ODC 2023

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) to screen out his complaint against a police officer.

The applicant had complained about the officer's investigation into an alleged assault, asserting the officer failed to lay charges, mischaracterized the incident, and ignored his injuries.

The OIPRD determined under s. 60(4) of the Police Services Act that it was not in the public interest to deal with the complaint, finding no evidence of malice or bad faith by the officer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the OIPRD's decision was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Review Body decision revoking his rent-geared-to-income (RGI) subsidy and a subsequent decision refusing to reconsider the revocation.

The applicant's subsidy was revoked after he failed to provide original tax documents and submitted falsified documents.

The Divisional Court held that the initial revocation was reasonable.

While the Review Body erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the decision simply because the applicant was no longer a tenant, the court found that declining reconsideration was nonetheless reasonable given the 18-month delay and the applicant's failure to provide valid documentation.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its Rule 21 motion for delay.

The motion sought to determine that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the respondent's action, which challenged the results of a statutory appraisal process under the Insurance Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the appraisal process is final and binding, subject only to judicial review.

The court held that a lack of jurisdiction cannot be treated as a mere irregularity and that delay in bringing a Rule 21 motion challenging jurisdiction should generally only result in costs consequences, not dismissal of the motion.

The action was stayed for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a Master's order granting the respondent leave to discontinue its defamation action.

The appellant argued that his outstanding anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act precluded the respondent from discontinuing the proceeding, relying on the statutory stay in s. 137.1(5).

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory prohibition on taking 'further steps' does not prevent a plaintiff from moving to bring the entire proceeding to an end with prejudice.

The court found the Master had jurisdiction and properly exercised her discretion to grant leave to discontinue on terms that barred subsequent actions.

The applicant, a school board trustee, sought judicial review of the school board's decisions finding he breached the code of conduct, imposing sanctions, and confirming those decisions.

The breach involved extreme and disrespectful comments made during a debate on adding gender identity and expression to the code of conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the board had the authority to reconsider an initial vote that failed to find a breach, and that the subsequent decisions reasonably balanced the applicant's Charter rights with the board's statutory objectives to promote a positive and inclusive school climate.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Landlord and Tenant Board decision without first exhausting statutory appeal rights under s. 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Board moved to quash the application on this basis.

The court dismissed the motion to quash, noting that the Court of Appeal's recent decision in Yatar shifted the jurisprudential ground regarding the necessity of exhausting appeal rights before seeking judicial review.

The court deferred the issue to be decided by the panel hearing the application.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal a Landlord and Tenant Board decision awarding him compensation for an illegal lockout.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the short delay was unexplained, the proposed appeal raised only questions of fact rather than law, and the justice of the case favoured finality given the modest damages and the moving party's unreasonable claims.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision upholding the constitutionality of Bill 66, which amended the Labour Relations Act to deem municipalities as non-construction employers.

The union argued this violated section 2(d) of the Charter by nullifying their collective agreements and subcontracting protections.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board correctly applied binding precedent and that the amendments did not substantially interfere with the right to a meaningful process of collective bargaining.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her discrimination and reprisal application against her former employer.

The HRTO had found that the applicant signed a full and final release during a mediation, and that allowing the application to proceed would be an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the judicial review, finding that the HRTO's procedural rulings were fair, its credibility assessments were entitled to deference, and its overall decision was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision awarding him $5,000 in nominal damages and $1,130 in special damages for an aborted real estate assignment agreement.

The appellant argued damages should have been assessed at the closing date rather than the date of breach, which would have yielded $195,000 due to a rising market.

The respondent cross-appealed, arguing nominal damages should be $1.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no procedural unfairness or error in principle in the motion judge's decision to assess damages at the date of breach, as the appellant failed to prove he could not re-enter the market at that time.

The City of Toronto and the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation appealed a decision holding that 'Air Parcels'—stratified parcels starting above the ground—are not 'land' under the Assessment Act until fixed to the ground.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that at common law, real property includes the air space above the ground.

The court held that the statutory definition of 'land' in the Assessment Act expanded upon, rather than restricted, the common law definition.

Consequently, the severed air parcels qualify as 'land' and are subject to assessment and taxation even before any structures are built.

The applicant sought judicial review of an OIPRD report that found her complaint against police unsubstantiated.

After the OIPRD lost jurisdiction because the implicated officer resigned, the applicant argued the court had inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying complaint.

The court issued a Rule 2.1 notice considering dismissal of the application as frivolous.

The court held it had no jurisdiction to decide the complaint but permitted the applicant to amend her application to seek only certiorari to quash the OIPRD report, given her concerns about issue estoppel.

The applicant Health Unit sought judicial review of a labour arbitration award that found it breached the collective agreement by offering straight-time payouts for accumulated comp time during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Health Unit argued the breach was authorized by the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act and O. Reg. 116/20.

The Divisional Court determined the standard of review for interpreting the emergency order was correctness.

Although the court found the arbitration board erred in concluding the Act did not permit orders with financial consequences, it upheld the board's factual finding that the specific measure taken was not 'reasonably necessary' to respond to the outbreak.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The self-represented appellant appealed two Small Claims Court decisions arising from an auto repair dispute: a costs order following a successful nonsuit motion by one defendant, and a final order dismissing the action against the remaining defendants.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the costs appeal required leave which was not sought, and that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors.

The court also rejected the appellant's allegations of procedural unfairness and judicial bias, noting the trial judge properly managed the proceeding and the appellant's unreasonable conduct.

The self-represented moving party sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal two orders appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee as her litigation guardian in proceedings arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the 2017 order, finding no basis for an extension as the order had been relied upon for years.

However, the court granted the extension regarding the 2019 order, finding that the moving party had a timely intention to appeal, there was no prejudice to the respondents, and the justice of the case warranted allowing her the opportunity to seek leave, despite the weak merits of the proposed appeal.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated July 15, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

In the absence of a costs outline, costs were fixed at a reduced amount of $2,500 payable to the responding parties.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated August 24, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Morgan J. dated August 15, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal.

On agreement of the parties, costs of the motion were awarded to the moving parties in the amount of $7,000 inclusive.

The College of Early Childhood Educators appealed a penalty order imposing a four-month suspension and conditions on an early childhood educator for failing to supervise a child and breaching professional standards.

The College sought revocation of the educator's license, arguing the penalty was clearly unfit and inconsistent with the misconduct findings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Discipline Committee properly considered mitigating factors, including a five-year period where the educator could not work due to unproven abuse allegations, and did not err in applying the principle of proportionality.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his motion for contempt against the respondent mother for alleged breaches of a final family law order, including terms requiring joint decision-making for the children's medical care.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law, no material misapprehension of evidence, and no denial of procedural fairness by the motion judge.

The court emphasized that contempt is a remedy of last resort in family law and that the motion judge properly exercised his discretion in managing the hearing and dismissing the ill-conceived motion.