2016 ONSC 4721
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-15-0010
DATE: 2016/07/22
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Honourable Mr. Justice Labrosse
BETWEEN:
Ryan Untinen
Appellant
– and –
Derrick Dykstra c.o.b. as Dykstra Roofing & Renovations and IKO Industries Ltd.
Respondents
Donald B. Shanks, Counsel for the Appellant
Micheal Harris, Counsel for the Respondents Derrick Dykstra c.o.b. as Dykstra Roofing & Renovations
Jordan Duplessis, Counsel for the Respondent IKO Industries Ltd.
HEARD: June 6, 2016
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
[1] The Appellant/Plaintiff, Ryan Untinen, appeals from the Reasons for Judgment by the trial judge of the Small Claims Court arising from a claim for damages from the Respondent Derrick Dykstra’s installation of a new roof on the Appellant’s home.
[2] The judgment awarded the Appellant damages in the amount of $750.00 and otherwise dismissed his claim for the value of a full roof replacement. The Appellant was not awarded any costs arising from the trial. The trial judge also dismissed the claim as against the manufacturer of the roof shingles, the Respondent IKO Industries Ltd. (“IKO”). With respect to the costs claimed by IKO, the trial judge awarded costs to IKO in the amount of $3,000 and denied the Appellant’s request for a Sanderson Cost Order to make the Respondent Dykstra liable for those costs.
[3] The appeal concerns the decision of the trial judge to allow the representative of IKO to provide opinion evidence without having filed an expert report prior to trial. The Appellant also appeals the trial judge’s failure to formally qualify IKO’s expert witness, along with his decision to allow the expert witness to testify on issues beyond the scope of the evidence he was initially allowed to provide. Finally, the Appellant appeals the trial judge’s refusal to grant a Sanderson Order and his reliance on an endorsement from a settlement conference in making his decision on costs.
[4] For the reasons that follow, the appeal should be allowed in part. The trial judge properly exercised his discretion with respect to the opinion evidence and in refusing to grant the Sanderson Order. However, in calculating the Appellant’s damages, the trial judge erred in his interpretation of the evidence and made a palpable and overriding error which had a direct impact on the outcome of the trial by reducing the damages estimated by IKO’s expert witness. The expert witness gave an estimate of the cost to repair the damage to this roof and the trial judge should have allowed this amount without any reduction.
Factual Background
[5] In 2005, the Appellant hired the Respondent Dykstra to install a new roof on his home. Dykstra used Marathon Shingles, manufactured by the Respondent IKO. By 2006, the Appellant noticed bumps over the new shingles and called Dykstra, who attributed the bumps to a faulty compressor and had a worker undertake repairs.
[6] A few years later, some shingles blew off the Appellant’s home during a windstorm. He contacted the Respondent Dykstra, who again undertook some repairs. On September 2, 2011, Thunder Bay experienced a violent hail storm. At that time, the Appellant decided to contact his insurance company to have someone look at his shingles. Although no hail damage was found, the Appellant’s insurer advised him that the shingles appeared to be cracking and that his policy would not cover such a claim. Upon discovering this, the Appellant contacted the Respondent again, who attempted to assist him by pursuing the Respondent IKO under the warranty. IKO denied the Appellant’s claim on the basis that the warranty had expired.
[7] Shortly thereafter, the Appellant’s insurer wrote him again. The letter stated that the problems he was experiencing with the shingles were the result of improperly placed nails. The Appellant obtained various assessments of the condition of the roof which generally concluded that the shingles were wearing prematurely and noted “cracking…loose shingles, exposed nail heads…” but did not suggest a solution. The Appellant’s consultants also concluded that nails had been applied incorrectly.
[8] In preparation for trial, the Appellant filed its expert reports in accordance with Rule 18.02 of the Rules of the Small Claims Court, O. Reg. 258/98, at least 30 days before the trial date. The Respondents did not file any expert reports, but Derek Fee, the representative at trial for the Respondent IKO, was permitted to give opinion evidence with respect to shingles the Appellant had sent in for testing. He concluded that the Appellant’s roof could be repaired by a method called “hot sealing” and did not need to be completely replaced.
[9] The parties disagree as to whether it was an error in law for the trial judge to allow Mr. Fee’s opinion evidence. Mr. Fee was not properly qualified as an expert. The trial judge attempted to remedy this procedural deficiency by giving the Appellant wide latitude to cross-examine Mr. Fee on his credentials. No adjournment was sought by either party at that juncture in the trial, and the trial judge concluded that the Rules of the Small Claims Court do not require an expert report to be delivered prior to the Court’s receipt of opinion evidence.
[10] In his Reasons for Judgment, the trial judge found that portions of the roof did suffer from improper installation by the Respondent Dykstra. He accepted Mr. Fee’s evidence that hot sealing was the appropriate repair. He found that 25% of the roof required hot sealing and, based on Mr. Fee’s estimate that the cost to hot seal the entire roof would be $2,000, ordered damages of $500. He also assessed the costs of nailing down lifted nails at $250, for a total damage award of $750.
[11] The Appellant’s claim against the Respondent IKO was dismissed. In his Costs Decision, the trial judge referenced the settlement offer made by IKO to the Appellant that was not accepted. On this basis, the trial judge awarded IKO $3,000 payable by the Appellant. He rejected the Appellant’s argument that he was entitled to a Sanderson Order for those costs to be payable by the Respondent Dykstra.
[12] Finally, regarding the Appellant’s claim against Dykstra, the trial judge did not accept the Appellant’s submission that an endorsement by a deputy judge following a Settlement Conference ought not to have been disclosed, as an alleged abrogation of Rule 13.03(4) of the Rules of the Small Claims Court. The trial judge held that the Rule is not applicable in circumstances where a settlement was reached during the course of a settlement conference. However, the trial judge held that an appropriate disposition with respect to the Appellant’s claim against Dykstra would be no order as to costs.
Issues
[13] Whether the trial judge erred in law with respect to expert/opinion evidence by:
(a) permitting opinion evidence from the Respondent IKO’s witness Derek Fee who was not qualified as an expert, did not submit an expert report, and was not an impartial witness; and
(b) ignoring the rule in Browne v. Dunn as no cross-examinations were requested of the Appellant’s expert witnesses, but evidence contrary to their positions was permitted.
[14] Whether the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact relating to the competing evidence on the damaged shingles.
[15] Whether the trial judge erred in law with respect to his Costs Decision by:
(a) improperly referencing discussions from a settlement conference; and
(b) applying the wrong test to determine if a Sanderson Order was required for the costs awarded to IKO should have been paid by the Respondent Dykstra.
[16] I will address these issues in turn.
Standard of Review and Powers of the Divisional Court on Appeal
[17] On an appeal from a judge, the standard of review on questions of law is correctness. On questions of fact, the standard is palpable and overriding error, while on questions of mixed fact and law, the standard is palpable and overriding error, unless there is an error with respect to an extricable question of law: see Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, at paras. 8, 10, 36.
[18] Specifically, when considering questions of mixed fact and law, the Supreme Court of Canada in Housen stated at para. 36:
Matters of mixed fact and law lie along a spectrum. Where, for instance, an error with respect to a finding of negligence can be attributed to the application of an incorrect standard, a failure to consider a required element of a legal test, or similar error in principle, such an error can be characterized as an error of law, subject to a standard of correctness. Appellate courts must be cautious, however, in finding that a trial judge erred in law in his or her determination of negligence, as it is often difficult to extricate the legal questions from the factual. It is for this reason that these matters are referred to as questions of “mixed law and fact”. Where the legal principle is not readily extricable, then the matter is one of “mixed law and fact” and is subject to a more stringent standard. The general rule, as stated in Jaegli Enterprises, supra, is that, where the issue on appeal involves the trial judge's interpretation of the evidence as a whole, it should not be overturned absent palpable and overriding error.
[19] The Supreme Court of Canada also stated at para. 55 of H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401, that the language of “palpable and overriding error” and “clearly wrong” found in the case law “encapsulate the same principle: an appellate court will not interfere with the trial judge’s findings of fact unless it can plainly identify the imputed error, and that error is shown to have affected the result”.
[20] With respect to the powers of the Divisional Court on appeal, subsection 134(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, sets out the powers of a court hearing an appeal. Generally, unless otherwise provided, the court can make any order or decision that ought to or could have been made by the court or tribunal appealed from, order a new trial, or make any other order or decision that is considered just. A new trial should not be ordered unless some substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred: see Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 134(6), (7).
[21] Further, subsection 134(4)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act deals with determination of facts on appeal, allowing the Court to draw inferences of fact from the evidence, provided that the inference is not inconsistent with a finding that has not been set aside.
Analysis
The Opinion Evidence by the Representative of the Respondent IKO
[22] The main ground of appeal pursued by the Appellant relates to the decision to allow opinion evidence from Derek Fee, the representative of the Respondent IKO. In addition, the Appellant raises the failure by the trial judge to hold a voir dire and properly qualify Mr. Fee, together with the failure by the trial judge to ensure that Mr. Fee was an impartial witness and to limit the scope of his opinion evidence to the interpretation of the reports prepared by IKO.
[23] On the trial judge’s decision to admit opinion evidence without a report having been filed 30 days prior to trial, the Appellant relies on Tosti v. Society of the Madonna Di Canneto of Windsor Inc., 2011 ONSC 339, 275 O.A.C. 108 (Div. Ct.), in support of his position that the Rules of the Small Claims Court require service and filing of an expert report prior to trial.
[24] The Respondents rely on Prohaska v. Howe, 2016 ONSC 48 (Div. Ct.), in support of their position that there is no such absolute requirement and that the Small Claims Court trial judge retains discretion over the evidence to be presented at trial; all of the circumstances of the matter must be considered in deciding if expert evidence should be received where no prior written report was served and filed.
[25] In Prohaska, LeMay J. specifically reviews the findings of Nolan J. in Tosti together with other jurisprudence. This leads her to the conclusion that there is to be a balancing of how evidence is admitted, and that in considering that balance, Small Claims Court judges can exercise discretion in deciding if opinion evidence should be admitted in the absence of a prior written expert report having been served and filed.
[26] In Prohaska, the trial judge ruled that the expert evidence was inadmissible in the absence of prior service of an expert’s report. The Divisional Court held that Rule 18.02 of the Rules of the Small Claims Court allows for flexibility: expert reports should be served at least 30 days prior to trial, but trial judges have the discretion (by virtue of their gatekeeping role) to allow expert evidence even if the report was not filed ahead of time, as long as they exercise their discretion reasonably.
[27] In Parkkari v. Lakehead Aluminum Ltd., 2014 ONSC 4167, 324 O.A.C. 8 (Div. Ct.), the trial judge admitted a document the Respondent claimed he had never seen. On appeal, Harvison Young J. relied on authorities which state that Rule 18.02 of the Rules of the Small Claims Court is an enabling provision and not a prohibition. It enables the admission of documents which might otherwise be excluded as hearsay but it does not prohibit evidence which has not otherwise complied with Rule 18.02: see Parkkari, at para. 21. The Divisional Court concluded that while Rule 18.02 mandates the admission of documents that fall within its terms, it does not require the exclusion of documents that do not fall within its terms.
[28] Consideration must also be given to the direction given by section 27(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, which states:
Evidence
- (1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), the Small Claims Court may admit as evidence at a hearing and act upon any oral testimony and any document or other thing so long as the evidence is relevant to the subject-matter of the proceeding, but the court may exclude anything unduly repetitious.
[29] Further, section 27(2) of the Courts of Justice Act provides that a Small Claims Court trial judge has the discretion to admit any oral or documentary evidence, whether or not sworn, affirmed or admissible in any other court.
[30] After reading the provisions of section 27 of the Courts of Justice Act and the direction provided by the Court in Prohaska, I find that there is no absolute obligation pursuant to the Rules of the Small Claims Court to file a written report prior to trial and that the discretion to admit opinion evidence without a report having been filed in advance of trial lies with the trial judge. I adopt the findings of the Divisional Court in Parkkari that the provisions of Rule 18.02 of the Rules of the Small Claims Court are permissive and not a prohibition. Consequently, any extricable question of law on this issue was decided correctly by the trial judge in this matter.
[31] My conclusion on this issue should not be seen as supporting a practice of not filing expert reports prior to a Small Claims Court trial. I agree with LeMay J. in Prohaska that parties should comply with Rule 18.02 and file expert reports in advance. However, the Rule was not drafted to be mandatory and I believe that the nature of the proceedings in the Small Claims Court mandates that the trial judge retain discretion, which must be applied reasonably. Caution should be exercised when parties wait until trial to present opinion evidence. In such circumstances the trial judge has the discretion to refuse to admit the evidence or possibly grant an adjournment and cost consequences may follow.
[32] I have also considered the application of Rule 18.02 of the Rules of the Small Claims Court and whether the absence of a requirement to file an expert report in advance of trial should lead to an application of Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. In the context of a Small Claims Court trial, I am of the opinion that it would be an error to apply Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Given the nature of the proceedings in the Small Claims Court and the frequent presence of self-represented litigants, it is appropriate to have the trial judge retain jurisdiction for the admission of evidence as provided in section 27 of the Courts of Justice Act.
[33] In turning now to the trial judge’s exercise of discretion in the present case, the Transcript of the Proceedings demonstrates that the trial judge took a gradual approach to the admission of the evidence of Derek Fee, the representative of the Respondent IKO. Initially Mr. Fee was permitted to give evidence concerning IKO’s October 8, 2013 letter report on the testing of the shingles. When Mr. Fee began to stray away from his limited opinion evidence, the Appellant objected and the trial judge made a ruling which referenced Mr. Fee’s qualifications. He also prevented Mr. Fee from testifying on other matters outside his expertise.
[34] The trial judge openly discussed the Appellant’s right to seek an adjournment and later, indicated that he would consider a request for additional relief by the Appellant arising from Mr. Fee’s evidence. The Appellant made no request for an adjournment and did not request any additional relief such as the right to call evidence in reply.
[35] On the issue of hot sealing the roof, this option was addressed in the October 8, 2013 IKO letter report as a potential solution. There was a gap in the evidence at trial as the cost of hot sealing the roof was never quantified in any expert report filed at trial. I am of the view that it was open to the trial judge to allow Mr. Fee to estimate the cost of hot sealing the Appellant’s roof.
[36] Finally, the Appellant refers to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 SCC 23, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 182, in support of his position that the trial judge failed to ensure that Mr. Fee was an impartial witness and that his evidence met the threshold admissibility requirements.
[37] At this point, it must be recognized that there is no requirement under the Rules of the Small Claims Court to sign an acknowledgment of the expert’s duty. While such an obligation has been included as part of Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, no equivalent rule applies in the Rules of the Small Claims Court.
[38] Further, a review of the Proceedings at Trial shows that Mr. Fee’s evidence was initially to deal with the findings in the October 8, 2013 letter report. The trial judge properly noted that he was aware of Mr. Fee’s qualifications and would reserve as to what weight to attribute to the evidence relating to the hot sealing of the roof. When it came to the issue of impartiality, the trial judge was prepared to allow the Appellant latitude to cross-examine on Mr. Fee’s qualifications and whatever other issues he wanted to explore.
[39] I am not satisfied that Mr. Fee’s employment relationship with IKO rendered his opinion evidence inadmissible. The opinion evidence that the Appellant opposes related principally to the condition of the shingles and the extent of the repairs required. There was a gap in this evidence as it was not fully addressed by the Appellant’s experts. The liability to repair the roof was not in the nature of a warranty issue involving IKO, but it was a workmanship issue involving Dykstra. When considering the available evidence before the trial judge together with the four factors set out in R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 (relevance, necessity, absence of an exclusionary rule and a properly qualified expert), I conclude that the trial judge did not make an overriding and palpable error in admitting Mr. Fee’s opinion evidence. I would therefore not give effect to this ground of appeal.
The trial judge’s Failure to Require Compliance with the Rule in Browne v. Dunn
[40] The Appellant claims that the decision of the trial judge to allow the Respondent IKO to present evidence contrary to the evidence of the Appellant’s experts without seeking to cross-examine them was a breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.
[41] As set out by the Appellant, the rule in Browne v. Dunn states that there is a general duty on counsel to put a matter directly to a witness if counsel is going to later adduce evidence to impeach the witness’s credibility or present contradictory evidence: see R. v. Pasqua, 2009 ABCA 247, 9 Alta. L.R. (5th) 89, at para. 17.
[42] The Appellant claims that the trial judge allowed a breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn by allowing Mr. Fee to testify as to the difference between fissures and cracks without having cross-examined the Appellant’s expert on this issue. Further, there was no cross-examination on the extent of the damage to the shingles and on the repair cost for hot sealing the roof.
[43] On the difference between fissures and cracks, I find that the Appellant’s experts did not comment on fissures and how these differ from cracks. As such, there was no contradictory evidence. Further, while Mr. Fee commented on what appeared to be fissures in the shingles, he clearly stated in his evidence that he could not be certain without inspecting those shingles. I find that this was not contradictory evidence.
[44] As for the evidence of Mr. Fee relating to the solution of hot sealing the roof and the associated cost, I find that the Appellant’s experts did not deal with this issue in any sufficient detail to require a cross-examination to satisfy the rule in Browne v. Dunn. The Appellant’s expert Mr. Stephenson only briefly referred to applying a sealant and made no comment on the associated cost. As such, the evidence of Mr. Fee on these issues does not offend the rule in Browne v. Dunn.
Evidence of the Damaged Shingles
[45] The trial judge made an initial finding that he accepted the evidence of Mr. Fee and the Respondent Dykstra whereby a full roof replacement was not required. This finding was available to the trial judge given that none of the Appellant’s experts opined that the condition of the roof required a full replacement.
[46] The Appellant’s appraisal evidence indicated that different colour shingles between the garage and home would reduce the value of the house. However, there was no evidence that to hot seal the roof and replace those shingles which were cracked or had nails popping through could not be an acceptable way to repair the roof. As such, it was open to the trial judge to find that a complete roof replacement was not required.
[47] However, the trial judge’s findings at paras. 91 and 95 of the Reasons for Judgment which conclude that only 25% of the roof needed hot sealing is contrary to the conclusions of Mr. Fee. In estimating the cost of hot sealing the roof, Mr. Fee did not opine that only certain portions of the roof needed to be done and did not specify whether this was even possible.
[48] During his evidence-in-chief, Mr. Fee calculated the cost of hot sealing the roof as being $2,000 “plus the cost of the service call”. He then stated: “So that would mean that the cost of a hand seal repair probably wouldn’t exceed $2,000”. During cross-examination, Mr. Fee stated: “I’ve seen photos of the roof. I know what the pitch is and I know what the size is and that would be sufficient for me to be able to draw a conclusion about what I think the repair cost would be, sir”.
[49] It is clear from Mr. Fee’s evidence that $2,000 does not represent the full cost of hot sealing the roof. Mr. Fee was not questioned on what he meant by “plus the cost of the service call”. This may be a nominal amount or it may be a more significant amount to deal with the labour component of hot sealing the roof. However, the best evidence was that Mr. Fee estimated the cost of hot sealing the roof based on his knowledge of its condition and that his estimate of $2,000 applied to the roof in its current condition.
[50] At para. 95 of the Reasons for Judgment, the trial judge takes the $2,000 figure and applies a 25% discount to arrive at his damage award for hot sealing. My reading of Mr. Fee’s evidence was that he felt the total cost of the repair of the roof would be $2,000, based on the photographs and other information he had. In my view there was no basis to further discount that figure.
[51] Consequently, in further reducing the damages for hot sealing to $500, I find that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error and that he was clearly wrong in his interpretation of the evidence of Mr. Fee that the full cost of hot sealing the roof was $2,000. This error is readily identifiable as having directly affected the result. I would therefore set the damages for repairs to the Appellant’s roof at $2,000 plus the $250 allocated for nailing down lifted nails.
Admission of Settlement Conference Discussions Error in Principle
[52] The Appellant alleges that the trial judge made an error in principle in referring to the endorsement of the settlement conference judge in his Cost Decision. This endorsement was provided to the trial judge during costs submissions by the Respondents.
[53] I disagree with the trial judge that the disclosure of the endorsement would not be a breach of Rule 13.03(4) of the Rules of the Small Claims Court. It does appear to disclose discussions held at a settlement conference. Also, it is irrelevant in a costs decision that a conditional settlement was not finalized following a settlement conference. I agree with the Appellant that this was a breach of Rule 13.03(4).
[54] However, in my review of the trial judge’s Costs Decision between the Appellant and the Respondent Dykstra, it is apparent that the endorsement of the settlement conference judge did not directly affect the result on costs. The trial judge’s decision on costs between the Appellant and the Respondent Dykstra was clearly based on the Appellant’s moderate success at trial. As a result of this decision, I have increased the damage award to the Appellant. However it is clear that the Appellant’s success at trial continues to be moderate given that this trial was focussed on the Appellant’s entitlement to a new roof.
[55] Although I have found that there was a breach of Rule 13.03(4) of the Rules of the Small Claims Court, I see no reason to interfere with the trial judge’s ruling on costs as between the Appellant and the Respondent Dykstra, which continues to be appropriate given the result of my decision.
Sanderson Order against the Respondent Dykstra
[56] The Appellant relies on the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Moore (Litigation Guardian of) v. Wienecke, 2008 ONCA 162, 90 O.R. (3d) 463, in support of his position that the trial judge erred in the assessment of the appropriateness of making a Sanderson Order against the Respondent Dykstra. The Appellant now claims that this Court should make the Sanderson Order.
[57] While the trial judge did not refer to the two-part test set out by the Court of Appeal in Moore (Litigation Guardian of) v. Wienecke for refusing to grant a Sanderson Order, I find that such an order would not be appropriate in the circumstances. The inclusion of the Respondent IKO in the matter was principally based on the applicability of IKO’s warranty and the limitation issue. The issue of deficient shingles was secondary and with the exception of an allegation that some shingles had cracked and needed to be replaced, it would not have formed the basis for replacing the entire roof.
[58] Although I conclude that it was reasonable to include the Respondent IKO in the action, a Sanderson Order would be inappropriate in the circumstances, as Dykstra’s claims against IKO were of a secondary nature. I am unable to conclude that the Respondent Dykstra tried to shift the responsibility on IKO or that he caused the Respondent IKO to be added as a party. The requirements of Moore (Litigation Guardian of) v. Wienecke have not been met. Consequently, these circumstances would not warrant a Sanderson Order being made against the Respondent Dykstra and this ground of appeal is dismissed.
Conclusion
[59] For the reasons set out above, I would substitute the trial judge’s award of $500 for the hot sealing of the affected areas with the amount of $2,000 and grant judgment to the Appellant against the Respondent Dykstra in the amount of $2,250.
Costs
[60] With respect to costs, the parties were not able to agree on the quantum of costs of the appeal. The appeal is successful in part and as such, the Appellant’s entitlement to costs of this appeal is reduced. In the event that the parties are unable to agree on the Appellant’s entitlement to costs, the Appellant may submit written representations not exceeding three pages and dealing with the issue of costs within 15 days of the decision. The Respondent Dykstra for its part will have a period of 15 days to file its written submissions not exceeding three pages.
Honourable Mr. Justice Labrosse
Released: July 22, 2016
2016 ONSC 4721
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-15-0010
DATE: 2016/07/22
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Honourable Mr. Justice Labrosse
BETWEEN:
Ryan Utinen
APPELLANT
Donald B. Shanks, Counsel for the Appellant
AND
Derrick Dykstra c.o.b. as Dykstra Roofing & Renovations and IKO Industries Ltd.
RESPONDENTS
Micheal Harris, Counsel for the Respondents Derrick Dykstra c.o.b. as Dykstra Roofing & Renovations
Jordan Duplessis, Counsel for the Respondent IKO Industries Ltd.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Honourable Mr. Justice Labrosse
Released: July 22, 2016