Court of Justice

The accused, Hemraj Lakhan, was charged with sexual assault and failure to comply with a probation order.

The central issue at trial was whether the complainant, K.L., consented to the sexual touching.

The court found K.L. to be a credible witness but had significant concerns about the reliability of her testimony due to memory issues, admitted drug use around the time of the incident, and inconsistent/contradictory statements during cross-examination, including agreeing that her initial claim of non-consent was "make believe" and that she had initiated sex.

Despite corroborating evidence of sexual contact (DNA) and the complainant's distraught post-event demeanour, the court determined that the Crown failed to prove the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the accused was acquitted of both charges.

The applicant father brought a motion to find the respondent mother in contempt of court for wilfully disobeying a final order regarding parenting time and an interim court order.

The mother repeatedly failed to return the child, citing misinterpretations of COVID-19 health guidelines, despite negative tests and police intervention.

The court found the mother in contempt, satisfying the test beyond a reasonable doubt, noting her deliberate actions and disregard for court orders.

Despite the finding, no jail time or fines were imposed due to the mother's medical conditions and existing child protection prohibitions on her parenting time.

The court amended the parenting order, granting primary residence to the father and restricting the mother's contact and future litigation without leave.

The accused, Austin Boyle, was found guilty of assaulting his intimate partner.

The court considered aggravating factors including the violent nature of the assault, abuse of an intimate partner, and significant victim impact.

Mitigating factors included his lack of a criminal record and youth.

The court emphasized denunciation, general and specific deterrence, and rehabilitation.

Despite the accused's lack of remorse and insight, an intermittent 60-day jail sentence was imposed, followed by two years of probation with conditions including restitution, no contact with the victim, counselling (anger management, alcohol abuse, domestic violence), community service, and a weapons prohibition.

A DNA sample was also ordered.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a final parenting order after the respondent mother unilaterally moved with the child from Mississauga to Toronto.

The mother failed to provide proper statutory notice of the relocation under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court found that both parents were equally capable of meeting the child's needs, but the mother's unilateral action disrupted the status quo and the child's established life.

The court ordered that the child's primary residence be with the father in her familiar community, with the mother having weekend parenting time and paying child support.

The applicant, Alex Yizhak, sought a mistrial alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The judge, after delivering a guilty verdict, disclosed the reason for a five-month delay in judgment (a health-related leave) when the accused indicated a potential s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The applicant argued this unsolicited disclosure, which could favour the Crown in a Jordan analysis, constituted bias by shaping the evidentiary record.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, emphasizing the presumption of judicial impartiality and the judge's proactive role in managing proceedings and providing relevant information.

This is a placeholder entry for a decision where the full reasons are not publicly available.

The case involves T.M. and J.N. and was decided by the Ontario Court of Justice on August 10, 2022.

The defendant, Meryem Iftikhar, was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The defense raised a Charter application alleging a breach of her section 10(b) right to counsel and a "regurgitation defense" regarding breath samples.

The court dismissed the regurgitation defense, finding no evidence of mouth alcohol.

However, the court found that Constable Alszegi violated Ms. Iftikhar's right to counsel of choice by waiting only six minutes before offering duty counsel and by steering her towards duty counsel based on his personal practice, rather than providing other means to contact her chosen lawyer or another lawyer.

Despite Ms. Iftikhar having spoken to duty counsel, the breach was deemed serious due to institutional issues.

Applying section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the breath test results, leading to the dismissal of the charge.

This criminal trial concerned a historical allegation of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The complainant alleged that the accused, her cousin, assaulted her when she was 5 and he was 15, disclosing the event 18 years later.

The case relied heavily on the conflicting testimonies of the complainant and the accused, with no corroborating physical or forensic evidence.

Applying the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility, the court found that while the complainant's evidence was persuasive, and the accused's denial was lacking in some respects, collective concerns regarding the delayed disclosure, the complainant's evolving memory, and the absence of corroboration prevented the Crown from proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

Olga Ajgirevitch was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg within two hours of ceasing operation.

She challenged the admissibility of breath samples based on alleged breaches of her Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(b)) and argued the Crown failed to prove the evidentiary requirements for the breath samples.

The court found no Charter breaches, specifically that there was no arbitrary detention or realistic opportunity to consult counsel before the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand.

The court also found the breath samples met the evidentiary requirements despite a deficient sample during the second test.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

Brian Graci was charged with willfully doing an indecent act in a public place, contrary to section 173(1) of the Criminal Code.

The actus reus was undisputed: Graci masturbated in a public courtyard, observed by a witness.

The central issue was the mens rea: whether "willfully" required an intent to be seen, or if indifference or recklessness as to the presence of others was sufficient.

The court, after reviewing conflicting authorities, adopted the latter interpretation, finding that Graci's actions, performed in a public area with medium traffic and facing an office building, demonstrated indifference or recklessness.

Consequently, Graci was found guilty.

This decision addresses costs arising from motions concerning the lifting of a stay order and the imposition of pre-conditions, including security for costs.

The court found divided success but determined the father (respondent) was more successful as meaningful pre-conditions were ordered for the mother (applicant) to lift the stay, particularly regarding her long-standing failure to provide financial disclosure.

The mother's unreasonable conduct in failing to provide adequate financial disclosure led to additional costs.

The court awarded the father $3,600 in costs, payable monthly, with 50% ($1,800) designated as support and enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office.

The offender, Enoch Villanueva, was found guilty of aggravated assault for biting off the tip of the victim's finger during an altercation.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating factors (violence, permanent disfigurement, ongoing victim impact, offender reigniting the fight, and returning to the scene), and mitigating factors (family support, expressed remorse, no prior criminal record).

The court rejected the defence's request for a 90-day intermittent sentence, finding it insufficient for denunciation and deterrence given the severity and lasting impact of the injury.

The Crown sought 8-9 months.

The court imposed a sentence of 6 months jail, followed by 2 years probation with conditions including anger management, a DNA order, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a no-contact order with the victim during custody.

In a child protection application, the father (A.A.) moved for a Section 98 assessment concerning allegations of sexual abuse against him and potential coaching of the children.

The court found the assessment necessary to determine the issues, particularly regarding coaching, as police opinions were deemed insufficient.

The motion was granted, and the court ordered the Children's Aid Society to pay 75% of the assessment costs, with the father responsible for the remaining 25%, including a repayment plan if he could not pay his share upfront.

The accused, Wendel Attard, was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm following a collision.

The Crown alleged that Attard's vehicle, travelling at an excessive speed (112-117 km/hr in an 80 km/hr zone), collided with another vehicle making a left turn, demonstrating dangerous driving.

The defence argued that while the driving might have been dangerous, it did not constitute a "marked departure" from the standard of care required for a criminal conviction, noting that other vehicles were also exceeding the speed limit.

The court found Attard's driving objectively dangerous due to speed and inattention, but ultimately concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct amounted to a "marked departure" from the standard of care of a reasonable and prudent person.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty.

The applicant society brought a motion in a child protection proceeding seeking a declaration that the respondent mother is a special party and requesting the appointment of the Public Guardian and Trustee as her legal representative.

The mother, who has indigenous heritage, had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, was not taking her medication, and had missed recent court appearances.

The court found compelling evidence that the mother was mentally incapable of understanding or appreciating the risks and consequences of her decisions regarding the litigation.

As no family member was willing to act as her representative, the court granted the motion and appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The applicants, charged with various drug trafficking and weapons offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was 915 days.

After deducting defence-caused delay and deliberation time, the net delay was 773 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The Crown argued that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance justifying the delay.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the primary cause of the delay was the Crown's failure to provide timely disclosure, not the pandemic.

As the Crown failed to mitigate the delay or establish exceptional circumstances, the court found a breach of s. 11(b) and stayed the proceedings.