Court of Justice

The accused pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon, and breach of probation in a domestic violence context.

The court noted the accused's lengthy history of non-compliance and high risk of violent recidivism.

The court sentenced the accused to 36 months of custody in addition to 99 days of pre-sentence custody credit, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition, a DNA order, and a non-communication order with the victim.

The accused was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

Following the conviction, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The core issue was whether the time the trial judge took to deliberate and render a decision should be included in the total delay calculation under the Jordan framework.

The court held that judicial deliberation time should be excluded from the Jordan calculation, and found that the net delay did not exceed the presumptive 18-month ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, assault with a weapon, fail to remain, assault, and uttering threats following an altercation that began outside a nightclub, continued on the road, and culminated in a McDonald's parking lot.

The court found the accused guilty of dangerous driving and assault with a weapon for deliberately driving his SUV at and striking a pedestrian in the parking lot, as well as failing to remain at the scene.

The accused was acquitted of the assault and uttering threats charges due to reasonable doubt arising from conflicting testimony and the fast-paced nature of the physical altercation.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the offender, who pled guilty to two counts of robbery.

The court reviewed the offender's criminal history and psychiatric evidence regarding his risk of violent recidivism.

The court dismissed the dangerous offender application, finding the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a high likelihood of violent recidivism.

However, the court found that the offender met the criteria for a long-term offender designation, as there was a substantial risk of violent reoffending and a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community.

The Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence across two counts of sexual assault alleged by two separate complainants against a massage therapist.

The accused opposed the application, arguing that the second complainant's evidence was unintentionally tainted by media reports of the first complaint, and that the accounts were too dissimilar.

The court found no evidence of actual or unintentional collusion.

Applying the test for similar fact evidence, the court held that the two accounts shared significant similarities, including the specific nature of the inappropriate touching during the massages.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence in assessing credibility and rebutting defences outweighed any potential prejudice, and granted the application.

The accused was charged with driving over 80 after failing an approved screening device (ASD) test and providing Intoxilyzer samples almost three times the legal limit.

At trial, the accused applied to exclude the breath evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 10(b) rights.

The court found no s. 8 breach, as the officer had reasonable suspicion for the ASD demand and reasonable grounds for the Intoxilyzer demand.

The court found a s. 10(b) breach because the police failed to give a Prosper warning when the accused waived his right to counsel after an unsatisfactory call with duty counsel.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the evidence should not be excluded.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his former girlfriend.

The complainant testified that the accused came to her apartment intoxicated, repeatedly asked for sex, and after she refused and went to sleep, she awoke to find him on top of her with her pajama bottoms pulled down.

A witness staying at the apartment corroborated the complainant's immediate distress and the accused's stated intention to have sex with her.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and corroborated, and found the accused guilty of sexual assault.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, driving over 80, and dangerous driving after a vehicle was seen driving with a heavily damaged wheel throwing sparks.

The court found the circumstantial evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver.

The accused applied to exclude breath test results based on a common law discretion to prevent an unfair trial, following a prior ruling that found a Charter breach but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the application, holding that s. 24(2) is the exclusive mechanism for excluding breath test results obtained following a Charter breach.

The accused was found guilty of dangerous driving and driving over 80.

The Ontario Provincial Police applied for a production order under s. 487.014 of the Criminal Code in relation to a fraud investigation known as Project Gundy.

The investigation concerned syndicated mortgage investments where multiple development projects were never completed and investors were allegedly misled about conflicts of interest, the use of their funds, and the priority of their claims.

The court found that the statutory prerequisites were met and that it was in the best interests of the administration of justice to issue the order to assist investigators in determining whether unlawful business practices occurred.

The application was granted.

The accused was stopped while riding an e-bike and arrested for driving under suspension.

The arresting officer searched the accused's backpack incident to the arrest and discovered fentanyl and marijuana.

The accused challenged the arrest and search under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found the officer's explanations for the arrest and search lacked credibility, concluding the officer was likely conducting an unjustified general criminal inquiry.

The court held the arrest was unlawful and the search unreasonable, constituting flagrant Charter breaches.

The drug evidence was excluded under section 24(2), resulting in the accused's acquittal.

The defendant was charged with driving while holding a hand-held communication device under the Highway Traffic Act.

The police officer observed the defendant holding a cell phone while driving.

The defendant argued the phone was in a mounting device that had fallen from the air conditioning vent and he merely caught it.

The court found the officer's evidence credible and reliable, and held that even if the defendant caught a falling mounting device containing a cell phone, holding it while driving constitutes an offence.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol after losing control of her vehicle and striking a pole.

At trial, she brought a Charter application alleging her s. 10(b) right to counsel was violated at the roadside and at the police station.

The court found no breach at the roadside but concluded a breach occurred at the station when the officer failed to correct her mistaken belief that she could only contact local counsel.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court admitted the breath samples, finding the breach was in the low-moderate range of seriousness and society's interest in adjudicating drinking and driving offences favoured admission.

A finding of guilt was entered.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control and over 80.

She brought a Charter application alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b), arguing the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds and that her right to counsel was infringed due to a staticky phone line when speaking to duty counsel.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the officer had ample objective and subjective grounds based on the accused's driving, physical indicia of impairment, and admissions.

The court also found no s. 10(b) violation, as the accused failed to be duly diligent in exercising her rights and indicated to police that she was satisfied with the legal advice received.

The accused was found guilty of the over 80 charge.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence seized during the execution of search warrants at his residence and motor vehicle, arguing a violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The warrants were based on information from a confidential informant and subsequent police surveillance.

Applying the Debot test, the court found the informant's tip was compelling, the source was reliable, and the information was sufficiently corroborated by police observations of suspected hand-to-hand drug transactions.

The court concluded there were reasonable and probable grounds to issue the warrants and dismissed the application.

The defendant was charged under the Public Lands Act with dredging and filling shore lands without a permit.

The defendant had obtained a permit from the local conservation authority for some work but proceeded to alter the shoreline below the high-water mark without the required provincial permit.

Despite being ordered to stop work, the defendant continued, claiming he needed to protect the shoreline from erosion and mistakenly believing no further permits were required.

The court found that the prohibited acts of dredging and filling were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court rejected the defences of due diligence and officially induced error of law, noting that the defendant continued the unauthorized work even after being explicitly told to stop.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with making child pornography, possession of child pornography, and voyeurism after his common-law partner discovered a surreptitiously recorded video of her eight-year-old daughter in the shower on his Instagram account.

Upon being confronted, the accused deleted the video and subsequently damaged his phone.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, finding he intentionally destroyed evidence.

The court concluded the accused had exclusive opportunity to commit the offences and found him guilty on all counts.