Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

The accused sought to strike his guilty pleas to break and enter and possession of stolen property on the grounds that they were involuntary, allegedly coerced by pressure from his parents who faced related criminal charges.

The court found that while the accused was under considerable pressure, including from his parents and the disclosure of fingerprint evidence on the day of trial, the pleas remained voluntary and conscious volitional decisions.

The court rejected the argument that the charges against his parents were meritless or used as leverage, finding instead that they were rooted in compelling evidence.

The application to strike the guilty pleas was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with failing to stop at a red light contrary to subsection 144(18) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of statements made by the defendant to police at the scene of a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown sought to admit the statements as voluntary admissions.

The defendant argued the statements were involuntary and alternatively that they were statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act, thereby violating the common law principle against self-incrimination.

The court found the statements were made voluntarily and that the defendant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that she honestly and reasonably believed she was required by law to make the statements.

The statements were admitted into evidence.

The accused was convicted at trial of communicating via telecommunication to facilitate child prostitution and communicating for the purpose of obtaining sexual services of a person under 18 years old.

The accused responded to an online prostitution advertisement, was informed the girl was 15 years old, engaged in graphic sexual discussions, negotiated price, and attended a hotel to complete the transaction where he was met by police.

The court imposed a global sentence of 12 months imprisonment followed by two years probation with strict conditions, rejecting the defence submission for an intermittent sentence and conditional sentence based on exceptional family circumstances.

The court found that denunciation and general deterrence were paramount in child abuse cases and that the accused's moral blameworthiness was high given his knowledge of the victim's age.

A boxing coach was charged with assault causing bodily harm after sparring with his 13-year-old student, who sustained a concussion.

The court examined whether the coach's conduct exceeded the student's implied consent to contact within the sport of boxing.

Despite evidence that the coach struck the student multiple times and the student suffered a concussion, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct constituted criminal assault.

The court noted the lack of expert evidence regarding boxing rules, inconsistencies in witness testimony, and the possibility that the student's injury resulted from contact with another sparring partner.

The accused was acquitted.

A youth was charged with two counts of assault arising from an incident where burning flammable liquid came into contact with another youth's face and torso.

The Crown alleged the defendant deliberately threw the burning liquid at the complainant.

The defence argued it was an accidental splash caused by the defendant slipping and falling after being struck with water.

The court found the defendant's evidence credible and consistent, and that both versions of events provided reasonable explanations for how the injury occurred.

The court held that the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the defendant on both counts.

The Crown applied to adduce evidence of past threats made by the accused against a former boyfriend of the complainant.

The defence conceded some relevance but argued the details were dated and disputed, potentially diverting the trial from central issues.

The court found the evidence directly relevant to the complainant's credibility and the accused's animus, which were central issues at trial.

The court determined the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect and, noting the judge-alone trial format, allowed the Crown to proceed with the evidence.

The defendant brought two applications to re-open trial proceedings following conviction.

The first application sought to challenge the admissibility of text messages on the basis that they were intercepted without authorization under Part VI of the Criminal Code.

This argument had been rejected by multiple appellate courts and trial courts.

The second application sought to re-open the entrapment hearing based on newly disclosed production order data showing the volume of responses to undercover police advertisements.

The court found that neither application met the legal test for re-opening and dismissed both applications.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a RIDE program stop.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction on the Over 80 count only.

The defence argued that the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were violated and sought exclusion of the Intoxilyzer results under section 24(2).

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, having manufactured evidence of slurred speech and taken an impermissible shortcut by proceeding directly to arrest rather than first administering an approved screening device test.

The court excluded the breath test results and acquitted the accused.

The defendant was charged with three counts of sexual assault and three counts of sexual interference arising from alleged misconduct with three separate young female employees at a fast food restaurant.

The defendant brought a Charter application to stay the charges due to excessive delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the delay application, finding it fundamentally without merit.

On the merits, the court found the defendant not guilty of all charges, determining that while the complainant E presented compelling evidence, the defence evidence created a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt that could not be safely displaced.

The court emphasized the importance of maintaining the presumption of innocence and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in sexual assault cases, despite public concern about such offences.

The accused was charged with "over 80" (operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood).

The defence raised two arguments: (1) a Charter section 11(b) right to trial within a reasonable time, and (2) that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the net delay after deducting defence-caused delay was 9 months and 22 days, below the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for Ontario Court of Justice cases.

The defence failed to demonstrate sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The court also found that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable within the circumstances, with all delays adequately explained or reasonable.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple offences including assault with weapon, forcible confinement, and assault causing bodily harm arising from a pattern of domestic violence against his intimate partner over seven years.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation.

The court declined to designate the accused as a dangerous offender, finding that his violent conduct was not intractable and that there was a realistic possibility of eventual control in the community through intensive treatment offered by Corrections Canada.

The court instead designated him as a long-term offender and imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment followed by a ten-year long-term supervision order with conditions including dialectical behaviour therapy, substance abuse counselling, and intimate partner violence counselling.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking crack cocaine involving the sale of 1.44 grams to an undercover officer for $120.

The Crown sought 90 days' intermittent imprisonment plus two years' probation, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with two years' probation, finding that significant mitigating circumstances, including the accused's status as a first-time offender, genuine remorse, positive rehabilitation efforts, and history of severe trauma, warranted a non-custodial approach.

The court found that collateral consequences of conviction and probation conditions adequately addressed principles of deterrence and denunciation.

Following a five-day trial, the offender was convicted of possessing, accessing, and attempting to distribute child pornography, as well as obstructing police by making a false statement.

The court stayed the accessing charge due to the Kienapple principle.

The offender possessed 5,602 images and six videos of child pornography, described by investigating officers as among the largest, most varied, and most vile collections encountered.

The court imposed a three-year penitentiary sentence, balancing the extreme nature of the offences and the need for denunciation and deterrence against the offender's status as a first offender with significant medical disabilities and likely deportation consequences.

The Crown applied to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct or similar fact evidence in a sexual assault trial.

The accused was charged with sexual assault on July 24, 2015.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of a prior incident occurring seven years earlier.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the prejudicial effect was limited, the Crown failed to establish sufficient probative value to outweigh any prejudice.

The court noted that the single prior incident was temporally remote, the similarities between the incidents were limited, and the defence position was one of complete denial rather than consent or innocent association.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg%.

Following a traffic stop for speeding in a parking lot, the officer observed signs of impairment including erratic driving, slurred speech, and the odour of alcohol.

The accused refused to comply with police directions and demanded a supervisor.

After arrest, the officer failed to read the Approved Instrument demand at the scene, but the breath technician made a timely demand at the station.

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds for the arrest and demand, and that the Crown proved both offences beyond a reasonable doubt despite the accused's argument that the impairment was only slight.

The Crown applied for an order under section 117.05(4) of the Criminal Code to forfeit the Firearms Possession Acquisition Licence of the respondent and to prohibit him from possessing weapons for five years.

The application arose from multiple incidents involving the respondent's alcohol abuse, mental health issues, violent threats against family members, and aggressive behaviour.

The respondent admitted to being an alcoholic and acknowledged his alcohol abuse contributed to violent outbursts.

The court found that it was not desirable in the interests of safety that the respondent possess weapons and ordered forfeiture of the licence and a three-year prohibition on weapon possession, reduced from the maximum five years to allow for treatment and rehabilitation.

The accused was charged with human trafficking, sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and possession of stolen property arising from his involvement in a sex trafficking operation in York Region.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant, a former university student who entered the sex trade.

The court found significant credibility issues with the complainant's evidence, including numerous internal contradictions, evasive demeanor, and inconsistencies between her trial testimony and her police statement.

The accused did not testify but made a voluntary statement to police.

The court convicted the accused on one count of possession of stolen property (the complainant's cellphone) but acquitted on all other counts, finding the Crown had failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit.

The vehicle became stuck in a snowbank in the early morning hours.

Civilians assisted in extricating the vehicle using a tow rope.

Police arrived at the scene and found the accused in or near the driver's seat.

The Crown proved impairment and care or control of the vehicle.

However, the Crown failed to establish that breath tests were taken as soon as practicable due to unexplained delays between the duty counsel call and the breath testing, particularly a significant gap between when the breath technician was ready and when the accused was presented for testing.

The accused was convicted of impaired care or control but acquitted of the over 80 charge.

The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s.5(3)(a.1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and possession of proceeds of crime contrary to s.354(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Police executed a search warrant at a residential address that was divided into two units without obtaining a separate warrant for the basement apartment.

The Crown conceded a breach of s.8 of the Charter.

The court applied the three-part test from R. v. Grant to determine whether evidence should be excluded under s.24(2).

The court found that the seriousness of the breach and impact on the accused's Charter-protected privacy interests favoured exclusion, despite society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The evidence was excluded and the charges were dismissed.

The Crown applied pursuant to section 117.05 of the Criminal Code for an order to forfeit a collection of 16 shotguns seized by Toronto Police Service and for an ancillary general weapons prohibition order.

The seizure arose from a domestic dispute involving the respondent's wife reporting concerns about his mental state and suicide risk after discovering escort service numbers on his phone.

The respondent was apprehended under the Mental Health Act, assessed, and released.

At the hearing, the respondent provided evidence of his responsible gun ownership, compliance with all regulatory requirements, and mental fitness.

The court found that the Crown had not established on a balance of probabilities that it was "not desirable" in the interests of safety for the respondent to possess the firearms and dismissed the application.