Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

The accused pleaded guilty to break and enter, robbery, forcible confinement, and possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000 following a violent home invasion.

The Crown sought an eight-year penitentiary sentence, while defence counsel argued for four years, emphasizing the accused's lesser involvement compared to co-accused, youth, and lack of prior record.

The court sentenced the accused to five years less pre-trial custody, finding that while the offence was serious and warranted substantial denunciation and deterrence, the accused's age, early guilty plea, lack of criminal record, and good rehabilitation prospects, combined with his secondary role in the violence, distinguished the case from more serious home invasion precedents.

Dwayne Thomas, a correctional officer, was found guilty of sexual assault (vaginal penetration of an inmate under his direct supervision) and breach of trust.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's vulnerability, the abuse of authority, and the assault occurring in a private area beyond surveillance.

Mitigating factors included the offender's positive community relationships and support.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, imposing a global sentence of six and a half years in penitentiary, with concurrent sentences for both offences.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a 10-year s. 109 order, and a 20-year SOIRA order.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay in his retrial.

The total delay from the appeal being granted to the anticipated end of trial was 18 months and 5 days.

The Crown argued that 1 month and 3 days of this delay was attributable to the defence for a late disclosure request, bringing the net delay below the 18-month presumptive ceiling set by R. v. Jordan.

The court agreed with the Crown regarding defence delay.

Considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic as a discrete event, the court found that the remaining delay of just over 17 months was not unreasonable, despite the Ontario Court of Appeal's comments in R. v. MacIsaac about retrials needing priority.

The applicant failed to demonstrate that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have given the pandemic circumstances.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant, Zosia Ruchlewicz, charged with impaired driving and "80 plus" sought a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Charter, alleging a violation of her right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay was approximately 26 months.

The court analyzed the delay using the R. v. Jordan framework, deducting defence delay and delay attributable to the COVID-19 public health crisis as a discrete event.

The net delay, after deductions, was found to be below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court also found that the case did not take "markedly longer" than it reasonably should have, despite some defence inaction regarding disclosure.

The application for a stay of proceedings was denied.

Krista-Lee Bruzas pleaded guilty to having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg, with readings of 390 mg.

She brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences under s. 255(1) and the unavailability of conditional discharges under s. 255(5) of the Criminal Code, arguing violations of ss. 12 and 15 of the Charter, particularly for First Nations individuals in Ontario.

The court considered significant mitigating factors, including Gladue factors and extensive rehabilitation efforts.

Despite finding a conditional discharge to be in the accused's best interests, the court determined it would be contrary to the public interest given the extremely high blood alcohol readings and the paramountcy of denunciation and general deterrence in impaired driving cases.

The court imposed a fine of $2000, 12 months of probation, and a 12-month driving prohibition.

Two young persons were convicted of robbery simpliciter following a trial.

They were among a group that forcefully entered a hotel room in Oakville and robbed an escort of her personal belongings.

The young persons' culpability was grounded in party liability.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of three to six months followed by probation, while defence counsel sought probation with conditions.

The court found the offence constituted a violent offence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act due to psychological bodily harm to the victim and the home invasion nature of the crime.

However, considering the young persons' lack of prior records, their conduct while on bail, educational achievements, supportive family circumstances, and the mitigating factor of adult influence, the court imposed a non-custodial sentence of two years' probation with conditions including community service.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded on the Over 80 charge after withdrawing the impaired operation charge.

The central issue was whether the Crown could rely on the statutory presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, which requires that breath samples be taken "as soon as practicable." The court found that a 39-minute gap between the accused's arrival at the police station and the initial call to duty counsel, combined with a 20-minute delay before a second call to duty counsel, was not adequately explained.

The Crown failed to establish that the breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable," and therefore could not rely on the statutory presumption.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicants brought applications to exclude financial records obtained pursuant to a production order issued on April 8, 2016, and executed on the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.

The applicants alleged the seizure violated their section 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found that while a section 8 violation was established regarding the improper inclusion of account particulars within the information to obtain, the violation did not warrant exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The application to exclude the financial records was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of possessing child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code and one count of distributing child pornography contrary to section 163.1(3) of the Criminal Code.

Over a three-day period in September 2016, the accused engaged in online chats with an undercover police officer, discussing sexual acts with minors and sending two images of child pornography.

A search of his computer revealed 526 unique images of child pornography.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less one day, while the defence sought 12 months.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 months in jail, with concurrent sentences on both counts, along with ancillary orders including probation, SOIRA registration, and a section 161 order restricting contact with minors and internet use.

The accused pleaded guilty to making available child pornography, possessing child pornography, making child pornography, sexual assault, and sexual exploitation of his stepdaughter between 2014 and 2017.

The offences involved the systematic grooming and sexual abuse of the victim from age 13 to 17, the creation and distribution of hundreds of sexually explicit images of the victim, and the possession of numerous child abuse images of other children.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4.5 years imprisonment, with specific counts running concurrently and consecutively as required by statute, less credit for pre-trial custody.

The sentencing emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives given the serious nature of crimes against children.

The accused brought a pre-trial application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed on his residence under section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of break and enter and possession of property obtained by crime.

The search warrant was obtained based on evidence that a stolen iPhone from a break and enter had been located near the accused's residence using Apple's "Find my iPhone" application.

The accused argued the warrant was invalid due to stale information and lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The court rejected both facial and sub-facial challenges to the warrant, finding that the investigating officer had taken adequate investigative steps to establish reasonable grounds and that the warrant could have been issued by the justice of the peace.

The offender pleaded guilty to multiple counts of sexual assault and sexual touching against four young children over a 31-year period, and to possession of and making available child pornography involving over 500,000 images and 25,000 videos.

The Crown sought 13 years imprisonment while the defence sought under 5 years.

The court imposed a total sentence of 9 years imprisonment, less presentence custody, with ancillary orders including DNA sampling, SOIRA registration, firearms prohibition, and lifetime restrictions on contact with minors and attendance at certain locations.

The court applied sentencing principles emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for offences involving abuse of children under 18 years of age.

The accused was charged with three offences arising from his communication via text message with an undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl offering sexual services.

The charges were: communicating with a person believed to be under 18 to facilitate obtaining sexual services for consideration; communicating with a person believed to be under 16 to facilitate invitation to sexual touching; and communicating to obtain sexual services from a person under 18.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed he was communicating with a minor.

The court found the accused's testimony unreliable and contradicted by the text message record.

The court concluded the accused made a detailed agreement to purchase sexual services from a person he believed was 15 years old and acted upon that agreement until arrested.

The court found the accused guilty on all three counts.

The offender, a former teacher and foster parent, pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a young person under section 153 of the Criminal Code.

The offence involved sexual contact with a foster child over a period of years beginning when the victim was 16 years old.

The offender was cooperative with police, confessed immediately upon contact, and demonstrated remorse.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent jail sentence followed by a 3-year probation order with strict conditions, balancing the serious breach of trust and vulnerability of the victim against mitigating factors including the offender's guilty plea, cooperation, low risk of reoffending, and psychological profile.

A young person was convicted after trial of one count of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against a victim who was six years old when the abuse began and eleven when it ceased.

The abuse occurred over five years between 1997 and 2002, perpetrated by the accused who was thirteen at the outset and eighteen at the conclusion.

The victim did not report the abuse to police until December 2011.

The court imposed a custody and supervision order of nine months followed by eighteen months of probation, with conditions including no contact with the victim, attendance for sexual offending assessment, and counselling as recommended.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography contrary to Section 163.1 of the Criminal Code.

He possessed 535 images and 31 pornographic digital movies depicting the sexual abuse of pre-pubescent children.

The Crown sought a reformatory term while the defence sought the 45-day minimum sentence to be served intermittently.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 months imprisonment followed by two years probation, a 10-year Section 161 order, DNA sampling, and 20-year Sexual Offender Information Registry placement.

The court found that the minimum sentence was inappropriate given the gravity of the offence and the accused's lack of insight into the seriousness of his conduct.

The offender was sentenced for two offences: possession of child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code and making available child pornography contrary to section 163.1(1)(3) of the Criminal Code.

The offender had sent images and videos of child sexual abuse to other users on an internet website.

A search warrant revealed an extensive collection of child pornography on the offender's external hard drive, containing 355 accessible images and 242 accessible videos, depicting very young children (ages 2-11) being sexually abused.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 120 days on the possession charge and 240 days consecutive on the making available charge, for a total of 348 days plus pre-sentence custody credit.

The court also imposed a three-year probation order, a lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act order, a 20-year section 161 prohibition order, a primary DNA order, and a forfeiture order.

The accused was retried and convicted of impaired driving relating to an accident from 2010.

At the first trial, the accused was sentenced to a 15-month driving prohibition, which was served in full before the conviction was successfully appealed and set aside.

The Crown sought a new driving prohibition upon retrial and conviction.

The court held that imposing a new mandatory driving prohibition would constitute double punishment and violate principles of sentencing and the integrity of the criminal justice system.

The court interpreted section 259(1) of the Criminal Code to permit credit for time already served under the prior prohibition, and imposed a one-day driving prohibition with notation that 15 months had already been served.

The accused, a black male passenger in a vehicle, was stopped by police for a seatbelt violation.

The officer pushed the accused back into the vehicle, smelled unburned marijuana, and subsequently pulled him out to effect an arrest, leading to a physical altercation.

The accused was charged with drug offences and assaulting a peace officer.

The court found the officer's actions constituted an arbitrary detention, an unreasonable search, and involved excessive force, raising concerns of racial profiling.

The court excluded the drug evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and found the accused not guilty of resisting arrest.

The offender was sentenced for his participation in the G20 riots in Toronto, where he masked his face and engaged in a continuous pattern of vandalism, including attacking a marked police cruiser with a vulnerable officer inside.

The court emphasized general deterrence and denunciation, rejecting a conditional sentence.

The offender was sentenced to 10 months' incarceration, followed by two years of probation with conditions restricting his conduct at future protests.