WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
CITATION: R. v. Young, 2026 ONCJ 446
DATE: 2026 07 29
COURT FILE No.: Windsor 21-11730
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
JEFFREY YOUNG
Before Justice S. G. Pratt
Sentencing submissions heard on 11 and 28 May 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on 29 July 2026
Elizabeth Brown and Delia Greco................................................... Counsel for the Crown
Jeffrey Young............................................................................................................... In Person
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
[1] On 18 September 2025 the Offender Jeffrey Young was found guilty of seven counts of sexual assault and one count of mischief. Sentencing submissions were set for 1 December 2025 but prior to that date the Offender’s counsel brought an application to be removed from the record. That application was granted. The December date was converted into a remand appearance for the Offender to advise how long he would need to prepare for sentencing. He requested four additional months. Given that he was now a self-represented litigant, I granted that request. Sentencing submissions were set for 22 April 2026.
[2] On an interim date, the Offender brought up several concerns he had with the conduct of the trial. Initially I advised him his recourse was to the Court of Appeal. On reflection, I determined that the concerns he was raising could be framed as an application for a finding of an abuse of process. I gave the Offender an opportunity to bring that application, and I gave the Crown the chance to respond. That application was argued on 16 March 2026 and a ruling dismissing the application was given on 9 April 2026.
[3] Because of issues with the Court’s schedule, the date of 22 April was adjourned to 11 May. On that date, the Crown made submissions and filed two Victim Impact Statements (VIS). The victim J.S. read her statement personally and the Crown read in the statement of J.P. The Offender began his submissions on that day but did not complete them. The matter returned on 28 May for him to conclude his submissions and for the Crown to make reply submissions.
[4] These are my reasons for sentence.
Facts
[5] The facts underpinning the convictions in this case are found in my reasons at 2025 ONCJ 481. Very briefly, the Offender was found guilty of seven counts of sexual assault and one count of mischief. The sexual assaults arose in the context of his work as a massage therapist and later, as an unlicensed masseur. The mischief count related to one of the sexual assault victims who was also the Offender’s neighbour. He was found guilty of damaging a tree on her property.
[6] The sexual assaults involved four victims. As set out in the trial decision, they complained of inappropriate touching over the course of massage therapy treatments. This touching varied among victims and included manipulation of the breasts and repeated touching of vaginal areas. Victims also complained of being improperly covered during their massages, leaving private areas of their bodies exposed unnecessarily.
[7] As to the mischief count, the facts found were that the Offender entered that victim’s yard and severely cut back her tree without her permission.
The Positions of the Parties
[8] Regarding the sexual assaults, Crown counsel seeks a global sentence of five years jail. She argues that each count should result in a consecutive sentence. In her submissions, counsel erroneously stated the Offender had been convicted of eight counts of sexual assault. In fact, he was convicted of seven counts. Under this misperception, counsel sought approximately seven months’ custody for each sexual assault count. Had there been eight counts, that would come to 56 months, just short of five years. Seven months per count over seven counts equates to 49 months, just over four years. Given counsel’s mistake as to the number of counts, it is this 49-month figure I will take as the Crown’s global position.
[9] The Crown also seeks an order that the Offender provide a DNA sample on each count, and that he register under the Sex Offenders Information Registry (SOIRA) for either 20 years or life.
[10] On the mischief count, the Crown seeks a suspended sentence and a period of probation. The Crown also argues for restitution of $470 to reflect the cost of an arborist retained to assess the damage.
[11] The Offender did not provide a specific sentence position. After hearing his submissions, including a desire to keep working to support his family, to be home for his son, and his willingness to wear an ankle bracelet, I asked if he was seeking a conditional sentence. I briefly explained what that meant and he said yes. I therefore take the Offender’s sentencing position to be a conditional sentence followed by probation.
[12] He disputes the need for registration under SOIRA as he says there is no risk of reoffending. He also argues that recent caselaw has found the provincial sex offender registry, known as Christopher’s Law, to be unconstitutional. He seeks relief from that registry as well.
Pre-Sentence Report
[13] I have received a Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) authored by Probation and Parole Officer Rammy Bhatia. It is helpful, though I recognize the Offender did have some concerns with its contents. I will address one such concern shortly.
[14] The Offender grew up in a relatively stable home, with two siblings. He earned a diploma in Massage Therapy and worked as a massage therapist for several years. After that, he worked as a masseur, seeing clients at his home. He is currently a self-employed maintenance technician. He has been married since 1996 and has two adult children, both of whom live at home. His son has autism and requires ongoing care.
[15] The Offender’s wife confirmed his commitment to his family. She said he is a dedicated provider to them. She also spoke of their daughter being heartbroken over the offences. The family’s bond, through it all, has remained strong.
[16] As part of the PSR, Mr. Bhatia spoke to two victims of the offences, Ms. P. and Ms. S. He also spoke with K.M. Ms. M. was the complainant in the count I stayed at the outset of this trial. Consequently, she is not a victim for the purpose of this proceeding. I can only surmise Mr. Bhatia did not know Ms. M.’s charge had been stayed when he contacted her. In the result, however, I do not take his discussion with Ms. M. into account in determining sentence.
[17] The Offender was asked about the offences. He maintained his innocence and expressed no remorse. Mr. Bhatia quoted the Offender as saying, “I am terribly upset all these women would perjure themselves”. He told Mr. Bhatia everything he did was for therapeutic purposes and that he had no intent to commit sexual assault.
[18] I make two observations. The first is that an offender maintaining their innocence following a trial is not an aggravating feature. Nor is a lack of remorse.
[19] The second is that the Offender’s position on his conduct seemed to change from what he told Mr. Bhatia to what he said in submissions. In the PSR he accused the victims of perjury and denied any culpability. In his submissions, he offered explanations for his conduct and expressed clear remorse at how his actions made the victims feel. He admitted to hurting the victims and breaching their trust. At times, he seemed genuinely remorseful for his actions.
[20] I say “at times” because the following exchange took place between the Offender and the court during his submissions:
THE COURT: Let’s keep it focused on what I should do from this point on. What the sentence should be. So we’re not re-arguing the case, you’re not…
MR. YOUNG: I understand that, Your Honour, I am gonna say things, I am gonna say things about things I’m upset of, that are absolutely putrid that were committed by people I consider absolute scumbags not because I was charged or convicted, scumbags because they are.
THE COURT: Ok…
MR. YOUNG: And if they’re here, they can leave.
THE COURT: First things first, Mr. Young. You’re not going to use language like that in my courtroom. That’s the first thing. And if you do, then we’re going to continue this proceeding in your absence. What I need from you today is to know what you think the sentence should be.
[21] It is hard to reconcile the Offender saying it breaks his heart to hear of the suffering his victims were carrying with them as a result of his actions with him calling them scumbags who could leave the courtroom if they didn’t like it. I am left to wonder at the sincerity of any claims of regret or contrition.
[22] I would further note that the Offender offered multiple explanations for his conduct over the course of his submissions. He first pointed to his mental health diagnoses as a reason. He said his condition requires him “to do everything 100% and I can’t fail”. He said he had to treat all the tissue, right up to the pubic bone if necessary. The implication is the vaginal contact was simply him trying too hard as a result of his mental health condition.
[23] He then added that he has compromised vision in his right eye, and so may not have seen what he was doing clearly.
[24] Respectfully, neither of these explanations were advanced at trial, and neither explain or excuse repeated vaginal and breast touching in the manner described by the victims and accepted by this court.
[25] While I have digressed somewhat from addressing the PSR, I conclude this section by finding it to be generally positive. The Offender had a stable upbringing and enjoys strong family support. He has no issues with addiction and is taking medication for his mental illnesses. He has expressed his willingness to abide by any conditions that might form part of his sentence.
Victim Impact Statements
[26] I have received two VIS in this case, from J.S. and J.P.
[27] Ms. S.’s statement details the ongoing effects of her victimization. She is fearful for her safety and the safety of her family. They are in the unenviable position of still living next door to the Offender. She said they have installed an alarm system with cameras, and that she now leaves her home through the side door rather than the front door to prevent the Offender from seeing her leave. She continues to have nightmares about the Offender. While she has a new massage therapist, she thinks of the Offender every time she lies on the table. She has had to adapt her work schedule and has her husband meet her in the driveway when she returns home. Without question, the offences have had a pervasive impact on her life and her family’s life.
[28] Ms. P. speaks of similar difficulties trusting others in the aftermath of her assault. She also feels anger that someone in a healing profession could use their position to harm a vulnerable person. Ms. P. avoided getting massage treatment for years afterward, and when she did return to a therapist, quickly broke down in tears and could not go ahead with the session. She also deals with feelings of guilt for not speaking up sooner, and self-doubt about her ability to protect herself. She is now more guarded in her everyday life, and continues to carry the weight of being victimized.
[29] The Offender has suggested that the impact described by the victims is disproportionate to the offences. I disagree. There is no scale of appropriate responses to sexual victimization where a certain level of assault should result in a certain level of impact. Victims are individuals. Every person will be affected by an offence in a unique way. This is particularly true in the context of sexual offences. Given the breach of trust and the vulnerability of Ms. P. and Ms. S. at the time of the offences, I have no difficulty accepting their statements as accurate.
Principles of Sentencing
[30] Parliament has set out several principles relevant to this case.
[31] First, any sentence imposed by a court should protect society and encourage respect for the law. It should reflect several principles, including denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders.
[32] Sentences should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender, and should be similar to those imposed in similar cases. Alternatives to custody should be considered in appropriate cases, and courts should exercise restraint when imposing jail sentences. This is especially so when a court imposes a first sentence of custody on an offender. Those sentences should be as short as possible while still achieving the objectives of sentencing.
[33] Section 718.04 states that when an offence involves the abuse of a vulnerable person – specifically including female victims – a court shall give primary consideration to denunciation and deterrence.
[34] Section 718.2(a)(iii) makes an abuse of trust a statutorily aggravating factor.
[35] Section 718.3(4) states that a court shall consider imposing consecutive sentences for multiple offences where those offences do not arise from the same event or series of events. Where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined length of those sentences should not be unduly long or harsh
[36] Overall, and subject to the limits and directions set out by Parliament, the punishment imposed is in the discretion of the sentencing court.
Caselaw
[37] The Crown filed a casebook of sentencing authorities. While only some were referenced in submissions, I have considered all of them.
[38] The case of R. v. Ateyah 2023 ONSC 6563 dealt with a doctor who victimized 13 female patients. The assaults included digital penetration, vaginal touching over clothing, and breast touching. The court noted there was no medical reason for the touching and that the offender had falsified medical records to create those reasons. After noting the egregious breach of trust, the trial judge sentenced him to a total of nine years jail. This number was arrived at after discounting the original sentence of 18 years to account for the totality principle. Importantly for present purposes, the trial judge imposed consecutive sentences regarding each victim. Sentences ranged from 4 ½ months to 9 months for each victim. The total sentence imposed was 9 years.
[39] In R. v. Vigon-Campuzano 2020 ONSC 2702, the offender was a massage therapist who assaulted two female patients. The first assault involved an unconsented breast massage and repeated touching of the victim’s vagina. The second involved digital vaginal penetration. The offender had already been disciplined by the College of Massage Therapists of Ontario but was still practicing. In fact, he asked one of the victims if she was actually from the college.
[40] Again, the trial judge noted the breach of trust and the “privileged position” the offender had over the victims. Both victims were greatly affected by the offender’s conduct. In the result, he was sentenced to 6 ½ months on each assault, to be served consecutively. That sentence reflected the impact of the COVID pandemic on conditions of incarceration. I note that in 2026 that is no longer the case.
[41] The offender in R. v. Al-Handani 2024 ONCJ 314 was also a massage therapist. In the course of a massage, he touched the victim’s breasts and vagina, telling her to relax. Justice O’Marra set out the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the impact the offence had on the victim. His Honour sentenced the offender to 90 days jail to be served intermittently. I observe the Crown elected to proceed summarily in that case. As well, the court stated that the offence was non-violent, which may well have influenced the sentence imposed. With the utmost of respect, I completely disagree that the facts of that case disclose a non-violent offence. In my view, all sexual assaults are acts of violence and sentencing courts must keep that fact in mind.
[42] R. v. Khan 2016 ONCJ 282 was another massage therapist case where the offender touched the victim’s breasts and vaginal area. He was working in a clinic despite not being a registered massage therapist. He was sentenced to six months jail and probation. I note this case pre-dates R. v. Friesen 2020 SCC 9 and so is of limited value.
[43] R. v. Norris 2016 ONSC 2482 saw an acupuncturist who victimized five women sentenced to 14 months jail concurrent on each count. This was also pre-Friesen.
[44] The case of R. v. Loewen 2023 BCSC 2154 bears many similarities to the case at bar. There, the offender had some training in massage, but was not a registered massage therapist. He advertised on Facebook and treated several women. There was a total of 12 victims. His conduct was similar in many ways to the Offender’s. In the course of massages, he would touch victims’ vaginal areas over and under their clothing. He also touched their breasts. In one instance, a victim complained of neck pain and the offender massaged her inner thighs and pelvis. In another, he spread the victim’s legs wide and massaged high on her inner thighs, rubbing against her vagina. He also massaged the space between that victim’s breasts. In yet another, he moved the victim’s underwear and touched her vagina. He would contact his victims afterward and offer free or discounted massages if they returned.
[45] One significant difference in Loewen is that the offender entered guilty pleas. He enjoyed significant mitigation of sentence as a result.
[46] The trial judge found a conditional sentence to be inappropriate in the circumstances. Sentences of 3-5 months jail were imposed on each count, to be served consecutively. The total sentence was two years followed by three years of probation.
[47] R. v. Baltazar 2021 ABQB 879 is a trial decision where a massage therapist victimized 11 male victims. The massages all involved touching of the victims’ genitals without consent. After considering aggravating and mitigating factors (and noting the reduced weight of character letters in cases of sexual assault), the trial judge imposed a sentence of 31 months jail. The sentence would have been 42 months, with quantums of 2-6 months for each count served consecutively. Accommodating for totality, the entire sentence was reduced to 31 months but there is no mention in the decision of how that was apportioned between counts. In any case, the court found a conditional sentence to be inappropriate.
[48] Other cases filed by the Crown included a medical aesthetics practitioner who victimized seven women and received an 11-year sentence, and an Indigenous healer who victimized three women and received a three-year sentence.
[49] While all cases are distinct and sentences must be tailored to individual circumstances, one point made in several of these decisions is that conditional sentences of imprisonment are inappropriate for sexual violations of a trust relationship.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
[50] The primary aggravating factor in this case is the egregious breach of trust committed by the Offender on each victim. The relationship between a massage therapist or a masseur and his client is built on trust. Client and therapist are often strangers to each other, but the client willingly disrobes and makes themselves physically vulnerable. This would not happen without a strong bond of trust and confidence in the therapist’s professionalism. Further, I cannot ignore the power imbalance that existed in the present case. A person who professed comprehensive knowledge of the human body and methods for relieving pain gained the trust of victims who needed his help. Even when the victims started to question the propriety of the treatments, they often reasoned to themselves that he was the professional and knew what he was doing. That the Offender broke their trust in this intimate but professional relationship is significantly aggravating.
[51] At paragraph 126 of R. v. Friesen 2020 SCC 9, Chief Justice Wagner and Justice Rowe said the following about breaches of trust in the context of sexual offences:
Any breach of trust is likely to increase the harm to the victim and thus the gravity of the offence. As Saunders J.A. reasoned in D.R.W., the focus in such cases should be on "the extent to which [the] relationship [of trust] was violated" (para. 41). The spectrum of relationships of trust is relevant to determining the degree of harm. A child will likely suffer more harm from sexual violence where there is a closer relationship and a higher degree of trust between the child and the offender (see R. v. J.R. (1997), 1997 CanLII 14665 (NL CA), 157 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 246 (N.L.C.A.), at paras. 14 and 18). This is likely to be the case in what might be described as classic breach of trust situations, such as those involving family members, caregivers, teachers, and doctors, to mention a few.
[52] Had they been asked, I expect the Supreme Court would have had no difficulty including massage therapists in their list of “classic breach of trust situations”. Certainly, I have no such difficulty in the present case. The breach of the victims’ trust is enormous. I reject the Offender’s submission that he should be viewed more generously as he was, in his words, “only an RMT”. The power imbalance between offender and victim was considerable and should not be discounted. I acknowledge that while Friesen was primarily about child sex offences, much of the court’s reasoning is still applicable regardless of the ages of the victims.
[53] I pause to remind myself that the Offender pleading not guilty and exercising his right to a trial is not an aggravating factor. He was presumed innocent of all charged offences. Indeed, following the trial, he was acquitted of two counts and a third was stayed. It is not in the least bit aggravating that he put the Crown to the proof of its case. The only effect holding a trial has on sentence is that the Offender is missing the mitigation that might have attended a guilty plea. It is the potential loss of a positive factor, not the addition of a negative factor. Justice Harris in Vignon-Campuzano, supra, affirmed that exercising one’s right to a trial is not an aggravating factor, even when that trial process takes an emotional toll on victims (see: paragraphs 16-18).
[54] While the Offender does have a prior criminal record, it is unrelated and quite dated. I do not consider it aggravating in the present case.
[55] In mitigation, I note the Offender has strong family support. This will be important in the future as he attempts to move on from these charges. I have also received several letters of support from former clients, though I note all the letters are from 2018, long before the trial of these matters.
[56] Regarding the letters of support, I am mindful of the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s endorsement in R. v. Lavigne 2015 ONCA 915. The Court saw no error in a trial judge refusing to use character letters as a mitigating factor. On the contrary, at paragraph 9 the Court said:
The judge explained that he would not use the letters to mitigate sentence because the letters “cement the very qualities that allow this kind of crime to happen. They show the position of trust and authority in spades.”
[57] Over and over in this trial, I heard the witnesses say they trusted the Offender as a professional. That trust made them overlook what was happening and in some cases continue seeing the Offender despite their better judgment. The age of the letters and the reasoning in Lavigne lead me to place little weight on them.
[58] The Offender has strong support from his church. Much like his family, having his faith community stand by him will help maximize his chances of rehabilitation and a positive future.
[59] I have reviewed the written materials filed by the Offender. These included what I will term “information sheets” related to Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), letters from medical practitioners confirming the Offender’s diagnosis with these conditions, and what are essentially written submissions to the court. I will address the points made in the written submissions, largely related to sex offender registries, later in these reasons.
[60] The information sheets explain the interplay between ADHD and BPD, and how those conditions can affect a patient’s thought processes and behaviours. I have no evidence to contradict the claims made in these materials, but I also have no information on who authored them or where they came from. As a result, I must be cautious in just how much weight I assign to them.
[61] That said, I accept the Offender has been diagnosed with these conditions. In a 2007 letter from Dr. N. R. Malempati, a psychiatrist, the Offender is diagnosed with ADHD persisting into adulthood and “[h]is personality shows impulsive and perfectionistic traits.” In a 2018 update, Dr. Malempati found “He has anxiety depression precipitated by occupational and financial stress.” In 2026, Dr. Rizwan Rafiq, another psychiatrist, diagnosed the Offender with the following:
(1) Attention deficit disorder, inattentive type
(2) Cluster B personality, borderline type
(3) Major depressive disorder
(4) Generalized anxiety disorder
[62] The 2007 and 2026 letters also mention treatments in the forms of medications and therapy.
[63] I am sympathetic to anyone dealing with mental health conditions. I must, however, not ignore the facts of the case before me. The materials state that the Offender has been suffering from ADHD since childhood. As of 2007 he still was and was also exhibiting impulsive and perfectionistic personality traits. While he was briefly medicated, he stopped taking that medication because of the side effects. What this means is that from the time he stopped his treatment in 2007 until, apparently, 2026, the Offender knew he had these conditions but did nothing to address them. He has gone to some lengths in his materials to describe what he calls the “perfect storm for professional misconduct” these conditions create, but until 2026 he took no long-term medication to treat them. It may well be that his conditions played a role in his conduct, but surely the Offender must take responsibility for failing to address issues he knew he had at the relevant times.
[64] I do not dismiss the other steps the Offender has taken since the offences. In particular, as I noted above, he has strong support from his church. I commend him for immersing himself in his faith. I’m sure that has had a beneficial effect on his mental well-being, and I hope he continues down that path. The letter submitted from Adam Boggs, the director of the men’s ministry at the Offender’s church, shows his commitment in this regard.
[65] I also acknowledge, as he’s pointed out, that five years have passed since the last offence and he has incurred no further convictions. There was an allegation of breach of release, but that charge has been withdrawn by the Crown and plays no role in my reasoning. On the record before me, the Offender has been law-abiding since his arrest. This is a mitigating factor that impacts on my assessment of his risk of recidivism.
[66] It is not a mitigating factor that these assaults were not worse. That the Offender did not further victimize the clients with even more invasive conduct is not mitigating. All sexual assaults are serious, and all sexual assaults are acts of violence. To the extent it is argued that the Crown’s screening form suggests otherwise is incorrect. I view the Crown’s words on that form as simply recognizing a spectrum of conduct that is captured by s. 271. All forms of sexual assault are serious and merit unreserved denunciation by the court.
Analysis
[67] In his submissions, the Offender told me he needed to support his family and in particular, to be there for his son. He also said he was willing to wear an ankle monitor. While he didn’t phrase it as such, I asked if he was seeking a conditional sentence. I explained what that meant, and he said yes.
[68] My first task, therefore, is to determine the propriety of a conditional sentence.
[69] Section 742.1 of the Criminal Code sets out the requirements that must be met before a conditional sentence can be imposed. It states:
742.1 If a person is convicted of an offence and the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, the court may, for the purpose of supervising the offender’s behaviour in the community, order that the offender serve the sentence in the community, subject to the conditions imposed under section 742.3, if
(a) the court is satisfied that the service of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2;
(b) the offence is not an offence punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment;
(c) the offence is not an offence under any of the following provisions:
(i) section 239, for which a sentence is imposed under paragraph 239(1)(b) (attempt to commit murder),
(ii) section 269.1 (torture), or
(iii) section 318 (advocating genocide); and
(d) the offence is not a terrorism offence, or a criminal organization offence, prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years or more.
[70] None of paragraphs b, c, or d are applicable in the present case. The questions for this court are 1) if a sentence of less than two years would be fit, 2) if a conditional sentence would endanger the safety of the community, and 3) if a conditional sentence would be consistent with the overarching purpose and principles of sentencing.
[71] I will deal with the second question first.
[72] In my view, a conditional sentence could be crafted with sufficiently restrictive conditions that the safety of the community would not be endangered. The Offender’s crimes came as a result of his work as a massage therapist. They were crimes of opportunity committed against victims who came to him for his services. A conditional sentence forbidding him from providing massages would eliminate the opportunity. I find this requirement for a conditional sentence has been satisfied.
[73] I reach a different conclusion on the third question. As stated by Justice O’Marra in Al-Handani, supra, at paragraph 48:
In my view, I must reject the imposition of a conditional sentence in this case as I do not believe that it would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing. A conditional sentence would not send a strong and clear message to Mr. Al-Handani, and to others, that this kind of criminal conduct perpetrated by a healthcare provider on a patient will not be tolerated.
[74] I have been provided with no cases where a massage therapist who sexually assaulted patients received a conditional sentence. The Crown’s cases all saw jail sentences imposed. My own research has found only one similar case where a conditional sentence was handed down, R. v. Cape 2025 ABCJ 129, a decision of the Alberta Provincial Court. While that offender was a massage therapist, he was charged and convicted of only one count of sexual assault against one victim. That is vastly different from the case here. Even in that case, with a single victim, the maximum conditional sentence of two years less a day was imposed.
[75] I have already set out the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing above. Sentences must encourage respect for the law. They must denounce and deter the victimization of vulnerable people. Significant, lasting impacts on victims must be considered by sentencing courts.
[76] In my view, a conditional sentence would be inconsistent with these principles.
[77] The Offender sexually victimized several vulnerable women who trusted him. They came to him for help with their physical ailments and he exploited them. While a lengthy sentence of house arrest can achieve the goals of denunciation and deterrence, I do not believe it would be sufficient in this case. In reviewing the caselaw provided to me earlier in these reasons, I have noted where courts found conditional sentences to be inappropriate. To those I would add R. v. Collins 2007 NBQB 169, where Justice McNally said this at paragraph 25:
In my view however, the imposition of a conditional sentence for this offence would not be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing and particularly the primary considerations of deterrence and denunciation that I believe must apply to this case. The abuse of trust by treating specialists or therapists who sexually assault their patients must be denounced categorically. A strong clear message must be sent to those who are inclined to abuse such trust that such conduct carries with it severe consequences, including incarceration.
[78] I am not ignoring the impact a custodial sentence will have on the Offender’s family. I cannot, however, impose an unfit sentence in an effort to avoid collateral consequences. At the risk of being blunt, the Offender knew his family responsibilities at the time he was committing these offences. And yet, he persisted.
[79] The final question to be answered is whether a sentence of less than two years would be fit in this case. Given the number of assaults and the number of victims, and the circumstances in which the assaults arose, I find a reformatory sentence would not be fit. A conditional sentence is therefore not an available sentencing option.
[80] I agree that these offences should attract consecutive sentences. Each was committed on a separate occasion and was clearly a distinct incident.
[81] The assaults perpetrated on the victims were brazen and damaging. The Offender had the victims in vulnerable situations, disrobed and alone in a room. He knew they were relying on his expertise to help treat their conditions. Their reliance on him is shown by some of the victims continuing to see him even after they experienced inappropriate behaviour. They reasoned that there must be a medical justification for what he had done, and that perhaps they were just making too much of the situation. This reliance allowed the assaults to continue.
[82] In his submissions, the Offender has argued against registration on both the national and provincial sex offender registries. I agree that based on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Ndhlovu 2022 SCC 38 an order of registration on the national registry is no longer compulsory. In response to that decision, Parliament changed the relevant sections of the Criminal Code. Section 490.012(3) now directs that registration shall be ordered unless the offender demonstrates:
(a) there would be no connection between making the order and the purpose of helping police services prevent or investigate crimes of a sexual nature by requiring the registration of information relating to sex offenders under that Act; or
(b) the impact of the order on the person, including on their privacy or liberty, would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest in protecting society through the effective prevention or investigation of crimes of a sexual nature, to be achieved by the registration of information relating to sex offenders under that Act.
[83] The onus is on the Offender to establish either no connection between the order and its purposes, or to show the order would be grossly disproportionate. The analysis begins, however, with the presumption that registration will be ordered.
[84] The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered this issue in the case of R. v. Eldon 2025 ONCA 348. At paragraph 52, Associate Chief Justice Fairburn said this:
First, it is critical to begin the analysis under s. 490.012(3) with the statutory presumption front and centre, recognizing that an order shall be imposed unless it can be established that the criteria under (a) or (b) are met. This presumption accords with what was recognized in Ndhlovu, that sexual offending is one of several “empirically validated predictors of increased sexual recidivism”: Ndhlovu, at para. 94. It also accords with the recognition that the prevention and investigation of sexual offending, through the assistance of the NSOR, is in the public interest: Criminal Code, s. 490.012(3)(b); SOIRA, ss. 2(1), 2(2).
[85] Subsection 4 sets out the factors a court must consider when determining whether an offender has rebutted the presumption. These factors include the seriousness of the offence, the characteristics of the victims, and the nature of the relationship between the parties. Courts must also consider the age of the victims, the criminal history of the offender, and any expert opinions offered. Courts are also empowered, under paragraph (g), to consider any other factors they deem relevant.
[86] At paragraph 44 of Eldon, Associate Chief Justice Fairburn stated that under either exception – there being no connection or the order being grossly disproportionate – the threshold is high. It is not easily met in the face of the clear statutory presumption.
[87] In his argument, the Offender points to two things to show there is no risk of reoffending and therefore no need for registration: his minor, dated, and unrelated criminal record, and his lack of offending in the five years since the charges were laid. He also notes that he no longer provides massages, a change that has effectively removed the opportunity for further offences.
[88] I agree that his lack of relevant criminal record is a factor in his favour. So too is the fact that he no longer provides massages. He has had no criminal convictions since his arrest.
[89] That said, in my view the Offender has not established that registration in this case would have no connection to the objectives of the registry or that its impact would be grossly disproportionate to him, including to his privacy or liberty. The threshold is high. His offences are very serious and struck at the heart of relationships of trust. Over and over, he exploited that trust. Registration in this case is connected to the important goals of investigating sexual offences and assisting police. Further, while registration requirements may seem onerous, there is a great public interest in protecting society through the use of the registry. The Offender has failed to establish that either exception applies in his case.
[90] He has also argued that the provincial sex offender registry, known as Christopher’s Law, has been found to be unconstitutional. In the case of R. v. Roberts 2026 ONCJ 41 Justice Garg of the Ontario Court of Justice used essentially the same reasoning used in Ndhlovu, supra, to find that the mandatory registration provision was overbroad and violated s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. His Honour declined to apply it in that case. The Offender submits that I should view this case as a precedent and come to the same conclusion here.
[91] I decline to do so for two reasons.
[92] First, a decision of a fellow justice of the provincial court is not binding on me. I acknowledge the importance of horizontal stare decisis, but find I am not bound by that principle, particularly in light of the second reason.
[93] That reason is that there is no application before me to find this provision unconstitutional. The Crown has offered no submissions. Without an adequate record, I am unwilling to adopt Justice Garg’s conclusions (which were based on the specific facts before him) and find the provision unconstitutional.
[94] If I am wrong in not accepting Justice Garg’s ruling as precedent, I would nonetheless have made the order under Christopher’s Law in any event.
Result
[95] The Offender will be sentenced as follows:
(1) Count 1: six months custody;
(2) Count 2: six months custody;
(3) Count 3: four months custody;
(4) Count 4: sentence will be suspended, with two years’ probation;
(5) Count 5: six months custody;
(6) Count 7: four months custody;
(7) Count 8: four months custody; and
(8) Count 9: six months custody.
[96] All sentences will be served consecutively. The total sentence, therefore, is 36 months.
[97] I have considered the important principle of totality. Section 718.2(c) states that where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined length of those sentences should not be unduly long or harsh. As well, as noted above, a first sentence of custody should be as short as possible while still achieving the objectives of sentencing. Without repeating the aggravating factors present in this case, I find a three-year sentence in these circumstances would not be unduly long or harsh. It would reflect the seriousness of the Offender’s crimes and recognize the impact they have had on the victims. It would also emphasize the justice system’s evolving understanding of how serious and damaging sexual offences can be. There is no need in this case to discount the combined length of the consecutive sentences.
[98] On count 4, the probation conditions will be:
(1) Report in person to a probation officer within two working days of your release from custody, and after that at all times and places as directed by the probation officer or any person authorized by a probation officer to assist in your supervision;
(2) Cooperate with your probation officer. You are to sign any releases necessary for your probation officer to monitor your compliance and you must provide proof of compliance with any condition of this order to your probation officer on request;
(3) Do not contact or communicate, in any way, directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic, or other means with J.S., J.P., A.L., M.R., or any members of their immediate families;
(4) Do not enter the residential property of J.S.;
(5) Do not attend within 100m of any place you know the persons named above to live, work, go to school, or anywhere you know them to be except for required court attendances, except that there will be no such radius condition related to any place known to you to be the place of residence of J.S.;
(6) Should either J.S. or you move from their current address, the radius condition excepted above will immediately apply with regard to her;
(7) Attend and actively participate in all assessment, counselling, or rehabilitative programs as directed by the probation officer and complete them to the satisfaction of the probation officer, including but not limited to counselling for sexual offending; and
(8) Do not possess any weapons as defined in the Criminal Code.
[99] While the probation order relates only to the mischief count, I have included prohibitions on contact with all victims, counselling, and a weapons term pursuant to s. 732.1(3)(h), which permits the inclusion of “other reasonable conditions as the court considers desirable, subject to any regulations made under subsection 738(2), for protecting society and for facilitating the offender’s successful reintegration into the community.”
[100] There will be an order under s. 743.21 prohibiting the Offender from contacting any victim in this case while in custody.
[101] There will be s. 109 weapons prohibitions on each count of sexual assault. Each will be for a period of ten years.
[102] On the mischief count, there will be an order under s. 738 of the Criminal Code for restitution in the amount of $470 payable to J.S. Given the custodial sentence, I will make the restitution payable within five years of today’s date.
[103] There will be an order on each count of sexual assault that the Offender register under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act pursuant to s. 490.012(3). The duration of the order in this case is determined by s. 490.013(3). That subsection states:
(3) An order made under subsection 490.012(1) or (3) applies for life if
(a) in the same proceeding, the person has been convicted of, or a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder is rendered for, two or more designated offences in connection with which an order under any of subsections 490.012(1) to (3) may be made; and
(b) the court is satisfied that those offences demonstrate, or form part of, a pattern of behaviour showing that the person presents an increased risk of reoffending by committing a crime of a sexual nature.
[104] The Offender has been convicted of two or more offences for which an order may be made. I find these offences reveal a pattern of behaviour that shows an increased risk of future sexual offending. Consequently, the registration orders will be for life. Pursuant to s. 490.015(1)(c), the Offender can apply for early termination of this order once 20 years have elapsed, if he wishes.
[105] Registration under the provincial sex offender registry is mandatory and in accordance with that legislation.
[106] There will be an order on each sexual assault count that the Offender provide a sample of his DNA to the Ontario Provincial Police for inclusion in the national DNA databank on or before 31 August 2026.
[107] Given the custodial sentences, I will waive the victim surcharges that would otherwise be payable.
[108] I wish all involved in this case the best for the future.
Released: 29 July 2026
Signed: Justice S. G. Pratt