CITATION: St. Louis v. Capreit LP, 2015 ONSC 5908
COURT FILE NO.: DC-14-29
DATE: 2015-06-04
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
MICHAEL ST. LOUIS AND TREVOR LIGHT
Gabriella V. Deokaran, for the Tenants, Appellants, Responding Parties
Tenants (Appellants/Responding Parties)
- and -
CAPREIT LP
Joe Hoffer and Mark Melchers, for the Respondent, Moving Party
Landlord (Respondent/Moving Party
HEARD: October 9, 2014, at Brampton, Ontario
PRICE J.
REASONS FOR ORDER
NATURE OF MOTION
[1] The tenant, Michael St. Louis, was once employed by the landlord, Capreit LP (“Capreit”), as a property manager. Later, while a tenant of Capreit, Mr. St. Louis complained to the Fire Marshall and the Ministry of Labour of deficiencies in Capreit’s apartment building, where he and his co-tenant, Trevor Light, resided. After inspecting the building and meeting with Capreit’s operations manager for four hours to review Mr. St. Louis’ complaints, the Fire Marshall found deficiencies, which he outlined in an e-mail to the Manager and ordered rectified. The Ministry of Labour also found deficiencies. Nevertheless, Capreit’s current property manager gave a Notice of Eviction to Mr. St. Louis, alleging that he had “harassed” the landlord by making “unfounded complaints to government officials”.
[2] After a two day hearing, Board Member Elisabeth Becket, of the Landlord and Tenant Board, made an order dated January 22, 2014, evicting Mr. St. Louis. In the course of the hearing, she questioned Mr. St. Louis. When Mr. St. Louis stated that he had once worked for Capreit, Member Becket responded, “I’ve been dealing with Capreit as well, for 12 years, probably longer than you’ve worked for them.”
[3] During her questioning of Mr. St. Louis, Member Becket stated that she doubted the truth of the testimony he had just given. Later, in her reasons, Member Becket stated that she found Capreit’s operations manager credible, based on documents and e-mails he had filed. She said they showed that Mr. St. Louis’ complaints were unfounded. Member Becket’s finding in this regard is contradicted by an e-mail from the Fire Marshall, Glenn Bramwell.
[4] Inexplicably, Mr. St. Louis’ lawyer did not raise the Fire Marshall’s e-mail in his cross-examination of Capreit’s manager, or in his examination of Mr. St. Louis, or in his arguments to the Board. However, the e-mail was attached to Mr. St. Louis’ application material, and was contained in a document book that Mr. St. Louis’ lawyer tendered during argument. It was therefore before Member Becket, who was entitled to rely upon it, and had a duty to consider it, as evidence.
[5] Mr. St. Louis appeals to the Divisional Court from Member Becket’s decision on the following two grounds:
a) First, that she was biased, as disclosed by her statement that she had dealt with Capreit for 12 years; and
b) Second, that her reasons disclosed a palpable error, in her acceptance of the landlord’s evidence as credible and supported by the documents, in the face of the Fire Marshall’s e-mail, which confirmed the deficiencies of which Mr. St. Louis had complained.
[6] The landlord moves to quash Mr. St. Louis’ appeal on the ground that it discloses no palpable error of law by Member Becket.
BACKGROUND FACTS
[7] Capreit LP filed an Application with the Landlord and Tenant Board on October 21, 2013, to evict Mr. St. Louis and Mr. Light from their rental unit, 1505-1297 Marlborough Court, Oakville, Ontario.[^1]
[8] Board Member, Elisabeth Becket, made an Order on January 22, 2014, evicting Mr. St. Louis and Mr. Light from their unit, based on the following findings:
a) The landlord did not interfere with the reasonable enjoyment of the tenant’s tenancy; and
b) The landlord had proven their notice and the tenancy between the parties was therefore terminated.
[9] On February 20, 2014, Mr. St. Louis requested an internal review of Member Becket’s order. On March 4, 2014, Board Member, Michael Soo, made a finding that Member Becket’s decision should be upheld.
[10] On March 28, 2014, Mr. St. Louis filed a Notice of Appeal to the Divisional Court in respect of the orders of both Member Becket and Member Soo. The Notice of Appeal sets out the following grounds of appeal, among others:
a) That the Board Member erred in failing to provide adequate reasons explaining why the Appellants were not deemed to be credible witnesses;
b) That the Board Member erred in failing to provide adequate reasons explaining why the evidence provided by the Appellants did not support their allegations;
c) That the Board Member erred by not weighing the evidence in a correct, reasonable, and just manner;
d) That the decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board was not supported by the facts before it and resulted in a palpable and overriding error both in fact and at law; and
e) Such further and other grounds as may be advised, and as the record and transcripts may reveal and that this Honourable Court may permit. [Emphasis added]
[11] Capreit, without notice to Mr. St. Louis, filed a motion on April 17, 2014, to extend the time to have Board Member Becket’s decision reviewed. On June 2, 2014, Board Member Soo declined to lift a stay pending the hearing of the review request.
[12] On July 8, 2014, Capreit moved to quash Mr. St. Louis’ appeal pursuant to s. 134(3) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. The hearing of the motion was adjourned from September 23 to October 9, 2014, at Mr. St. Louis’ request, to permit him to supplement his material with the transcript from the hearing, or excerpts from the transcript.
ISSUES
[13] The Court must determine whether Mr. St. Louis’ appeal raises a legitimate question of law, or whether it is frivolous, vexatious, and manifestly without merit.
PARTIES’ POSITIONS
[14] Capreit asserts that Mr. St. Louis’ appeal does not raise a legitimate question of law and is frivolous, vexatious and manifestly without merit. Mr. St. Louis asserts that Capreit’s motion was brought prematurely, as Mr. St. Louis had not yet perfected his appeal. In any event, he asserts that the motion is without merit and should be dismissed.
ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE
b) Reasonable Apprehension of Bias
[15] Mr. St. Louis asserts that Member Becket’s conduct at the hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. During the course of the hearing on January 20, 2014, the following exchange occurred during Mr. St. Louis’ testimony, between Member Becket and Mr. St. Louis:
Member Becket: Okay, so you’re just there to answer questions right now.
Mr. St. Louis: Okay
Member Becket: So, when did you get this notice?
Mr. St. Louis: I got this, two days after the camera was installed, hence no date, the rest of the residents got it on the 2nd of October, which I have submitted.
Member Becket: So, two days after the camera was installed.
Mr. St. Louis: Correct.
Member Becket: You got a notice that there was a camera
Mr. St. Louis: Without a date on it.
Member Becket: Well, you were there.
Mr. St. Louis: I understand that ma’am but the way it was given to me that after the other residents got it on them on the 2nd, which had a date, mine was given to me on the 3rd, which didn’t have date, which I also find is weird, if you’re going to give a notice –
Member Becket: I know, you have that frame of mind –
Mr. St. Louis: It’s because I used to work with them, I know.
Member Becket: I’ve been dealing with Capreit as well, for 12 years, probably longer than you’ve worked for them. [Emphasis added]
[16] In another exchange, Member Becket makes an early and arguably premature finding that Mr. St. Louis’ testimony was not credible:
Mr. St. Louis: My aggressive behavior in the office, I was quite pleasant about it, there was no need for any aggressive behavior –
Member Becket: Well, I just want to say, it’s a little hard for me to completely believe that testimony you just gave, because you also said that you phoned your lawyer.
[17] These two exchanges above, taken together, raise a genuine issue for determination by the Divisional Court as to whether Board Member Becket was biased in favour of Capreit. The Court of Appeal in Majcenic v. Natale states:
When a Judge intervenes in the examination or cross-examination of witnesses, to such an extent that he projects himself into the arena, he of necessity, adopts a position which is inimical to the interests of one or other of the litigants. His action, whether conscious or unconscious, no matter how well intentioned or motivated, creates an atmosphere which violates the principle that “justice not only be done, but appear to be done”. Intervention amounting to interference in the conduct of a trial destroys the image of judicial impartiality and deprives the Court of jurisdiction. The right to intervene is one of degree and there cannot be a precise line of demarcation but if it can be fairly said that it amounted to the usurpation of the function of counsel it is not permissible.[^2] [Emphasis added]
[18] The Court further states:
In appeals based on errors in the conduct of the trial by prejudgment of issues and undue interventions in the examination of witnesses, the test is not prejudice but whether the image of impartiality, the absence of which deprives the court of jurisdiction, has been destroyed.[^3] [Emphasis added]
[19] In J.M.W. Recycling Inc. v. Attorney-General of Canada, the Court of Appeal states:
…the conduct of the trial cannot be dependent on the merit of the cause. Every litigant is entitled to have his case fully presented and fairly considered.
However, when a litigant, on reasonable grounds, can fairly conclude that the opportunity of putting the full case before the Court was denied, there has been, in my opinion, a substantial wrong done, and it is the duty of an appellate Court to remedy it.[^4] [Emphasis added]
[20] Mr. St. Louis submits that Member Becket, before allowing him to finish answering the questions put to him by his legal representative, interjected and stated, in effect, that she did not believe his testimony to be true. He submits that in doing so, Member Becket denied him the opportunity to elaborate on his answer and present his full evidence to the tribunal. Board Member Becket gave the appearance of having assessed Mr. St. Louis’ credibility prior to hearing all his evidence.
[21] The Court of Appeal in Benedict v. Ontario stated:
…It is right and proper that judges be held to the highest standards of impartiality since they will have to determine the most fundamentally important rights of the parties appearing before them. This is true whether the legal dispute arises between citizen and citizen or between the citizen and the state. Every comment that a judge makes from the bench is weighed and evaluated by the community as well as the parties. Judges must be conscious of this constant weighing and make every effort to achieve neutrality and fairness in carrying out their duties. This must be a cardinal rule of judicial conduct.[^5] [Emphasis added]
[22] The Court considered this issue in Metropolitan Properties Co. Ltd. v. Lannon:
…The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless, if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand.[^6]
[23] Apart from the issue of bias, Member Becket’s consideration of her experience with Capreit in earlier cases, outside Mr. St. Louis’ knowledge or experience, was not permissible. The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in R. v. Bornyk, set aside the decision of a trial judge who had relied on his own research, stating: “It is basic to trial work that a judge may only rely upon the evidence presented at trial, except where judicial notice may be taken.”[^7]
[24] A tribunal’s consideration of extraneous matter subjects its decision to review, even apart from errors of law. If a statutory tribunal exercises the jurisdiction the statute gives to it, it is not subject to the control of the Court, but if it considers extraneous matters, it becomes subject to that control.[^8]
[25] In Service Employees’ International Union, Local No. 333 v. Nipawin District Staff Nurses Association et al., Dickson J., as he then was, stated for the Supreme Court:
A tribunal may, on the one hand, have jurisdiction in the narrow sense of authority to enter upon an inquiry but, in the course of that inquiry, do something which takes the exercise of its powers outside the protection of the privative or preclusive clause. Examples of this type of error would include acting in bad faith, basing the decision on extraneous matters, failing to take relevant factors into account, breaching the provisions of natural justice or misinterpreting provisions of the Act so as to embark on an inquiry or answer a question not remitted to it.[^9] [Emphasis added]
[26] In extraordinary circumstances, courts have declined to interfere with decisions of tribunals that have relied on matter within their own experience, but these have related to general matters within the tribunal’s specific areas of expertise. In Re City of North Vancouver et al. and Lynn Terminals et al., the British Columbia Court of Appeal declined to interfere with a decision of the Assessment Appeal Board which relied on its own experience in arriving at land values.[^10] Similarly, in Amalgamated Transit Union (Local 569) v. Alberta (Industrial Relations Board), the Alberta Queen’s Bench declined to interfere with a decision of the Industrial Relations Board which had relied on its own investigator’s report.[^11] The Ontario Divisional Court, in Re Tandy Electronics Ltd. and United Steelworkers of America et al., declined to interfere with a decision of the Labour Relations Board which, when considering whether the company in the case before it had intentionally impeded unionization, considered factual findings by differently constituted panels of the Board concerning the same company’s treatment of employees seeking unionization. Cory J., speaking for the Court, stated:
In general terms, the continuing responsibility of the Board to monitor the relationships between companies, unions and employees may often render it necessary and essential for the Board to consider prior decisions made by other panels. So long as those prior decisions involve the same union and the same company, are relevant to the issue under consideration, are timely to the issues under consideration, then it would seem to be appropriate for the Board to refer to those decisions. The extent to which they can be utilized must be restricted to the actual decision of the Board together with those findings of fact made by the Board that were essential to its decision. No other findings of fact or evidence that may be contained in the decisions should be considered.
In certain situations, the consideration of a prior finding by a different panel of the Board may be an essential requisite or condition precedent to a subsequent determination of the Board: see Re Tandy Electronics Ltd. and United Steel Workers of America et al. (1979), 1979 1914 (ON SC), 26 O.R. (2d) 68, 102 D.L.R. (3d) 126, 79 C.L.L.C. 15,286.
It should be observed that to hold otherwise would impose practical problems of a well-nigh insurmountable nature. For example, in this case it might well be difficult if not impossible for a union to locate former employees who had been wrongfully dismissed as a result of their union activity. To give force to the argument submitted on behalf of Radio Shack would appear to confer benefits on that party which could litigate most often, a result contrary to the general intent of the Labour Relations Act.[^12] [Emphasis added]
[27] Exceptional circumstances aside, a tribunal is not entitled to rely on information that is extraneous to the proceeding before it, or on facts not proven by the evidence presented to it. This general rule is needed to avoid unfairness, which could otherwise result from decisions based on facts that a litigant and his counsel have not had an opportunity to disprove. In the present case, Mr. St. Louis and his lawyer did not have a fair opportunity to address facts within Member Becket’s personal experience, arising from her prior dealings with Capreit, and the conclusions she may have drawn from those dealings concerning the credibility of Capreit’s representatives. These facts were not derived from the Board’s written decisions, which Mr. St. Louis or his lawyer might have used to circumscribe the facts or give them context. The Member should therefore not have considered them.
[28] Member Becket’s reference to her own previous dealings with Capreit arose during Mr. St. Louis’ testimony, as he sought to explain his conduct in questioning Capreit’s staff by stating that he had previously been employed by Capreit. Member Becket’s statement that she had dealt with Capreit for more than 12 years, likely longer than Mr. St. Louis had been employed by Capreit, was especially problematic. It set her experience against that of Mr. St. Louis, in a contest that Mr. St. Louis could not possibly win. It undermined her impartiality and cast her in the role of an advocate, giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
[29] Member Becket’s questioning of Mr. St. Louis, her apparent making of a finding of his credibility before he had completed his testimony, and her reliance on her own prior dealings with Capreit, raise a legitimate question of law as to whether the appearance of the Member’s impartiality was compromised. In light of the Member’s conduct, I find that Capreit has failed to discharge the onus that it bears in a motion of this kind to demonstrate that Mr. St. Louis’ appeal is frivolous, vexatious and manifestly without merit.
b) Do Member Becket’s reasons disclose a palpable error of fact?
[30] Mr. St. Louis’ appeal raises a further legitimate question of law as to whether Member Becket’s reasons disclose a palpable error of fact. At paragraph 14 of her reasons, Member Becket states: “the landlord’s Operations Manager testified that he spent four hours going over the Tenant’s allegations regarding fire safety with the local Fire Marshall. No deficiencies were found.” This finding is contrary to the Fire Marshall, Glenn Bramwell’s, own e-mail dated April 26, 2013, which states, in part:
Mr. Benvenuto,
I attended the above properties to investigate a complaint received regarding possible fire code violations. During my inspection fire code deficiencies were noted. This is my notice of intent to issue an order and proceed laying charges if the deficiencies list below are not corrected by the compliance date noted.
1297 Marlborough Crt.
• Provide a certificate of inspection, (TSSA), indicating that the elevators have been tested in accordance with the Ontario Fire Code. (Compliance date: May 24, 2013)
• Provide adequate lighting in the parking garage exit stair closest to Monaghan’s restaurant. (Compliance date: May 24, 2013)
• Remove general storage from the underground parking garage. The space is approved for auto storage only. (Compliance date: May 24, 2013)
• Call Fire Dispatch at 905-637-8253, request that the area crew attend the property to unlock the key vault so that you can add the master keys that have recently changed (Compliance date: April 27, 2013)
• Remove redundant wiring and install cover plates on electrical boxes in the A/C room. (Compliance date: May 24, 2013)
• Repair ceiling fire separation in exit corridor south stairs first floor (Compliance date: May 24, 2013)
[31] The Fire Marshall’s e-mail discloses that he found deficiencies in Capreit’s building. Member Becket found Capreit’s Operations Manager credible and upheld Capreit’s Notice of Eviction, which alleged that Mr. St. Louis had “harassed” the landlord by making “unfounded” complaints to officials.
[32] In Housen v. Nikolaisen, the Supreme Court held that an appeal from a trial judge’s findings of fact, or inferences drawn from facts require palpable and overriding error.[^13] An error in applying a legal standard to the facts is a mixed question of fact and law, and also requires palpable error, unless it involved applying an erroneous principle of law. Iacobucci and Major JJ., with whom McLachlin C.J. and L’Heureux-Dubé J., concurred, stated, in this regard:
In this regard, we respectfully disagree with our colleague when he states, at para. 106, that “[o]nce the facts have been established, the determination of whether or not the standard of care was met by the defendant will in most cases be reviewable on a standard of correctness since the trial judge must appreciate the facts within the context of the appropriate standard of care. In many cases, viewing the facts through the legal lens of the standard of care gives rise to a policy-making or law-setting function that is the purview of both the trial and appellate courts”. In our view, it is settled law that the determination of whether or not the standard of care was met by the defendant involves the application of a legal standard to a set of facts, a question of mixed fact and law. This question is subject to a standard of palpable and overriding error unless it is clear that the trial judge made some extricable error in principle with respect to the characterization of the standard or its application, in which case the error may amount to an error of law.[^14] [Emphasis added]
[33] Member Beckett, in stating, “the landlord’s Operations Manager testified that he spent four hours going over the Tenant’s allegations regarding fire safety with the local Fire Marshall. No deficiencies were found.” mischaracterized the Fire Marshall’s findings. This involved an error of fact, since it concerned the Fire Marshall’s determination of whether the condition of the premises was deficient. The Member’s mischaracterization of the Fire Marshall’s finding discloses a palpable error of fact.
[34] Mr. St. Louis’ physical evidence (i.e. the email and log entries) discloses that the Fire Marshall found deficiencies in Capreit’s compliance with the Fire Code.[^15] It would be incorrect to characterize Member Beckett’s finding as a mixed finding of fact and law simply because it involved a conclusion that the condition of the premises failed to meet the legal standard set by the Fire Code. Member Beckett was not substituting her own opinion as to the application of that legal standard for that of the Fire Marshall. She was making a finding of fact as to the conclusion reached by the Fire Marshall himself.
[35] In concluding that there was no deficiency, Member Beckett apparently relied on the testimony of Capreit’s Operational Manager. She apparently failed to consider the e-mail from the Fire Marshall. Mr. Bramwell’s e-mail was clearly the best evidence on the issue of whether there was a deficiency. While counsel failed to examine the witnesses on the e-mail, or refer Member Beckett to it in their arguments, this does not render the e-mail inadmissible as evidence. It was within the discretion of the Board to receive the e-mail and, given its nature and importance, it was the Member’s duty to consider it. Section 15 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act provides:
15.(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), a tribunal may admit as evidence at a hearing, whether or not given or proven under oath or affirmation or admissible as evidence in a court,
(a) any oral testimony; and
(b) any document or other thing,
relevant to the subject-matter of the proceeding and may act on such evidence, but the tribunal may exclude anything unduly repetitious.[^16] [Emphasis added]
[36] Member Becket states, at paragraph 17 of her reasons, “the Operational Manager acknowledged that it is his job to respond to tenant’s concerns but he stated the concerns raised by this tenant were groundless.”[^17] At paragraph 22 of her reasons, she states, “the landlord’s witnesses were credible.” Member Becket’s finding, based on the Operational Manager’s testimony, that the tenant’s complaints were frivolous, when Fire Marshall Glenn Bramwell’s e-mail clearly states the contrary, discloses a palpable error of fact. The Member does not, in her reasons, seek to reconcile the Operational Manager’s testimony with the e-mail, which contradicts it.[^18]
[37] It is no answer to say that counsel failed to question Capreit’s Operational Manager about the e-mail, or that counsel failed to refer to the e-mail in their arguments to the Board. The e-mail was attached to the tenants’ pleadings. Capreit had notice of the tenants’ intention to rely on it, and an opportunity to respond to it. The e-mail was also included in the document book that the tenants tendered in their argument to the Board.
[38] Mr. St. Louis additionally complained to the Ministry of Labour, which also found deficiencies that needed to be addressed.
[39] The fact that the Fire Marshall and Ministry of Labour found deficiencies is determinative as to whether there was a s. 83 violation, and Member Becket failed to address that in her reasons. Capreit’s claim that Mr. St. Louis was guilty of “harassment” was premised on the fact that Mr. St. Louis’ complaints were groundless. Repeated complaints about serious issues such as Fire-Code violations did not amount to harassment as they were necessary to ensure that the violations were rectified. In the face of Capreit’s denial of the deficiencies, the Board’s finding that Mr. Louis’ complaints amounted to harassment undermines the Fire-Code and Capreit’s duty to rectify the deficiencies.[^19]
[40] Based on the Fire Marshall’s e-mail, the Member’s mischaracterization of the Fire Marshall’s finding, her finding that Capreit’s Operations Manager was credible in alleging that Mr. St. Louis’ had “harassed” the landlord by making “unfounded” complaints to officials, and her failure to reconcile her finding with the e-mail from the Fire Marshall, disclose a palpable error of fact material to the order appealed from. On this basis also, I find that Capreit has failed to discharge the onus upon it of demonstrating that Mr. St. Louis’ appeal is frivolous and vexatious and manifestly without merit.
c) Was the eviction order in breach of s. 83 of the Residential Tenancies Act?
[41] The Residential Tenancies Act provides, in part:
83(1) Upon an application for an order evicting a tenant, the Board may, despite any other provision of this Act or the tenancy agreement,
(a) refuse to grant the application unless satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that it would be unfair to refuse; or
(b) order that the enforcement of the eviction order be postponed for a period of time.
(3) Without restricting the generality of subsection (1), the Board shall refuse to grant the application where satisfied that:
(b) the reason for the application being brought is that the tenant has complained to a governmental authority of the landlord’s violation of a law dealing with health, safety, housing or maintenance standards.[^20] [Emphasis added]
[42] Mr. St. Louis’ complaint to the Fire Marshall was a complaint to a governmental authority of the landlord’s violation of a law dealing with health, safety, housing or maintenance standards. The Fire Marshall’s e-mail discloses that the complaint was, in fact, well-founded.
[43] Capreit, at page 4 of its application to terminate the tenant’s tenancy dated October 18, 2013, (Schedule A), states the following as the reason for its application for termination of the tenants’ tenancy:
that the tenants “have harassed and interfered with the Landlords reasonable enjoyment and rights and privileges of the landlord through inundated email, taking pictures of our staff and making frivolous complaints to government bodies; Fire Department, Ministry of Affairs and Housing, Halton Po9lice and Ministry of Labour.”
[44] Section 83(b) of the Residential Tendencies Act sets out that,
…the Board shall refuse to grant the application where satisfied that,
(b) the reason for the application being brought is that the tenant has complained to a governmental authority of the landlord’s violation of a law dealing with health, safety, housing or maintenance standards.
[45] Member Becket’s enforcement of Capreit’s Notice of Eviction, made on the basis that Mr. St. Louis had complained to a governmental authority of its violation of a law dealing with health, safety, housing or maintenance standards, her failure to consider the Fire Marshall’s e-mail in the context of section 83 of the Act, and her failure to exercise her discretion to refuse to grant Capreit’s application for termination on the ground that Mr. St. Louis’ complaints were well-founded, or to explain why she was declining to exercise her discretion, disclose a palpable error of law. For this reason also, I find that Capreit has failed to discharge the onus that it bears in a motion of this kind to demonstrate that Mr. St. Louis’ appeal is frivolous, vexatious and manifestly without merit.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
[46] For the reasons stated above, I find that the tenants’ appeal discloses genuine issues of law which must be determined by the Divisional Court.
[47] Based on the foregoing, it is ordered that:
The Landlord’s motion is dismissed.
If the parties are unable to agree on costs, they shall submit written arguments, not to exceed four pages, and a Costs Outline, by June 18, 2015.
Price J.
Released: June 4, 2015
CITATION: St. Louis v. Capreit LP, 2015 ONSC 5908
COURT FILE NO.: DC-14-29
DATE: 2015-06-04
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
MICHAEL ST. LOUIS AND TREVOR LIGHT
Appellants/Respondents to the Motion
- and –
CAPREIT LP
Respondent/Moving Party
REASONS FOR ORDER
Price J.
Released: June 4, 2015
[^1]: Board File No. SOL-42341-13 [^2]: 1967 267 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 12. [^3]: Ibid. [^4]: 1982 1947 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 10. [^5]: 2000 16884 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 20. [^6]: As cited in: 2000 16884 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 20. [^7]: R. v. Bornyk, 2015 BCCA 28, para. 8 [^8]: Re Tenenbaum et al. and The Local Board of Health for the City of Toronto, 1955 133 (Ont. C.A.), citing Toronto Newspaper Guild v. Globe Printing Company, 1953 10, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 18, 106 C.C.C. 225, [1953] 3 D.L.R. 561 [^9]: Service Employees’ International Union, Local No. 333 v. Nipawin District Staff Nurses Association et al., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 382, 1973 191 [^10]: Re City of North Vancouver et al. and Lynn Terminals et al. (1973), 1973 1326 (BC CA), 35 D.L.R. (3d) 437, [1973] 3 W.W.R. 262 sub nom. City of North Vancouver et al. v. Philps et al. [^11]: Amalgamated Transit Union (Local 569) v. Alberta (Industrial Relations Board), 1981 1158 (AB QB), paras. 16 to 18. [^12]: Re Tandy Electronics Ltd. and United Steelworkers of America et al., 1980 1738 (Ont. S.C.J.) [^13]: 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 (S.C.C.). [^14]: Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, 2002 SCC 33, para. 37 [^15]: Affidavit of Yunjae Kim dated September 19, 2014, paragraph 12. [^16]: Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 22 [^17]: Reasons for Judgment dated January 20, 2014, at paragraph 17. [^18]: Affidavit of Yunjae Kim dated September 19, 2014, paragraph 13. [^19]: Exhibit to the Board Member, Elizabeth Becket on January 20, 2014. [^20]: Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 17, s. 83