Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

The accused was convicted of possession of a loaded, restricted firearm with accessible ammunition, careless storage of a firearm, possession of a prohibited device and ammunition without a licence, and disobeying a lawful court order prohibiting weapon possession.

The court imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment on the firearm-related offences (served concurrently) and six months imprisonment on the breach of court order (served consecutively), for a total of three years and six months, less 574 days of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in a remaining custodial term of one year, eleven months, and eight days.

The court found that the accused transported the loaded firearm across provincial borders in a motor vehicle and possessed it in public places, constituting aggravating factors.

The court emphasized the serious and escalating problem of illegal firearm possession in Peel Region and the paramount importance of denunciation and deterrence in sentencing for such offences.

This decision involves a complex sentencing of K.T. for multiple sexual offences including criminal harassment, indecent communications, child pornography, luring, voyeurism, and exposure to persons under the age of 16.

The court carefully considered the offender’s mental health, intellectual functioning, and the aggravating and mitigating factors, including the deplorable pre-sentence custody conditions at the Ottawa Carleton Detention Centre.

The judge imposed consecutive sentences as mandated by the Criminal Code, balancing denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and granted enhanced credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The accused was charged with assault by choking and two counts of sexual assault (anal penetration and breast touching) against a former intimate partner.

The court found the accused guilty of assault by choking and sexual assault by breast touching, but acquitted on the charge of sexual assault by anal penetration.

Key issues included the reliability of dated evidence, the application of the Browne v. Dunn rule regarding contradictory evidence, and the legal definition of consent, particularly concerning unconsciousness and bodily harm in a sexual context.

The court determined that a person cannot consent while unconscious and that repeated choking causing temporary unconsciousness constituted non-trifling bodily harm, vitiating any potential consent.

This ruling addresses an application for a complainant to testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV) in a criminal proceeding involving an indecent act.

The court granted the application, applying the "facilitate" test under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code, considering the complainant's anxiety, the sensitive nature of the allegations, and the familial relationship with the accused.

The judge also expressed concerns about the Crown's repeated failure to address the suitability of screens as an alternative testimonial aid and persistent technical failures with CCTV equipment, which cause significant delays in the court system.

Malcom Lee was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg.

The defence filed Charter applications, primarily alleging breaches of section 10(b) rights regarding access to counsel.

The court found no breach of the informational or implementational components of the right to counsel, or if there was a minor breach, the evidence would still be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed both offences based on observations of impairment, the unexplained collision, and breath readings.

The accused, Wendell Brereton, brought an application for a stay of charges of sexual assault and careless storage of a firearm, pursuant to section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that his right to trial within a reasonable time had been violated.

The total delay from charge to scheduled trial date was over 32 months, exceeding the 18-month ceiling set by R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that significant portions of the delay were attributable to defence conduct, particularly the first lawyer's lack of diligence and failure to request key disclosure.

The court found that the 11-week period between the charge date and the first appearance was not attributable to the defence.

Even after subtracting all other conceded defence delays, the net delay still exceeded the 18-month ceiling by 12 days, making it presumptively unreasonable.

The Crown was unable to rebut this presumption.

Consequently, the court granted the stay of proceedings.

The defendant, Jehangir Khan, was charged with sexual assault.

The case hinged on the credibility of the complainant and other witnesses versus the defendant's testimony.

The court applied the principles of R. v. W.(D.) and found the defendant's evidence credible and reliable, corroborated by a third-party witness (PW).

The complainant's testimony was deemed untrustworthy due to altered text messages, evasiveness, internal inconsistencies, and collaboration with other witnesses to craft a false narrative.

The Crown failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

The accused was charged with four counts of assault against his former common-law partner spanning from 2006 to 2017.

The Crown alleged: (1) assault with a weapon (beer bottle) in 2006-2007; (2) assault in fall 2015 (cooking incident); (3) assault in November 2015 (bathtub incident); and (4) assault on October 17, 2017 (forcible ejection from residence).

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence on counts 1-3 lacked credibility and coherence, with significant gaps in memory and inconsistencies.

On count 4, while the accused admitted applying force, the trial judge found the defence of property under s. 35(1) of the Criminal Code did not apply because the force used was unreasonable in the circumstances.

The accused was acquitted on counts 1-3 and convicted on count 4.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood following a single-vehicle accident on January 31, 2017.

The Crown established that the defendant was found in the driver's seat of a severely damaged vehicle that had travelled over 150 meters off the road.

The defendant's blood alcohol content was measured at 220 milligrams at 2:10 and 3:01 a.m., which toxicological evidence interpolated back to 220-260 milligrams at the time of the accident.

The court rejected Charter arguments regarding the right to counsel and found the defendant guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 253(a) of the Criminal Code and wilfully failing to provide a suitable breath sample contrary to section 254(3).

The accused admitted to operating his vehicle while impaired but raised the defence of necessity, arguing he was transporting an injured friend to hospital and then returning home to protect his sister from imminent danger.

The court rejected the necessity defence, finding no clear and imminent peril to the sister and that reasonable legal alternatives existed.

On the breath sample charge, the court found the accused wilfully failed to provide a sample through malingering rather than incapacity, and that voluntary intoxication does not constitute a reasonable excuse.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace following a stabbing incident at the intersection of Rossland and Salem in Ajax.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of the victim, Joshua Lawrence, who claimed he was stabbed without warning while making a friendly greeting.

The defendant claimed self-defence, asserting that Lawrence approached him with an open box-cutter knife.

The court found the victim's testimony unreliable and accepted the defendant's account.

The defendant was acquitted of the assault charges on the basis of self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code, but convicted of possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace under section 88(1), as the defendant could have avoided the confrontation by contacting police.

The accused was charged with three counts of trafficking in heroin and three counts of trafficking in fentanyl arising from three separate drug transactions in August 2016.

The accused admitted to facilitating the sale of heroin but disputed knowingly or intentionally trafficking in fentanyl.

The court found that while the Crown need not prove knowledge of the exact narcotic to secure a conviction for trafficking, the Crown must prove the mental element required for each specific offence.

Applying the Kienapple principle, the court held that convicting on both heroin and fentanyl trafficking counts for the same single act constituted an abuse of process.

The court stayed the fentanyl counts and convicted on the heroin counts, while noting the presence of fentanyl as an aggravating factor for sentencing.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit.

She was found asleep in the driver's seat with the key in the ignition.

After failing a roadside screening device test, she was arrested and provided with duty counsel.

However, when asked by the breath technician if she was satisfied with the legal advice received, she indicated she was not satisfied and did not understand the advice.

The court found a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter because the accused was not informed of her right to a second consultation with counsel.

The breath readings and statements were excluded under section 24(2), resulting in a not guilty verdict.

The defendant was charged with driving while impaired and driving with excess alcohol on June 22, 2015.

He brought a Charter application under Section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed and seeking a judicial stay of charges.

The total delay from charge to trial completion was 13 months and 8 days, falling below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court applied the transitional framework and found that the case did not take markedly longer than it reasonably should have, considering the complexity of impaired driving cases and acceptable institutional delay under the previous Morin framework.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a RIDE spot check.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath test evidence on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10.

The three issues at trial were: (1) whether the right to counsel was breached when the accused initially expressed a desire to speak to a lawyer but later declined; (2) whether breath tests were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c)(ii); and (3) whether any breaches warranted exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The court found no Charter breaches and convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood following a motor vehicle incident on September 20, 2013.

The Crown established that the accused was driving during the operative two-hour window and that breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

Although the statutory presumption of care or control was rebutted due to the vehicle being inoperable, the Crown proved de facto care or control based on the accused's ongoing intentional course of conduct with the vehicle in circumstances creating a realistic risk of danger.

The court found the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, evidenced by observations of impairment, alcohol on breath, stumbling, red-rimmed eyes, and impaired judgment in standing on a live traffic lane.

Both charges were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The offender pleaded guilty to defrauding her employer of over $219,000 over a five-year period using three separate methods, including forging a colleague's signature on cheques.

The Crown sought an 18-23 month custodial sentence with restitution and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a one-year custodial sentence, finding that a conditional sentence would be inconsistent with the fundamental purposes of sentencing, particularly denunciation and deterrence in cases involving breach of trust.

The court also imposed restitution orders and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The accused was charged with failing to provide a suitable sample of breath into an approved screening device on December 12, 2010.

The Crown's case relied on two police officers with significantly divergent observations regarding the accused's sobriety and the sobriety of a female passenger.

The trial judge found material inconsistencies between the officers' evidence, particularly regarding whether alcohol was detected on the accused's breath and whether the female passenger was impaired.

These inconsistencies created reasonable doubt regarding the reliability of the investigation.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused, an off-duty Peel Regional Police officer, was charged with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) following a motor vehicle accident.

The Crown alleged the accused knowingly possessed crack cocaine and powder cocaine found in his briefcase.

The accused testified that he had lawfully seized the drugs during a residential raid conducted in his capacity as a police officer, inadvertently failed to submit them at shift end, and subsequently retained them with the intent to submit them for lawful destruction.

The central legal issue was whether the accused's possession fell within the regulatory protection afforded to police officers under the Narcotic Control Regulations.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after driving approximately 50 meters while intoxicated.

The Crown conceded that the accused was impaired and had driven the vehicle.

The sole issue was whether the defence of necessity was available.

The accused testified that he was assaulted by a group of hostile males, one of whom brandished a knife, and that he drove to escape the imminent peril.

The court found that all three elements of the necessity defence were satisfied: there was clear and imminent peril, no reasonable legal alternative existed, and the harm inflicted was proportionate to the harm avoided.

The accused was acquitted.