Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

The accused was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

The investigating officer was unable to testify due to serious illness.

The Crown brought a Khan application to admit the officer's notes and reports under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

While the court found the necessity requirement was met, it held that threshold reliability was not established.

The notes lacked procedural safeguards, contained inconsistencies, and addressed crucial issues like grounds for arrest and Charter rights that required cross-examination.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm after a playground altercation involving his son and a group of older children.

The Crown alleged the accused grabbed and twisted the arm of a child who was running away, causing a buckle fracture to her wrist.

The accused denied touching the child, testifying she fell while running.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the Crown witnesses' evidence had frailties and inconsistencies.

Furthermore, medical evidence indicated the fracture was most likely caused by a forward fall rather than a twisting motion.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt regarding both the commission of the assault and causation, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired by a drug following a traffic stop on Highway 118.

The Crown alleged the accused's ability to drive was impaired by a central nervous system depressant based on poor driving observations, a failed roadside sobriety test, and a Drug Recognition Expert evaluation.

The accused's urine tested positive for Olanzapine, an anti-psychotic medication.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: the accused was not promptly informed of his right to counsel following arrest, the Drug Recognition Expert evaluation demand was not made as soon as practicable, and the accused was arbitrarily detained after the investigation was completed.

The court excluded the evidence of the Drug Recognition Expert evaluation and urine analysis under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted.

An 18-year-old defendant pleaded guilty to mischief by sending bomb threats via digitized voice messages to a residential property and a group home, and to failure to comply with a youth probation order.

The defendant was on probation at the time of the offences.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with probation, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court granted a conditional discharge with probation, finding that despite the defendant's significant youth record for serious offences and the seriousness of the conduct, a discharge was in the defendant's best interests and not contrary to the public interest.

The court emphasized the defendant's mental health diagnoses, genuine remorse, cooperation with police, engagement in rehabilitation programming, and the collateral consequences of converting the youth record to an adult record.

This is a reverse onus judicial interim release (bail) hearing for an accused charged with multiple serious offences including impaired operation of a motor vehicle, firearm-related offences, drug trafficking, and weapons possession.

The Crown sought detention on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court granted bail with strict conditions, finding that the accused met his onus despite the serious nature of the charges.

The decision emphasizes the importance of a strong plan of release with credible sureties and the narrow scope of the public safety component under the secondary ground.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content over the legal limit after moving her car from one friend's driveway to another.

The court found two Charter breaches: (1) the roadside screening demand was not made "forthwith" as required by statute, as the investigating officer deliberately delayed making the demand to provide training to a junior officer; and (2) the accused's use of the toilet in her cell was videotaped without a valid waiver of her privacy rights, despite the police offering a privacy sheet that the accused was unaware of.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence as a remedy under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the long-term interests of justice favoured exclusion despite the seriousness of impaired driving offences.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and agreed that facts related to a third robbery count could be considered in sentencing.

Over four days in April 2018, the offender committed three bank robberies using note-passing methods without weapons or disguises, obtaining modest amounts of cash.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years imprisonment with concurrent sentences on the two guilty counts, applying principles of denunciation, general deterrence, and public protection while considering mitigating factors including the offender's guilty plea, addiction and mental health issues, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

Police intercepted communications and observed the accused purchasing approximately 2985 grams of heroin with a street value between $600,000 and $900,000.

The Crown sought eight years' incarceration while the defence sought four to five years.

The court imposed a six-year sentence, giving significant weight to the early guilty plea as a mitigating factor equivalent to police cooperation.

The accused received credit for presentence custody of two years, four months, and two weeks, leaving approximately three years, seven months, and two weeks to serve.

The accused was charged with breach of probation for failing to attend and actively participate in the Partner Assault Response (PAR) program as directed.

The Crown sought to introduce copies of business records (sign-in sheets, attendance sheets, and a client agreement) generated by the PAR program through the testimony of the program's case coordinator.

The court ruled that the documents were inadmissible because they failed to meet the requirements for admission under both the Canada Evidence Act and the common law.

The copies were not properly authenticated, entries appeared on the copies that did not exist on the originals, and the person testifying did not make the copies or participate in the redaction process.

The accused was charged with five counts of assault arising from incidents occurring between June and October 2016 during a romantic relationship.

The accused claimed the physical contact was consensual and part of a mutually agreed therapeutic program involving "slap-bets," pinning, and verbal challenges.

The Crown argued the complainant's apparent consent was vitiated by the accused's coercion, manipulation, and duress.

The court found the accused guilty on all five counts, determining that the complainant's will was completely overcome through the accused's controlling behaviour, verbal abuse, and escalating physical violence.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as unreliable due to his mental health condition and medication non-compliance, and found corroboration in text messages and audio recordings where the accused admitted to assaultive behaviour.

The accused was charged with three counts of breach of probation for allegedly contacting his wife and children in violation of probation orders.

The first allegation occurred on July 7, 2014, but the information was not sworn until July 21, 2017.

The accused was arrested on March 11, 2017.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter motion arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the total delay exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months, the pre-arrest delay qualified as a discrete event attributable to exceptional circumstances, as the police acted with reasonable diligence in attempting to locate the accused.

Additionally, the accused's failure to appear at trial demonstrated he was not genuinely exercising his 11(b) rights.

The defendant was charged with breaching section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act for using a cell phone while driving.

A police officer testified that he observed the defendant holding and scrolling through a cell phone while stopped at a red light.

The defendant testified that his phone was mounted on the dashboard and he only touched it to activate Bluetooth connectivity.

The trial judge convicted the defendant, finding the officer's evidence more credible.

The defendant appealed, arguing the trial judge's reasons failed to adequately explain the path to conviction and that the trial judge failed to apply the burden of proof correctly.

The accused was charged with sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought an application under section 276.1 of the Criminal Code seeking to adduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual relationship with the accused and her sexual activity with third parties.

The court conducted a hearing under section 276.2 to determine admissibility.

The court granted the application only to the extent that the defence could adduce evidence that the complainant and accused had met during a specific period to exchange sex for crack cocaine or money, as this was necessary context for understanding their relationship.

The court denied the application regarding evidence of specific prior sexual encounters between the parties and all evidence regarding the complainant's sexual activity with third parties.

The application record was sealed to protect the complainant's privacy and dignity.

The accused was convicted of historical sexual assault against his stepson (A.B.) and assault against his biological son (C.D.).

The stepson was approximately 14 years old when he was anally penetrated by the accused while asleep in his own bedroom.

The biological son was approximately six years old when the accused forcefully removed his shirt in a closed washroom during a party.

The court imposed a sentence of three and a half years in penitentiary for the sexual assault and 30 days concurrent for the assault, rejecting the defence position for a conditional sentence and accepting the Crown's position that denunciation and deterrence must take precedence.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample following a motor vehicle collision on December 14, 2015.

The Crown alleged the accused was impaired by alcohol when operating his vehicle and subsequently refused to provide breath samples at the hospital.

The accused was acquitted of impaired operation but convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The court found insufficient evidence of impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, but determined the accused intentionally failed to provide a sample despite suffering from a fractured sternum.

The defendant was charged with driving while impaired and with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 ml following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample results obtained following an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand.

The defence challenged the validity of the ASD demand, arguing the officer lacked proper grounds and that the officer's failure to activate his in-car camera system breached the Charter.

The court found the officer's testimony regarding grounds for the demand was unreliable, established a breach of section 8 of the Charter, and excluded the breath results under section 24(2).

Both charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code following a RIDE programme stop.

Three issues emerged at trial: whether the defendant's section 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated by an improper breath demand; whether the defendant's section 10(a) Charter right to be informed of the charge was breached; and whether the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer failed to follow mandatory protocols established by the Ontario Provincial Police regarding the reliability of the approved screening device, specifically failing to eliminate the possibility of false positives from sugary foods and beverages and failing to conduct required self-tests.

The court concluded that the officer's reliance on the screening test result was unreasonable, constituting a breach of the defendant's section 8 Charter right.

The breath test results were excluded as a remedy, resulting in a verdict of not guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) and section 255(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a motion alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while there was no violation of section 8 rights regarding the breath samples, there was a serious violation of section 10(b) rights regarding access to counsel.

The officer failed to facilitate access to counsel for over one hour and forty-three minutes following detention.

Despite the Charter violation, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with assault arising in a domestic context.

The accused brought a motion alleging a breach of his section 11(b) Charter rights regarding trial delay.

The Crown and defence disagreed on when the section 11(b) clock begins to run.

The defence argued it starts when the information is sworn; the Crown argued it starts when process is executed or brought to the attention of the accused.

The court found that the information was sworn on August 27, 2014, but the warrant was not executed until October 16, 2016—approximately two years and two months later.

The court held that the section 11(b) clock starts when the information is sworn and process is issued, and that the delay far exceeded the 18-month threshold established in R. v. Jordan.

Finding no exceptional circumstances justifying the delay, the court granted a stay of charges.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving over 80 after a single-vehicle rollover accident.

At a blended trial and Charter application, the accused argued his s. 7 rights were violated because his admission to being the driver was compelled by the Highway Traffic Act, and his s. 10(b) rights were violated because police did not allow him to call his parents to help find a lawyer.

The court dismissed the application, finding the admission was not made under statutory compulsion as it was a brief exchange during initial investigation, not an accident report.

The court also found no s. 10(b) breach, as the accused did not explain why he wanted to call his parents and was not reasonably diligent in exercising his right to counsel after being given multiple opportunities.