Administrative Law - OCJ

The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion for the appointment of amicus curiae for the respondent mother in a child protection proceeding.

The mother, who had previously retained and discharged three counsel, was self-represented at the time of the motion hearing.

The court found that the legal test for appointing amicus was met, considering the high stakes of the matter, the mother's demonstrated inability to participate meaningfully in proceedings, her pattern of discharging counsel, and concerns that the trial would not progress reasonably without amicus assistance.

The court appointed amicus to assist in ensuring the trial is orderly and fair, with the appointment remaining in effect even if the mother retains counsel in the future.

The Children's Aid Society brought a child protection application, and the court *sua sponte* raised the question of whether the application was brought within the five-day statutory limit under s. 88 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Society argued that Rule 3(2) of the Family Law Rules, which excludes weekends for periods less than seven days, applied.

The court held that Rule 3(2) does not apply to statutory timelines, as it would exceed the rule-making authority and conflict with the substantive legislative intent of balancing child protection with parental constitutional rights.

Consequently, the Society failed to bring the application within the five-day period, having done so on the seventh day.

Claude Laporte appealed his conviction for failing to comply with an Order to Comply under the Building Code Act.

The appeal raised four grounds: misapprehension of evidence regarding his testimony, incorrect interpretation of "build" and "owner" under the Building Code Act, improper judicial interference by raising the principle of collateral attack, and an erroneous consideration of the defence of officially induced error.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, confirming the applicability of the collateral attack principle to administrative orders, and rejecting the officially induced error defence.

The appellant, Andrew Zaranek, appealed a conviction for operating a commercial vehicle and following too closely under section 158(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

He argued that the trial justice of the peace erred by finding the essential element of speed (exceeding 60 km/h) was proven, alleging judicial notice was improperly taken.

The appellate court found that proof of speed exceeding 60 km/h is an essential element for a charge under s. 158(2).

It clarified that the trial judge did not take judicial notice of speed, but rather inferred it from video evidence and took judicial notice of the Highway 401 speed limit.

The appellate court agreed that the video evidence supported a reasonable inference that the vehicle was travelling over 60 km/h.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a motion under section 14B of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act to suspend the running of time on a six-month supervision order by three weeks.

The order had been made on March 11, 2020, placing two children with their mother and one child in the temporary care of the society.

A Status Review Application hearing was scheduled for September 29, 2020, which exceeded the six-month supervision period by three weeks.

The court granted the motion, finding that the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act applied to child protection proceedings and that it was in the best interests of the children that the society not lose jurisdiction due to an apparent administrative error.

The Status Review Application was made effective as of September 29, 2020, and the matter was adjourned to December 2, 2020 for a case conference.

The applicant Ogwadeni:deo sought to withdraw an amended child protection application and replace it with a formal customary care agreement, despite the biological parents not having signed the agreement.

The Six Nations Band argued that its governing resolution, enabled by the new federal legislation (Bill C-92), authorized the Band to sign the customary care agreement on behalf of the parents.

The court denied the motion to withdraw the protection application, finding insufficient evidence regarding the child's welfare and best interests, and noting the lack of court oversight since the initial temporary order in 2018.

The City of Toronto appealed fourteen separate sentencing decisions where a Justice of the Peace reduced or suspended minimum fines prescribed under the Highway Traffic Act and Provincial Offences Act.

The appellants were charged with various traffic offences including red light camera violations and handheld device offences.

The Justice of the Peace invoked section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act to reduce fines below the statutory minimums, citing factors such as early guilty pleas, age, employment status, and financial circumstances.

The appellate court found that the Justice of the Peace erred in applying section 59(2) by treating exceptional circumstances too routinely and by considering immaterial factors such as guilty pleas.

The court allowed the appeal but did not increase the fines as requested by the City.

The applicant appealed the revocation of his firearms license following his guilty plea to possession of child pornography.

The Area Firearms Officer revoked the license based on the applicant's conviction, his admission of a long-standing sexual interest in children that he could not control, and public safety concerns reflected in the sentencing court's imposition of custody, probation, and a section 161 order with extensive restrictions.

The applicant argued that the revocation was based on an automatic policy rather than individualized assessment and that he had been a responsible firearms owner in full compliance with all regulations.

The court upheld the revocation, finding that the AFO conducted an individualized assessment applying the proper criteria under the Firearms Act and that the decision was objectively reasonable.

The Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society brought a motion seeking a finding that the subject child (S) is a Metis child under section 90(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) and that the child has no connection to or engagement with any First Nations, Inuit or Metis community.

The child's father claimed Metis ancestry but did not self-identify as Metis nor identify the child as such.

The mother denied any Indigenous status.

The court found the evidence insufficient to support the Society's motion, noting critical gaps in the affidavit evidence regarding the basis of the father's Metis claim, the source of the relatives' self-identification, and the child's own preferences.

The court adjourned the motion pending better evidence and clarification of the Society's contradictory requests.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered in his absence under section 9.1 of the Provincial Offences Act for an unsafe motor vehicle movement charge under section 154(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the Certificate of Offence was complete and regular on its face, given that it contained expired short form wording that was no longer prescribed by regulation at the time of the charge.

The court held that the Certificate was complete and regular because it identified the statute, section number, and all essential elements of the offence, and the use of expired short form wording did not mislead the appellant or prejudice his defence.

Toronto Community Housing Corporation sought access to youth court records of a tenant to use in eviction proceedings under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The court addressed a procedural "chicken and egg" problem: TCHC needed information about the youth proceedings to determine which statutory test applied for access, but could not access records without first establishing the applicable test.

The court adopted a bifurcated approach, initially obtaining and reviewing the Information to provide counsel with necessary details.

The court also addressed the novel issue of whether notice should be given to the young person despite no statutory requirement under section 119(1)(s)(ii) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, finding that notice was desirable in the interests of justice given the serious consequences of potential eviction and the rehabilitative purposes of youth justice legislation.

An appeal of a conviction under sections 107(11) and 207(1) of the Highway Traffic Act for operating a commercial motor vehicle with major defects.

The central issue was whether the corporate defendant was properly identified as "Trans-West Logistics Inc." when the vehicle registration documents identified the owner as "Logistiques Trans-West Inc." The appellant argued that the exact legal name must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that prior case law on corporate identity should have been binding.

The appellate court found that the prior cases involved materially different facts and that stare decisis did not apply.

The court determined that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the two names referred to the same corporate entity and that the name constituted a misnomer rather than a substitution of a different entity.

The conviction was upheld with the corporate name amended to reflect the registration documents.

This decision addresses a motion by Children's Aid Society of Algoma seeking to substitute Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services as the applicant in a child protection proceeding.

The motion arose from the recent designation of Nogdawindamin as a native children's aid society effective April 1, 2017.

The court examined the Minister's designation of Nogdawindamin and determined that the child in question did not fall within any of the paragraphs of the designation that were currently in effect.

The court dismissed the transfer motion, finding that Nogdawindamin lacked jurisdiction to act as the applicant society in this particular case.

This is an application under Part Six of the Youth Criminal Justice Act for an order granting the parties access to police records created during a police interaction with a young person that did not result in criminal charges or extrajudicial measures.

The respondent sought access to police records to pursue a discrimination claim before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, alleging that the police interaction was based on race, colour, place of origin, ethnic origin, and disability.

The court determined that while the Act does not explicitly provide a statutory pathway for accessing records where no charges were laid and no extrajudicial measures were used, such access is available by necessary implication from the legislative scheme, particularly where the young person's own interests in the proper administration of justice would otherwise be compromised.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered ex parte under section 9.1 of the Provincial Offences Act for failing to move into another lane for an emergency vehicle.

The Certificate of Offence cited an incorrect and repealed section of the Highway Traffic Act (section 159.1(2)) rather than the valid provision (section 159(3)).

The respondent conceded that the Certificate was not regular on its face due to the improper section citation.

The court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction, finding that the discrepancy between the section number and the description of the offence created ambiguity that rendered the Certificate incomplete and irregular for purposes of an ex parte conviction.

The Toronto Police Service and a police officer sought access to youth records of a young person (L.D.) who was a witness and complainant in a police disciplinary hearing.

The officer was alleged to have assaulted L.D. while in police custody.

The court considered whether access to L.D.'s youth records was permitted under sections 119(1)(s) and 123 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court held that the applicants failed to establish a valid or valid and substantial interest in the records, and that permitting access would undermine the proper administration of justice under both the YCJA and the Police Services Act.

The application was dismissed.

The police service applied for an order under the Youth Criminal Justice Act to disclose a young person's police records for use in a police disciplinary hearing against an officer.

The subject officer also sought access to the records.

The court held that both the police service and the officer must apply for access under sections 119(1)(s) and 123 of the Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that neither applicant established a valid interest in the records, as the records had no nexus to the alleged misconduct and were not relevant to the young person's credibility or character.

Furthermore, granting access would undermine the privacy protections and principles of diminished moral culpability under the Act.

The defendant entered a guilty plea to driving while his license was suspended under the Highway Traffic Act.

After conviction was entered, the court discovered that the defendant was also facing a related Criminal Code charge of "drive disqualified" arising from the same circumstances.

The justice struck the conviction and underlying plea, finding that the municipal partner court lacked administrative authority to proceed when criminal proceedings had been commenced in relation to the same circumstances, pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the Crown and the City of Brantford.

The matter was directed to be marked returnable to the same court when the related Criminal Code charge would be considered.

The appellant was convicted at trial of speeding contrary to s. 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

On appeal, the appellant raised seven grounds of error, including allegations that the Justice of the Peace erred in proceeding without counsel, failed to inform the appellant of his right to an adjournment, erred in granting an amendment to the charge, applied the wrong legal standard, and failed to adequately explain the rejection of the appellant's evidence.

The appeal court found that while the Justice of the Peace applied an incorrect legal standard (strict liability instead of absolute liability), this error benefited the appellant and did not affect the verdict.

The court upheld the conviction, finding no reversible error.

The defendant pleaded guilty to eight counts of giving contradictory evidence in relation to his testimony at various court proceedings in a second-degree murder case involving the death of a two-and-a-half-year-old child.

The defendant's testimony evolved significantly across multiple hearings, from denying knowledge of the child's injuries to eventually admitting responsibility.

The court imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment, emphasizing the serious nature of misleading evidence in homicide proceedings and the need for general deterrence and denunciation.