Health Law - OCJ

The applicant, a psychiatrist, sought an order to commit a 17-year-old youth, J.P., to a secure treatment program for 180 days under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The application was opposed by the Family & Children’s Services and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer representing J.P. The court dismissed the application, finding that while J.P. had a mental disorder and a history of substantial threats, the strict statutory criterion requiring evidence of serious bodily harm caused or attempted within 45 days immediately preceding the application was not met.

The court emphasized that secure treatment is an extraordinary measure with significant liberty interests at stake, and the "best interests" of the child, while paramount in general child protection proceedings, is not the test for committal to secure treatment.

The applicants, charged with violating the Quarantine Act, brought numerous pre-trial motions challenging the validity of the charging documents, the legislation itself, the authority of the screening officer, alleged breaches of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (including sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11(a), 11(e), 11(i), and 15), and unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The court dismissed all motions, finding the charging documents valid, the Quarantine Act enforceable, the screening officer's authority established, no Charter breaches proven due to lack of evidence or prior judicial precedent, and no unreasonable delay after accounting for defence-caused delay and the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The matter was remitted for trial.

The defendant, 961557 Ontario Ltd. (The Crooked Cue), was charged with failing to comply with an emergency order by operating an indoor dining area during Stage 2 COVID-19 closures, which only permitted outdoor dining.

The defendant brought a motion for non-suit, arguing the prosecution failed to adduce evidence proving the establishment was not an outdoor dining area.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there was sufficient admissible evidence, direct and circumstantial, which if believed, could reasonably support a finding of guilt.

The court clarified that the test for a non-suit motion does not permit weighing evidence or assessing credibility, distinguishing it from the s.11(b) analysis for delay under R. v. Jordan.

The accused, Chiduben Anthony Okeke, was charged with Aggravated Assault and Failing to Comply with a Recognizance.

Both the Crown and Defence jointly sought a finding of Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) under sections 16 and 672.34 of the Criminal Code.

Two forensic psychiatrists provided reports concluding that the accused suffered from schizophrenia with paranoid and somatic delusions and auditory hallucinations at the time of the offence, rendering him incapable of knowing the wrongfulness of his actions.

The court accepted the joint recommendation, finding the accused NCR for both charges, and issued a DNA order.

The judgment also highlighted the severe impact on the victim, PC Andrew Varao, and raised concerns about the lack of adequate supervision for mentally ill individuals released on bail.

The defendant pleaded guilty to sexual interference against a nine-year-old girl.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of six to nine months, while the defence sought a 12-month conditional sentence order.

The court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence with electronic supervision, followed by three years of probation.

The sentencing was guided by R. v. Friesen and the principle that sexual offences against children warrant denunciation and deterrence, but exceptional circumstances—including the defendant's unresolved mental health issues—justified a non-custodial sentence.

The defendant was also subject to ancillary orders including sex offender registry, DNA collection, weapons prohibition, and a 10-year section 161 order restricting contact with minors.

Application by a family physician for an order committing a 17-year-old youth with a history of traumatic brain injury and complex mental health issues to a secure treatment program at Syl Apps for 180 days.

The youth initially opposed the application but subsequently consented after meeting with the Clinical Director.

The court found that all six statutory criteria under s. 164 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act were satisfied: the youth had a mental disorder (Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Intermittent Explosive Disorder, likely ADHD, and borderline intellectual functioning); had caused or attempted to cause serious bodily harm within 45 days preceding the application; had made substantial threats of self-harm within the preceding 12 months; the secure treatment program would be effective; appropriate treatment was available at Syl Apps; and no less restrictive method of treatment was appropriate.

The court granted the order for the maximum 180-day commitment period.

The Crown brought an application for a warrant to take bodily samples (DNA) from the respondent pursuant to section 487.05 of the Criminal Code.

While the judge found that the statutory preconditions for issuance of the warrant had been met, the application was dismissed without prejudice.

The dismissal was based on the judge's determination that insufficient evidence regarding COVID-19 safety protocols and procedures had been presented to satisfy the requirement that issuance be in the best interests of the administration of justice.

The judge identified ten specific issues that should be addressed in future applications, including safety of sample collection, personal protective equipment availability, screening procedures, and potential collateral consequences for the detainee.

The Crown sought a finding that the defendant was not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder for two assaults committed on strangers.

The defendant opposed the finding.

The court found the defendant criminally responsible, holding that the Crown failed to displace the presumption of criminal responsibility.

The court found that the expert opinion relied heavily on materials not before the court, significantly diminishing its weight, and that the question of the defendant's mental state at the time of the offences was too speculative and tenuous to support an NCR finding.

The accused pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving arising from a head-on collision on Highway 17 near Walden in Greater Sudbury.

The accused deliberately drove his truck into oncoming traffic as a suicide attempt.

One victim (Dawn Ceasar) was killed, and two others (Hartley Ceasar and Jack Ceasar) suffered serious injuries.

The court imposed a 15-month custodial sentence followed by three years probation, rejecting both the Crown's request for 18 months incarceration and the defence request for an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court found that while the accused suffered from depression and demonstrated remorse and rehabilitation efforts, the gravity of the offence and harm to victims required a custodial sentence to satisfy principles of denunciation and general deterrence.

This child protection trial concerns access between an eight-year-old child and her biological father.

The father was convicted of serious violent offences against the mother, including human trafficking, sexual assault, and assault causing bodily harm.

Following his release from prison, a Quebec Superior Court ordered supervised access.

However, the mother relocated to Ontario to avoid implementing that order.

The Society sought a finding that the child is in need of protection and a no-access order.

The father engaged in extensive online harassment of the mother and the child, posting videos, images, and commentary that violated non-publication provisions.

The mother suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression, and made statements about suicidal ideation if access was ordered.

The court found that access is not in the child's best interests at this time, but ordered comprehensive terms and conditions addressing the parents' online conduct and requiring expert assessment of the child's needs regarding her paternal identity.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The defence brought Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The accused, who suffered from bipolar disorder, PTSD, severe depression and anxiety, was living in her car with her therapy dog when stopped by police.

The court found that while the arrest was lawful and the breath demand was made as soon as practicable, there was a breach of the accused's section 10(b) rights to counsel.

Police failed to exercise adequate diligence in contacting the accused's counsel of choice and did not offer her the option of speaking to alternative counsel when her preferred lawyer was unavailable.

The evidence was excluded as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship with no access for two young children apprehended at birth.

The respondent parents sought return of the children with consent to a six-month supervision order.

Following a two-phase trial spanning nearly two years, the court ordered Crown wardship based on the parents' significant mental health diagnoses (father with schizophrenia, mother with a significant personality disorder), the mother's inability to regulate anger and control abusive behavior toward the children and father, the father's lack of engagement and failure to recognize safety issues, and the parents' inability to work therapeutically with child protection services.

The court found that return would be traumatizing to the children.

Access to the biological parents was denied, but access between the two sisters was granted.

The defendant was charged with two counts of mischief and two counts of failing to comply with a probation order prohibiting contact with her neighbours.

The Crown alleged the defendant threw eggs at the neighbours' window, made excessive noise, and engaged in direct contact in violation of the court order.

The court found the mischief charges were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as the egg-throwing did not cause sufficient damage to property and the noise did not substantially interfere with the neighbours' quiet enjoyment of their property.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of both counts of breaching the probation order, as her conduct on both dates constituted unacceptable conduct that violated public peace and good order, and she made direct contact with the neighbours in contravention of the order.

The Crown's application for a mental disorder assessment under section 672.12(3) of the Criminal Code was dismissed, as the Crown failed to establish reasonable grounds to doubt the defendant's criminal responsibility on account of mental disorder.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon following a stabbing incident at a restaurant.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to introduce two statements made by the accused during police interviews.

The court found that the second statement, which comprised virtually the entire Crown case, was not made voluntarily.

The statement was obtained through interrogation techniques characteristic of the Reid technique, including the presentation of fabricated evidence, manipulation of the accused's mental illness, and oppressive conditions including extended questioning without adequate food or rest.

The accused, who suffered from schizophrenia, was subjected to approximately nine and a half hours of questioning over a twelve-hour period.

The court found a reasonable doubt as to voluntariness and excluded the statement.

Without the statement, the Crown conceded there was insufficient evidence to commit the accused for trial, and the accused was discharged on all counts.

An 11-year-old First Nations child from Six Nations of the Grand River was diagnosed with acute lymphoblastic leukemia with a 90-95% cure rate with chemotherapy.

The child's mother withdrew consent for chemotherapy to pursue traditional medicine consistent with their longhouse beliefs.

The hospital applied under section 40(4) of the Child and Family Services Act seeking a protection order.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the mother's decision to pursue traditional medicine constituted an exercise of an aboriginal right protected under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The court held that the child could not be found in need of protection when the substitute decision-maker exercised a constitutionally protected right.

The Crown brought an application under section 672.11(b) of the Criminal Code seeking an assessment order to determine whether the accused was suffering from a mental disorder at the time of committing the offences so as to be exempt from criminal responsibility.

The accused had pleaded guilty to public mischief and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the evidence did not establish reasonable grounds to believe an assessment was necessary.

The evidence consisted of observations of odd behaviour and a statement by the accused that he was schizophrenic and receiving treatment, which was insufficient to meet the threshold for ordering an assessment.

The Crown applied under section 117.05 of the Criminal Code for an order forfeiting firearms and ammunition seized from the respondent and prohibiting him from possessing firearms.

The respondent, who had been apprehended under a Form 1 psychiatric assessment in September 2008 following concerning behaviour at a functional restoration program, opposed the application.

The court found that while the respondent's conduct on September 11, 2008 raised clinical concerns, the assessment must be made at the time of the hearing.

Considering the respondent's lack of criminal record, absence of violence, proper storage of weapons, and his family physician's opinion that he poses no danger to himself or others, the court declined the Crown's application for forfeiture and prohibition orders.

The Crown applied for an assessment of the defendant's fitness to stand trial pursuant to section 672.11(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant, a 26-year-old deaf and non-speaking individual from Nigeria who communicates only through family sign language and is illiterate, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference.

The defence opposed the application, arguing that deafness is not a mental disorder and that the defendant possessed rudimentary understanding of fitness concepts.

The court found reasonable grounds to doubt the defendant's fitness based on expert evidence establishing mental retardation as a mental disorder, despite the defendant's basic understanding of rules and punishment.

The court granted the Crown's application for a fitness assessment, distinguishing its conclusion from a prior ruling by Justice Schneider based on the different evidence presented.

The defendant, a convenience store clerk in her second day of training, was charged with selling tobacco to a person under 19 years of age, contrary to the Smoke-Free Ontario Act.

A test shopper, aged 17, successfully purchased cigarettes from the defendant without being asked for identification.

The defendant claimed she honestly believed the purchaser was of legal age and that she exercised due diligence given the high volume of customers and stressful circumstances.

The court found the defendant guilty, determining that while her belief may have been honest, it was not objectively reasonable, and she failed to meet the required standard of being "scrupulously vigilant" in preventing sales to minors.

The accused was charged with six counts of criminal harassment under Section 264 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown withdrew the sixth count at trial.

The accused pleaded not guilty to the remaining five counts.

The Crown signaled its intention to seek a finding of not criminally responsible following trial.

The trial focused on the accused's conduct toward the complainants, Mark and Donna McBride, spanning from 2000 to 2012.

Key evidence included the accused's name change to McBride in January 2012, surveillance of the complainants' residence, and extensive journals documenting the accused's obsessive interest in Mark McBride.

The court found the accused guilty on counts four and five (threatening conduct causing fear for safety) but dismissed counts one, two, and three (following and repeated communication).

The court did not enter convictions but made findings of guilt only.