’s process.

[2] The Talpades made extensive written submissions, which I have carefully reviewed and considered. For the following reasons, I have concluded that these proceedings are a blatant abuse of the court’s process and should be dismissed pursuant to r. 2.1.01(1).

I. HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

A. Commencement of Proceedings in the Superior Court

[3] In 2020, Twisha Talpade and Vineet Talpade entered into a contract with AMJ Campbell to store their household items while they moved to the United States. By 2024, the Talpades owed storages fees totalling $120,000, which they indicated they were unable to pay. AMJ Campbell advised them that it intended to sell their property pursuant to the Repair and Storage Liens Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.25 (“RSLA”), following which the Talpades brought a motion in the Superior Court for an interlocutory injunction to prevent AMJ Campbell from selling the goods.

[4] The Talpades’ motion was heard by De Sa J., who dismissed it on May 6, 2024: Talpade v. AMJ Campbell Company Toronto East, 2024 ONSC 2641. He held that the Talpades should have sought relief in accordance with ss. 23 and 24 of the RLSA, which provides a complete code for resolving disputes relating to stored property. De Sa J. also held that he would not have provided relief in any event as the Talpades had made no efforts to pay the outstanding amounts or arrange alternative storage for their property and were simply attempting to avoid the consequences of their non-payment. It appears that costs were ordered against the Talpades, although the quantum is unknown.

B. Proceedings in the Court of Appeal

[5] On June 7, 2024, the Talpades filed a Notice of Appeal in the Ontario Court of Appeal against the decision of De Sa J. They did not perfect the appeal in accordance with the rules and were notified that it would be dismissed for delay, whereupon they brought a motion for a three-month extension of time as well as a stay of De Sa J.’s decision. That motion was heard on August 26, 2024 by Pepall J.A., who dismissed the stay motion but granted the Talpades an extension of time, but for 30 days rather than the three months they sought.

[6] The Talpades did not perfect the appeal within the time granted by Pepall J.A. Instead, on September 30, 2024, they filed a Notice of Motion seeking an extension of time to file a motion to have Pepall J.A.’s decision reviewed by a panel of the Court of Appeal, as well as an order for such a panel review.

[7] The Talpades’ appeal was dismissed for delay by the Registrar of the Court of Appeal on November 24, 2024, as a result of which they filed a Notice of Motion seeking to have the Registrar’s order set aside, an extension of time to perfect the appeal, and a stay of an auction which AMJ Campbell was arranging to sell their goods pursuant to s. 15(1) of the RSLA.

[8] All of the Talpades’ outstanding motions were heard by Coroza J.A., who released a decision on December 30, 2024 dismissing the motion to set aside the Registrar’s dismissal of the appeal for delay. Coroza J.A. concluded that the Talpades’ conduct “suggests an intention to delay the appeal,” that the delay was not adequately explained, and that the proposed appeal had no merit. As all of the other motions were predicated on the existence of a live appeal, they were also dismissed. Coroza J.A. also made a $5000 costs order against the Talpades.

[9] The Talpades were unhappy with Coroza J.A.’s decision and on January 6, 2025 filed a Notice of Motion to have it reviewed by a full panel of the Court of Appeal. They did not, however, perfect the motion within 30 days as required by the rules and instead brought a motion for an extension of time to perfect the motion for a panel review. The motion for an extension of time was heard by Copeland J.A., who dismissed it on April 17, 2025. She found that the Talpades “are abusing the court’s procedures in order to delay the respondent’s ability to exercise its rights under the RSLA.” The respondents were awarded costs of $5000.

C. Return to the Superior Court

[10] Following Copeland J.A.’s dismissal of their motion, the Talpades brought two motions in the Superior Court of Justice, one seeking an interlocutory injunction preventing AMJ Campbell from selling their property and another seeking a stay of De Sa J.’s order. Those motions were heard on July 24, 2025 by Sutherland J. and dismissed the following day on the basis that the court had no jurisdiction to vary De Sa J.’s order. Sutherland J. also noted that most of the Talpades’ property had already been sold. He awarded costs of $9000 against the Talpades, to be paid within 30 days. He noted that there were already three prior unpaid costs awards against the Talpades and cautioned them about the need to pay these.

D. Proceedings in the Divisional Court

[11] On August 14, 2025, the Talpades filed a Notice of Appeal in this court seeking to set aside Sutherland J.’s costs order. When the respondents pointed out that pursuant to s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, leave is required to appeal a costs order, the Talpades amended their Notice of Appeal on August 14, 2025 to include in the relief sought “An order setting aside that part of the order of Justice Sutherland . . . . which muted the appellant’s motion for particulars concerning the sale of their goods on the ground of mootness” and having the matter remitted to the Superior Court “for proper determination on the merits.”

E. Continuation of Proceedings in the Court of Appeal

[12] Despite having attempted to re-initiate proceedings in the Superior Court and then in this court, the Talpades continued to pursue proceedings in the Court of Appeal by bringing a motion to have Copeland J.A.’s April 17, 2025 decision reviewed by a full panel. That motion was heard on August 27, 2025 by Sossin, Favreau and Wilson JJ.A., although the Talpades had unsuccessfully attempted to have it adjourned. They had also unsuccessfully attempted to have the president of the panel, Sossin J.A., recuse himself on the basis that his denial of their adjournment request created a “conflict of interest.” On September 9, 2025, the panel dismissed the motion and awarded costs of $5000 to the respondents: Talpade v. AMJ Campbell Co. Toronto East, 2025 ONCA 615.

[13] The Talpades then filed a motion for reconsideration of the panel’s decision. After issuing a r. 2.1.01 notice, a panel of the Court of Appeal (Trotter, Gomery and Dawe JJ.A.) dismissed the motion as frivolous, vexatious and abusive, finding that “The Moving Parties continue to engage in an abusive course of conduct whereby they attempt to re-litigate matters that have already been decided”: Talpade v. AMJ Campbell Co. Toronto East, 2025 ONCA 888. However, the order was later set aside on January 19, 2026 when it was discovered that the Talpades had filed responding materials which the court had been unaware of: Talpade v. AMJ Campbell Co. Toronto East, 2026 ONCA 30. As a result, the Talpades’ motion for reconsideration remains outstanding.

E. Continuation of Proceedings in the Divisional Court

[14] On January 23, 2026, the parties attended a case management conference before me at which I requested to be provided with the materials that were before Sutherland J. A further conference was scheduled for February 11, 2026 to discuss whether the Talpades were required to bring a motion to extend time or a motion for leave to appeal to this court. However, upon reviewing written submissions provided by the parties, I cancelled the case conference and issued the following directions:

1. The subject of the proposed appeal is the decision of Justice Sutherland dismissing a motion for an interlocutory injunction. Regardless of the reason why it was dismissed, this was an interlocutory order. Section 19(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act provides that an appeal to this court requires leave to appeal.

2. The moving parties (as they are properly referred to given the requirement that they obtain leave to appeal) first filed a Notice of Appeal against the costs order of Justice Sutherland, which they later amended to include grounds of appeal against the dismissal of the motion. That Notice was filed 21 days after Justice Sutherland’s decision, six days after the 15-day deadline in Rule 61.03(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Given the short period of time and the fact that the moving parties are self-represented, nothing would be served by requiring them to file an additional notice. In all the circumstances, the notice that has been filed should be treated as a Notice of Motion for an Extension of Time and Leave to Appeal.

3. The Registrar is directed to issue a notice to the moving parties pursuant to Rule 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure that the court is of the view that it may be appropriate for the court to make an order pursuant to Rule 2.1.01(1) dismissing the proceeding on the basis that it appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court. The moving parties will have 15 days to respond by filing written submissions of no more than 10 pages in length. Any such submissions should address the concern that Justice Sutherland’s order was in response to a motion seeking the same remedy as was sought in the motion that was dismissed by Justice De Sa in 2024, whose decision the moving parties attempted unsuccessfully to have reviewed in the Court of Appeal. This raises a concern that the motion before Justice Sutherland was for a remedy he had no jurisdiction to provide, a collateral attack on Justice De Sa’s order, and an abuse of the court’s process.

II. ANALYSIS

[15] The proceedings thus far can be summarized as follows. The Talpades are seeking leave to appeal Sutherland J.A.’s decision not to set aside De Sa J.’s decision, which is the subject of an outstanding motion in the Court of Appeal for a reconsideration of a panel’s decision refusing to vary Copeland J.A.’s decision refusing to grant an extension of time to bring a motion for a panel review of Coroza J.A.’s decision not to set aside a dismissal for delay and an extension of time to bring a motion for a panel review of Pepall J.A.’s decision refusing a three-month extension of time (but granting a 30-day extension) to perfect their appeal from De Sa J.’s decision. The Talpades are the subject of costs orders totalling $24,000 in addition to whatever amount was ordered by De Sa J., none of which have been paid.

[16] The abuse of the court’s process is self-evident. The Talpades have already unsuccessfully sought various remedies from two judges of the Superior Court and nine judges of the Court of Appeal. To allow them to use up the further judicial resources required to have three judges of this court consider their motion for leave to appeal, which is devoid of merit, would serve only to perpetuate the ongoing abuse of the court’s process. To put it simply, enough is enough.

[17] The proceedings are dismissed pursuant to r. 2.1.01 on the basis that they are frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court’s process.

Schreck J.

Date: February 27, 2026