CITATION: St. Louis v. Capreit LP, 2015 ONSC 5538
COURT FILE NO.: DC-14-29
DATE: 2015-09-04
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
MICHAEL ST. LOUIS AND TREVOR LIGHT
Gabriella V. Deokaran, for the Tenants
Tenants (Appellants/Responding Parties)
- and -
CAPREIT LP
Joe Hoffer and Mark Melchers, for the Landlord
Landlord (Respondent/Moving Party)
HEARD: October 9, 2014,
at Brampton, Ontario
PRICE J.
COSTS ENDORSEMENT
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
[1] When the property manager, Capreit LP (“Capreit”), moved unsuccessfully for an order quashing an appeal by the landlord’s tenant and Capreit’s former employee, Michael St. Louis, from the Landlord and Tenant Board’s order evicting him, Capreit was unable to come to an agreement with Mr. St. Louis as to whether it should pay his costs of the motion. This endorsement addresses that issue. This endorsement should be read in conjunction with the reasons for the motion.[^1]
BACKGROUND FACTS
[2] The court dismissed Capreit’s motion on the grounds that: (1) the Member of the Landlord and Tenant Board who granted Capreit the order evicting Mr. St. Louis relied on external facts, being her long involvement with Capreit; and, (2) in sustaining Capreit’s complaint that Mr. St. Louis had made unfounded complaints to government officials, the Member had overlooked the fact that his complaints had, in fact, resulted in findings by the Fire Marshall and Ministry of Labour that there were deficiencies, which they had ordered Capreit to rectify. Eviction of a tenant for making a well-founded complaint to a government authority is prohibited by s. 83(3)(b) of the Residential Tenancies Act.
ISSUES
[3] The court must determine whether costs should be paid and, if so, by whom and in what amount.
THE PARTIES POSITIONS
[4] Mr. St. Louis seeks his costs on a full indemnity scale in the amount of $19,554.21 or, alternatively, on a substantial indemnity scale, in the amount of $17,704.63, or, in the further alternative, on a partial indemnity scale. He relies on the fact that he was successful in opposing Capreit’s motion.
[5] Capreit argues that it should not be required to pay the costs of its motion because Mr. St. Louis did not plead the “reasonable apprehension of bias” on the part of the Board Member in his initial Notice of Appeal, and raised it only two days before Capreit’s motion was heard.
[6] Additionally, Capreit repeats the argument it made in support of its motion, submitting that the court’s finding that the Board Member had made a palpable and overriding error by overlooking the Fire Marshall’s e-mail, setting out the deficiencies in the property and ordering the landlord to rectify them, which had been tendered to her as an attachment to the pleadings and in a documents book tendered to her during argument, was unjustified because Mr. St. Louis had failed to mention the document in his oral argument at the hearing.
[7] Capreit also repeats its argument that the court’s finding that the Board Member violated the Residential Tenancies Act by evicting a tenant based on the tenant’s well-founded complaints to government officials was also based on the information contained in the Fire Marshall’s e-mail, which was not brought to the Board Member’s attention at the hearing, even though it was contained in the material tendered to her.
[8] Capreit, in summary, argues that it is premature for this court to issue a costs order at this time, and that the court should reserve the determination of costs to the panel of the Divisional Court that hears Mr. St. Louis’ appeal, where Capreit will have an opportunity to repeat the arguments that it made at the hearing of its motion.
ANALYSIS AND LAW
a) General principles
[9] Justice Boswell set out the general principles governing costs assessments in George v. Landles, where he stated:
The award of costs is governed by section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. C.43 and by Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 131 provides for the general discretion to fix costs. Rule 57.01 provides a measure of guidance in the exercise of that discretion by enumerating certain factors that the court may consider when assessing costs. In addition, the Court must always be mindful of the purposes that costs orders serve. As Perell J. summarized in 394 Lakeshore Oakville Holdings Inc. v. Misek, 2010 ONSC 7238, [2010] O.J. No. 5692 (S.C.J.), at para. 10:
Modern costs rules are designed to advance five purposes in the administration of justice: (1) to indemnify successful litigants for the costs of litigation, although not necessarily completely; (2) to facilitate access to justice, including access for impecunious litigants; (3) to discourage frivolous claims and defences; (4) to discourage the sanctioning of inappropriate behaviour by litigants in their conduct of the proceedings; and (5) to encourage settlements (internal citations omitted).
Ultimately, in fixing an amount for costs, the overriding principles are fairness and reasonableness: Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 2004 14579 (ON CA), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.); and Moon v. Sher (2004), 2004 39005 (ON CA), 246 D.L.R. (4th) 440 (C.A.). In assessing what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances, the Court is not to engage in a mechanical exercise, but rather must take a contextual approach, applying the principles and factors discussed above, to settle on a figure that is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances: Gratton-Masuy Environmental Technologies Inc. (c.o.b. Ecoflow Ontario) v. Building Materials Evaluation Commission, 2003 8279 (ON SCDC), [2003] O.J. No. 1658, at para. 17.[^2]
[10] The Court is guided by the factors set out in Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court may consider, among other factors, the following:
(a) The complexity of the proceeding;
(b) The importance of the issues;
(c) The conduct of any party that tended to shorten or to lengthen unnecessarily the duration of the proceeding;
(d) Any offers to settle;
(e) The principle of indemnity;
(f) The concept of proportionality, which includes at least two factors:
(i) The amount claimed and the amount recovered in the proceeding; and,
(ii) The amount of costs that an unsuccessful party could reasonably expect to pay in relation to the step in the proceeding for which costs are being fixed;
(g) Any other matter relevant to the question of costs.
b) Importance and complexity of the motion
[11] The motion was important to Mr. St. Louis because, had Capreit been successful, he would have been evicted from his rental unit, essentially in reprisal for making well-founded complaints to the Fire Marshall and the Ministry of Labour concerning the deficiencies in the property. An eviction order made in violation of s. 83(3)(b) of the Residential Tenancies Act raises an issue of public importance in that s. 83(3)(b) is designed to ensure compliance by landlords with legislation protecting the health and safety of tenants by protecting tenants who make well-founded complaints from reprisal by their landlords.
[12] The motion was moderately complex. It raised issues of the admissibility of evidence tendered at a hearing before the Landlord and Tenant Board, the test for bias, the limits of the prohibition on a tribunal’s reliance on external facts, the test to be applied to an appeal from a statutory tribunal, and the applicability of s. 83(3)(b) of the Residential Tenancies Act to the facts of this case.
c) Reasonableness and offers to settle
[13] The general rule in a determination of entitlement to costs is that costs follow the event, and will be awarded on a partial indemnity scale.[^3] In special circumstances, costs may be awarded on a higher scale, but those cases are exceptional and generally involve circumstances where one party to the litigation has behaved in an abusive manner, brought proceedings wholly devoid of merit, and/or unnecessarily run up the costs of the litigation.[^4]
[14] Neither of the parties tendered any offers to settle that would affect the determination of costs.
[15] I must consider whether Capreit’s conduct justifies an award of costs against it on a substantial or full indemnity scale. In the normal course, costs are awarded to a successful party on a partial indemnity scale; however, the court has the discretion to order costs payable on a substantial indemnity basis in exceptional cases.[^5]
[16] A motion to quash an appeal as disclosing no palpable error of law by the tribunal is analogous to a motion for summary judgment dismissing an action on the ground that it discloses no genuine issue for trial. The 2010 amendment of Rule 20.06 shifted the burden of persuasion in relation to the costs of such a motion away from the party who has unsuccessfully applied for summary judgment. Before the Rule was amended, the moving party faced a presumption that the party successfully resisting the motion is entitled to costs on a substantial indemnity scale. The amendment shifted the burden to the successful party (whether it be the moving party or the party resisting the motion), who now must demonstrate that costs on a substantial indemnity scale are justified. Rule 20.06 now provides that the court may order the payment of costs of such a motion on a substantial indemnity basis if the party acted unreasonably by making or responding to the motion.
[17] Capreit argues that it should not be penalized for unreasonableness in bringing its motion since it relied on deficiencies in Mr. St. Louis’ Notice of Appeal, which failed to identify a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Board Member as a ground of appeal. The function of a Notice of Appeal is similar to that of pleadings in an action. Justice Farley, in National Trust Co. v. Furbacher, observed that the functions of pleadings are to:
(i) define with clarity and precision the question in controversy between the litigants;
(ii) give fair notice of the precise case which is required to be met and the precise remedies sought; and
(iii) assist the Court in its investigations of the truth and the allegations made.[^6]
[18] Master McLeod, in Canadian Council of the Blind v. Davis, further stated:
A pleading should not be simply a recitation of facts that may support a defence or counter claim. Besides admitting the facts that are true and denying those that are not, the party pleading should approach the matter with a clear understanding of the additional facts that constitute a defence…. Assuming the facts exist to support the theory, those are the facts to be included in the pleading. Because the pleadings establish the boundaries of production and discovery and delimit the issues for trial, the consequences of vague and unfocused pleadings will be exaggerated costs and more difficult pre-trial and trial proceedings.
A reader of pleadings should be left in no doubt what the case is about and what the issues are that must be tried.[^7]
[19] I find that Mr. St. Louis’ Notice of Appeal adequately set out the grounds he relied on in the motion to quash, allowing for the fact that the Notice of Appeal was drafted at an early point in time, before counsel had received the transcript of the hearing. The grounds would likely have been further particularized if Capreit had waited until the transcript from the hearing was completed before bringing its motion to quash the appeal. Mr. St. Louis’ Notice of Appeal set out the following grounds:
a) That the Board Member erred in failing to provide adequate reasons explaining why the Appellants were not deemed to be credible witnesses;
b) That the Board Member erred in failing to provide adequate reasons explaining why the evidence provided by the Appellants did not support their allegations;
c) That the Board Member erred by not weighing the evidence in a correct, reasonable, and just manner;
d) That the decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board was not supported by the facts before it and resulted in a palpable and overriding error both in fact and at law.
[20] Mr. St. Louis’ assertion that the Board Member “erred in failing to provide adequate reasons explaining why the Appellants were not deemed to be credible witnesses” encompassed the fact that the Member rejected Mr. St. Louis’ evidence and accepted that of Capreit’s witness based on her long history of dealings with Capreit, an external fact upon which I found that she was not permitted to rely, and which gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on her part in favour of Capreit.
[21] Mr. St. Louis’ assertions “[t]hat the Board Member erred by not weighing the evidence in a correct, reasonable, and just manner” and “[t]hat the decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board was not supported by the facts before it and resulted in a palpable and overriding error both in fact and at law” encompassed the fact that the Board Member failed to consider the e-mail from the Fire Marshall in concluding that Mr. St. Louis had made unfounded complaints against the landlord.
[22] Had Mr. St. Louis set out his grounds of appeal with greater particularity from the outset, Capreit would have been better able to assess its prospects of success in its motion to quash the appeal. However, Mr. St. Louis’ failure to do so should not obscure the fact that Capreit brought its motion to dismiss the appeal, as disclosing no palpable error, knowing that the Board Member’s order evicting Mr. St. Louis was based on Capreit’s false assertion, before the tribunal, that Mr. St. Louis had harassed the landlord by making unwarranted complaints to government officials. Capreit knew that Mr. St. Louis’ complaints had resulted in an order from the Fire Marshal requiring the landlord to correct the deficiencies in the property, and that the Board Member’s order was therefore in violation of s. 83(3)(b) of the Residential Tenancies Act, which protects tenants from eviction for making justified complaints. Capreit proceeded with its motion in spite of this knowledge.
[23] In considering Capreit’s argument that the lack of particulars in Mr. St. Louis’ Notice of Appeal deprived it of the opportunity to properly assess its prospects of success on the motion, I note that Capreit did not deliver an Offer to Settle even after it received Mr. St. Louis’ final material in response to its motion. This suggests that Capreit was not disposed, even with the benefit of Mr. St. Louis’ full argument, to abandon its motion and avoid the costs of the hearing.
[24] The Court of Appeal for Ontario, in Smyth v. Waterfall, held that solicitor and client costs (i.e. substantial indemnity costs) ought to be awarded where it should have been obvious to the moving party at the time when the motion was brought that it stood virtually no chance of success.[^8] I find that it should have been obvious to Capreit at the time when it brought its motion that it stood no chance of success, unless it prevailed in the factual premise (that Mr. St. Louis had made unfounded complaints to government officials) that it knew to be false.
[25] I find that Capreit’s conduct was unreasonable, having regard to its persistence in pursuing its motion which it knew to be without merit. On this basis, it should be required to pay Mr. St. Louis’ costs on a substantial indemnity scale. However, because Mr. St. Louis’ counsel have charged him even less than the partial indemnity rates they would be entitled to claim, he will be allowed the hourly rates they have charged.
d) Indemnity - The hourly rates charged
[26] In determining the appropriate hourly rates to be assigned to the lawyers involved in the motion, the court follows the approach taken by Aitkin J. in Geographic Resources.[^9] That is, the starting point is the successor of the Costs Grid, namely, the “Information for the Profession” bulletin from the Costs Sub-Committee of the Rules Committee (the “Costs Bulletin”), which can be found immediately before Rule 57 in the Carthy or Watson & McGowan editions of the Rules, and sets out maximum partial indemnity hourly rates for counsel of various levels of experience.
[27] The Costs Bulletin suggests maximum hourly rates (on a partial indemnity scale) of $80.00 for law clerks, $225.00 for lawyers of less than 10 years’ experience, $300.00 for lawyers of between 10 and 20 years’ experience, and $350.00 for lawyers with 20 years’ experience or more.[^10] The upper limits in the Costs Bulletin are generally intended for the most complex and important of cases. Gabriella V. Deokoran, who was Mr. St. Louis’ counsel at the hearing, was called to the Bar in Ontario in 2011, and is entitled to the maximum hourly rate for a lawyer of under 10 years’ experience, having regard to the complexity of the motion. Moses Muyal, a senior counsel who assisted Ms. Deokoran with her costs submissions, was called to the Bar in 1993, and is entitled to the maximum hourly rate for a lawyer of over 20 years’ experience.
[28] The Costs Bulletin, published in 2005, is now dated. Aitkin J. considered adjusting the Costs Subcommittee’s hourly rates for inflation, as Smith J. did in First Capital (Canholdings) Corp. v. North American Property Group,[^11] but the unadjusted rates of the lawyers in her case were only slightly less than the actual fees they charged, so she elected to use their unadjusted rates. Normally, however, it is appropriate to adjust the hourly rates in the Costs Bulletin to account for inflation since 2005.
[29] Based on the Bank of Canada Inflation Calculator, available online,[^12] the current (2014) equivalent of the hourly rates in the Costs Bulletin are $93.52 for law clerks, $263.03 for lawyers of under 10 years’ experience, $350.71 for lawyers of between 10 and 20 years’ experience, and $409.16 for lawyers of over 20 years’ experience.
[30] The court is guided by the rates in the Costs Bulletin, not the actual hourly rates charged. The actual rates charged are relevant only as a limiting factor, in preventing the costs awarded from exceeding the actual fees charged. The Costs Subcommittee’s rates apply to all lawyers and all cases, so everyone of the same level of experience starts at the same rate.
[31] The court adjusts the hourly rate, or the resulting fees, to reflect unique features of the case, including the complexity of the proceeding, the importance of the issues, and the other factors set out in Rule 57.01(1). If an excessive amount of time was spent, or too many lawyers worked on the file, the court reduces the resulting amount of fees accordingly. As long as the resulting amount does not exceed the amount actually charged to the client, the actual fee that the client agreed to pay is irrelevant.
[32] Ms. Deokoran, being a lawyer of under 10 years’ experience, was entitled, according to the Costs Bulletin, to claim a maximum hourly rate of $225 on a partial indemnity scale, in 2005, which translates to $263.03 today. I would round that rate to $265.00. Mr. Muyal was entitled to claim a maximum hourly rate of $350 in 2005, which translates to $409.16 today, which I would round to $410. Ms. Deokoran billed Mr. St. Louis at an hourly rate of $250 and Mr. Muyal at an hourly rate of $350. The court should not award costs in excess of the actual rate the client was charged, which in the present case is below even the hourly rate that counsel were entitled to claim on a partial indemnity scale, and accordingly, the court will allow counsel’s time at the hourly rates they charged.
e) Indemnity - The time spent on the motion
[33] Ms. Deokoran spent a total of 60.5 hours which, at her hourly rate of $250, results in a charge of $15,125. Mr. Muyal spent 5.5 hours which, at his rate of $350, which results in a charge of $1,925. The combined total time was 66 hours, valued at $17,050, inclusive of HST (60.5 hours @ $250) + (5.5 hours @ $350).
[34] The motion was argued on a regular motion day, on which argument of each motion is restricted to less than an hour. In fact, counsel collectively spent 1.3 hours in their arguments (from 10:21 a.m. to 11:38 a.m.). At the court’s invitation, they later submitted written arguments on the issue of the admissibility of the Fire Marshall’s e-mail. Ms. Deokoran claims 4 hours for the initial attendance in court, which may reflect the full morning she spent at court. She claims 1.5 hours to prepare for the motion, including reviewing the motion materials.
[35] Mr. St. Louis’ lawyers spent 37 hours, following the hearing, responding to the court’s invitation to submit written arguments on the issues of admissibility and whether the Board Member was required to consider the Fire Marshall’s e-mail. Ms. Deokoran spent 37 hours following the initial hearing, as follows:
a) 4 hours reviewing the exhibits tendered at the motion;
b) 18 hours preparing and reviewing written arguments, including further research and preparing a book of authorities;
c) 3 hours with Mr. St. Louis reviewing and finalizing the written argument,
d) 4 hours receiving and reviewing the respondent’s written submissions and book of authorities.
[36] Ms. Deokoran spent a further 2.5 hours in correspondence with opposing counsel and Mr. Moses spent 5.5 hours reviewing my reasons and preparing costs submissions.
[37] Mr. Hoffer, who was Capreit’s lawyer at the hearing, has practiced law for 26 years. He spent 12.4 hours, at a partial indemnity rate of $350, or a substantial indemnity rate of $425, for a value of $4,340 on a partial indemnity scale, or $5,270 on a substantial indemnity scale. His associate, Mr. Merchers, who has practiced law for 1.5 years, spent 16 hours at a partial indemnity rate of $150, or a substantial indemnity rate of $200, for a value of $2,400 on a partial indemnity scale or $3,200 on a substantial indemnity scale. Their combined time was 28.4 hours, valued at $6,740 on a partial indemnity scale, or $8,470 on a substantial indemnity scale.
[38] While Mr. Hoffer purports to set out, in his Bill of Costs, the total time he and his associate spent on the motion, he does not provide the breakdown of the time that the court would require to compare the time he spent with the time Mr. St. Louis’ counsel spent on a comparable task. This court has held, on more than one occasion, that when one party attacks another’s costs as excessive, but does not put its own dockets before the court, the attack “is no more than an attack in the air.” In Risorto v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., (2003), Winkler J., then a motion judge, stated:
The attack on the quantum of costs, insofar as the allegations of excess are concerned, in the present circumstances is no more than an attack in the air. I note that State Farm has not put the dockets of its counsel before the court in support of its submission. Although such information is not required under Rule 57 in its present form, and the rule enumerates certain factors which would have to be considered in exercising the discretion with respect to the fixing of costs in any event, it might still provide some useful context for the process if the court had before it the bills of all counsel when allegations of excess and “unwarranted over-lawyering” are made. In that regard, the court is also entitled to consider “any other matter relevant to the question of costs”. (See Rule 57.01(1)(i). In my view, the relative expenditures, at least in terms of time, by adversaries on opposite sides of a motion, while not conclusive as to the appropriate award of costs, is still, nonetheless, a relevant consideration where there is an allegation of excess in respect of a particular matter.[^13]
[39] At the beginning of oral argument on October 9, 2014, the court asked counsel to estimate their costs of the motion to that point. Mr. Hoffer, on behalf of Capreit, stated that on a partial indemnity basis, his client’s costs to that point in time consisted of fees of $7,616, inclusive of HST, and disbursements of $781.52, for a total of $8,397.52. This is the total time that Mr. Hoffer has set out in his Bill of Costs, from which I conclude that he has not included the time he spent responding to the court’s invitation to submit written arguments following the hearing.
[40] Deducting the 37 hours that Mr. St. Louis’ lawyers spent following the hearing of the motion from the 66 hours they spent on the motion as a whole, I conclude that they spent 29 hours up to and including the hearing, all spent by Ms. Deokoran at her hourly rate of $250. This amounts to $7,250, inclusive of HST. This amount is $366.20 less than the amount Mr. Hoffer claims, inclusive of HST, for the same period, on a partial indemnity scale.
[41] The court attached considerable importance to the written arguments that the parties submitted following the hearing. I do not doubt that Ms. Deokoran spent the amount of time she claims on them. On this basis, and in the absence of any evidence from Mr. Hoffer as to the time he spent following the hearing, I find that the time claimed by Mr. St. Louis’ lawyers was reasonably spent.
f) Proportionality and the reasonable expectation of the unsuccessful parties
[42] I find that the $17,337.71 amount which results from allowing Mr. St. Louis’ lawyers’ time at their actual hourly rates, and the total disbursements, is proportionate to the importance of the motion and the interests at stake. For the reasons stated above with regard to the hours spent, I additionally find that amount is proportional to the costs that Capreit incurred in relation to the motion.
g) Other matters relevant to the determination of costs
(i) Deferral of costs
[43] As noted above, Capreit asks the court to defer the determination of costs to the panel hearing Mr. St. Louis’ appeal. The question of whether the costs of the motion should be dealt with now or be left to court hearing the appeal depends on whether the outcome of the motion should have been a foregone conclusion, that is, whether it was a “close call” and whether the arguments made at the hearing of the appeal may shed light on the reasonableness of the motion. In the latter case, it may be best to leave the disposition of costs to the full panel of the appeal court.
[44] In Marini v. Muller, Justice Nordheimer, in the context of a motion for summary judgment, ordered costs to be payable in the cause. The basis for his decision can be found in the following passage:
In my view, in a case such as this where the result of the summary judgment motion was what might fairly be referred to as a “close call”, the appropriate result is to leave the costs in the cause.[^14] [Emphasis added.]
[45] I interpret Justice Nordheimer’s statement to mean that where the result of a summary judgment motion is a close call, in circumstances where the evidence heard at trial is likely to shed some light on whether it was reasonable for the moving party to have brought it, then it may be best to leave the disposition of the costs of the motion to the trial judge. Extrapolating the general principle from his reasoning, I find that although the outcome of Capreit’s motion was not a foregone conclusion, this was only because it needed to be determined whether the facts that Capreit possessed, which demonstrated that Mr. St. Louis’ complaints had been warranted and that the Member’s finding was incorrect, was before the tribunal and should have affected its decision. It is not likely, in my view, that the arguments to be made on the appeal will shed light on the reasonableness of the motion. Capreit’s reasonableness must be assessed with reference to the time when the motion was brought. However, it must also be assessed with reference to the knowledge that Capreit possessed at that time. The evidence that is before me on that issue leads me to the view that it is incumbent on me to deal with costs now, and not to defer them.
(ii) Disbursements
[46] In fixing costs, the court need not undertake a line by line analysis of the hours or expenses claimed, nor should it second guess the amounts claimed unless they are clearly excessive or overreaching.[^15] The defendants have not asserted that the amounts claimed for disbursements are unreasonable and accordingly, I do not propose to reduce the amount payable in relation to them. Disbursements will be allowed in the amount of $254.61 plus HST of $33.10.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
[47] For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that:
a) Capreit LP shall pay to Mr. St. Louis his costs of the motion in the amount of $17,337.71, consisting of the following:
a) Fees: $15,088.50
b) HST: $ 1,961.50
c) Disbursements: $ 254.61
d) HST: $ 33.10
Price J.
Released: September 4, 2015
CITATION: St. Louis v. Capreit LP, 2015 ONSC 5538
COURT FILE NO.: DC-14-29
DATE: 2015-09-04
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
MICHAEL ST. LOUIS AND TREVOR LIGHT
Appellants/Respondents to the Motion
- and –
CAPREIT LP
Respondent/Moving Party
COSTS ENDORSEMENT
Price J.
Released: September 4, 2015
[^1]: St. Louis v Capreit LP, 2014 ONSC 5908. [^2]: George v. Landles, 2012 ONSC 6608 at paras. 4-6. [^3]: Bell Canada v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (1994), 1994 239 (ON CA), 17 O.R. (3d) 135 (C.A.). [^4]: Standard Life Assurance Company v. Elliott (2007), 2007 18579 (ON SC), 86 O.R. (3d) 221 (S.C.). [^5]: Murano v. Bank of Montreal, (1998), 1998 5633 (ON CA), 41 O.R. (3d) 222 at p. 244 (C.A.), citing 131843 Canada Inc. v. Double “R” Toronto Ltd. (1992), 7 C.P.C. (3d) 15 at p. 17 (Ont. Gen. Div), per Blair J. [^6]: National Trust Co. v. Furbacher, [1994] O.J. No. 2385 (Gen. Div.). [^7]: Canadian Council of the Blind v. Davis, 2007 51159 at paras. 13-14 (Ont. S.C.). [^8]: Smyth v. Waterfall (2000), 2000 16880 (ON CA), 50 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.). [^9]: Geographic Resources Integrated Data Solutions Ltd. v. Peterson, 2013 ONSC 1041 at paras. 7 and 11-16. [^10]: “Information for the Profession” bulletin (“the Costs Bulletin”) from the Costs Sub-Committee of the Rules Committee (that the Costs Sub-Committee of the Rules Committee issued to replace the Costs Grid, which it repealed in 2005). The Costs Bulletin has advisory status only and not statutory authority, as it was not included in the Regulation that repealed the Costs Grid. [^11]: First Capital (Canholdings) Corp. v. North American Property Group, 2012 ONSC 1359. [^12]: Available online at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/related/inflation-calculator/. [^13]: Risorto v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (2003), 2003 43566 (ON SC), 64 O.R. (3d) 135 at para. 10 (S.C.), per Winkler J., cited in Springer v. Aird & Berlins LLP (2009), 2009 26608 (ON SC), 74 C.C.E.L.(3d) 243 at paras. 10-17 (Ont. S.C.). [^14]: Marini v. Muller, [2001] O.J. No. 259 at para. 6 (S.C.). [^15]: Fazio v. Cusumano, 2005 33782 (ON SC), [2005] O.J. No. 4021 at para. 8 (S.C.).