CITATION: Bokhari v. Top Medical Transportation Services, 2026 ONSC 1073
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-160-00JR
DATE: 2026/02/20
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Backhouse, D.L. Corbett, Rees JJ.
BETWEEN:
Ali Bokhari
Anna Rosenbluth, Nabila F. Qureshi, and
Applicant
Richa Oza, for the Applicant
- and -
Top Medical Transportation
Aaron Rosenberg, for the Respondent Top
Services and Human Rights
Medical Transportation Services
Tribunal of Ontario
Respondents
Morgana Kellythorne and Mindy Noble, for
the Respondent Human Rights Tribunal of
Ontario
Ilinca Stefan, for the Intervener ARCH
Disability Law Centre
Saneliso Moyo and Ikram Handulle, for
the Intervener Black Legal Action Centre
Maryth Yachnin and Taneeta Doma, for
the Intervener Migrant Workers Coalition
Megan Evans Maxwell, for the Intervener
Human Rights Legal Support Centre
Roger Love, for the Intervener Ontario
Human Rights Commission
HEARD at Toronto: November 24, 2025
REASONS FOR DECISION
Rees J.
I. Overview and background
[1] Mr. Bokhari was employed as an ambulance driver. He alleged that he injured his right ankle. After seeking medical attention, he alleged that he emailed his employer with a medical note and asked for two weeks off so that he could recover. His employer terminated his employment a week later, responding “i consider you quitting”.
[2] Mr. Bokhari commenced an application before the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal. He alleged discrimination in employment based on disability. He asserted that he suffered an injury to his dignity and financial harm because of his termination. He sought monetary compensation and an order that his former employer undergo training on their obligations under the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 (the Code) to accommodate disability.
[3] Seven months later, the Tribunal wrote to Mr. Bokhari with a Notice of Intent to Dismiss. The Notice stated that an adjudicator had reviewed his application and determined that his application appeared to be outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Notice alleged that his application failed to identify any specific acts of discrimination within the meaning of the Code and also stated that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over general allegations of unfairness.
[4] The Tribunal sent the Notice under r. 13 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure (the Tribunal Rules). When a Notice is issued, the Tribunal Rules do not require that the employer be served with the application nor that the employer provide any response or disclosure.
[5] In response to the Notice, Mr. Bokhari filed further submissions setting out what he alleged were the specific acts of discrimination within the meaning of the Code and explained why his application came within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
[6] Two months later, the Tribunal issued a decision dismissing Mr. Bokhari’s application (the Jurisdictional Decision).[^1] The Tribunal did not hold an oral hearing, having considered the issue of jurisdiction in writing. It concluded that there was nothing in Mr. Bokhari’s application or submissions in response to the Notice that indicated a connection to the Code and that the application did not therefore fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
[7] Mr. Bokhari applied for reconsideration. He made additional, extensive submissions in support of his reconsideration request. He also filed the medical note and the email correspondence with his former employer which were referenced in his application form.
[8] The Tribunal dismissed his request for reconsideration (the Reconsideration Decision).[^2] In doing so, the Tribunal disclosed for the first time in this matter that it had made its Jurisdictional Decision based on “a balance of probabilities”, consistent with a January 2021 protocol and subsequent December 2022 Practice Direction on Jurisdiction (the Practice Direction). The Tribunal acknowledged that it had not applied the test which it historically used in jurisdictional screening, in which the Tribunal would only dismiss the application for lack of jurisdiction if it were “plain and obvious” that the application is outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
[9] Before this court, Mr. Bokhari seeks judicial review of both decisions. He argues that the Tribunal’s decisions were unreasonable.
[10] First, he says that the Tribunal applied an extended interpretation of jurisdictional questions that was unreasonable given the text, context, and purpose of the Code. Second, he argues that the Tribunal unreasonably applied the wrong test in the context of jurisdictional screening under r. 13—applying a balance of probabilities standard instead of the settled plain and obvious threshold. Third, he contends that the Tribunal’s interpretation of “disability” conflicts with binding jurisprudence. Finally, he argues that the decision was procedurally unfair because the Notice did not provide him with meaningful notice that the case he had to meet was whether his injury was a disability within the meaning of the Code.
[11] Mr. Bokhari’s former employer, Top Medical Transportation Services, appeared but did not make substantive submissions given it had not been called on to respond before the Tribunal. The Tribunal therefore responded to Mr. Bokhari’s application for judicial review.
[12] The Tribunal opposes Mr. Bokhari’s application for judicial review on three bases. First, it argues that in determining whether an application is within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, it was reasonable to require Mr. Bokhari to plead a factual basis linking the alleged adverse treatment with a Code-protected characteristic. It contends that the preliminary screening of applications for jurisdiction is an important tool to control its process and manage its workload. Second, the Tribunal argues that it reasonably applied a balance of probabilities standard to its determination of jurisdiction. Finally, it argues that it met the requirements of procedural fairness when it provided notice to Mr. Bokhari of its concerns regarding whether it had jurisdiction over his application.
[13] I would grant Mr. Bokhari’s application for judicial review for three reasons. First, dismissing his application as a matter of jurisdiction was unreasonable. The question of whether Mr. Bokhari’s physical infirmity is a “disability” within the meaning of the Code is an arguable substantive question requiring a hearing on the merits. Second, it was unreasonable for the Tribunal to lower the test for jurisdictional screening under r. 13 from “plain and obvious” to a balance of probabilities. Third, it was unreasonable to conclude that there was no arguable case that Mr. Bokhari’s ankle injury is a disability under the Code on the facts alleged and the law.
II. Issues
[14] The application for judicial review raises the following issues:
a. Was it reasonable for the Tribunal to consider, as a jurisdictional issue, whether Mr. Bokhari’s ankle injury was a disability?
b. Was it reasonable for the Tribunal to adopt the balance of probabilities standard in determining whether it had jurisdiction over Mr. Bokhari’s application?
c. Was it reasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that there was no arguable case that Mr. Bokhari’s ankle injury is a disability on the facts alleged and the law?
d. Did the Tribunal give Mr. Bokhari adequate notice of the case to meet in its Notice of Intention to Dismiss his application?
III. Analysis
A. Standard of review
[15] All agree that the reasonableness standard of review applies to the Tribunal’s Jurisdictional Decision and Reconsideration Decision: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, at para. 65.
B. The Tribunal’s Jurisdictional Decision
[16] The Tribunal began its analysis by recognizing that to properly engage the Tribunal’s process, an application must come within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. It then considered that its jurisdiction is limited to enforcement of the Code, which only prohibits actions that discriminate against people based on their enumerated ground(s) in a protected social area. It observed that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over general allegations of unfairness unrelated to the Code.
[17] The Tribunal then turned its analysis to Mr. Bokhari’s application. It summarized Mr. Bokhari’s application and his submissions in response to the Notice. With respect to the latter, the Tribunal observed that Mr. Bokhari argued that his ankle injury constituted a disability under the Code and that his request for two weeks off work constituted a request for accommodation of his disability. The Tribunal noted that Mr. Bokhari argued that his employer breached its duty to accommodate because it did not provide the requested leave and failed to inquire whether a duty to accommodate existed.
[18] The Tribunal next considered the duty to inquire. It held that the issue was whether Mr. Bokhari’s ankle injury was a disability within the meaning of the Code. It held that if there is no disability, there is no duty to accommodate. It further held that there was nothing in Mr. Bokhari’s application form or submissions that could support a determination that, based on a reported ankle injury, the employer knew or ought reasonably to have known that the applicant was a person with a disability and therefore they should have engaged in the duty to inquire whether accommodation was needed to avoid discrimination.
[19] The Tribunal reasoned that, based on Mr. Bokhari’s materials, the employer was not given sufficient knowledge to trigger the duty to inquire. It held that “beyond the doctor’s note indicating that the applicant had suffered an ankle injury and required two weeks off, no other information, for example that treatment beyond the one doctor’s visit was required or sought, was conveyed.”
[20] The Tribunal then considered Mr. Bokhari’s ankle injury and determined that it was not a disability within the meaning of the Code because it was a transitory condition. The Tribunal reasoned that there was nothing in his application or submissions that indicated that his injury was not a transitory condition expected to resolve in two weeks. The Tribunal relied on three of its decisions to conclude that common, transitory ailments such as a turned or swollen ankle are not disabilities under the Code. (I note that two of these decisions followed full oral hearings on the merits and the third followed a summary hearing. None were jurisdictional decisions.) The Tribunal acknowledged that there were other cases in which the Tribunal had found that transitory conditions were disabilities under the Code but chose not to follow them.
C. The Tribunal’s Jurisdictional Decision was unreasonable
(a) The Tribunal performed a merits review, not a jurisdictional analysis
[21] Although the Tribunal framed the issue as being one of jurisdiction, its analysis shifted to a merits review based on Mr. Bokhari’s application and submissions in response to the Notice. The Tribunal moved almost immediately from assessing whether Mr. Bokhari’s pleadings fell within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to determining whether he could succeed in his application. The Tribunal foreclosed Mr. Bokhari’s claim by choosing the narrower of two lines of authority in deciding whether the type of ankle injury sustained by Mr. Bokhari qualified as a disability under the Code.
[22] This is not a proper jurisdictional analysis; it is a disguised merits review. This approach impermissibly collapses the merits of the claim—as pleaded—into the threshold question of whether an application is within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
[23] The Legislature gave the Tribunal broad jurisdiction under s. 39 of the Code “to exercise the powers conferred on it by or under this Act and to determine all questions of fact or law that arise in any application before it.” Whether an applicant has a disability within the meaning of the Code—that is, the interpretation of the Code and its application to the facts—is the very essence of a question of law that arises in an application before the Tribunal.
[24] The Supreme Court has held that whether the elements of a statutory human rights claim are made out is not a jurisdictional question: Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 31, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 230 [CHRC]. The court considered this in the context of a decision by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal about whether alleged discriminatory conduct had occurred in the context of a “service” available to the public. Like the Code, the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6 only permits the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal to order remedies where discrimination occurs within a prescribed social area, such as services. The court held that what falls within the meaning of “services” was not a jurisdictional question: “There is no question that the Tribunal had the authority to hear a complaint about a discriminatory practice. …Plainly, the definition of a service under the CHRA is not a true question of vires”: at para. 33. In my view, Vavilov does not affect the conclusion that the meaning of “services” was not a jurisdictional question.
[25] This reasoning applies with equal force to whether Mr. Bokhari’s ankle injury is a disability within the meaning of the Code. There is no question that the Tribunal has the authority to hear Mr. Bokhari’s application about discrimination in his employment. Whether Mr. Bokhari’s injury constitutes a disability under the Code is not a question of jurisdiction. Rather, it is a question for the merits of his application.
[26] To be clear, it was not open to the Tribunal on a jurisdictional analysis to choose between two lines of Tribunal authority to decide whether Mr. Bokhari has a disability under the Code. Once it is understood that the claimed infirmity could arguably be a “disability”, there is no jurisdictional basis to dismiss the claim. This is because determining whether someone has a disability under the Code requires a contextual rights-based inquiry, which considers the socio-political dimensions of discrimination: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal (City); Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Boisbriand (City), 2000 SCC 27, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665 [Boisbriand]; Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 2000 SCC 28, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703. This is inherently a contextual, fact-based inquiry, not a jurisdictional one. I will return to this point below.
[27] A technical or narrow reading of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction that moves the determination of disability as a protected characteristic from the merits of an application to the jurisdictional stage is unreasonable. The approach adopted by the Tribunal hinders the achievement of the Code’s objectives and potentially deprives applicants who have been discriminated against of the Code’s protection. It denies applicants the opportunity to adduce at a hearing the necessary factual context as to why they have a disability and creates a barrier to accessing a remedy under the Code. Applicants must be permitted to demonstrate through evidence that they have a disability within the meaning of the Code.
[28] This is not to say that every application must proceed to a full hearing. There are various tools available to the Tribunal that permit it to dismiss applications that should not proceed to a full hearing: see e.g. Pellerin v. Conseil scolaire de district catholique Centre-Sud, 2011 HRTO 1777, at paras. 13-18.
[29] One mechanism is the summary hearing under r. 19A to determine whether an application should be dismissed in whole or in part because there is no reasonable prospect it will succeed. In this respect, this court has recognized that “Rule 19A is a responsible and rational attempt by the Tribunal to prudently use its limited resources to facilitate access for persons bringing applications that might reasonably succeed”: Gill v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario et al., 2014 ONSC 1840 (Div. Ct.), at para. 12, leave to appeal to Ont. C.A. refused, CA M43732 (September 5, 2014), leave to appeal to S.C.C refused, [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 483. It goes without saying that any decision under r. 19A must itself be procedurally fair and reasonable given the applicable constraints.
[30] That said, summary hearings on the merits are distinct from jurisdictional screening under r. 13. Here, assessing whether Mr. Bokhari’s ankle injury qualified as a disability was not the appropriate question when screening for jurisdiction.
(b) Applying a balance of probabilities standard to jurisdictional screening was unreasonable
[31] Mr. Bokhari argues that the balance of probabilities standard applied by the Tribunal in its Jurisdictional Decision was unreasonable. I agree.
[32] Mr. Bokhari learned for the first time from the Tribunal’s Reconsideration Decision that it applied a balance of probabilities standard to the question of its jurisdiction. The Reconsideration Decision points to a January 2021 protocol and the December 2022 Practice Direction, which was released about a week after the Tribunal’s Jurisdictional Decision.
[33] The Tribunal’s Jurisdictional Decision does not explain why it applied a balance of probabilities standard. Nor does the Tribunal’s Reconsideration Decision, beyond pointing to the Practice Direction and protocol. The Practice Direction does not explain the reason for changing the standard for finding that it is “plain and obvious” that an application is outside of its jurisdiction to the new standard of determining jurisdictional issues on a balance of probabilities. We were not pointed to any other decision justifying the use of the new standard.
[34] It is not apparent what the Tribunal’s balance of probabilities standard means in this context. The balance of probabilities standard is normally understood as the civil standard of proof that applies to fact-finding based on evidence: F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 41.
[35] This, however, cannot be what is meant because the balance of probabilities standard was applied in the context of a r. 13.2 Tribunal-initiated preliminary consideration of jurisdiction, and there is no evidence before the Tribunal at this stage. The determination was made solely based on the application and Mr. Bokhari’s submissions. He did not have an opportunity to marshal a record to support his claim. It follows that the Tribunal is dismissing applications under r. 13 when it concludes that it is more likely than not that an application is outside of its jurisdiction.
[36] The Tribunal departed from its long-settled practice and established internal authority, and the Tribunal did not meet its justificatory burden for doing so.
[37] A review of Tribunal decisions before the 2021 protocol was implemented reveals that the plain and obvious standard was overwhelmingly applied under r. 13. This standard became firmly rooted in the Tribunal’s internal jurisprudence after the Code’s 2006 amendments: see e.g. Masood v. Bruce Power, 2008 HRTO 381; Morin v. Alliance de la function publique du Canada, 2008 HRTO 58; Hotte v. Ontario (Finance), 2008 HRTO 63; Battaglia v. Maplehurst Correctional Complex, 2009 HRTO 1167, at para. 5. Indeed, some adjudicators continue to apply the plain and obvious standard after the adoption of the protocol and the release of the Practice Direction: see e.g. Burnside v. Service Ontario, 2021 HRTO 263, at para. 4; Rachel Sword v. Exceldor Foods, 2022 HRTO 706, at para. 4; Pal v. Toronto District School Board, 2022 HRTO 875, at para. 4; and L.L. v. Dollarama Inc., 2022 HRTO 974, at para. 4.
[38] Of course, a tribunal may implement tribunal-wide policies or practices provided they do not compel or induce decision makers to decide against their own conscience or opinion: Iwa v. Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd., 1990 132 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 282, at pp. 327-328, 332-333. But the protocol and Practice Direction were not examples of the Tribunal seeking to foster coherence and avoid conflicting results: Vavilov, at para. 130. Coherence already existed within the Tribunal’s precedent. Rather, it is the protocol and Practice Direction which break with settled practice.
[39] While the Tribunal is not bound by its previous decisions, consistency with past decisions is a constraint on whether a decision is reasonable: Vavilov, at paras. 129 and 131. Where a decision maker departs from longstanding practices, it bears the justificatory burden of explaining that departure in its reasons. This reduces “the risk of arbitrariness, which would undermine public confidence in administrative decision makers and in the justice system as a whole.” Failing to do so renders the decision unreasonable: Vavilov, at para. 131.
[40] The plain and obvious standard is consistent with the test applied by the courts on motions to strike civil claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The plain and obvious standard has also been applied to assess whether a proceeding should be struck because a court lacks the jurisdiction to hear it: e.g. Benarroch v. Abitbol, 2018 ONCA 203, at para. 7 (appeal brought in the wrong court); and Windsor (City) v. Canadian Transit Co., 2016 SCC 54, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 617, at para. 24 (application brought in the wrong court).
[41] The plain and obvious standard responds to the policy concern that “if there is a chance that the plaintiff might succeed, then the plaintiff should not be ‘driven from the judgment seat’”: Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., 1990 90 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, at p. 980. This policy concern applies with even greater force in the context of human rights legislation, given its quasi-constitutional nature and its objective of eliminating discrimination.
[42] Applying the balance of probabilities standard to jurisdictional questions inevitably results in screening out, at a threshold stage, applications that appear unlikely to fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal but which, with the benefit of a factual record and argument, would ultimately be determined to be within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. This results in applicants who have been discriminated against being denied the Code’s protection. Managing workload and efficiency cannot justify this result. A higher threshold must be met before the Tribunal can reasonably close its doors to applicants on jurisdictional grounds under r. 13.
[43] Jurisdictional issues may arise outside of r. 13 screening, for example at a summary hearing or at a hearing on the merits. In some instances, deciding a jurisdictional question may require the Tribunal to resolve a factual dispute. For example, there may be a factual dispute as to whether the application was brought within one year after the incident to which the application relates under s. 34(1)(a) of the Code. Another example would be where there was a dispute about whether the alleged discrimination occurred in Ontario or, for instance, Alberta. These factual determinations would properly be decided on a balance of probabilities at a summary hearing or at a hearing on the merits.
[44] In sum, the Tribunal’s application of the balance of probabilities standard to r. 13 jurisdictional screening was unreasonable.
(c) It was unreasonable to conclude that there was no arguable case that Mr. Bokhari’s ankle injury is a disability under the Code on the facts alleged and the law
[45] I have already concluded that the decision was unreasonable because it engaged in a disguised merits review rather than a jurisdictional analysis. But I cannot leave unaddressed the Tribunal’s analysis of the merits of whether Mr. Bokhari’s ankle injury was, based on the facts alleged, a disability under the Code.
[46] The Code defines “disability” to include, “any degree of physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement that is caused by bodily injury…”: s. 10(1)(a).
[47] Here, the Tribunal held that while a Code-protected disability may result from an injury, there was nothing in the application or submissions in response to the Notice to indicate that the applicant’s injury was not a transitory condition expected to resolve in two weeks. It identified two lines of Tribunal authority on whether transitory injuries are Code-protected and chose the narrower one. It held that Mr. Bokhari’s injury fell within the line of cases which do not find such transitory conditions to be Code-protected.
[48] The Tribunal’s analysis focused on the nature of the injury itself. It reasoned that “the applicant’s injured state was of short duration; they asked for two weeks off to recover. It does not appear from the information provided, that the ankle was broken”. The Tribunal concluded that “[t]here is no factual basis provided to indicate that the injury was so serious as to cause ‘substantial ongoing limits’ in the applicant’s activities or that they could not perform their job ‘for a significant period of time’”.
[49] The Tribunal’s analysis of Mr. Bokhari’s ankle injury was unreasonable because it adopted a biomedical model of disability and did not engage in a socio-political analysis of disability, as required by the governing jurisprudence.
[50] Over 25 years ago, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the exclusive application of the biomedical model of disability and held that human rights legislation requires a socio-political dimension to the analysis: Boisbriand, at para. 77. This is also referred to as a multidimensional model or analysis of disability. As the court explained:
This is not to say that the biomedical basis of “handicap” should be ignored, but rather to point out that, for the purposes of the [Quebec] Charter, we must go beyond this single criterion. Instead, a multi-dimensional approach that includes a socio-political dimension is particularly appropriate. By placing the emphasis on human dignity, respect, and the right to equality rather than a simple biomedical condition, this approach recognizes that the attitudes of society and its members often contribute to the idea or perception of a “handicap”. In fact, a person may have no limitations in everyday activities other than those created by prejudice and stereotypes.
[51] According to the Supreme Court, it follows that a disability may be the result of “a physical limitation, an ailment, a social construct, a perceived limitation or a combination of all of these factors. It is the combined effect of all these circumstances that determines whether the individual has a [disability]”: Boisbriand, at para. 79. See also Granovsky, at paras. 26-7, and 29.
[52] Examining these factors requires a careful contextual analysis in which the alleged discrimination occurred. This is necessary to determine whether an actual or perceived ailment causes the applicant to experience the loss or limitation of opportunities to take part in the life of the community on an equal level with others: Boisbriand, at para. 80. This is a highly fact-based evaluation.
[53] The Tribunal engaged in none of this analysis—and could not have done so in the absence of a factual record. It was bound by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to do so.
[54] And while the Supreme Court in Boisbriand acknowledged that “normal ailments” like a cold “will generally not” constitute a disability because there is “normally not a negative bias” against these ailments, the court did not lay down a hard and fast rule that transitory injuries were necessarily excluded from the meaning of disability. In this regard, the court was careful to emphasize that the multidimensional analysis of disability required under human rights legislation focuses on “obstacles to full participation in society rather than on the condition or state of the individual”: at para. 82.
[55] None of this is new ground for the Tribunal. There is a long line of Tribunal authority that is consistent with the multidimensional analysis of disability. See e.g. Boodhram v. 2009158 Ontario Ltd (A Buck or Two #342), 2005 HRTO 54, at para. 19; Hinze v. Great Blue Heron Casino, 2011 HRTO 93, at para. 22; and Hill v. Spectrum Telecom Group Ltd., 2012 HRTO 133, at paras. 23-4. The Tribunal has also recognized that the determination of whether an applicant has a disability requires evidence and is a fact-based inquiry: Avati v. Inter-Ontario Equipment Rental and Repair Ltd., 2025 HRTO 1870, at para. 34.
[56] On the facts alleged, it is arguable that Mr. Bokhari’s ankle injury is a disability under the Code. It follows that it was unreasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that there was no arguable case that Mr. Bokhari’s ankle injury is a disability under the Code on the facts alleged and the law.
[57] Before leaving this point, I observe that Mr. Bokhari’s application form and submissions also provide an arguable basis that his employer knew or ought reasonably to have known that Mr. Bokhari was a person with a disability, triggering the duty to inquiry.
D. It is unnecessary to address any other issues
[58] Given my proposed disposition of these issues, I would not address the other issues argued on this application.
IV. Disposition
[59] For these reasons, I would grant the application for judicial review and set aside the Jurisdictional Decision. Because the only reasonable conclusion is that Mr. Bokhari’s application is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, I would not remit it for a new hearing under r. 13. Instead, Mr. Bokhari’s application should proceed to the next stage in the Tribunal’s process before a different adjudicator.
V. Costs
[60] The parties have agreed that there shall be no costs on the application for judicial review.
Rees J.
I agree:
Backhouse J.
I agree:
D.L. Corbett J.
Released: February 20, 2026
CITATION: Bokhari v. Top Medical Transportation Services, 2026 ONSC 1073
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-160-00JR
DATE: 2026/02/20
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
ALI BOKHARI
Applicant
- and –
TOP MEDICAL TRANSPORTATION
SERVICES and HUMAN RIGHTS
TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
Respondents
REASONS FOR DECISION
Released: February 20, 2026
[^1]: Reasons reported at Bokhari v. Top Medical Transportation Services, 2022 HRTO 1424.
[^2]: Reasons reported at Bokhari v. Top Medical Transportation Services, 2024 HRTO 229.